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Abstract 
The theory and application of critical realist philosophy and morphogenetic 
methodology: emergent structural and agential relations at a hospice. 
Critical realist philosophy and realist social theory have much to offer nurse 
researchers and theorists who investigate or comment on the social dimensions of 
healthcare and health related behaviour. Critical realists argue that witting or, more 
often, unwitting ontological presumptions about the nature and powers of society 
and people are embedded in and influence social explanation. Critical realist theory 
seeks to make overt the logical ties binding ontology with epistemology and 
methodology. It proposes emergentist and relational rather than conflationary or 
epiphenomenal descriptions of structure and agency both of which are granted sui 
generis powers. Critical realist social theory presents a significant challenge to 
alternative non-realist perspectives. Potentially, it may even permit more accurate 
and therefore `better' forms of social explanation to be advanced. 
The thesis is divided into two sections. Section one describes and critiques 
the realist theories of Roy Bhaskar and Margaret Archer. The deficiencies inherent 
in non-realist approaches are exposed and a realist alternative is outlined. Thereafter, 
section two uses Margaret Archer's realist morphogenetic methodology to configure 
an illustrative study into aspects of hospice activity at one organisation in central 
England. 
The illustrative study described in section two exposes both the benefits and 
problems that accompany the application of morphogenetic theory. Beneficially, it is 
suggested that the explanation of hospice activity presented in this work would not 
have been available to non-realist researchers. In particular, structural and agential 
relations are outlined that alternative approaches might have overlooked or 
misrepresented. Problematically, researchers cannot apply social realism without 
maintaining an ongoing philosophic or theoretic interest in their objects of study 
and it is recognised that this continuing commitment places heavy demands upon 
practically orientated researchers. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is premised on the assumption that realist philosophy and social theory 
have much to offer nurse researchers and theoreticians who investigate or comment 
on the social dimensions of healthcare and health related behaviour. The thesis 
begins by describing and critiquing the realist philosophy and theory of Roy Bhaskar 
(1998d, 1997) and morphogenetic methodology of Margaret Archer (1996,1995): 
Thereafter, morphogenetic modelling is used to structure an exploration into 
aspects of hospice activity at one organisation in central England. 
Study outline 
The work is divided into two sections. Section (§) 1 introduces realist philosophy 
and theory to nurse researchers and theoreticians who may be unfamiliar with 
realism. It contains four chapters. §1 Chapter 1 describes Roy Bhaskar's critical 
realist philosophy. §1 Chapter 2 describes Margaret Archer's realist social 
(morphogenetic) theory. §1 Chapter 3 critiques and comments on the work of 
Bhaskar and §1 Chapter 4 critiques and comments on the work of Archer. 
§2 is addressed to health care professionals, researchers and theoreticians 
with an interest in realist philosophy and theory and hospice or palliative care. " It 
demonstrates the use value of the philosophy and theory outlined in §1 by guiding 
an illustrative study into aspects of hospice activity. §2 contains two chapters. §2 
Chapter 1 bridges the theoretical and applied elements of the study. It describes the 
manner in which ethical responsibility was met, it evaluates the form and 
significance of data and evidence within the study and it details the data coding 
process. §2 Chapter 2 presents the study's `findings' under two headings titled 
1 
`Structures and institutions' and `Relations within the hospice. ' A concluding chapter 
completes the thesis. A summary of the benefits and problems that attend realism in 
theory and use is presented. The value of realism for nurse researchers and 
theoreticians is reasserted. Literature specific to each element of the study is 
explored within the relevant section or chapter. 
As stated, the thesis begins by presenting and critiquing critical realist 
philosophy and morphogenetic theory. It then applies this philosophy and theory in 
research that, from the perspective of participating study site personnel, describes 
relations between the organisation under review and hostile external institutional 
structures (here associated with the NHS and Department of Health). Using 
morphogenetic methodology, it is suggested that these structural relations created a 
logic of interests that caused senior managerial staff to re-designate the hospice a 
`specialist palliative care unit'. Organisational re-description or re-designation 
catalysed and encapsulated the development of pre-existing long-term trends in 
internal clinical practice. It also exacerbated tensions amongst clinical staff some of 
whom, it is argued, can be identified with pro- and anti-change groups. It is 
proposed that tensions between these groups are expressed or evidenced as 
conflicting beliefs about the purpose and form of organisational activity as well as 
the role of, for example, clinical treatments and interventions. Tentative suggestions 
are made concerning the causes of agential dissonance. 
Realists claim that philosophy and theory must ultimately be judged 
according to use value. This thesis moves from the presentation and critique of 
philosophy and theory to the application of philosophy and theory and, hopefully, 
realism's use value is demonstrated in this process. It is argued that rnorphogenetic 
methodology offers researchers - nurses and others - the opportunity to 
both 
ü 
comment productively on the nature of society and overcome some of the problems 
associated with alternative metaphysics. 
Personal commentary: three motives for undertaking this study 
An interest in realism provides the, primary motive for undertaking this study. 
However, questions arising from clinical experience and reflection on the 
argumentative structure of nursing scholarship were also important drivers. 
Realist theory: 
The primary stimulus for this study stems from reflection upon and recognition of 
deficiencies in my understanding of the social realm. In particular I began this study 
with a desire to better appreciate the nature of causality in social explanation and 
engagement with this issue appeared necessary if I was to progress my 
understanding of the organisation in which I worked. 
The difficulty of establishing causality in social explanation came to my 
attention when, in earlier work, I became aware that I employed causally implicative 
descriptors such as `led to', `encouraged', `produced', or `prompted' (the list can be 
extended ad libitum) without justifying the link between events or concepts thus 
associated. Failure to-clarify what is meant by causation is not unusual. Yet lack of 
clarity is of signal importance to the status and validity of explanation. 
'y Reading led 
me to `discover' the critical realist philosophy of Roy Bhaskar and realist social 
theory of Margaret Archer and the work of these theorists and the movement with 
which they are associated has, as the study progressed, broadened my interest from 
causality to the ontological stature of social phenomena and the nature of social 
iii 
explanation in general by enabling me to articulate what had hitherto been merely an 
intuitive reticence towards alternative non-realist perspectives. 
Unsurprisingly, my relation to realism altered over the course of this study. I 
was initially and perhaps naively attracted to the realisms of Bhaskar and Archer 
because they appeared to offer an element of ontological certitude as well as some, 
admittedly tentative, methodological guidance. Retrospectively, I now concede that 
the ontological claims and methodological suggestions of both theorists are less 
secure than I originally perceived. I suspect the version of free will apparently 
endorsed by Bhaskar and Archer is not necessary for realist theory and like Dean 
(2006) I believe that, to better inform research practice, realist insights require 
considerable support from non-realist theorists. " 
Nevertheless, despite this reappraisal and notwithstanding considerable 
qualification, the realisms of Bhaskar and Archer continue to offer, in my opinion, 
an attractive option for nurse researchers. " Why this is so and the precise nature of 
this `option' is the major consideration of this thesis. 
Clinical experience - from hospital to hospice to specialist unit: 
I completed nurse training in 1993 and went to work on a Professorially led 
combined haematology, oncology and bone marrow transplant unit in a newly built 
hospital on the south coast of England. This `high tech' and generously resourced 
facility, part sponsored by a cancer research charity, was considered to be one of the 
UK's most innovative and research active centres. Nevertheless, at any one time up 
to a fifth of inpatients might be dying and, although the care given to these patients 
was of a good clinical standard, this eventful and at times frenetic environment 
could be considered an inappropriate place in which to die. For, not only was the 
unit continuously busy (activity continued around the clock) but medical enthusiasm 
iv 
for curatively orientated interventions was sustained, on occasion, up until the point 
of death. When this occurred, feelings of unease were often verbalised by colleagues 
and a personal interest in palliative care was kindled during this period. 
Several years and a number of posts later I went to work at a charitably 
funded hospice in central England. This organisation provides outstanding care to 
those in its charge and comparisons between it and NHS hospitals with which I am 
familiar cast those NHS institutions in an unfavourable light. In particular, hospice 
staff spend more time with patients and their families, specialist expertise is greater, 
equipment and facilities are superior and more attention is paid to comfort and 
emotional support than appears feasible within the state sector. 
Nonetheless, `hands-on' experience as a staff nurse led me to query aspects 
of clinical and organisational practice and clarifying and addressing these questions 
provided a focus for the applied component of this study. Specifically, in 
conversation, staff expressed conflicting interpretations of what their work is or 
should be and, importantly, these various understandings, when translated into 
behaviours, directly influence the nature and quality of patient care. (This assumes, 
following Swinburne, 2005, that beliefs generate goals and purposes which may 
direct actions. ) Colleagues with whom I spoke are aware of actual or potential inter- 
collegiate disagreement and some staff identify instances of friction associated with 
differing understandings. Conversations regarding such matters and their impact 
upon clinical care occupy a part of many daily interactions. Yet explanations 
regarding the cause(s) of ideational dissonance are mixed (when forthcoming). 
In exploring these issues, a review of hospice and palliative care scholarship 
neither provided the answers I sought, nor described the situation in which I 
worked. Indeed, despite the existence of a flourishing, sophisticated and increasingly 
analytical literature (e. g. Woods, 2007; Randall and Downie, 2006; Sandman, 2005; 
V 
Seymour, 2001; Cobb, 2001; Lawton, 2000) significant areas of contention remain 
regarding the essential nature of hospice or palliative activity. Understanding how 
staff at the study site interpret their work and the organisation in which they 
function - i. e. as hospice or specialist palliative care unit - forms the focus of the 
applied element of this study and motivation for undertaking §2 of this thesis 
therefore comes from the simple desire to better understand or `study up'"' the 
organisation where I worked. 
Nursing schote 
An interest in nursing scholarship's argumentative structures also influences the 
study. This interest complements realist concerns with scientific lucidity, it is an 
interest which is responsible for steering this thesis in a firmly theoretical direction 
and, as such, it is an interest that requires explanation. 
Realists presume that argumentative coherence relies, in part, upon making 
explicit the mutually implicative logical bonds that connect ontological, 
epistemological and methodological reasoning (Bergene, 2007; Danermark et al, 
2002). (These terms are defined in §1 Chapter 1. ) Focusing upon argumentative 
structure may appear needlessly abstract to researchers grappling with complex real 
world issues (Foss and Ellefsen, 2002) and the `metaphysical paradigm' or 
theoretical orientation that realists endorse is dismissed by Morgan (2007, p. 62) on 
pragmatic grounds (it is seen as too abstract). Certainly scholars and scientists can 
and do operate effectively without developed philosophic understandings (Rose, 
2006). Yet, as Leplin (2004, p. 118 - italicisation in original) notes, whilst there `is no 
a priori stance from which philosophy can assume to dictate the standards and 
methods for acquiring knowledge. Philosophical assumptions are ineliminable from 
the reasoning by which science fixes its ontological commitments. ' 
vi 
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Mixed messages regarding the importance of philosophic and theoretic 
issues are apparent within the nursing literature. Table 1 (below) describes the 
results of an unlimited e-search of the British Nursing Index (BRNI) and 
Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL) using the 
keywords research, ontology, epistemology and methodology. As can be seen, a progressively 
smaller number of papers are identified using the combined terms research and 
methodology, epistemology or ontology. The significance of these data should not 
be over-egged; however, the small percentage of abstracts that identify their 
interests as including research and ontic or epistemic issues perhaps supplies 
indicative evidence for the proposition that many nurse researchers are reluctant to 
explicitly discuss philosophic issues (specifically ontological philosophy), scientific 
theory (here theories of epistemology) and research practice (methodological choice 
and methods in use). 
Table 1: e-search all fields of BRNI (1994 to May 2008) and CINAHL (1982 to May 
week 5 2008) using keywords research, ontology, epistemology and methodology 
(search performed 06.06.08. ) 
BRNI 
Keyword Research and 
keyword 
CINAHL 
Keyword Research and 
keyword 
Research 39631 232363 
Ontology 6 1 163 71 
Epistemology 11 6 481 278 
Methodology 422 352 15459 11694 
Reluctance to engage with philosophic issues may be sustained by the perception 
that nurse researchers must maintain a `person-centred' (McCormack, 2003, p. 179) 
focus on bed-side patient care and the concomitant view that philosophy's 
contribution to theory and investigation is intangible, distancing or superfluous. The 
vii 
symbolic significance of clinically situated and patient focused research is apparent 
in Carr and Galvin's (2005) study into nurse consultant doctoral preparation and the 
notion that philosophic consideration detracts from instrumental immediacy is 
evident in Newell and Burnard's (2006, p. 4 - emphasis added) claim that nursing 
research `should have immediate consequences for patient care. ' 
Alternatively, Simons (2007, p. 73), in an argument aimed at mixed method 
investigators, suggests that researchers must be sensitive to other `conceptions of 
knowledge and reflect on their position in relation to the range of possibilities. ' 
Reflection can and perhaps should prompt all researchers to consider the 
intertwined nature of philosophy, theory and scientific practice for, self-evidently, 
the existence of competing forms of explanation necessitates that researchers make 
witting or unwitting ontological, epistemological and methodological choices 
(Willmott, 2003). Moreover, as Collier (1994, p. 16 - emphasis in original) notes 
`part 
of the answer to the question `why philosophy? ' is that the alternative to philosophy 
is not no philosophy but bad philosophy. ' Kuhn (1977, p. 271), anxious not to 
overplay theoretic pedantry, correctly states that `in the final analysis it is the 
individual scientist rather than .. theory which is tested. ' Yet, equally, argumentative 
explicitness and clarity are easily compromised when a pragmatic approach to 
methodological use is combined with an indifferent attitude towards theoretical 
dispute and the philosophic questions that this dispute articulates (Rose, 2006). 
For example, Rycroft-Malone et al (2004, p. 88) dismissively describe the 
quantitative-qualitative debate as `sterile'. They do not explore the reasons for or 
importance of the philosophic or theoretical (ontological and epistemological) 
arguments that lie behind such methodological debates. However, they do suggest 
that nurse researchers use `whatever approach(es) are relevant to the clinical 
problem and resultant research question' (ibid, p. 88). This `pick-n-mix' attitude is 
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not unusual (see also, for example, Weaver and Olson, 2006) though it is 
problematic. Methodologies rest upon and embody theories stemming from diverse 
and occasionally incommensurable philosophic traditions. A pragmatic approach to 
methodological use can be appropriate or acceptable where these extended linkages 
are understood and respected. However, when sundry methodologies or methods 
are employed without careful consideration, incoherence and irrationality may ensue 
(Hedström, 2005). 
Despite this Bryman (2007, p. 17) notes, again in relation to mixed studies, 
that `epistemological and ontological issues have been marginalized to a significant 
extent as pragmatism has emerged as a major orientation to combining quantitative 
and qualitative research. ' And a literature review by Kinn and Curzio (2005) into 
nurse researchers' use of mixed qualitative and quantitative methods argues that 
although the combination of approaches is `not always appropriate' (p. 330) strong 
`enthusiasm amongst [nurse] researchers' (p. 331) for this activity is apparent. 
Kinn and Curzio (ibid, p. 322) also claim that researchers who mix 
methodologies or methods rarely address the rigour of study forms combined and 
different approaches `to integrating the results .. [of 
diverse methodologies] were 
not commented upon in the majority of reports. ' Their analysis suggests that some 
nursing scholars are unreflective pragmatists and, as such, `a "sense of evidence", or 
a feeling of plausibility' (Hempel, 1945, p. 8) presumably determines whether 
evidence successfully supports a study's hypothesis (broadly defined), finding(s) or 
conclusion. 
The problem with this approach is that it involves `a confusion of logical 
and psychological considerations' (ibid, p. 8). Pragmatists who accept or reject 
evidence on the basis of subjective criteria - that such evidence supplies a sense of 
evidence - ignore, for example, both the directive role that ontic and epistemic 
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assumptions play in sensitising researchers to study topics or problems and the 
influence exerted by ontology and epistemology on the form that investigation and 
analysis takes (Cruickshank, 2003b). Authorial interests as well as the object and 
purpose of study inevitably and properly determine the emphasis or balance given 
to theoretic concerns in research and scholarly papers. However, all explanation 
makes ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions (Hammersley, 
2005b) and whilst the balance given to these elements varies between reports, no 
element of this triptych can be disposed of. 
Contra pragmatism, the need to acknowledge philosophy's affiliation with 
theory and research practice is also apparent in the nursing literature and voices 
from a range of perspectives argue that this relationship must be examined if 
nursing studies are not to be denuded of the robustness and validity that their 
subject matter deserves. Thus Annells (1996, p. 712) claims it is `essential' that nurse 
researchers who engage with postmodern hermeneutic phenomenology be 
cognisant of its roots in the philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer. (See also Paley, 
2005. ) Gastaldo and Holmes (1999, p. 233) call for a more philosophically, 
Foucauldian, informed approach to nursing theory and research and, in an argument 
favouring cross-disciplinary engagement, they claim that reticence to tackle 
traditional or non-nursing philosophic discourse in anything other than abridged 
secondary sources `may have inhibited a more interdisciplinary and critical approach 
to nursing science. ' Nolan et al (1998) likewise advocate, from a Nietzschian 
perspective, greater philosophic awareness amongst nursing theorists and 
researchers. And yet, the ability of nurse researchers to demonstrate this awareness 
is questioned when, like Gastaldo and Holmes (1999), Nolan et al (1998, p. 251) 
suggest that nurses frequently engage superficially with philosophic ideas that are 
`poorly understood. ' As realists, Wilson and McCormack (2006, p. 45) argue that 
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nurses should be more philosophically and theoretically aware, they suggest that 
researchers need `to carefully consider not only the methodology but also the 
philosophical intent of the study' and Rolfe (2006b) develops kindred themes 
through an exploration of the misuse of postmodern concepts in nursing research. 
Realists assert that scholars who understand and respect the logical ties 
binding ontic, epistemic and methodologic discourse are more likely to maintain and 
demonstrate argumentative coherence and validity than studies which ignore and 
break such linkages. Further, unless nurse researchers are prepared to examine the 
relationship between philosophy, theory and research practice (here associated with 
ontology, epistemology and methodology) then their outputs will, however patient 
focused, inevitably lack robustness. 
As is evident, realism is you sto `where I stand' and a desire to link the 
realisms of Bhaskar and Archer with concrete social description structures the study. 
The danger in this approach is that more is asked of philosophy and theory than can 
reasonably be expected. Philosophy and theory then gets in the way of explanation 
or, worse, they become exclusionary, righteous, sectarian and inward looking 
whereon, as Seale (1999, p. 87) warns, the: `Readers of theory may feel immersed in a 
self sustaining literary fantasy. '"' The opposite danger is that naive pragmatism 
produces explanatory muddle. In relation to my own study and where nursing 
research investigates care from a social perspective: 
The view [of social science] I wish to commend presupposes a certain 
conception of philosophy .. So, however irrelevant it may at 
first appear, a 
discussion of .. philosophy is an e sential part of the argument .. 
(Winch, 1958, p. 2 - emphasis in original)"" 
My work therefore includes a substantial philosophic and theoretic component and 
to justify this inclusion I here quote and endorse Margaret Archer's statement that: 
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what society is held to be also affects how it is studied. Thus one of the 
central theses of .. [this study] is that any given social ontology 
has 
implications for the explanatory methodology which is (and in consistency 
can be) endorsed .. The tripartite link between ontology, methodology and 
practical social theory is the leitmotif of this whole text. 
(Archer, 1995, p. 2-3 - emphasis in original) 
To conclude, this study is divided into two sections each of which has a distinct 
purpose. In §1 Bhaskar and Archer's work is introduced and critically appraised so 
that nurse researchers and theoreticians can gain an overview of its potential. In §2 
realist philosophy and theory's use value is demonstrated as it guides an 
investigation into aspects of structural and agential interaction. 
Inevitably, the thesis generates more questions than answers. However, I 
hope that in some small way my work productively adds to nursing research's 
philosophic and theoretic palette and furthers the literature on hospice activity. 
Prior publication 
Several chapters in this study contain material published by the author during the 
writing of this thesis. In accordance with University guidelines and with the 
publishers' permission, copies of these papers are included with the thesis. 
1. The introduction and passages in §1 Chapters 3 and 4 and §2 Chapter 1 are 
informed by and reproduce material from: Lipscomb M (2008) Mixed 
method nursing studies: a critical realist critique. Nursing Philosophy. 9(1), 32- 
45. [An abridged version of this paper was presented at the HSHS Mixed 
Method Conference, Fitzwilliam College Cambridge on 9th July 2007. ] 
2. References to Groff in §1 Chapters 1 and 3 are, in part, taken from 
Lipscomb M (2006a) Book Review: Groff "R (2004) Critical Realism, Post- 
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positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge. Nursing Philosophy. 7(2), 104- 
105. 
3. §1 Chapter 2 reproduces passages from Lipscomb M (2006b) Rebutting the 
suggestion that Anthony Giddens's Structuration Theory offers a useful 
framework for sociological nursing research: A critique based upon 
Margaret Archer's Realist Social Theory. Critical Response. Nun ng 
Philosophy. 7(3), 175-180. 
4. §1 Chapters 3 and 4 are informed by and reproduce passages from: 
Lipscomb M (2006c) Review Essay: Realist Theory In Research Practice - 
Review of Making Realism Work: Realist Social Theory and Empirical 
Research. Carter B and New C, eds. (2004). With a response commentary by 
Carter B and New C. Journal of Critical Realism. 5(2), 362-379. 
5. §2 Chapter 2 reproduces brief excerpts from: Lipscomb M (2007b) 
Maintaining patient hopefulness: a critique. Nursing Inquiry. 14(4), 335-342. 
6. §2 Chapter 2 reproduces brief excerpts from: Lipscomb M (2007a) Book 
Review: Jewell A, ed. (2004) Ageing, Spirituality and Wellbeing. Nursing 
Philosophy. 8(1), 68-70. 
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Endnotes - Introduction 
i The descriptors realist and realism are often employed loosely. In this study, unless otherwise 
stated, the terms refer exclusively to the realist philosophy and theories of Roy Bhaskar and Margaret 
Archer. Where alternative realist theoreticians are introduced their work is differentiated 
appropriately. 
Bass (2006) notes that, within the literature, the . terms 
hospice, palliative and terminal care 
are often used interchangeably. Unless otherwise stated, references to hospice and palliative care 
organisation and delivery are UK specific. 
w Berlin (1998 [1960], p. 32) states: `If these bridges [causally implicative terms] from one set 
of facts or statements to another were suddenly withdrawn from our textbooks, it is, I think, not too 
much to say that the transition from one set of statements to the other would become a great deal 
less smooth. ' 
iv Nicolas Rescher (2000) might be advanced as a candidate for this role since, amongst much 
else; Rescher (ibid) addresses subjective influence (i. e. the researcher's role) in realist analysis. 
Variously interpreted, Thomas (2004a) situates Rescher as a pragmatic idealist. 
V Noting Edwards's (2001) critique of Bhaskarite realism it is not here suggested that realism 
necessarily speaks to nursing's normative concerns (though this possibility is not excluded). 
`i Nader (1972, p. 284) introduced the phrase `studying up' in an essay on the limits of 
anthropological participant observation. Following Nader (ibid), use of the phrase in the current 
context signals that, whilst the researcher was a participant observer at the study site, realist research 
does not limit data or evidence to that obtained in any one manner (see §2 Chapter 1). 
`'" I am indebted to Bob Carter and Caroline New (2005) for bringing to my attention the 
danger inherent in theoretical over-elaboration and the unfinished or loose-ended nature of realist 
thought. 
"u Fay (2000) suggests that this quotation echoes sentiments originally expressed by 
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations (1976 [1953]). The citation captures the link between 
philosophic theory and social scientific practice that Roy Bhaskar and Margaret Archer promote or 
maintain. Realists however, would distance themselves from the certain conception of philorophy advanced 
by Winch and Wittgenstein. 
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Introduction to Section 1 
Realist theory in this thesis 
Theoretical description and critique is integral to this study for a number of reasons. 
First, as the quotation below makes clear, critical realism is primarily a philosophy of 
ontology rather than a methodology for research and this hiatus, between 
philosophy and methodology, necessitates and justifies the detailed examination in 
this study of texts by Bhaskar and Archer. 
There is simply no way to move directly from .. critical realism 
(as 
philosophy) to substantive methodological development. The need to 
engage in in-depth philosophical groundwork can frustrate practicing social 
scientists, who .. are keen to employ it in substantive research without 
getting bogged down in complex philosophical speculation. Yet, the fact 
that critical realism places ontology at the heart of analysis means that there 
can be no specification of methods in an ontological vacuum .. 
Critical 
realism as a philosophy .. cannot be directly `plugged' into social research .. 
(Wight, 2006, p. 33) 
Like Wight (ibid), Carter (2000, p. 65 - emphasis in original) claims that any 
`distinctively sociological realism .. requires some considerable refinement of 
Bhaskar's philosophical naturalism. ' Archer's realist social theory (1996,1995) 
attempts this refinement. Yet it is here asserted that Archer's work cannot be 
adequately understood or successfully employed without an appreciation of 
Bhaskarian theory., For, not only must knowledge of philosophical or qualified 
naturalism precede consideration of its sociological embodiment; but, 
understandably in work aimed at researchers, Archer fails to describe the 
philosophic `underpinnings of her theory and methodology in the detail that Bhaskar 
provides - detail necessary for the critical appraisal of that theory and methodology. 
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Second, a misleading and unbalanced understanding of Bhaskar, and 
Archer's theories would ensue if only ideas or concepts with immediate use value 
were presented. A rounded but by no means comprehensive account of their work 
is therefore outlined since the alternative (disjointed and partial explanation) would 
handicap evaluation of the approach to social understanding that these authors 
promote. Inevitably this means that elements from their respective works are 
discussed that, whilst necessary for internal explanatory coherence, might be 
considered overly exhaustive in this context. 
Third, explicit utilization of any theory exposes its limitations as well as 
possibilities and, to the extent that these features affect applicability, a critique of 
realism is therefore integral to this study. 
Fourth, realism potentially offers a valuable, if qualified, alternative to 
established empiric and idealist metaphysics and, in consequence, it is beginning to 
stimulate interest in a variety of fields including nursing (McEvoy and Richards, 
2006,2003; Wilson and McCormack, 2006; Porter 2001,1998), mental health 
(Bergin et al, 2008), health and social care (Hart et al, 2004; Williams, 2003c), 
palliative care (Tolson et al, 2007) and social policy (Dawson, 2006). Problematically, 
some of these texts (e. g. Tolson et al, 2007) use CR terms idiosyncratically or 
without adequate clarification and it might therefore be suggested that Bhaskar and 
Archer's work has yet to receive substantive or sustained attention from nurse 
researchers and theoreticians. Relative novelty thus necessitates that a more detailed 
description and critique of this study's conceptual framework and nomenclature be 
advanced than would be required were a more familiar approach adopted. 
To validate this claim it might be noted that critical or social realist designs 
are not identified in McVicar and Caan's (2005) study into research design 
popularity. This work reviewed the abstracts of 204 nursing and allied health 
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professionals who completed PhD, DPhil and Professional Doctorate theses 
(published on electronic databases between 1983 and 2002). Increased interest in 
`Naturalistic/realistic evaluation' was noted, up from 1 percent of 1983-1996 studies 
to 3.9 percent of 1997-2002 studies (ibid, p. 637), and Pawson and Tilley's (1997) 
Realistic Evaluation is associated with this development. However, McVicar and 
Caan's (2005) use of the term `naturalistic' requires clarification (it is linked with 
`Think aloud' methods, ibid, p. 641). As will be shown (§1 Chapter 3), `naturalism' is 
capable of supporting a variety of meanings and, in this conjoint form, the term 
`realistic' also needs explanation. Moreover, it is uncertain whether Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) are situated by the abstract writers against the descriptor `realistic' or, 
alternatively, whether this connection is made by the reviewers and, in the absence 
of such information, it may be that interest in realist designs is overestimated even 
at 3.9 percent. 
Fifth, nurse researchers and theoreticians do not always recognise or 
adequately respect the links that bind ontological, epistemological and 
methodological reasoning (see `Introduction' this thesis). Realist theory is concerned 
with these links and detailing this concern makes apparent the significance of such 
connections. 
Sixth, §1 describes realist theory so that reference can thereafter be made to 
its descriptors and precepts in §2 without additional explanation. 
Seventh, study at higher degree level not only seeks to develop new 
knowledge or understanding, it also aims to facilitate the training of researchers 
(McVicar and Caan, 2005; Thompson et al, 2005) and, in this latter respect, a focus 
upon theory and the manner in which it relates or fails to assist in social explanation 
is germane (i. e. reflection on these issues contributes to this training). 
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Section 1- Chapter 1 
Roy Bhaskar 
It is increasingly evident that in order to gain a critical understanding of the 
social and political disciplines, we must face not only epistemological but 
metaphysical issues. 
(Bernstein, 1979, p. 117) 
Miller (2002) states that `the nature and plausibility of realism is one of the most 
hotly debated issues in contemporary metaphysics, perhaps even the most hotly 
debated issue in contemporary philosophy' and Collier (1994, p. ix) enthusiastically 
describes Bhaskar's critical realism (henceforth , 
CR) as `the most exciting 
development in Anglophone philosophy in this half-century. ' Interest stems from 
the possibility that CR offers a `point of entry into epistemology and metaphysics 
for practicing social scientists' (Groff, 2004, p. 23)' and Archer (1995, p. 5 - emphasis 
in original) acknowledges this potential when she notes that: `The practical analyst 
of society needs to know not only what social reality is, but also how to begin to explain it, 
before addressing the particular problem under investigation. ' 
1ßhaskar's early work focused on the philosophy of science and A Realist 
Theory of Science (1997, first published 1975, henceforth RTS) and The Possibility of 
Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (1998d, first 
published 1979, henceforth PN) have been especially influential (Archer et al, 1998). 
Both books challenge established orthodoxies, together they launched a self- 
conscious movement° in the humanities and social sciences (Engholm, 1999) and 
CR now inspires work across a broad range of academic fields °' 
This Chapter describes RTS and PN. RTS chiefly presents a philosophy for 
physical science and although Bhaskar touches upon the humanities in this work, 
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the implications of CR theory for social explanation are primarily developed in PN. 
Both texts are outlined since together they introduce CR thought and inform the 
sociological writing of Margaret Archer. 
Philosophy's purpose: 
Bhaskar is interested in causality and the nature of knowledge claims. These 
concerns prompt him to theorise about the relationship between ontology (being), 
epistemology (theories of knowledge), methodology (structures and rationalisations 
of enquiry that develop or test ideas) and methods (techniques or procedures to 
obtain and assess data). " Significantly, Bhaskar advances theory in order to affect 
scientific reasoning and practice" and this approach contrasts with thinkers such as 
Wittgenstein (2001,1976)" or Russell (Irvine, 2004)"' who query the use value of 
philosophy, or those such as Scruton (1994) who maintain a distinction between 
pure and applied philosophy. Thus, for Bhaskar, metaphysical or ontological theory, 
whilst `recondite and abstract' (ITS, p. 226-7), is important because it guides or 
underpins the acceptability or otherwise of claims which inform belief and action. 
Social theory, proto-theory and theory proper, inevitably contains explicit or, 
more commonly, implicit ontological presumptions which legitimise or veto ideas, 
behaviours and doxastic"" criteria concerning what can be admitted in explanation. 
With this in mind, Bhaskar proposes that ontological precepts materially affect 
human life. Further, he maintains that metaphysical truth (i. e. contingent and 
`theoretically-informed' but nonetheless accurate scientific descriptions of reality - 
RTS, p. 240) possesses, if attainable, a liberating dimension that reflects or is 
grounded in CR's strong commitment to reason's potential as an emancipatory 
force. " And, although some of Bhaskar's later outputs have a strong spiritual focus 
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(Hostettler and Norrie, 2003), CR's emancipatory claims rest in RTS and PN upon 
recognisably Marxist insights (Trigg, 2001). 
Bhaskar's basic argument is that within the physical sciences a defective 
ontology has been conjoined with a flawed epistemology to misinterpret a special 
situation (experimentation). The apparent predictive success of this developed 
perspective (traditional empiricism) allowed it to colonise the natural and human 
sciences, including those branches of social science that ostensively recognise the 
problems inherent in empirical reasoning and, in consequence, social science has yet 
to articulate a satisfactory philosophic base. Sociology's `theoretical fragmentation' 
(Dean et al, 2006b, p. 1) reflects, for Bhaskar, the confusion wrought by the 
importation of this false metaphysic and the neglect of overt ontblogic and 
epistemological reasoning in much sociological writing evidences researcher unease 
with the grounding philosophy of their discipline. ' 
Terminology and commentary: 
Before considering RTS and PN, three general points need to be made concerning 
Bhaskar's use of terminology and his style or form of argument. 
First, Bhaskar is a dense author (Scambler, 2002) and comprehension is 
occasionally hindered by the variety of terms that are used to describe CR theory. ' 
To avoid misunderstanding, the descriptors realism, critical realist or critical realism 
(CR) and transcendental realism are used here to describe Bhaskar's philosophy. 
Second, Huntington (1996, p. 21) claims that: We know who we are only 
when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are 
against. ' RTS introduces and defines CR through an appraisal of two alternative 
philosophies of science. In this process, Bhaskar employs a number of 
interchangeable terms. Thus, Humean, empiricism X" empirical realism X"' 
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deductivism"' and positivism" collectively describe one metaphysic. Kantian, neo- 
Kantianism, idealismX"' and transcendental' idealism jointly describe another. 
Similarly, in PN, CR argument is advanced through the critique of positivist 
(Humean) naturalism and anti-naturalist hermeneutics. ""' As with RTS, a variety of 
descriptors characterise the non-CR perspectives. 
For clarity, this study will generally describe the non-realist perspectives in 
RTS thus, Hume (Humean) or empiric (empiricism) and Kant (Kantian) or idealist 
(idealism). In PN, Bhaskar opposes Humean empiric naturalism (which he conflates 
with materialism and positivism) and Kantian, idealist or hermeneutic anti- 
naturalism. These descriptors are explained as they are introduced within the thesis. 
However, it should be noted that the meaning of some of the terms used by 
Bhaskar are contested and vary depending upon whether they are used in a 
sociological or philosophic sense ('naturalism' is, for example, particularly vulnerable 
to contextual misinterpretation). ' Bhaskar's terminological usage is critiqued at 
several points within the study. 
Third, metaphor, allegory, simile and analogy play a significant part in most, 
if not all, scholarly or scientific theories and arguments (Greenwood and Bonner, 
2008) - as they do in all discourse - and Bhaskar consciously manipulates language's 
evocative potential in presenting his philosophy. Thus both RTS and PN advance a 
nomenclature that includes open and closed systems, emergent strata, `powers, 
tendencies, structures, generative mechanisms, transfactuality, normic statements etc 
.. [so that] What one is dealing with here is a network, `family' or constellation of 
concepts .. [in order] to introduce the reader to a new way of thinking .. 
in the 
hope that the reader willget a feel for it (PN, p. 169 - emphasis added). 
Whenever possible, this study utilises Bhaskar's own words to describe CR. 
Overuse of direct quotation can seem excessive. However, first, the use of multiple 
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citations (common in literature studies) may assist the reader to get a feel for the 
family of concepts that Bhaskar wishes to convey. Second, little benefit accrues from 
precising an original that is clear and succinct and third, citations are a protective 
device. Bhaskar's work can be variously interpreted and the outline presented here 
will inevitably differ from alternative interpretations. Reference back to the source 
material is one means by which this particular reading can be sustained. 
A Realist Theory of Science 
As its name implies, transcendental realism is founded on the question: What must 
the world be like for science to be possible? This starting point is significant for it 
allows that phenomena precede and are `independent of experiences' (ITS, p. 32). 
.. it is not the fact that science occurs that gives the world a structure that 
is 
known by men. Rather, it is the fact that the world has such a structure that 
makes science whether or not it occurs, possible. 
(RTS, p. 30) 
Like Kant (1990 [1781], Critique of Pure Reason), Bhaskar recognises that mind (the 
knower) contributes to perception. However, for Bhaskar, development and 
elaboration of the phenomena-experience distinction informs an opposition to both 
neo-Kantian transcendental idealism and deductive Humean empiricism. Both 
traditions are accused of misleadingly equating scientific laws with event 
conjunctions. Separately, Kantian idealism is charged with underplaying the 
ontological reality of phenomena and Humean empiricism is indicted for neglecting 
the perceiver's role in experience. 
CR recognises that scientific knowledge is socially derived ('knowledge is a 
social product, produced by means of antecedent social products' RTS, p. 16-17) and 
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that the objects of study are ontologically discrete (i. e. that things exist apart from 
the knower). Bhaskar thereby distinguishes what is known from what might be known. 
He accepts that truth claims vary through time but denies reality is similarly plastic 
(Cruickshank, 2007). RTS argues against judgemental relativism (which, by CR 
criteria, speciously gives equal voice or weight to multiple theories or 
interpretations), for epistemological relativism (which acknowledges `the 
impossibility of knowing objects except under particular descriptions', RTS, p. 249) 
and for judgemental rationality (which suggests that it is in principle possible to reach 
contingently reasoned and accurate judgements concerning truth and reality). 
CR is implacably hostile to postmodern thought (Curry, 2003) and 
unfashionably traditional in its support for the modernist ideal of potential scientific 
progress. Modernism's confidence in experience is abandoned however, when RTS 
invokes a priori arguments to maintain that physical and social reality are both 
stratified and emergent. RTS thus simultaneously denounces what it defines as 
Humean and Kantian traditions in science whilst dialectically reformulating and 
integrating elements from both philosophies into a theory that transcends their 
alleged limitations. In this process Bhaskar claims he is an `under-labourer" in the 
production of a new metaphysics or `conceptual science' (RTS, p. 36), a realist 
`philosophy for science' (RTS, p. 10 - emphasis in original). If taken seriously CR 
requires that a radical overhaul of non-realist research theory and practice take 
place. "' 
Humean experience: 
Although Bhaskar takes issue with Kant and Hume and their intellectual heirs, RTS 
directs its most sustained attack at Hume who, Bhaskar claims, inadequately 
described as subjective expectation `the conditions under which experience is 
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significant in science' (RTS, p. 13). Orthodox empiricism, which Bhaskar equates 
with Hume, is charged with misunderstanding the place and meaning of experience 
in scientific theory (particularly in regard to experimentation) so that explanatory 
criteria, ideas concerning confirmation, falsification and notions of rationality 
become confused (explanandum becomes conflated with explanans). Allegedly, these 
failings stem from Hume's description of causality and scientific law. 
Hume's An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding (1955 [1748], henceforth 
IHU) distinguishes knowledge derived from `Relations of Ideas' (e. g. Euclidian 
geometry - IHU, p. 40) from `Matters of Fact' (e. g. that the sun has risen - IHU, 
p. 40). Relational knowledge is `discoverable by the mere operation of thought' 
(IHU, p. 40). However, observation rather than a priori reasoning is required to 
determine factual understanding since, to quote from Book One of A Treatise of 
Human Nature (Hume, 2004 [1739], emphasis in original) it is `by EXPERIENCE 
only, that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another. ' This 
experience is of an event and a constant conjunction of such events arc necessary `to 
make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect' (Hume, ibid), that is, 
establish the relationship as law-like. Indeed, Hume's argument within the three 
books of A Treatise of Human Nature is summarised in the phrase: `No matter of fact 
can be proved but from its cause or effect. Nothing can be known to be the cause 
of another but by experience' (Hume, 1955 [1740], p. 191). 
RTS (p. 25) argues that Hume's focus on establishing objective event 
regularities and the investigator's attempt to abstract him or herself from the process 
leaves experimental science as `a kind of automatic and behavioural response to the 
stimulus of given facts and their conjunctions. ' Further, Humean empiricism fails, 
according to Bhaskar, to acknowledge the perceiver's role in understanding or 
defining experience (other than to see it as a nuisance to be eradicated or overcome) 
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and, as will be seen, the pre-eminence afforded to observable event conjunctions 
problematises the role and function of theory (remainder) in explanations of what is 
observed. That is, theory, necessary to comprehend and order experience, is 
unobservable and therefore un-real by Humean standards. 
Bhaskar's use of transcendental argument and his interpretation and critique 
of Hume and Kant are discussed in §1 Chapter 3. However, it might be prudent 
here to note that Hume's concept of causal relations involved: 
three elements: ideas of spatial contingency, temporal succession, and 
necessary connection. Whereas in the case of the first two the matching of 
these ideas to experiences is unproblematic, there is, Hume presumes, no 
perceptual warrant for the idea of a necessary connection between events, 
such that given the first the second had to follow, and that had not the first 
occurred the second would not have happened. This being the case he 
offers a psychological substitute, namely that succession and contiguity of types 
of objects found conjoined in our experience are such as to determine the 
mind to form the idea of one object or event upon the occasion of observing 
(or forming the idea of) the other object or event. 
(Haldane, 2002, p. 100 - emphasis added) 
At stake is the extent to which mind interprets or creates a version of a putative 
external reality. Given Haldane's (ibid) account it might be argued that Bhaskar's 
interpretation of Hume as negating the perceiver's role in experience is misguided since 
Hume situates causation `in the mind (imagination)' (Salmon, 2002, p. 26). This is 
indeed the conclusion reached in §1 Chapter 3 though the fault is not fatal to CR 
and it is here merely noted that, in arguing against Humean empiricism, Bhaskar is 
persuasive in his attack upon naive empiricism and its consequents. 
Bhaskar's critique of the role of empiricist theory in physical science is also 
challenged by, for example, Monod (2004), who argues that post Einstein and 
Heisenburg, quantum physicists (contra Hume) neither directly observe events nor 
require that laws rest upon repeatable conjunctions. "" Nevertheless, Bhaskar claims 
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that empiricism's apparent predictive achievement within physical science has 
cloaked the shortcomings outlined above (regarding observation) and, quantum 
physics notwithstanding, this success has amplified empiricism's influence so that its 
assumptions, regarding causality and the justifiable basis of law-like or generalisable 
statements, now pervasively inform both the natural and human sciences including, 
as will be seen, those forms of neo-Kantian and idealist human science which 
ostensibly reject its precepts (Bhaskar, 1998b; Bhaskar, 1998c). Exposing inherent 
flaws within the empiricist tradition can, CR maintains, help establish a more 
satisfactory philosophy for science and hence, better science (Archer et al, 1998). 
The episternic fallacy (transitive knowledge and intransitive reality): 
For Bhaskar, Hume's error stems from his belief `that statements about being can 
always be transposed into statements about our knowledge of being' (RTS, p. 16). 
Reducing ontology to epistemology is described by Bhaskar as the `epistemic fallacy' 
(RTS, p. 16) and recognising this error is vital to CR argument. 
CR differentiates between the social production of knowledge (what is 
known) and the things that exist (what might be known). The objects of scientific 
knowledge are the mechanisms or structures that generate phenomena. These 
`objects are neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human constructs imposed upon 
the phenomena (idealism), but real structures which endure and operate 
independently of our knowledge, our experience and the conditions which allow us 
to access them' (RTS, p. 25). These real structures constitute an intransitive and 
ontologically existent domain that transitive or fallible human scientific knowledge 
aims to penetrate. 
Transitive knowledge is not knowledge of reality, it is `only a description of 
that reality' (Porpora, 2004, p. 49). Transitive knowledge is contingent because it 
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inevitably includes or entails both theory and values (it is socially and historically 
positioned)""' and it is therefore epistemologically relative (there is no immanent or 
unmediated access to reality). However, recognising that human understanding lacks 
certitude need not imply, according to RTS, that ontologically objective reality is 
illusory or that judgementally rational and provisionally accurate statements cannot 
be made about reality (Cruickshank, 2007,2003a; Groff, 2004). 
Hume's episternic fallacy is, for Bhaskar, the natural if fallacious result of 
misreading experience's ontological status (i. e. empiricism's error is to believe that 
experience is necessary to comprehend reality, that observable event regularities 
describe causality and that a constant conjunction of events is both necessary and 
sufficient in establishing laws). Contra Hume, separating transitive social knowledge 
from intransitive reality enables Bhaskar to maintain that events `are categorically 
independent of experiences. There could be a world of events without experiences. 
Such events would constitute actualities unperceived and, in the absence of men, 
unperceivable' (RTS, p. 32) and this claim, that knowledge cannot circumscribe 
existence, allows him to assert that `not only is a constant conjunction of events not 
a sufficient, it is not even a necessary condition for a causal law' (RTS, p. 12). 
Closed and open systems: 
CR proposes that, to be intelligible, experimental activity must accept the 
redundancy of definitions of causality that rely upon event regularities (indeed, 
experience is essentially an `accidental property', ITS, p. 28). X"° If correct, this claim 
undermines a major bulwark of empiric science. 
Bhaskar states that explanatory causal laws must describe how mechanisms 
`endure and continue to operate in their normal way under conditions, which may 
be characterised as `open', where no constant conjunction or regular sequence of 
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events is forthcoming' (RTS, p. 33). CR thus distinguishes between open 
(uncontrolled) and closed (controlled laboratory or experimentally isolated) systems. 
Humean causality allegedly binds laws to closed systems because it is only 
within such systems that manipulation and control of antecedent activities by 
scientists makes a constant conjunction of events possible. Closure `depends upon 
either the actual isolation of a system from external influences or the constancy of 
those influences' (RTS, p. 74). However, in open or non-isolated systems, a myriad 
of confounding mechanisms interact so that laws, established in closed systems, are 
seldom evidenced as regular event conjunctions. RTS proposes that empiric activity 
only acquires meaning when the relation between closed experimental situations, in 
which constant conjunctions can occur, and real world open systems, where they 
infrequently do, is understood. For committed empiricists the general absence of 
event conjunctions in open systems presumably indicates, absurdly, that no laws are 
operating. However, the non-empirical or counterfactual status of closed system 
laws in open systems indicates, to Bhaskar, that the place of experience in scientific 
explanation must be re-conceptualised. 
Intransitive reality - mechanisms, tendencies and nomic laws: 
The world consists of mechanisms not events. Such mechanisms combine 
to generate the flux of phenomenon that constitute the actual states and 
happenings of the world. They may be said to be real, though it is rarely that 
they are actually manifest and rarer still that they are empirically identified by 
men. They are the intransitive objects of scientific theory. 
(RTS, p. 47) 
To explain how causality and laws operate in open systems RTS outlines a theory 
which differentiates between three domains (the real, the actual and the empiric) 
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and three types or objects of knowledge (termed generative mechanisms, events and 
experiences), see table 2. 
Table 2- Domains and objects of knowledge (RTS, p. 56 - adapted) 
Domain of Domain of Domain of 
Real Actual Empiric I 
: Mechanisms 
Events 
Experiences 
Mechanisms or generative mechanisms refer to phenomena operative in the 
intransitive realm of the real. They represent the `way of acting of a thing' (RTS, 
p. 51) and possess ontological status. "' Mechanisms are possible objects of 
knowledge though they may remain forever unknown. " " Mechanisms need not 
cause events to take place in the domain of the actual since they can be blocked, 
disrupted or redirected by the operation of alternative mechanisms. Mechanisms 
may thus operate but remain unexercised (existing solely within the domain of the 
real) and this indeterminacy in actually causing events means that mechanisms cause 
and underpin laws that in open systems are best described as tendencies. 
Tendencies may or may not be exercised, but even when exercised, 
tendencies, in open systems never guarantee or determine that particular outcomes 
ensue. As per mechanisms, tendencies produce events erratically `due to the 
presence of `offsetting factors' or `countervailing causes" (RTS, p. 98). Significantly, 
it is only in regionally isolated systems that `a tendency once set in motion must be 
fulfilled' (RTS, p. 96) and, in open systems, tendencies are unlikely to instigate an 
`invariant pattern or regularly recurring sequence of events' (RTS, p. 14). Tendencies 
are the powers of generative mechanisms. ' "ü However, tendencies are distinguished 
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from powers through the concept of continuing temporal activity: `In the concept 
of tendency, the concept of power is thus literally dynamized and set in motion' 
(RTS, p. 50). In closed systems, tendencies may be actualised and experienced 
(identified) through Humean empiric practice. Yet, contra Hume, CR does not 
conflate experience with events since `in an experiment we [scientists] are a causal 
agent of the sequence of events, but not of the causal law which the sequence of 
events, because it has been produced under experimental conditions, enables us to 
identify' (ITS, p. 33). Experimental activity, Bhaskar notes, artificially aligns 
mechanisms, events and experiences, which are `not naturally or normally in phase' 
(ITS, p. 57) through the deliberate causative intervention of agents (scientists). 
Laws are thereby re-described. They now apply equally in closed and open 
systems and, in open systems, become explanatory rather than predictive. Thus 
defined, laws are non-deterministic. They are `neither empirical statements 
(statements about experiences) nor statements about events. Rather they are 
statements about the ways of acting of independently existing and transfactually 
active things' (ITS, p. 51-2). Laws thus refer to potentialities rather than certainties 
and are `normic, rather than subjunctive' (ITS, p. 51 - italics in original). 
""' Nomic 
statements (the `indicative form' of normic statements, RTS, p. 51) refer to 
generative structures and not events. They describe what is happening irrespective 
of actual events and are not generalisations (i. e. such and such is likely to occur), 
indeed they `are not empirical statements at all' (RTS, p. 102). 
Stratification and emergence: 
Mechanisms and the nomic laws they generate suggest to Bhaskar that reality is 
stratified and emergent. This means that, for example, physical mechanisms are 
necessary for the emergence of chemical mechanisms, which are necessary for the 
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emergence of biological mechanisms, which are necessary for the emergence of 
human social and psychological mechanisms. ' In each instance, a prior or lower 
level mechanism or strata (e. g. physical) was required before a subsequent or higher 
level mechanism or strata (e. g. chemical) could develop or emerge. Lower level 
mechanisms or strata constrain or place limits on the actions of higher level 
emergent mechanisms or strata (chemical laws cannot abrogate physical laws). 
However, lower level mechanisms or strata do not cause higher level mechanisms or 
strata. Each emergent strata is defined by specific mechanisms the operation of 
which are irreducible to (not determined by) those at a lower level and thus, just as 
`the path of my pen does not violate any laws of physics .. [so] 
it is not determined 
by any either' (RTS, p. 105). 
Bhaskar states that there are in principle no limits to the `new and ever 
deeper, and explanatory more basic, strata' (RTS, p. 169) that await discovery in 
either the human or physical sciences tm The significance of the concepts of 
stratification and emergence are developed later. However, since each strata and its 
mechanism(s) is ontologically real and distinct, `the transcendental realist sees the 
various sciences as attempting to understand things and structures in themselves, at 
their own level of being .. and as making causal claims which are specific to the 
events and individuals concerned .. according with the way things really are' 
(ITS, 
p. 78). In consequence, CR makes possible a science of the social that recognises the 
ontological reality of mechanisms (powers) specific to both structure and agency (i. e. 
it sanctions non-epiphenomenal and non-elisionary or non-conflationary theory). 
Structure thus describes the pre-formed social and cultural forces that agents 
confront and are embedded in and this distinction, between structure and agency, 
permits explanations to be advanced that give weight to the emergent powers of 
man and society without denying their separate status or complementary interaction. 
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Emergence and stratification emasculate reductive (and reified) theories in 
sociology (see pages 33 and 34 this thesis), "" psychology (e. g. Behaviourism), 
biology (e. g. socio-biology)XXX" and physics (e. g. reductionism proper)""" - which 
suppose that functions at one level should correctly be understood by reference to 
another (higher or lower) level. For example, from a realist perspective Durkheim's 
sociology overemphasises structural factors at the expense of agential freedom 
(downwards conflation), ""' whilst socio-biology suggests that higher level functions 
such as consciousness and behaviour are best explained by reference to lower level 
functions such as brain chemistry and genetic imprinting (upwards conflation). 
Similarly undercut are (upwards conflationary) reductive idealist theories (e. g. 
phenomenology) which valorise the perceptions of individual agents and underplay 
pre-existing material and ideational social and cultural structures so that social life 
becomes the aggregated output of individual insights and actions. " 
Emergence and stratification are intrinsic to CR. They describe the 
interrelated, layered and essential nature of mechanisms but do not invoke 
determinism or preclude change. Objects can therefore possess essence. "" that allow 
explanations `in terms of more fundamental structures and things' without 
conceding that such explanations are `ultimate' or exclusive (RTS, p. 213). 
Transitive knowledge Xantian idealism and the significance of theory): 
The aim of physical science, according to RTS, is to comprehend the generative 
mechanisms which, independently of man, constitute intransitive reality (i. e. that 
`generate the actual flux of phenomenon of the world', RTS, p. 17). Science is 
`concerned with both taxonomic and explanatory knowledge: with what kinds of 
things there are, as well as how the things there are behave' (RTS, p. 20). However, 
the relationship between what exists and the form of its explanation requires 
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clarification. Bhaskar rejects correspondence theories that suggest reality can be 
grasped without or apart from human theoretical constructs... ' He states that: `If 
we can imagine a world of intransitive objects without science, we cannot imagine a 
science without transitive objects, i. e., without scientific or pre-scientific 
antecedents. That is, we cannot imagine the production of knowledge save from, 
and by means of, knowledge-like materials' (RTS, p. 22). These knowledge-like 
materials are defined by RTS as: `the raw materials of science - the artificial objects 
fashioned into items of knowledge by the science of the day. They include the 
antecedently established facts and theories, paradigms and models, methods and 
techniques of inquiry available to a particular scientific school or worker' (RTS, 
p. 21). And thus: 
men never construct their knowledge from scratch. It stands to them always 
as a given product, a social transmit; which they must themselves reproduce 
or partially transform .. man never creates, but only changes .. (RTS, p. 148) 
This focus on knowledge's social construction is reminiscent of Kant's insight that 
cognitive processes structure experience. Kant argued that mind uses a priori 
reasoning to actively create, interpret and manufacture understandings from external 
sensory experience (i. e. in contrast to Locke's dark room metaphor, mind is not a 
passive recorder, Zeitlin, 1997). However, whilst CR and Kant jointly reject forms 
of thinking associated with Humean empiricist reductionism and accept that science 
(knowledge production) is a social or human process, they fundamentally disagree 
about the ontological status of the thing perceived. 
For Bhaskar `it is necessary to assume for the intelligibility of science that 
the order discovered in nature exists independently of man' (RTS, p"27)" Yet whilst 
Kant similarly recognises the existence of a noumenal world of real things that exist 
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apart from man (Dinge an sich, things-in-themselves) we can `only know it as it is for 
us ("things-for-us")' (Butchvarov, 2002, p. 283). Kant is, contra Bhaskar, therefore 
agnostic regarding `the sources of our perceptual experiences' (Sprigge, 2002, p. 233) 
and reluctant to accept that man can ever know this world or decipher its order 
(Stern, 2000). ""ii' Kantian idealism is perforce ambivalent regarding the ontological 
status of objects in the noumenal non-human realm. 
To clarify the difference between ontologies and the implications of such 
difference, RTS proposes that the philosophy of science can heuristically be 
envisaged as a three stage process (diagram 1). 
Diagram 1. The Logic of Scientific Discovery (RTS, p. 145 - reproduced) 
results regularity 
events; sequences; invariances (1) classical empiricism 
generative 
mechanisms 1 model-building 
in models 
(3) ----F_.... _____.. ... (2) transcendental idealism 
real empirical-testing imagincdJimaginary 
transcendental realism 
In the first instance, classical or Humean empiricism formally concludes with the 
establishment of event regularities. Empiricism has problems conceptualising 
theories and models that might explain observed events because these theories and 
models cannot be experienced or observed (Howson, 2000). Clearly, empiric science 
does advance new theories; however, their status, along with the `auxiliary' theories 
and concepts that support experimental activity remain indeterminate (RTS, 
p. 55). XXX'X On the other hand, Kantian idealism (stage two) does acknowledge the 
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social or man-made nature of scientific activity. Theory development is integral to 
this metaphysic. Yet knowledge is here seen to reside within such theories (models, 
concepts etc. ) and the reality of external phenomena (to which theory approximates) 
is marginalised. 
In contrast, Bhaskar claims that CR is prepared to accept that the theories 
science proposes may refer to a concrete reality. That is, the generative mechanisms 
suggested by theory might actually exist. In this third step, RTS distinguishes itself 
from Humean empiricism (by reinterpreting event regularities at step one as 
experimentally produced outcomes that need not occur in open-systems) and 
Kantian idealism in granting that `what is imagined' (RTS, p. 15) in theory may have 
ontological substance (reuniting theory with incident to restore the `relevance of 
empirical research', Carter, 2000, p. 2). Thus theory `is not an elliptical way of 
referring to experience, but a way of referring to hypothesized inner structures .. 
which experience can .. confirm or 
falsify' (RTS, p. 158). 
Ontology and the human sciences: 
Within the physical sciences `rough and ready regularities are everywhere at hand' 
(RTS, p. 68), so that, according to Bhaskar, predictive control seems plausible if 
ultimately misguided in open systems. However, within the human sciences few if 
any Humean constant conjunctions have been identified. " The absence of empiric 
law-like statements and the palpable difficulty in establishing them has proved 
problematic for the humanities and PN (p. 18) suggests that, in consequence, these 
sciences historically `see-saw' between the poles of fashionably competitive and 
exclusive epistemologies. The neo-Humean response to this absence has, Bhaskar 
asserts, been to weaken the requirements for such statements so that statistical tests 
and P values have come to replace the need for invariant constant conjunctions. 
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(Probabilities are not the same as nomic laws which refer to underlying mechanisms 
rather than the likelihood of event conjunctions. ) Alternatively, RTS proposes that 
the neo-Kantian or idealist response to empiric hegemony has been to concede that 
the Humean definition of causality and laws is substantively correct but to withdraw 
half-heartedly from attempting to make generalisable statements about reality. 
Idealists instead focus upon the uniqueness of individual meanings, understandings 
and perceptions as if these were formed ex nihilo through a process unaffected by 
externally patterned socio-cultural constraints and enablements. "' Focusing upon 
unique perceptions raises questions about the translation and transmission of such 
understandings and, to the extent that idealists look for commonalities of 
understanding between perceivers, they can be accused, Bhaskar suggests, of 
generalising by default. 
For CR, the `patent absurdity' (RTS, p. 104) of attempting to find constant 
conjunctions in the social and psychological strata is a consequence of the open and 
stratified nature of mechanism interaction. In such circumstances scientists cannot 
erect anything other than the most cursory of regional closures around their objects 
of study and attempts to establish full closure (experiment) are generally doomed 
since the complex and pre-formed nature of individuals and societies means that 
both evidence manifold and non-predictable responses to externally applied stimuli. 
Further, even if it were possible to manipulate the flow of external stimuli and the 
prior development of the individual or society thus affected, it would remain 
impossible to control the internal and emergent development of individuals or 
societies. Indeed, since emergence may be retrospectively explained but not 
prospectively predicted simple metrics whether founded on deductive or inductive 
reasoning must, according to CR, give way to theories based upon retroductive or 
retrodictive argument. 
22 
Retroduction and retrodiction: 
Morris (1970) associates abduction or inference to the most explanatory helpful 
form of explanation with retroduction and, again in relation to abduction, Evers and 
Wu (2007, p. 207) emphasise the: `role of background theory in helping to adjudicate 
the matter of the best explanation. Strictly speaking, for inferential purposes 
hypotheses never occur in isolation but rather as embedded in some theoretical 
context. ' 
Emphasising the relative significance or role of background theory in 
adjudicating between discrepant explanatory hypotheses highlights important 
differences between retroduction and retrodiction. Retroduction occurs when 
knowledge of mechanism function is relatively impoverished. Retrodiction takes 
place when knowledge of mechanism function is relatively advanced. "Hereafter, to 
simplify explanation, this thesis generally employs the term retroduction to describe 
this form of inferential reasoning. However, since the difference between 
retroduction and retrodiction is relative and, potentially, contestable, this thesis 
discusses and delineates retroductive from retrodictive analysis in §2. 
For realists retroduction describes a `thought operation' (Downward and 
Mearman, 2007, p. 88) or `mode of inference in which events are explained by 
postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing them' 
(Sayer, 1992, p. 107). As a form of inferential reasoning retroduction occurs in many 
contexts (e. g. it is evident in historical studies, archaeology, palaeontology, biology 
and theoretic astronomical physics). For Bhaskar, retroduction moves from: 
present effects to prior (perhaps hidden, perhaps just unrecorded) causes, 
via the application of normic statements. 
(ITS, p. 135). 
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Thus described, retroduction permits explanations that cite or invoke the nomic 
tendencies of unobserved and possibly unobservable generative mechanisms in 
open systems (i. e. situations not amenable to experimental verification or 
falsification). It involves: 
the building of a model, utilizing such cognitive materials and operating 
under the control of something like a logic of analogy and metaphor, of a 
mechanism, which if it were to exist and act in the postulated way would 
account for the phenomenon in question. 
(PN, p. 12 - emphasis in original) 
CR theory relies upon retroduction to underpin the transitive models that, it claims, 
describe intransitive reality. In granting that unobserved mechanisms may have 
ontological substance, retroduction differentiates itself from deductive Humean 
science and inductive neo-Kantian idealism (stages 1 and 2, diagram 1, page 20 this 
thesis)""' Retroduction cannot prove the existence of hypothesised mechanisms and 
the `move from (2) to (3) involves experimental production and control, in which 
the reality of the mechanisms postulated .. are subjected to empirical scrutiny' 
(RTS, 
p. 146). Yet, contra empiricism, this scrutiny aims to clarify or reveal the mechanisms 
that he behind observed events. It does not simply codify the existence of event 
conjunctions and it occurs within a process that acknowledges the contingent and 
man made nature of scientific knowledge, i. e. it recognises that science is: `the 
imaginative and disciplined work of men .. [where] the 
instruments of the 
imagination are themselves provided by knowledge' (RTS, p. 185). 
Conclusion to description of RTS - introduction to PN: 
In a postscript to the second edition of ITS Bhaskar asserts that, although `I have 
developed my arguments .. mainly from a consideration of the experimental 
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sciences of physics and chemistry, ideologies, derived from defective conceptions of 
those sciences, weigh, like a dead hand, heavily on the shoulders of .. the proto- 
sciences of society and man' (ITS, p. 260-1). 
Bhaskar thus believes that exposing the epistemic fallacy (an orthodoxy 
supposedly accepted by empiricists and idealists alike), positing a distinction 
between transitive and intransitive knowledge, developing a new language for 
causality, delineating closed from open systems, recognising stratification and 
emergence in relation to the generative mechanisms that constitute reality and the 
promotion of retroduction are as relevant to social as they are to physical science. 
Bhaskar does not advance in either RTS or PN a substantive sociology or 
psychology but rather the `formal or a priori conditions for them' (PN, p. 22). 
Nevertheless, ATS offers a vocabulary (of tendencies and norms) to describe the 
physical world and, as will be seen, PN takes some tentative steps towards 
developing and modelling these abstract concepts for use in social explanation. 
The Possibility of Naturalism 
PN performs two interrelated tasks viz. the human sciences. First, as the title 
suggests, Bhaskar argues for a form of naturalism. Second, PN presents a 
transformational model of social activity (henceforth TMSA). Both tasks progress 
through a critique of naturalist Humean positivism"" and anti-naturalist Kantian 
hermeneutics (personified by Winch) and, in this process, PN develops ideas initially 
presented in RTS. 
According to PN, social science is split between two factions; naturalists 
advocate the essential unity of science, whereas anti-naturalists suppose that social 
and natural science are set apart by their objects of study. ' For Bhaskar, naturalism 
25 
rests upon Humean empiricist and positivist principles, it is nomothetic in character 
(Erklären) and can be reductive (all sciences share a common subject) or scientist (all 
sciences share a common method)»' Anti-naturalism, by contrast, seeks to describe 
or understand ideographic or unique (Verstehen) meanings invested in concepts and 
objects. Consequent to these differences, naturalists and anti-naturalists have 
developed distinctive and exclusive research programmes, epistemologies, theories, 
models and world-views: `For the positivist, science is outside society; for the 
hermeneuticist, society is outside science' (PN, p. 123). 
PN asserts that naturalists and anti-naturalists are united in error. They both 
mistakenly link empiricism with natural science, they both accept Humean notions 
of causality and law and they are both ultimately `individualistic' (PN, p. 15). In 
contrast, CR claims that its precepts are equally applicable to natural and social 
science and, contra traditional positivist-naturalism and hermeneutic anti-naturalism, 
Bhaskar argues for a `qualified anti-positivist naturalism' (PN, p. 3), the radical 
compass of which is apparent in the following quotation: 
From the standpoint of transcendental realism, rivers, hydrochloric acid and 
humans are equally (1) agents, (2) products, (3) possible objects of scientific 
investigation. Any metaphysically significant differences between them must 
be located at the level of their different kinds of properties/powers, not in 
their possession, generation or susceptibility to scientific explanation per se. 
(PN, p. 113) 
Bhaskar unreservedly accepts that social and natural science employ different 
methods `grounded in real differences in their subject-matters and in the 
relationships in which their sciences stand to them' (PN, p. 3). Yet although variable 
objects of study necessitate the use of different investigative strategies, this does not 
detract from the fact that, from a CR perspective, the aim of all science is identical 
(i. e. it attempts to uncover hitherto unknown explanatory strata and generative 
26 
mechanisms or reveal new or unrecognised relations between strata and 
mechanisms). "'"' 
Anti-positivist naturalism informs social explanation through the TMSA. As 
will be seen, Archer adapts and develops this model for practical use (albeit that as a 
theorist she continues to operate at a relatively conceptual level) and the significance 
of Bhaskar's TMSA within this thesis therefore rests upon the philosophical 
direction or weight that it lends to Archer's morphogenetic-morphostatic theory 
(TMSA's offspring). 
To expose the TMSA's philosophic underpinnings, to demonstrate the tight 
connection between RTS and PN and to open up CR thinking in the social realm 
for critique, it is necessary to outline the ideas and premises that support this model. 
A description of Bhaskar's attack upon Humeanism and hermeneutics in the human 
sciences therefore precedes commentary on the TMSA. Specifically, four themes are 
explored: (i) Hume's legacy for the social sciences, (ii) Hermeneutics and Hume, (iii) 
The linguistic fallacy of Winch and (iv) Agency, reasons and causes. 
Hume's legacy for the social sciences: 
As per RTS, exposing Hume's epistemic fallacy plays a pivotal role in demolishing 
the `ontological gap between causal laws and their empirical grounds, which both 
parties to the naturalist debate have hitherto ignored. This not only renders standard 
positivist methodological injunctions patently inapplicable, but vitiates the most 
familiar hermeneutical contrasts' (PN, p. 11). Bhaskar traces a philosophic history 
through Hume to the allegedly erroneous positivist principles of `empirical-invariance' 
and `instance-confirmation' (PN, p. 124 - emphasis in original). This allows 
him to 
accuse empiricists of misunderstanding the role of experience and observation in 
experiment and of falsely generalising the significance of constant conjunctions 
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beyond closed systems (`the illicit generalisation of a special case', PN, p. 128). 
According to Bhaskar positivist sympathisers respond to the absence of observable 
conjunctions in the social realm by claiming that either `the empirical invariances 
that govern social life are so complex as to elude detection, or .. they operate at some 
more basic (for example, neurophysiological) level' (PN, p. 126 - emphasis in 
original). These rationalisations are rejected however since they derive from 
`unthinking commitment to the legend of regularity determinism' (PN, p. 126). 
Hermeneutics and Hume: 
Both RTS and PN direct fire at Hume and his successors. However, PN also aligns 
its sights squarely on the hermeneutic and idealist traditions in social science that, it 
claims, fail to either capitalise upon shortcomings in Humean reasoning or 
disentangle themselves from empiricist logic. Thus, `the hermeneutical tradition is 
determined in the last instance by its acceptance of an essentially Humean account 
of natural science, and more generally of an empiricist ontology. And .. significant 
aspects of the thought of different hermeneutical writers can be reconstructed as 
dependent upon essentially positivist theories' (PN, p. 132). Hume's influence on 
hermeneutic and idealist thought is evident in anti-naturalism's uncritical acceptance 
of the `empirical realist dissolution of ontology, of the actuality of causal laws .. 
[which are] interpreted .. following Hume, as empirical regularities. 
In this way 
causal laws are reduced to sequences of events, and events to experiences. Anything 
further, any `surplus element' in their analysis, is then supposed to be contributed by 
mind' (PN, p. 15). 
Traditional empirical science only designates an object as real if it meets 
perceptual (observable) causal criteria. Yet, as Bhaskar points out, phenomena such 
as magnetic fields are directly unobservable albeit that they can be identified 
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through their ability `to bring about changes in material things' (PN, p. 12). And the 
ontological argument of proof by effect is invoked by PN when it asserts that 
hermeneutics: 
ignores precisely those possibilities opened up by a causal criterion for 
ascribing reality. Thus both parties to the naturalist dispute have assumed 
that the social must be either merely empirically real or in effect 
transcendentally ideal, so producing either a conceptually impoverished and 
deconceptualised empiricism, or a hermeneutics drained of causal import 
and impervious to empirical controls. 
(PN, p. 12) 
Winch and the linguistic fallacy: 
Hermeneutic's inability to sever itself from Humean notions of causality and law 
stem, like the empiric epistemic fallacy, from the `denial of ontology, and the 
collapse of the intransitive dimension' (PN, p. 133). Taking Winch to be 
`representative of the hermeneutical tradition' (PN, p. 155), Bhaskar describes how 
Wittgenstein's insight, that the meaning of language derives from social rules 
concerning the relation of words and ideas to other words and ideas in use (rather 
than correspondence), was misappropriated by Winch who, in extrapolating 
Wittgenstein's linguistic metaphor, mistakenly conflates concepts with behaviours, a 
mistake described by Bhaskar as the linguistic fallacy. Thus Winch correctly 
`perceiving ideas to be distinctive of social reality, incorrectly infers them to be 
exhaustive of it' (PN, p. 136). Winch's achievement was to see `that social life does 
not exist independently of the concepts in terms of which agents think their own 
existence' (PN, p. 134). His error, according to Bhaskar, was to reduce social science 
to the study of concepts. 
Any adequate account of social science must be able to do justice to Winch's 
intuition that the subject-matter of social science is concept-dependent .. 
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without committing itself to the position that it is exhausted by such 
conceptualisations .. Similarly .. social science must accept that social 
causation depends upon the identification by the agents concerned of 
conceptual connections (that is, that social causation is conceptually and 
linguistically mediated), so that our knowledge of social causation depends 
upon our identification of these connections; that is, that social science 
depends upon Verstehen, without committing itself to the position that 
Verstehen exhausts social science, or that the ontology necessitated by its 
recognition requires a fundamentally different analysis from the normic one 
appropriate to the science of nature. 
(PN, p. 135-6 - emphasis in original) 
For Bhaskar, social explanation must acknowledge that agents often act 
intentionally, that intentions derive from reasons (concepts, beliefs, desires and 
interests) and that, in some but not all instances, an interpretation of these reasons 
may be available to the individuals concerned. However, even when social 
explanation can be derived from agential interrogation, material or structural factors 
are inevitably implicated in full or adequate explanations. And thus, whilst social 
behaviour inevitably involves some understanding on the part of those involved, 
this need not imply that such understanding is sufficient or complete or that the 
understanding does not `actually function so as to mask, repress, mystify, obscure or 
otherwise occlude the nature of the activity concerned' (PN, p. 136). XI"" 
Klein (2004) suggests that hermeneutics can meet the challenges levelled 
against it by Bhaskar. Yet the idea of flawed or false consciousness is not easily 
assimilated into those forms of hermeneutic thought that explore social life by 
privileging the explanations of sovereign individuals over the influence of covert or 
unrecognised external referents (Manicas, 1998). Individuals can be mistaken 
(misled) about the causes (reasons) for their holding opinions just as they can be 
wrong about substantive factual issues. Allowing that agents need not be omniscient 
with regard to their own understanding removes a great burden from them, it 
permits a more fulsome explanation of the relation between reasons and causes to 
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be developed and prevents or saves, as will be seen, agents from always having to act 
volitionally, whilst permitting that they may. 
Agency - reasons as causes: 
The claim that humans have volitional emergent properties depends, for Bhaskar, 
on two interrelated factors. First, since `mind is a sui generis real emergent power of 
matter' (PN, p. 81) agents possess the ability (capacity or possibility) to formulate 
and recognise reasons or intentions that may, but need not, cause or motivate 
behaviours, actions or inactions. "' Second, structural or contextual influences (e. g. 
pre-existing social and cultural mechanisms) circumscribe and enable but never 
determine agential reasons or intentions. 
External environmental influences therefore contribute to agential decision 
making (for example, by constituting reasons or interests) but it is agents who act. 
And, in recognising that agents are not governed by structural influences Bhaskar 
aligns himself with incompatibilist rather than compatibilist conceptions of free will. 
' 
.. the freedom of self-determination itself cannot exist in a 
determined world. 
For it cannot exist unless some acts in the life histories of agents were 
undetermined and such that the agents could have done otherwise, namely, 
self-forming acts. 
(Kane, 2005, p. 173 - emphasis in original) 
Although Bhaskar might have provided greater clarity, he implicitly suggests that a 
distinction should be made between initiating reasons, which may derive from 
conscious or unconscious, logical or emotive beliefs and desires or any mix thereof, 
and actions (failure to make this distinction would reduce reasons to observable 
behaviours). Actions and attitudes are always guided by reasons or intentions and 
agents can always explain their behaviour or thoughts, a feat termed `psychic 
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ubiquity determinism' (PN, p. 96). However, whilst reasons or intentions construe `a 
disposition or state' (PN, p. 84) that incline agents towards action, they are not the 
sole determinants of action. Reasons are one factor amongst (possibly) many in 
affecting actions or outcomes and when identifiable as causes it is argued that they 
`so tipped the balance of events as to produce the known outcome' (PN, p. 83). 
It is left to Archer to fully explore the implications of this argument. 
However, if `beliefs cause real effects' (Potter, 2003, p. 162), agential reasons or 
intentions volitionally ground actions that support, enhance, conflict with or 
contradict existing social mores as well as the recognised or unrecognised interests of 
individual agents or groups, then, Bhaskar asserts, CR is employing a form of agential 
causal reasoning that is non-Humean and non-hermeneutic. Specifically, CR 
contradicts established (stereotyped) sociological approaches such as Durkheim's 
Humeanism which leads to the designation of agents as indeterminate matter 
(Thompson, 2004), a position antipathetic to the possibility of significant volitional 
agential action, whilst Weberian hermeneutics fails, according to PN, to adequately 
recognise material or external (structural) influences and constraints on individual 
thought and action. " 
Bhaskar designates long-term dispositions and, although he does not make 
the point, presumably those of especial strength, as nomic tendencies. Such 
tendencies orientate agents, consciously or otherwise, to adopt and articulate certain 
reasons as genuine rather than ad hoc rationalisations for action preferences and, in 
this way, CR connects philosophic ontology with social theory. For example, 
individual or agential reasoning and volition is here linked to interest bearing social 
structures. Significantly, reason initiated action need not cause the effect intended, 
or that effect alone and, although Bhaskar again fails to develop the point, no 
correlation can be assumed between reason directed action and consequence. 
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Agents may support, ignore or contravene existing social conventions, norms, rules 
or habits deliberately through conscious design or unthinkingly (unconsciously or 
unknowingly). However, social reproduction or transformation can ensue from 
intention as well as chance and thus the unintended outcome of support (witting or 
otherwise) may be transformation just as action aimed at change can reproduce 
(entrench) existing structures. It is the job of social theorists to explain what has or 
is occurring. 
The Transformational Model of Social Activity: 
For Bhaskar, `society does not consist of individuals [Or, we might add groups], but 
expresses the sum of the relations within which individuals [and groups] stand' (PN, 
p. 26 - parenthesis in original). Sociology is thus concerned with the nature and form 
of relations between individuals and society. However, disagreement exists regarding 
the factors (people or society) that are most significant in this process as well as the 
degree of freedom agents have, or do not have, in affecting social transformation. 
To describe existing sociological perspectives regarding the relationship between 
structure and agency and to advance CR social theory, PN presents four models, 
three of which, it is claimed, typify erroneous forms of empirical or idealist thought. 
Model I symbolises the Weberian tradition. Here, `social objects are seen as 
the results of (or constituted by) intentional or meaningful human behaviour' (PN, 
p. 32) i. e. society is the sum of voluntary individual actions (upwards conflation). 
Model I: The Weberian stereotype -'Reification' (PN, p. 36 - adapted) 
Society 
Individual 
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Model II: The Durkheimian stereotype -'Reification' (PN, p. 36 - adapted) 
Society 
Individual 
Model II, in contrast, represents the Durkheimian tradition. Here society is reified 
and agential freedom is curtailed. Durkheimian society possesses an independent 
existence and directs or coerces individual opportunities (downwards conflation). 
Further: With some stretching the various schools of social thought - 
phenomenology, existentialism, functionalism, structuralism etc. - can be seen as 
instances of one or other of these positions. And the varieties of Marxism can then 
also be neatly classified' (PN, p. 31-32). 
For Bhaskar, Humean inspired empiricist positivism is responsible for the 
Durkheimian stereotype (Model II). This form of social explanation is associated 
with, for example, distinguishing normalcy from deviance in a metrics of social 
health that creates `a sociology which sees in the spirit of discipline the essential 
condition of all human life' (Zeitlira, 1997, p. 362, citing Durkheim's [1895] The Ruler 
of the Sociological Method, p. 124). Alternatively, the idealist Weberian stereotype (Model 
I) might be accused of overplaying, for example, the ability of charismatic 
individuals to bypass or circumvent bureaucratic barriers to action (Adair-Toteff, 
2005). 
Model III: The `Dialectical' conception - `Illicit Identification' (PN, p. 
36 - 
adapted) 
Society Society 
Individual Individual 
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Model III (above) synthesises models I and II. It is linked, by Bhaskar, with the 
work of `Peter Berger and his associates' (PN, p. 32) and suggests that `society forms 
the individuals who create society; society, in other words, produces the individuals, 
who produce society in a continuous dialectic' (PN, p. 32). According to Bhaskar, 
model III reproduces rather than overcomes the shortcomings in models I and II. It 
elides or conflates social structures with agency by portraying society as the 
`objectivation or externalization of human beings. And human beings .. are the 
internalization or reappropriation in consciousness of society' (PN, p. 33). Bhaskar 
argues however, that: `People and society are not .. related `dialectically'. 
They do 
not constitute two moments of the same process. Rather they relate to radically 
different types of thing' (PN, p. 33). ß" Thus, whilst it is: 
true to say that society would not exist without human activity .. 
[it is 
equally] true to say that such activity would not occur unless the agents 
engaging in it had a conception of what they were doing (which is of course 
the fundamental insight of the hermeneutic tradition). But it is .. [not true] 
that agents create it. Rather one must say: they reproduce or trap form it .. 
Society stands to individuals .. as something that they never make, 
but that 
exists only in virtue of their activity. 
(PN, p. 33-34 - emphasis in original) 
The Durkheimian truth which model III loses is that society is `outside and `prior' to 
individuals for whom it is always `already made' (PN, p. 33 - emphasis in original). 
And, because society pre-exists individuals, cognitive or physical activity is `work on 
given objects' (PN, p. 34 - emphasis in original). Thus: `Speech requires language; 
making materials; action conditions; agency resources; activity rules' (PN, p. 34). This 
suggests to Bhaskar that society and persons share a `dual character. Society is both 
the ever-present condition (material cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of 
human activity. And praxis is both work, that is, conscious production, and (normally 
unconscious) reproduction of the conditions of production, that is society. One could 
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refer to the former as the duality of structure and the latter as the duality of praxis' (PN, 
p. 34-35 - emphasis in original). 
Model IV: The Transformational Model of the Society/Person Connection (PN, 
p. 36 - adapted) 
Society 
Socialisation 
reproduction/transformation 
Individuals 
01 
4 
II 
$I 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
In contrast to models I, II and III, Bhaskar allows that both society and individuals 
have specific emergent suigeneris powers and thus `the properties possessed by social 
forms may be very different from those possessed by the individuals upon whose 
activity they depend' (PN, p. 35). Model IV (above) purports to encapsulate this 
emergentist perspective. It illustrates what Bhaskar terms The Transformational 
Model of the Society/Person Connection and it is a model in which society: 
provides the necessary conditions for intentional human action, and 
intentional human action is a necessary condition for it. Society is only 
present in human action, but human action always expresses and utilises 
some or other social form. Neither can, however, be identified with, reduced 
to, explained in terms of, or reconstructed from the other. There is an 
ontological hiatus between society and people, as well as a mode of 
connection (viz. transformation) that the other models typically ignore .. on 
Model I there are actions but no conditions; on Model II conditions, but no 
actions; on Model III no distinction between the two. Thus in Durkheim, 
for example, subjectivity tends to appear only in the guise of the interiorised 
form of social constraint. But it should be equally clear, against voluntarism, 
that real subjectivity requires conditions, resources and media for the 
creative subject to act. 
(PN, p. 36-37) 
Bhaskar argues that in most instances people unconsciously (non-intentionally) 
reproduce or transform existing social structures and relations although, with 
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varying degrees of success, agents may consciously and deliberately act to refashion 
their environment. However, wittingly or unwittingly, reproduction or 
transformation always occurs through existing social structures and reproduction or 
transformation cannot be perceived (as CR claims hermeneutic and idealist thought 
permits) `as the immaculate product of unconditioned (`responsible') human 
decisions, free from the constraints (but presumably not the opportunities) inherited 
from the past and imposed by its environment' (PN, p. 37). 
Model V: Bhaskar's amended TMSA (1989, p. 94 - adapted) 
outcome 
12 
reproduction condition 
3 
1' 
reproduction/transformation 
production 1 4 
In response to criticism, '"` Bhaskar subsequently developed the TMSA and the 
revised schema (from Reclaiming Reality, 1989) is illustrated in model V (above). This 
amended and clarified form more clearly matches Archer's theorising towards a 
usable CR social methodology. Specifically, in model V: 
(a) the prior emergence and current influence of structural properties at points 
1 and 2, as the unintended consequences of past actions and 
unacknowledged conditions of contemporary activities, are now explicitly 
introduced: (b) their influence is to limit actor's understanding of their social 
world which is compounded, at 3 and 4, by limitations in self understanding, 
thus rendering the necessary production process .. the mediated product of agents 
who are far from highly knowledgeable about why they find themselves in 
the relations they do and why they do whatever they do in those situations: 
(c) the temporal phasing of the process is now prominent, the diagram is now 
a sequence through time -1 is the explicit outcome of an antecedent cycle 
and 1' signals the start of a new and different posterior cycle (if 
transformation ensues). If reproduction is the outcome, then we are in for a 
structural replay in the next cycle but not necessarily an action replay. 
(Archer, 1995, p. 155-6 - emphasis in original) 
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Agency and Structure - relational concepts: 
Since social structures are reproduced or transformed by the agents who sustain and 
are themselves sustained by society, the transformational model necessitates `a 
system of mediating concepts' (PN, p. 40) to link both parties. To this end: 
the mediating system we need is that of positions (places, functions, rules, 
tasks, duties, rights, etc. ) occupied (filled, assumed, enacted, etc. ) by 
individuals and of the practices (activities, etc. ) in which, in virtue of their 
occupancy of these positions (and visa versa), they engage. I shall call this 
mediating system the position-practice system. Now such positions and 
practices, if they are to be individualised at all, can only be done so 
relationally. 
(PN, p. 40-41 - emphasis in original) 
Bhaksar's argument here is akin to Marx's insistence that society does not consist of 
individuals but rather expresses the connections and relationships between individuals 
(Layder, 1994). Social analysis, which aims to discover the generative mechanisms 
that support and describe its structures, must perforce therefore commence with 
reference to actual social relations. Such relations may be between man and nature, 
man and social products (things) as well as between bodies (individuals or 
organisations, e. g. subjects and governments). '" Articulating these relations and 
explaining how they are sustained and transformed is the very core of sociology and 
since the reproduction or transformation that occurs between relations may be 
considered productions, sociology's subject matter is defined by Bhaskar as `relations 
of production' (PN. p. 44 - emphasis in original)? 
Internal and external relations: 
The sociology envisaged by the transformational model is concerned with 
`persistent relations between individuals (and groups), and with the relations between 
those relations (and between such relations and the nature and the products of such 
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relations)' (PN, p. 28-29 - emphasis in original). Recognising that society and agency 
are both sui generis entities allows Bhaskar to critique existing theories of relations. 
Humean causality is attacked for tending towards the idea that all relations are 
external, "" whilst `absolute idealists .. have usually subscribed to the equally 
erroneous view that all relations are internal' (PN, p. 42). In contrast, Bhaskar wishes 
to maintain that `some relations are internal, and some are not' (PN, p. 42). 
PN argues that: `A relation KEA may be defined as internal if and only if A 
would not be what it essentially is unless B is related to it in the way that it is. Ri113 is 
symmetrically internal if the same applies also to B. (`A' and `B' may designate 
universals or particulars, concepts or things, including relations. ) The relation 
bourgeoisie-proletariat is symmetrically internal; traffic warden-state asymmetrically 
internal; passing motorist-policeman not (in general) internal at all' (PN, p. 42-43). '"" 
Furthermore, it is `vital to appreciate that there can be no presumption of 
explanatory equality between the relata of an internal relationship .. Internally 
related aspects may command, as it were, differential causal force (PN, p. 43 - 
emphasis in original). Depending upon the nature of agential and structural 
relations, Bhaskar thus permits a cause or causes (e. g. reason R' and material interest 
Al') to act (normically) in trumping or overriding alternatives (e. g. reasons R2 and R3 
and material interest M2) and, in emphasising the emergent and dynamic nature of 
such interactions, Bhaskar differentiates his interpretation of Marx from alternative 
variants such as the `static and closed notion of a structure frozen in time' that is 
associated with Althusser (Layder, 1994, p. 53). l l" 
Conclusion to description of PN 
PN cements arguments for a qualified naturalism with a critique of Humean 
(naturalist) and hermeneutic (anti-naturalist) forms of social scientific theorising. It 
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also outlines a model of social explanation (TMSA) and, in this process, Bhaskar 
builds upon and develops those concepts originally advanced in RTS that describe 
the physical sciences. His achievement is to propose an ontologically stratified 
conception of society and agency that acknowledges their sui generis emergent 
nature whilst simultaneously avoiding the twin dangers of social reification and 
excessive agential voluntarism. As will be seen, Bhaskar's insights are extended by 
Margaret Archer in the construction of a theory and model of social explanation 
that moves yet closer towards the goal of usable theory. 
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Endnotes §1 Chapter 1 
' Carter (2000, p. 1) likewise suggests that realism may reconcile the threatened `divorce 
between social theory and empirical research, ' and Tudor (1982, p. 181) claims that Bhaskar 
reconnects `the discourse of the philosophy of science with that of sociological theory. ' See also 
Pawson (2006). 
The descriptor `movement' is difficult to define. Nevertheless, suggestive evidence for a 
realist movement is apparent. The UK Centre for Critical Realism (CCR) was founded in 1996 and 
The International Association for Critical Realism (IACR) was launched in 1998. The CCR 
newsletter Alethia has grown into the Journal of Critical Realism. Routledge publish two CR book series. 
The British Sociological Association (2004) inaugurated the Realism and Empirical Research group in 
2003 and, in the US, Utah University has been prominent in promoting discussion around Bhaskar's 
work. 
in CR now underpins activity in a number of fields albeit that Bhaskar's ideas are occasionally 
used erratically or loosely. With these caveats in mind it may be noted that CR informs work in: 
ecology and environmental studies (Benton, 2001), economics (Jamie, 2003; Lewis, 2003; Downward 
et al, 2002; Fleetwood, 1998; Foss, 1994), international relations Cones, 2002; Morgan, 2002a; Wight, 
1999), political theory Cones, 2003b; Patomäki, 2003), psychoanalysis (Clarke, 2003), religious or 
spiritual studies (Archer et a!, 2004a), social science (Williams, 2003c; Cruickshank 2002; Danermark 
et al, 2002; Harvey, 2002; Brante, 2001; Sayer, 2000), statistics (Amit, 2002), cultural studies 
(MacLennan and Thomas (2003), as well as applied or practical disciplines such as accountancy and 
business studies (Burrowes et al, 2004; Easton, 2002; Harrison and Easton, 2002), education (Scott, 
2005,2000), management theory (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Connelly, 2000), nursing 
(Littlejohn, 2003; McEvoy and Richards, 2003; Porter, 2001; Porter, 1998; Wainwright, 1997; Porter 
and Ryan, 1996), organisational and systems studies (l\lingers 2004; Del Casino Jr et al, 2000) and 
social work (Moren and Blom, 2003; Houston, 2001). 
IV Rolfe (2006a) and Olsen and Morgan (2005) likewise delineate methodology from methods. 
`Practice' refers here to scientific techniques of research and experimentation as well as 
social relations and interactions. 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2001 [1921]) questions the meaningfulness of metaphysical 
propositions whilst PhilorophicalInvestigations (1976 [1953]) suggests that, although philosophy clarifies 
and advances argument, it should not, cannot, adjudicate between positions (ibid, p. 49 [124] 
`Philosophy .. leaves everything as it is'). See also Biletzti (2004) on Wittgenstein and philosophy's 
use value. 
`'" Russell, according to Irvine (2004), thought philosophy only benefited the philosopher. 
ViU Pertaining to belief and the justification of belief. 
'x Realism's liberating potential rests on the negative-critical assumption that truth's 
consequents are preferable to those of falsehood (Wight, 2006, p. 35). This assumption is under- 
explored within RTS and PN and may be contested. Nevertheless, Trigg (2001, p. 237) notes that `it 
must be true that understanding what produces a situation may give us the ability to do something 
about it. Indeed there is little point in furthering social science if it is useless in helping to deal with 
the human world in which it is situated. ' Suggesting parallels between Bhaskar and Enlightenment 
ideals regarding the emancipatory potential of reason, Collier (1994, p. ix) records that Bhaskar opens 
Reclaiming Reality (1989, p. 1) with Kant's Enlightenment motto Sapere aude! - `Piave courage to use 
your own reason'. Further, by linking scientific theory with critical thought Bhaskar embodies 
Enlightenment thinking insofar as his work resembles Zeitlin's (1997, p. 2) description of the 
Philosophes for whom rational discourse `was no longer merely a matter of abstract thinking. It 
acquired the practical function of asking critical questions about existing institutions and demanding 
that the unreasonable ones .. be changed .. Enlightenment thinking, then had a negative-critical as well 
as a positive side' (emphasis in original). Wilson and McCormack (2006) connect CR's emancipatory 
potential with nursing via critical theory and realistic evaluation. 
41 
Many theorists lament sociology's internal fragmentation (e. g. lledström, 2005; Brante, 
2001; Tudor, 1982; Bernstein, 1979). For Bhaskar (RTS, p. 195) the `trouble with social science .. 
is 
not that it has no (or too many) paradigms or research programmes; but rather it lacks an adequate 
general conceptual scheme. ' 
xi These terms include realist theory (RTS, p. 20), transcendental realism (RTS, p. 25), critical 
realism (PN, foreword 3'' edition), dialectical critical realism (PN, foreword 3«1 edition), critical 
theory (PN, p. 94), critical naturalism (PN, p. 147) and `depth realism' (Wight, 2006, p. 33). Collier 
(1994, p. xi) describes the evolution of the term `CR' whilst Groff (2004, p. 10) connects 
terminological and theoretical developments across an extended period. 
xii See pages 9-12 this thesis. 
xi For Bhaskar empirical realism refers to the idea that `the only objects which exist are those 
that have been perceived' (Groff, 2004, p. 34). So used, the descriptor summarises Humean thought 
and produces, according to Bhaskar, the epistemic fallacy (p. 12 this thesis). However, if observation 
and perception are not clearly delineated, the term may also be seen as `a prime example of subjective 
idealism' (Groff, 2004, p. 34) a trait associated by Bhaskar with Kant. The ability of this descriptor to 
refer to traditions associated with both Hume and Kant may (i) highlight the influence of Fiume upon 
Kant and/or (ii) it might illustrate the lax use of terminology by Bhaskar (discussed §1 Chapter 3). 
xiv Deduction here refers to a form of reasoning reliant upon logical inference where 
conclusions inescapably follow premises (Trigg 2001). 
xv Following Baert (1998), positivism refers to a radical form of inductive naturalistic 
philosophy that denies metaphysical claims regarding the ontological reality of unobservable 
structures or powers. Induction refers to reasoning from observed occurrences; it is associated with a 
posteriori reasoning (Upton, 1999). 
x`i Idealism describes the `view that existence depends logically on perception by a mind' 
(Trigg, 2001, p. 257). Sprigge (2002, p. 219) more exhaustively defines idealism as involving acceptance 
of one or more of the following propositions: `(1) Nothing really exists which is not mental or mind- 
dependent. (2) Physical things are really mental. (3) Physical things are really mind-dependent. (4) 
The fact that a physical thing exists is really simply the fact that it would be perceived under certain 
circumstances. ' These propositions differ in the degree to which they delineate perception from the 
thing perceived. Proposition `1' describes a radical or strong form of idealism that denies the 
existence of mind independent reality whereas proposition `4' might be accepted, with caveats, by 
many non-idealists. 
x°" §1 Chapter 3 suggests that Bhaskar misidentifies Kantian transcendental idealism - 
transcendental reasoning in CR is also critiqued. 
x°'ii Originally linked with scriptural interpretation, hermeneutics is now claimed by many 
disciplines and perspectives. Paul Natorp promoted its value in historical study (Kim, 2004). Fredrich 
Schelling's Naturphilorophie employed hermeneutic arguments to situate nature's significance beyond 
the restrictions of positivistic science (Bowie, 2004). Wilhelm Wundt, co-founder with William James 
of experimental psychology, sought to explore higher mental processes non-experimentally through 
völkerprychologie, the hermeneutic study of culture (Thomas, 2004b). And Paul Ricoeur advocated that 
the study of man combine phenomenological description with hermeneutic interpretation of 
linguistic mediating structures (Dauenhauer, 2004). Associated with idealist conceptions regarding 
the significance and place of language in human thought and understanding, hermeneutics traces the 
creation of meaning through linguistic analysis, the study of signs, signifiers, symbols and texts. 
ILK For Kaidesoja (2005, p. 50) `the meaning of the term `naturalism' is controversial .. 
it is used 
differentially in different contexts. ' 
xx Winch (1958, p. 3), who pointedly rejects the concept, notes that the `Underlabourer 
Conception of Philosophy' is associated with Locke. 
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xx' The significance of CR for social theory is recognised by Groff (2004). She suggests CR 
offers `a more complete break with positivism' (ibid, p. 8) than post-positivist (idealist) and 
postmodern (relativist) alternatives and critical realism, which is `primarily an account of causality' 
(ibid, p. 2), achieves this by proscribing `relativism on ontological grounds' (ibid, p. 1). 
XXU A similar point is made by Howson (2000), though not in relation to CR. Further, Rees 
(2008) asserts that theoretical astrophysicists postulate the existence of multi- or bubble-universes 
that, in principle, cannot be observed or known through effects. 
xxw So that `meaning has a history' (Harre and Madden, 1998, p. 111). 
XXIV However, to anticipate §1 Chapter 3's critique of Bhaskar's reading of flume, it should be 
noted that Hume similarly recognises that `we cannot directly perceive causal powers, and thus our 
belief in causal relations cannot be justified by appeal to experience' (Stern, 2000, p. 190). 
xxv Many social theories invoke the concept of mechanism; Hedström (2005, p. 25), a non-CR 
realist, provides a typology of such theories. 
xXvi Demonstrating the ontic status of unknowable and unperceivable entities or laws is 
problematic. Bhaskar asserts that `there are (or may be) laws which are unknowable; and .. there are 
(or may be) laws whose instances are unperceivable' (RTS, p. 59-60). However, this bold claim might 
benefit from greater explication (for example, see Priest, 2000). Lycan (2002) and Pruss (2002) 
examine, from a non-CR perspective, the logic and paradoxes inherent in such theorising. 
xxvu Bhaskar differentiates between two types of tendency. First, a tendency is `just a power 
which may be exercised unrealised, a power normically qualified' (RTS, p. 229). Second, in the social 
realm, `All men .. possess the power to steal; kleptomaniacs possess the tendency to 
do so' (RTS, 
p. 230). This is an important clarification because: `In distinguishing in this way between tendencies 
and powers we are able to avoid the dilemma of supposing either that all behaviour is law-like or that 
some events are uncaused' (RTS, p. 230). 
xx""' Bhaskar ascribes original use of the term `normic' to Scriven (1959). 
xx'x Two points might be made here. First, Haldane (2002, p. 101) notes that Aquinas and 
scholastic-Aristotelian discussion regarding the essential nature of substances or properties involves 
the belief that altere sequitur esse (acting follows upon being) and being acts ab intrinseco (from within). 
Without arguing for too direct a linkage it could be suggested that CR and Thomist thought share 
certain orientating concepts and CR ideas on emergence might be pressed to demonstrate this 
linkage. Secondly, the concept of emergence can be coupled to ideas of subvening or supervening 
entities, multiple realisation or non-reductive materialism (Rose, 2006; McLaughlin and Bennett, 
2005; Sawyer, 2002; Le Boutillier, 2001). Terms such as supervenience are variously interpreted 
(McLaughlin and Bennett, 2005) and analogies with CR should not be pushed too far. Nevertheless, 
supervenience supports the argument that `biological properties plausibly supervene upon chemical 
ones; mental properties upon chemical ones .. 
[and] One promise the notion holds out is that by its 
means we can understand the relation of such different layers of description without attempting a 
reduction of the one area to the other' (Blackburn, 1994, p. 368). Important differences separate 
Bhaskar's concept of emergence from ideas concerning strong supervenience (Le Boutillier, 2001) 
albeit that connections between these ideas are recognised (Sawyer, 2002; Le Boutillier, 2001). The 
term supervenience does not appear in RTS or PN and Rose (2006, p. 22) restricts its technical 
application to `the materialist mind-body relationship'. However, in ethical study it is associated with 
Hare (Blackburn, 1994) who is cited in both RTS and PN. Arguments challenging the concept of 
emergence come from a variety of sources including Heard (2006), Rose (2006) and Hedström 
(2005). 
Xxx Blaikie (2000) disagrees. He questions whether new and ever deeper levels exist in the social 
realm since social mechanisms derive from social constructions (this does not imply constructivism). 
Blaikie (ibid) implies that social stratification is ontologically shallower than physical stratification. 
xxx' Bhaskar argues that Weber and Durkheim reify their objects of study. Bhaskar does not 
recognise Durkheim as an influence in CR thinking and Durkheim's model of social explanation is 
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critiqued in RTS. Nevertheless, just as Marxist insights litter Bhaskar's work, so links can easily be 
made between CR and aspects of Durkheim's thought (see endnote xlvi, 51 Chapter 3). 
xxxü However, note Dawkins. (1999) comments regarding the misuse by sociologists of reductive 
labels in relation to socio-biology. 
=xxw More properly, the term `compositional nihilism' (which denies the existence of composite 
entities) should perhaps be used here. See Rosen and Dorr (2002) for a discussion of compositional 
nihilism and the mereological challenge. 
xxxiv To aid descriptive clarity Archer's metaphors of upwards and downwards conflation are 
introduced here. 
: xxv Bhaskar's position is perhaps synonymous with the third of Alexander et als (1987, p. 14) 
five definitions of micro-macro relations in social theory: that `socialised individuals re-create society 
as a collective force through contingent acts of freedom. ' 
=xxvi Or, possibly, monadic properties (Swoyer, 2000). 
x==vi Correspondence theories of truth (and many such theories exist) suggest language (a human 
construction) can truthfully or accurately describe material non-human and human or social objects 
(their powers, attributes etc). Epistemologically, correspondence theories are usually contrasted 
against coherence theories (Rose, 2006); however, Bhaskar (1998a, p. 651) situates correspondence 
theories alongside Marxist, `coherence, pragmatic, redundancy, performative, consensus and Hegelian 
theories'; as well as his own Alethic theory which, as Potter (2006) critically notes, defines Alethic 
truth as ontological truth. Here `truth is itself simply a category mistake. Truth is inescapably 
epistemological .. [whereas] `Things', `powers', `causal mechanisms' etc. are neither true nor 
false; 
they simply are (ibid, p. 102 - emphasis in original). 
xxxvii For Kant, `intuition and the organizing principles of our understanding .. partly constitute the 
objects of our experience .. [so that] the objects of our cognitive experience (and our empirical knowledge) have to conform to our ways of cognizing (or knowing) them, not visa versa' (Kaidesoja, 
2005, p. 33). Contra Berkley, Kant did not hold that `everything is mental' (Butchvarov, 2002, p. 283); 
however, Kantian argument is associated with the idea that knowledge or truth claims exist within an 
ideational rystem (a concept allied with certain forms of coherence theory) and, in some versions of this 
system, the external referent becomes tenuous or attenuated. The validity or standing of knowledge 
and truth claims within an ideational system is judged by their closeness of fit to or within the system 
and this; it is argued, undercuts or inverts, from a realist perspective, the relation between knowledge 
and externality. A criticism of coherence theory, (arguably not dissimilar to Aristotle's Principle of 
Non-Contradiction or inter-belief rationalisation, Stern, 2000) is that truth or knowledge claims may, 
if erroneous, be difficult to refute because they are buttressed by the totality of the ideational system. 
Alternatively, irrespective of their truthfulness, knowledge claims may come to be seen as false if the 
system in which they are embedded collapses into disrepute. 
xxxix Tudor (1982, p. 73) likewise notes that: `Any analysis of science which is strongly rooted in 
empiricism is bound to have difficulties here, difficulties even in answering the primary question: 
why do we have theories at all? .. The root of the problem .. [lies] with the central empiricist act of faith: commitment to the view that science's achievements stemmed from its constant reference to 
the empirical. ' 
'1 Of course the social world is patterned and Bhaskar, as Engholm (1999) notes, introduces 
the concept of limited `conditional predictions' in recognition of this fact (PN, p. 176). Thus CR, 
whilst denying the feasibility of social prediction, nevertheless recognises a distinction between 
conjunctions and constant conjunctions. As Potter (2003, p. 163) points out: `There are many 
empirically observable relatively enduring regularities in the social world. Indeed .. without such 
it 
would be impossible for human beings to navigate this world. The existence of agency and open 
systems does not rule out empirically observable regularity. Nor does it rule out the possibility of 
useful quantitative statistical analysis or mathematical modelling. ' However, for Bhaskar, Humean 
closed system laws do not and cannot generate empirically observable constant (invariable) 
conjunctions in open systems. 
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=li Contra Bhaskar, a distinction might here be made between phenomenologist idealists (who 
may make strong ex nihilo claims) and social constructionist idealists (who need not). See §1 Chapter 
3. Paley (2005) notes that, in nursing texts, phenomenologist, constructionist and other idealist 
standpoints are often conflated. 
xlü Professor Steve Fleetwood - personal communication 16.10.07. 
Xhi Linking deductive logic with Hume and inductive logic with Kant might be considered 
simplistic. 
xliv Specifically, Bhaskar attacks the Popper-Hempel explanatory model (wherein he links 
explanation with prediction) and the consequents, though not the essence, of Popper's argument 
against historicism. Thornton (2004) summarizes Popper's definition of historicism as a belief in 
historical determinism. 
'lv Tudor (1982) similarly recognises that problems attend divisions between naturalist and 
anti-naturalist approaches in social theory and he states that: `it has become common in sociology to 
claim that the fact that social actors are active agents necessitates a non-naturalistic social study. One 
of the disturbing features of such claims is that they invariably lead to a neglect of structure in favour 
of a subjectivist viewpoint' (ibid, p. 180-1 - emphasis in original). 
xlvi However, contra Bhaskar, CR theorists have argued that (i) quantification is not invariably 
nomothetic (quantification is not synonymous with positivism) and (ii) it is possible to measure 
qualitative change (New, 2001). Williams and Dyer (2004) even argue that CR can and must develop 
a theory of predictive probability. 
xlw `To posit an essential unity of scientific method is to posit an account which conceives the 
sciences as unified in the form that scientific knowledge takes, the reasoning by which it is produced 
and the concepts in terms of which its production can be most adequately theorised or 
reconstructed' (PN, p. 18). 
xlvi' Bhaskar does not refer to Gottlob Frege in either RTS or PN. However, in some respects 
Frege's theory of language resonates closely with elements of CR philosophy. For example, Frege 
distinguishes between the referents of ordinary and special case statements. This differentiation 
permits speakers to advance propositions that, whilst truthful for them, do not accord with reality 
(Zalta, 2004; Dummett, 1991; Dummett 1973). In this way, Frege's argument complements Bhaskar's 
insight that social explanations should take into account agential reasoning without committing itself 
to the idea that agential interpretations are necessarily primal or final. CR interest in Frege comes 
from authors such as Arp (2005). And non-CRs, such as Stroud (2000) describe Frege's philosophy 
in a manner reminiscent of, or translatable into, Bhaskarian nomenclature. 
xlix The term `action' can presumably imply the possibility of inaction as a choice (deliberate or 
otherwise). 
Bhaskar apparently takes an incompatibilist position akin to that developed by Kane (2007, 
2005) in order to grant agents the emergent power to effect change and resist social or external 
determination. However, the relationship between reasons, intentions, causes and actions is complex 
and contested (Eng, 2006). Counter-intuitively compatibilists such as Fisher (2007) and determinists 
such as Pereboom (2007) allow agent-structure distinctions to be maintained. Further, a close reading 
of Pereboom (ibid) suggests that some forms of determinism are not antithetical to CR ideas 
regarding emergence. Bhaskar's reticence in discussing this issue is surprising given CR's focus on 
causality. This topic would benefit from additional theoretic clarification. 
h Equating Durkheim with Humeanism and Weber with hermeneutics is contentious. As 
stated, §1 Chapter 3 critiques Bhaskar's terminological usage. 
s' However, from within a realist perspective, Dean (in Dean et al, 2006a) problematises the 
idea that society and people are radically different things. 
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liii It was suggested that although the two-way arrows in the TMSA distinguish CR from 
upwards and downwards conflationary models `the features which are repressed in this 
representation (historicity, emergence and mediation) [did not sufficiently] .. separate the 
TMSA 
from central conflation' (Archer, 1995, p. 155). 
by Contra Bhaskar (e. g. see PN, p. 41), Archer is prepared to examine individual psycho-social 
historical perspectives (developed §2 Chapter 2). 
I° By using the phrase relations of production, Bhaskar self-consciously invokes Marx and in 
particular Marx's [1848] Wage Labour and Capital (Bottomore and Rubel, 1963). As the following 
quotation illustrates, strong ties link Bhaskar's interpretation of social reality with Marx: 'The social 
relations within which individuals produce, the social relations of production, are altered, tranformed, with the 
change and development of the material means of production, of the forcer of production. The relations of pro duction in 
their totality constitute what is called the social relations, society, and moreover, a society at a definite stage of 
historical development, a society with a unique and distinctive character (Marx, [1848] - Bottomore 
and Rubel, 1963, p. 156 - emphasis in original). 
Ivi A critique endorsed by GE Moore (Baldwin, 1993). 
I%qi However, first, Engelskirchen (1996) recognises that agents are unlikely to be aware of such 
issues, second, Bhaskar here introduces the concept of `universal' (and perhaps by implication it's 
modern denotation, `property) without sufficient explanation. Aune (2002) notes the existence of at 
least three major classes of theory concerning universals (i. e. those derived from or associated with 
Platonic, Aristotelian and trope theories). Bhaskar's use of the term may be incompatible with 
significant aspects of each theory or its variants and it is not necessarily clear which, if any, of these 
concepts Bhaskar is referring to at this or other points in RTS and PN. 
lVfii Althusser employed Marx's later dialectical materialist writings to emphasise the deep power 
of social mechanisms to maintain stability (reproduction) (MIA, 2005; Althusser, 2003 and 1962). 
This perspective downplays the transformatory ability of agency. However, see Dean (2006) for a 
positive CR reading of Althusser. 
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Section 1- Chapter 2 
Applied and theoretical realist sociologies owing a considerable debt to Roy Bhaskar 
have been advanced by authors such as Layder (1997,1994,1990), Pawson (2006, 
1989), Pawson and Tilley (1997) and Sayer (2000). Archer is used in this study since 
she has, arguably, developed the fullest and most nuanced realist sociology to date. 
Margaret Archer 
Margaret Archer is a major theorist whose `accomplishment cannot be overstated' 
(Potter, 2003, p. 161): Together with Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie, she edits 
two realist Routledge book series, Critical realism: Interventions and Studies in Critical 
Realism. Archer is a member of the editorial advisory committee for the journal of 
Critical Realism and a Trustee of the Centre for Critical Realism. 
In addition to those texts by Bhaskar already described, this thesis is 
informed by Archer's Realist Social Theory: the morphogenetic approach (1995, henceforth 
RST, not to be confused with Bhaskar's RTS) and Culture and Agency: The place of 
culture in social theory (1996, first published 1988, henceforth CAA). " Both texts 
combine forms of transcendental realism and qualified naturalism to extend and 
apply CR to social theory for use in research practice. 
As the title suggests, RST is an overtly CR text. The frontispiece claims it is 
`the sociological complement of transcendental realism"" and the social theory it 
advances is described as `the practical methodological complement of the realist 
social ontology' (RST, p. 16). However, CAA is more reticent in acknowledging its 
antecedents. Bhaskar provides the main philosophic scaffolding that Archer builds 
upon in RST and CAA. Yet despite Archer's sustained and intimate involvement in 
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the realist movement Bhaskar's name is absent from the main index of C4A and 
realism's significance is not specifically mentioned until page 275 of the second and 
revised edition. 
Archer's relationship with realism is therefore complex. She occasionally 
uses Bhaskarian terms without clarification, '" her developed theory evidences input 
from non-realist sources and, as acknowledged, CR themes are occasionally 
introduced in RST without being exploited. For example, Archer follows but does 
not develop arguments from PNwhen she states that: 
In any field of study, the nature of what exists cannot be unrelated to how it 
is studied. This is a strong realist statement, which I endorse, but cannot 
explore here. 
(RST, p. 1 G) 
As might be expected in works written for researchers rather than philosophers, CR 
concepts such as emergence, stratification, open system explanation and the 
impossibility of experimental social closure are, compared with ITS and PN, 
relatively underdeveloped in RST and CAA. In consequence, this thesis occasionally 
employs CR terminology (e. g. generative mechanisms, intransitive reality or 
transitive knowledge) to clarify meaning where Archer points towards, but does not 
necessarily use, Bhaskar's nomenclature. It might be suggested that this 
misrepresents Archer, though, hopefully, this is not the case. 
Morphogenetic-Morphostatic Theory - an overview: 
Like Bhaskar, Archer is concerned with the nature of causal reasoning in social 
explanation. She begins RST and CAA (mirroring the structure of RTS and PN) by 
debunking the direction and implications of causal argument in alternative forms of 
social theory. In RST these alternative forms are `identical' (p. 139) with models I, II 
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and III in PN, i. e. downwards, upwards (epiphenomenal) and central (ehsionary) 
theoretical stereotypes. " Thereafter, Archer combines Lockwood's (1964) concept of 
analytic dualism (henceforth AD) with CR philosophy, overtly or otherwise, to 
produce, following Buckley's (1967) terminology, the morphogenetic-morphostatic 
model (henceforth MM) of social interaction. " 
For Archer, MM is `the practical methodological embodiment of the realist 
social ontology' (RST, p. 16) and AD is `the basis of the morphogenetic approach' 
(1ST, p. 165). AD treats structure (both cultural and social"") and agency as distinct 
but interacting emergent entities and this enables Archer (RST, p. 65) to argue that 
sociological explanation need not privilege the causal significance of either society's 
`parts' or `people' on a priori grounds. In contrast to antithetical epiphenomenal and 
elisionist theories, MM exploits the `explanatory power'"iii (ISST, p. 171) that derives 
from dealing separately with society's features and, moreover, Archer maintains that 
ontological substance accompanies this `analytic distinctness' (RST, p. 171), i. e. the 
things described possess discrete essences ix 
Notwithstanding the emphasis placed upon Lockwood by Archer, it may be 
argued that he is unnecessary to MM since AD is, as Archer acknowledges, 
presupposed within CR and, in particular PN, wherein `separability is indispensable 
to realism' (ISST, p. 70). " Nevertheless, ignoring this quibble, the centrality of CR and 
AD is apparent in the two founding principles of MM; first, that `structure 
necessarily pre-dates the action(s) leading to its reproduction or transformation .. 
[and second] That structural elaboration necessarily post-dates the action sequences 
which give rise to it' (RST, p. 15) X' It might at this point be suggested that 
recognising the historical pre-existence of structure inadvertently undercuts the 
volitional capacity of agency. However, the powers inherent in agential emergence 
preclude determinism and Archer would not therefore countenance this criticism. 
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In their developed form (to be discussed), these two principles underpin a 
three part explanatory cycle, i. e. `structural conditioning --+ social interaction --º 
structural elaboration' (AST, p. 16). (Analogues exist for social and cultural 
structures, as well as primary and corporate forms of agency. ) And this cycle 
generates as its final product a narrative or `analytical history of emergence' (R. S'T, 
p. 91 - emphasis in original). 
Several CR and AD themes are thereby introduced or suggested which 
enable MM to avoid explanatory conflation whilst recognising the stratified, open 
and nomic nature of social reality and causation. For example, temporality, which is 
intrinsic to CR philosophy (Dean et al, 2006b) `is incorporated as sequential tracts 
and phases rather than simply as a medium through which events take place' (RST, 
p. 89). And it is in or through this medium that distinct processes of generative 
activity and their elaborative `emergent consequences' (RST, p. 62) occur or 
function. Similarly, AD underpins the idea that structural or agential analytic 
histories can be told apart from the entities with which they interact and overlap. 
And, in consequence, MM makes it possible to theorise about the differential 
morphogenesis (change) or morphostasis (non-change) occurring between 
structures and agents over time. Another way of putting this is that agential or 
cultural- or socio-structural developments need not take place synchronously (i. e. 
cultural- or social structural as well as agential change may occur in any order). 
This form of causal reasoning can only be accommodated by emergentist 
theory, it is denied to epiphenomenalists and elisionists. Thus, using CR 
nomenclature, upward conflationists rebut the suggestion that structure may in 
some instances be unaffected by agential change or that structural change could 
precede or promote agential change since structure is, for them, simply an 
epiphenomena or reflection of agential activity (structure cannot be granted sui 
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generis status). " Alternatively, downward conflationists (e. g Althusser, 2003) reject 
the idea that agents may be relatively unaffected by structural developments since 
agents, as anonymous träger, instantiate and objectify structure. And elisionists, who 
by definition conjoin structure with agency, deny the possibility that their interplay 
can be separately investigated or differentially described. 
MM develops CR social theory in three ways. First, it elaborates upon and 
updates Bhaskar's critique of non-CR social theory (e. g. by redirecting the attack 
upon elisionism towards Giddens). Second, it exposes and improves upon 
deficiencies in Bhaskar's original TMSA as well as a later version of this model in 
Reclaiming Reality (Bhaskar, 1989) (page 36 this thesis). Third, whilst accepting realist 
arguments concerning emergence, openness and the impossibility of prediction, 
Archer outlines the beginning of a practical methodology for use. She therefore 
emphasises society's potential comprehensibility and the possibility of explanation. 
"' 
Methodological Theory and Research Practice 
Archer connects claims that social explanation inevitably contains ontological 
premises with assertions that methodological theory (the means by which such 
issues are formally addressed) must usefully guide practice if it is to be of any real 
value. Indeed, `methodology broadly conceived of as an explanatory programme, is 
the necessary link between social ontology and practical theory' (RST, p. 5). Archer 
follows Bhaskar in arguing that abstract theories about what is admissible in or for 
explanation are ineffectual unless they can fruitfully inform research so that more 
accurate accounts of reality are developed (progress being an aspirational objective 
rather than a guaranteed outcome) and theory is therefore purposeful: `It is never an 
end in itself but a tool for the working social analyst which gives explanatory 
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purchase on substantive social problems, through supplying the framework for their 
investigation' (RST, p. 12-13). Thus: 
Social theory has to be useful and usable .. The vexatious 
fact of society has 
to be tackled in and for practice. These two tasks cannot be separated, for 
were practical utility to be the sole criterion we would commit ourselves to 
instrumentalism - to working with theoretically ungrounded rules of thumb. 
Conversely, a purely theoretical taming of the vexing beast may give a warm 
inner glow of ontological rectitude but is cold comfort to practical social 
analysis. 
(AST, p. 135 - emphasis in original) 
Archer therefore sketches in RST and CAA a methodology for practical social 
theorising. She acknowledges that her work `remains at a high level of theoretical 
abstraction and at certain points becomes purely speculative for want of appropriate 
data' (CAA, p. xxviii). MM, as a conceptual theory, presents orientating principles 
for social research. It is about method but it is not a method (New, 2001). As will be 
seen, abstractness and the provisional nature of realist social theory mean that 
Archer's work is susceptible to criticism. Nevertheless, MM provides researchers 
with some basic guidance if not a detailed map to help them proceed"' and hers is 
therefore a work (to borrow from a rival theoretician): 
about `method' in .. the sense in which Durkheim used it in 
his Ruler of 
Sociological Method. That is to say, it is not a guide to `how to do practical 
research', and it does not offer any specific research proposals. It is primarily 
an exercise in clarification of logical issues. 
(Giddens, 1976, p. 8) 
Archer is contrite in acknowledging that realist theory is underdeveloped, `a mess .. 
with few worthwhile offerings' (RST, p. 136). However, her response is that the `only 
thing to do is admit it, confront it, and hope to do something about it' (RST, p. 136). 
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As part of this response she emphasises that social explanation's theoretical 
underpinnings must be acknowledged head-on. 
.. no social theory can 
be advanced without making some assumptions 
about what kind of reality it is dealing with and how to explain it. All social 
theory is ontologically shaped and methodologically moulded even if these 
processes remain covert and scarcely acknowledged by the practitioner. 
(RST, p. 57-58) 
Following RTS, Archer suggests that `social reality, ought to regulate how we 
explain it' (BST, p. 21) and she therefore agrees with Bhaskar that `what social reality 
is held to be cannot but influence how society is studied .. [since] there 
is always a 
connection between social ontology and explanatory methodology' (RST, p. 13). 
Ontology, epistemology and methodology are thus mutually implicative. (`An 
ontology without a methodology is deaf and dumb; a methodology without an 
ontology is blind'. RST, p. 28. )X° However, within this triptych ontology dominates. 
Primacy emanates from ontology's ability to regulate and `govern those concepts which 
are deemed admissible in explanation as in description' (RST, p. 20 - emphasis in 
original). It is `both gatekeeper and bouncer for methodology' (RST, p. 22). 
Epiphenomenalism and Elisionism in social explanation (Hume's ghost) 
Archer critiques epiphenomenalism and elisionism in individualist and collectivist 
forms of social explanation. For Sawyer (2002, p. 537) the debate between individual 
and collectively orientated perspectives `occurs at two levels: an ontological level, 
concerning arguments about what entities and properties exist in the world, and a 
methodological or epistemological level, concerning the proper way to proceed in 
scientific practice. ' Archer engages with both of these levels. 
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Whereas RTS and PN commence with a frontal assault upon the legacy of 
Hume and Kant, Archer begins her critique of epiphenomenalism (in RSZ) 
by 
introducing the work of Alexander et al (1987). This is not however, a radical 
departure, for it permits her to stick with familiar Bhaskarian themes. She suggests 
(mirroring Alexander et al, ibid) that debates within social science about society and 
the individual, voluntarism versus determinism, micro-macro 
levels of analysis or 
structure and agency, can all 
be understood as re-descriptions of an essentially, 
similar problem, viz: `The perennial conflict between individualistic and collectivist 
theories' (RST, p. 7). Archer thus trails Bhaskar in critiquing those forms of social 
causal reasoning that PN describes as Humean or Durkheimian collectivist or 
downwards conflationary and Kantian or Weberian individualist or upwards 
conflationary. Since the form of this criticism was outlined in relation to Bhaskar's 
models I, and II (pages 33 and 34 this thesis), it is presumed that the fundamental 
`problem' with both variants is recognised and, if this is granted then, for Archer: 
In the heritage of Individualism it was `structure' which became the inert 
and dependent element, whilst Collectivism fostered instead the 
subordination and neglect of `agency'. 
(RST, p. 33) 
Obvious difficulties attend the collapse of different and nuanced non-realist social 
theories into a simple and perhaps simplistic opposition (i. e. individualism vs. 
collectivism). "' Nevertheless, differentiating between ideational protagonists in this 
manner enables Archer to claim, following Bhaskar, that it is an uncritical `rooting in 
empiricism' (RST, p. 8) which ultimately grounds, by realist criteria, the historic 
failure of each epiphenomenal tradition-"° And thus, whilst UK theorists discussed 
the problem of structure and agency and North Americans investigated scope or 
micro-macro-sociology it is empiricism which bedevils both standpoints' (RST, 
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p. 28). Accordingly, empiricism or the perceived need to base explanation in 
observables (behaviour or speech) provided: 
individualists with their trump card (for who could doubt the existence of 
flesh-and-blood people) and the collectivists with their stumbling block 
(since how could they validate the existence of any property unless they 
could translate it into a series of observational statements about people). 
The American debate was even more unabashed in its positivism, since its 
defining terms, the `micro-' and the `macro-' necessarily dealt only with an 
observable property, that is site. 
(RST, p. 8 - emphasis in original) 
As will be seen, Archer argues that this micro-macro distinction (and by analogy the 
agency-structure debate) is more usefully conceptualised in terms of relations rather 
than bulk. However, before outlining the role of relational theorising in MM, the 
significance of the absence of this dynamic within epiphenomenal and elisionary 
reasoning is noted. 
Archer argues that individualist and idealist social methodological theories 
(e. g. phenomenology or hermeneutics) fail to adequately address (and therefore 
underestimate) the enabling possibilities and constraining realities that society 
generates for agents. And thus, despite protestations to the contrary, theorists with 
an individualist or idealist orientation inevitably minimise or ignore the significance 
of exterior structural (social or cultural) factors when describing concrete 
interactions. Downplaying the impact of structural factors in social explanation 
allows agency to assume unwarranted freedoms. This occurs, Archer argues, 
because individualist theories erroneously privilege the demonstrably objective and 
empirically verifiable reality of face-to-face interaction between small groups of 
people. And although MM provides scant guidance as to how particular 
interpretations of reality and abstract social theory are to be reconciled by 
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researchers, it is important to avoid an overemphasis upon personal (respondent) 
understandings in explanation for, as Archer notes: 
To the social realist there is no `isolated' micro world - no lebsenwelt 
`insulated' from the socio-cultural system in the sense of being uncontrolled 
by it, nor a hermetically sealed domain whose day-to-day doings are 
guaranteed to be of no systemic `import'. 
(RST, p. 10 - italicisation in original) 
Structuralists and collectivists are also chided by Archer for failing to draw the 
correct ontological conclusion which, she claims, their explanatory success would 
permit, namely that `a causal criterion of existence is acceptable' (RST, p. 23). Archer 
asserts that historically, theorists such as Mandelbaum (1959)"' and Gellner 
(1968)"' recognised links between causation and ontological veracity as well as the 
role that emergence plays in this process. However, at the time that they wrote, the 
`framework of empiricism' (KST, p. 50) presented a `brick wall' (RST, p. 52) insofar as 
non-observables, which collectivists identified as influencing social life, could not 
`be `pointed to' in the sense in which we can point to material or organic objects, or 
to their qualities or activities' (ISST, p. 52) and they therefore failed to meet empiric 
criteria for existence. Like Bhaskar, Archer claims that what had yet to be discerned 
was that agreeing to `play a purely methodological game according to Humean rules 
.. undermines the Collectivist programme' (ISST, p. 55) since for 
`most of the time, 
in open social systems, regularities at the level of events are just what emergent 
features do not generate' (RST, p. 54). Conflict between individualist or idealist and 
structural or collectivist perspectives was however, then and now, often cloaked and 
the `unsatisfactory' (RST, p. 58) nature of social theory often bypassed researchers 
who continued in: 
56 
a state of inarticulate unawareness .. at one extreme 
interpretive sociologists 
undertook small-scale interactional studies and simply placed a big etc. after 
them, implying that the compilation of enough sensitive ethnographies 
would generate an understanding of society by aggregation. At the other, 
large scale multivariate analysis pressed on towards some predictive goal 
without reference to the interactional processes generating such variables. 
(R5T, p. 58) 
Archer does not explain why this state of inarticulate unawareness had to end. However, 
in outlining the historical development of elisionism, she proposes that `idealist' 
(ISST, p. 60) neo-phenomenological and symbolic interactionists were the first to 
attempt to surmount or evade the limitations associated with traditional individualist 
and collectivist approaches by merging structure with agency. Thereafter, `mutual 
constitution' (RST, p. 60) or elision (model III, page 34 this thesis) developed into a 
`distinctive theoretical orientation' (RST, p. 60) when Giddens (1976), the apogee of 
elisionist thinking for Archer, advanced Structuration Theory (henceforth ST). " 
For Bhaskar, Berger personified elisionist social explanation. Archer 
acknowledges Berger's influence (RST, p. 63), but primarily critiques elisionism 
through an attack upon ST which, she asserts, illegitimately conjoins structure and 
agency to preclude `examination of their interplay, of the effects of one upon the 
other and of any statement about their relative contribution to stability and change 
at any given time' (BST, p. 14). ST, Archer claims, is grounded upon the idea that 
language is a valid metaphor for society and, just as Bhaskar criticised Winch for 
perpetrating what he defines as the linguistic fallacy, so Archer lambasts Giddens 
for committing an identical offence. Thus, having justifiably noted that `many 
elements of syntax are mutually implicative' (RST, p. 95), ST illegitimately, in 
Archer's view, employs the linguistic metaphor to assert that within society `every 
aspect of `structure' is held to be activity dependent in the present tense and equally 
open to transformation, and .. [thus the] causal efficacy of structure 
is dependent 
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upon its evocation by agency' (RST, p. 60). ST is thereby equated with the 
`phonological revolution' (CAA, p. 43) which denies AD by discounting the 
separability and relative temporal autonomy of structure and agency: 
Because `structure' is inseparable from `agency' then, there is no sense in which it 
can be either emergent or autonomous orpre-existant or causally influential. 
(ISST, p. 97 - emphasis in original) 
Archer suggests that elisionist theories of one sort or another gained in popularity 
because their adherents believe that they thereby circumvent the now passe `old 
debate' (RST, p. 61) of individualism vs. collectivism. However, sociologists are, she 
claims, still confronted with a choice between two competing world views, since: 
`Elision' (the term used for those grouping themselves around Structuration 
theory) and `Emergence' (those exploring the interface between 
transcendental realism and social theory) are based upon different 
ontological conceptions, related to disparate methodological injunctions and 
thus have quite distinct implications for practical social theorising. 
(RST, p. 60-61) 
Morphogenetic-Morphostatic Theory 
In RST, Archer acknowledges that Bhaskar is the primary influence on developed 
MM theory. She states that Bhaskar's `ontological realism, premised explicitly upon 
emergence, is used to develop the framework of a social theory which seems set fair 
to navigate a passage between Individualism and Holism' (RST, p. 136) and she 
notes that TMSA and MM are in `objective and approach.. very close indeed' (RST, 
p. 137). "That said, Archer recognises that Bhaskar's work can be variously 
interpreted, '" she acknowledges the existence of other ideas within MM and 
unacknowledged influences may also be discernable. ''"' 
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Metaphors of relation rather than size: 
As previously noted, an alternative to size orientated assumptions concerning the 
micro-macro metaphor was advanced by Alexander et al (1987) in an edited work 
that contains a review by Münch and Smelser (1987). In part, this review refers to 
micro-macro descriptors as relational distinctions that are `analytic rather than .. 
concrete' (1 bid, p. 357) and Archer makes considerable use of this distinction. She 
interprets it as applying equally to the agency-structure debate and its significance, 
for her, is that if micro-macro or agency-structure links are relational then actual 
group or unit size becomes immaterial. Defining these concepts in relational terms 
complements CR attempts to explain interaction within and between strata. It is a 
viewpoint which does not assume `that observable differences in the size of groups 
automatically means that they constitute distinct levels of social reality' (RST, p. 9) 
and it allows for forms of explanation wherein `a given stratum can be `micro' to 
another and `macro' to a third' (ISST. p. 9). 
Archer asserts `complete agreement' (RST, p. 9) with Alexander et al (1987) 
that there `can be no empirical referents for micro or macro as such. They are 
analytical contrasts, suggesting emergent levels within empirical units, not 
antagonistic empirical units themselves' (ISST, p. 9). From this, Archer concludes 
that relational descriptors rely upon or are authorised by the existence of emergent 
properties that are size independent and that these properties, normically expressed, 
possess relational components which are `internal and necessary' (RST, p. 173) albeit 
that external and contingent relations may also influence each other `reciprocally or 
asymmetrically' (RST, p. 174). 
As will be seen, MM in contrast to elisionist and epiphenomenalist theory, 
uses relational metaphors to explore the temporal interplay of links between and 
within agency and structure ('rather than sinking one into the other', RST, p. 65 - 
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emphasis in original) without privileging the influence of either aspect (agency- 
structure or micro-macro) in advance of an examination of specific historical 
interaction(s). Archer follows Lockwood (1964) in analytically distinguishing social 
from system integration to differentiate `the orderly or conflictual relations 
maintaining between groups of actors from the orderly or conflictual relations 
prevailing between parts of the social structure' (RST, p. 67). And AD, thus defined, 
allows Archer, contra Giddens, to untie structure from agency in order that their 
respective emergent powers or tendencies can be identified. "" Archer thereby 
grants structure an ontological status that is distinct from agency. However, to 
support this position Archer must demonstrate how structure(s) can be identified 
`independently of their occupants and incumbents, yet of showing its effects upon 
them (establishing the reality of structures via the causal criterion)' (RST, p. 167) and 
to this end MM amalgamates CR ideas concerning emergence, temporality (or 
interplay), reason as cause and proofs of existence by effect (outcome). 
Archer claims that whilst cultural and social structures differ from each 
other, serendipitously, they each `raise identical difficulties and the method by which 
these can be resolved turns out to be exactly the same' (CAA, p. xi). This alleged 
homogeneity allows Archer to model cultural and social structure using the same 
descriptive morphogenetic sequences and, in this process, Archer emphasises that: 
all structural influences (i. e. the generative powers of SEPs [structural 
emergent properties] and CEPs [culturally emergent properties]) work 
through shaping the situations in which people find themselves. It is the 
situations to which people respond which are mediatory because they 
condition (without determining) different courses of action for those 
differentially placed, by supplying different reasons to them. This is the basic 
manner in which I conceive of the mediation of the tendential powers 
inherent in material and ideational structures to agents, who, in their turn, 
represent necessary mediators if such structural powers are to be realized. 
(RST, p. 201 - emphasis in original) 
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To demonstrate how structural influences work through the situations in which agents 
operate, the ontological status and place in MM theory of structure (social and 
cultural) and positioned agency is explored and their respective morphogenetic- 
morphostatic sequences and propositional models are described. 
Social structure in MM theory: 
AD and the relational yet contingent nature of emergence are modelled through the 
morphogenetic sequence. Figure 1 (below) illustrates this sequence as a three stage 
orderly progression that begins at T' with emergent pre-existent irreducible social 
structures (SS) that constrain and enable but do not determine the social interaction 
(SI) of agents who evidence (2 to T) independent emergent properties which, at 
T4, transform and elaborate (morphogenesis) or reproduce (morphostasis) but never 
create ex-nihilo the structures that initially confronted them at T' "' 
Figure 1- Social structure and the morphogenetic-morphostätic sequence (RST, 
p. 157 - adapted) 
Structural (SS) conditioning 
T1 
Social interaction (SI) 
T2 T3 
Structural elaboration (morphogenesis) 
Structural reproduction (morphostasis) T4 
Describing a complete cycle (T' to T4) articulates an analytic history (whence T4 
becomes T' for a successor cycle) and a double morphogenesis of structures and 
agents is narrated by analytic histories in which all components (parts and people) 
`emerge, intertwine and redline one another' (RST, p. 76 - emphasis in original). 
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Importantly, the concept of double morphogenesis denies nominalism, which 
assumes or gives stable identities to structural or agential descriptors across time 
regardless of internal or external volatility (see Loconto and Jones-Pruett, 2006). 
And thus: 
at the end of a transformational [double morphogenetic] sequence, not only 
is structure transformed, but so is agency as part and parcel of the same 
process. As it reshapes structure, agency is ineluctably reshaping itself, in 
terms of organization, combination and articulation, in terms of its powers 
and these in relation to other agents. 
(RST, p. 74) 
Historically, SS at T' are the product of innumerable past sequences of antecedent 
agential and structural interactions each of which was, in turn, the product of still 
earlier analytic cycles. In the present tense, SS at T' precedes and shapes the 
situations in which agents are located and the ontological status of SS are 
demonstrated through the emergent causal powers that they evidence in providing 
or suggesting interests to agents. SS thus have powers which are un-attributable to the 
actions of current agents' and Archer claims these are identifiable: 
because of their irreducible character, autonomous influence and relatively 
enduring character .. this means that they pre-date any particular cohort of 
occupants/incumbents. 
(RST, p. 168). 
Structure thus provides agents as individuals and groups with interests (i. e. 
`frustrating or rewarding contexts', RST, p. 90) in relation to the social roles or 
positions that they occupy. X'"° And SI (T2 to T3) is thereby structurally conditioned 
albeit that the possession by agents of emergent volitional properties means that 
actions are `never structurally determined' (RST, p. 90). 
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Interests, which provide trasons for actions, can be variously interpreted, 
need not generate consistent or even logical responses and initiate `action patterns' 
(RST, p. 90) aimed at change or entrenchment that may be explained but never 
predicted vt As RTS and RST make clear, augury is inappropriate in open social 
systems where emergent powers are instantiated as interacting normic tendencies 
and deliberate attempts to maintain or reform structures are unlikely to meet 
individual or group expectations. Indeed, the outcome of structural elaboration is 
generally `unintended' (RST, p. 91). XX'X 
SS thus describe relations that pertain between stratified or differentiated 
classes, ethnic groupings, occupational roles and societal positions as well as 
relations between material organisations. "' And, although agential SI can modify or 
maintain SS, SI does not, to repeat, create SS. Archer describes the model outlined 
below as a propositional model (model 6) which, as will be seen, mirrors that 
proposed for cultural system. 
Model 6- The propositional model of SS and SI interaction (RST, p. 168-9) 
i) there are internal and necessary relations within and between social 
structures (SS); 
ii) causal influences are exerted by social structure(s) (SS) on social 
interaction (SI); 
iii) there are causal relationships between groups and individuals at the level 
of social interaction (SI); 
iv) social interaction (SI) elaborates upon the composition of social 
structure(s) (SS) by modifying current internal and necessary structural 
relationships and introducing new ones where morphogenesis is 
concerned. Alternatively, social interaction (SI) reproduces existing 
internal and necessary structural relations when morphostasis applies. 
Cultural structure in NM theory: 
In CAA Archer argues that social structures are better understood than their 
cultural counterparts and, accepting this proposition, more attention is given here to 
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the description of culture as structure. As can be seen (figure 2 below) the 
morphogenetic-morphostatic sequence for cultural structure (defined as the cultural 
system or CS) and agential socio-cultural (S-C) interaction exactly reflects that 
depicting the SS/SI morphogenetic sequence. Similarly, CS/S-C interplay gives rise 
to a propositional model (model 7) that likewise mirrors its SS/SI counterpart. 
Figure 2- Cultural structure (CS) and the morphogenetic-morphostatic sequence 
(RST, p. 193 - adapted) 
Cultural (CS) conditioning 
T1 
Socio-cultural interaction (S-C) 
Tz T3 
Cultural (CS) elaboration (morphogenesis) 
Cultural (CS) reproduction (morphostasis) T4 
Model 7- The propositional model of CS/S-C interaction (RST, p. 169)XXXI 
i) there are internal and necessary logical relationships between 
components of the Cultural System (CS); 
ii) causal influences are exerted by the Cultural System (CS) on Socio- 
Cultural interaction (the S-C level); 
iii) there are causal relationships between groups and individuals at the 
Socio-Cultural (S-C) level; 
iv) there is elaboration of the Cultural System (CS) due to Socio-Cultural 
Interaction (S-C) modifying current logical relationships and introducing 
new ones, where morphogenesis is concerned. Alternatively, Socio- 
Cultural Interaction (S-C) reproduces existing internal and necessary 
cultural relationships when morphostasis applies. ' 
To sustain the ontological distinctness of cultural structure, Archer offers a very 
particular definition of culture that distinguishes culture in total (everything that 
might be understood) from the CS which describes that part of total culture that has 
been or is capable of translation into propositional statements. Here Archer follows 
Bhaskar in viewing (CS) ideas as `essentially specific forms of the material world, or. . 
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[as being] qualitatively specific material social entities in their own right' (Dean et al, 
2006b, p. 3 - emphasis in original). Significantly, culture is not therefore `understood 
in its conventional sense as something that expresses the identity of a community' 
(Carter, 2000, p. 22-23), but rather: 
culture as a whole is taken to refer to all intelligibilia, that is to any item 
which has the dispositional capacity of being understood by someone. 
Within this I then distinguish the Cultural System, which is that sub-set of 
items to which the law of contradiction can be applied. These are 
propositions, for only statements which assert truth or falsity can be deemed 
to be in contradiction or to be consistent with one another. In turn this 
means that the Cultural System is restricted to the propositional register of 
society at any given time. The justification for defining the CS in this way 
rests partly on the fact that it meets the criterion of methodological 
workability, but partly, too, on the self-evident importance of those things 
held to be true or false in society at any given time and place. 
(CAA, p"xvi )... 
By justifying her definition of the CS, in part, upon the grounds of methodological 
workability, Archer might be accused of allowing pragmatism (contrary to earlier 
assertions - RST, p. 135, reproduced page 52 this thesis) to usurp ontological theory. 
However, Archer can equally be complimented for attempting to clarify the 
meaning of descriptors (where many social theorists abrogate precision) and she is 
aware of the limitations surrounding this definition. 
Obviously we do not live by propositions alone (any more than we live 
logically); in addition, we generate myths, are moved by mysteries, become 
rich in symbolics and ruthless in manipulating hidden persuaders. But all of 
these elements are precisely the stuff of Socio-Cultural interaction. For they 
are all matters of interpersonal influence, whether we are talking at one 
extreme of hermeneutic understanding (including religious experience at the 
furthest extremity) or of the manipulative assault and battery of ideas used 
ideologically. All those other non-propositional things to which we assent or 
over which we dissent - such as tastes and preferences, likes and 
dislikes, 
affinities and animosities, patriotism and prejudice - he in between. 
(CAA, p. xviii-xix) 
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MM theory focuses predominantly upon the interplay of ideas within the CS rather 
than culture as all intellirgibilia. And in this capacity it may be noted that Archer 
associates culture with interlinked Bhaskarian themes concerning the relation 
between transitive and intransitive forms of knowledge, the idea that knowledge is 
produced from knowledge-like antecedents and proof of emergence by effect. 
If we think of culture then all knowledge was certainly activity dependent 
for its genesis and elaboration. Nevertheless, once recorded .. 
it constitutes 
knowledge without a current knowing subject. It is knowledge because it 
retains the dispositional character to be understood, though it persists 
unrecognized, sustaining potential powers (of contradiction and 
complementarity with other cultural items) which remain unexercised. 
Ontologically it exists and if the theory it states is true, if the technique it 
describes works, or if the belief it articulates is justifiable, these remain the 
case quite independently of current actors knowing it, using it or believing it. 
We know that they are real by virtue of their realisable effects .. 
(RST, p. 144) 
It might be argued that Archer here (and at other points) conflates knowledge with 
true or justifiable knowledge, a position that problematises the ontological status of 
factually erroneous or unvalidated knowledge vis-ä-vis agential action. """ 
Nevertheless, despite this caveat, Archer is here making major claims for the 
ontological substance and power of CS propositions to inform sociological enquiry. 
Logical relations and situated logics: 
Archer argues that CS propositions coexist within a matrix of four ideal logical 
relations which generate, for agents, as role and position occupants, a series of 
interest bearing situational logics. This matrix of logical relations and the situated 
logics (influences) that they generate is integral to the claim that the CS register 
temporally pre-exists agency's ability to transform or reproduce it...... 
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Figure 3 (below) lists the structural (CS and SS) relationships that, Archer 
claims, pertain at T' as well as the situated logics that they present to agents as 
interests in S-C and SI interaction between T2 and V. Significantly, if CS/SS logical 
relationships exist then they exist re<gardlesc of whether agents recognise, adopt or 
make use of them. Agents are free to identify or not-identify, observe or ignore the 
interests inherent in situational logics albeit that exercise of this freedom carries a 
price (i. e. failure to identify or meet the expectations that interests describe, for 
whatever reason, incurs material penalties). XXX" 
Figure 3- CEP and SEP, logical relations and situational logics (RST, p. 303 - 
adapted) 
Contradictions Complementarities 
Necessary Contingent Necessary Contingent 
(Situational logic) (Correction) (Elimination) (Protection) (Opportunism) 
CEP's 
C. S. level Syncretism Pluralism Systematization Specialization 
S-C level Unification Cleavage Reproduction Sectionalism 
SEP's 
S. S. level Compromise Competition Integration Differentiation 
S-I level Containment Polarization Solidarity Diversification 
Each of the four relations of contradiction and complementarity that give rise to 
agentially situated logics is hereafter explained in turn. To avoid duplication only 
CS/S-C level interaction is described and the process is not repeated for SS/SI 
relations or logics (overt similarities in cultural- and socio-structural modelling make 
duplication unnecessary). Archer recognises that concrete instances of the 
relationships detailed in figure 3 will be complex and, in reality, ambiguous; 
nevertheless, she asserts that the schema presented above provides ontologically real 
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if idealised illustrations of relations existing between propositional and agentially 
situated logics. Sketched exemplars of the four permutations are now outlined. In 
these examples the same descriptors (A and B) are used to signify both CS 
propositional sets and their sponsoring S-C groups. 
Necessary complementarities describe situated logics of protection. In such 
instances it is supposed that agents who advance CS proposition (belief, theory, idea 
or idea set) A within the S-C realm also and inevitably invoke proposition B. 
Further, it is assumed that B reproduces, reinforces or promotes A. Supporters of A 
and B therefore have no reason to contradict or hinder each other (indeed they may 
be or become the same group) and a protective, supportive or defensive association 
may develop between the two agential groups as well as the ideational sets 
(propositions) in question (i. e. distinct propositional sets may become enmeshed 
and arguments may be erected against their mutual corruption). This cosy 
environment is not an unalloyed benefit however, since protection deters critical 
and challenging debate and agential and propositional positions may thus become 
entrenched, embedded and incapable of reform or development. 
Necessary contradictions, on the other hand, describe situated logics of 
correction. In this instance, rather than reciprocal support, it is supposed that agential 
groups with (potentially) differing political or social power hold mutually implicative 
and co-dependent but disputational CS propositions that are at variance (bringing 
either CS proposition into play necessarily implicates the co-dependent other). 
Thus, for example, if proposition B is supported by politically more powerful 
individuals or groups than A and if in advancing the politically weaker proposition 
(A) the contradictory other is inevitably invoked, then, in consequence, individuals 
or groups holding and advancing A will seek syncretism at the CS level and 
unification at the S-C level. Initially, though not necessarily subsequently, unification 
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will be attempted in regard to either or both ideational sets by group A (assuming 
that neither individual or group is willing simply to concede the field). However, as 
described, this is not a `fair' fight and it may be expected that syncretism will be 
variously contested according to the cultural and material resources that each group 
can martial within the S-C realm. Three options are available for the groups 
involved and, as will be noted, the outcome of each option differentially favours the 
advocates of each propositional set. The available options are (RST, p. 233): 
(1) A E-- B, i. e. correcting B so that it becomes consistent with A. 
(2) AHB, i. e. correcting both A and B so they become mutually consistent. 
(3) A --> B, i. e. correcting A so that it becomes consistent with B. 
Contingent contradictions are associated with the situated logic of elimination. Here 
the logical relation is that of doctrinal incompatibility between mutually oppositional 
propositional sets. In this instance co-dependence is absent and relations between 
agents whose interests orientate them to `take up' the antagonistic propositional sets 
are, whatever their relative political powers in the S-C realm, anti-syncretic and 
incommensurable. Rejecting syncretism, agents in S-C interaction become and 
remain hostile towards each other. Combative parties now have everything to gain 
and nothing to lose from engaging in activities that aim to annihilate their 
opponents (in argument or otherwise). However, in this process, even if it is 
assumed that advocates of one proposition in some. sense `win', propositional CS 
knowledge cannot be eliminated and, as long as a rump of adherents remain, the 
battle continues. Further, the consequence of hostilities are both the conscription of 
primary agents (unattached individuals) to corporate agency (organised groups), as 
well as the splintering of corporate agents to form new groups (C°) that may be 
partisan, insensible, agnostic or antagonistic towards the initiating fray. As can be 
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seen, co-dependence between propositions at the CS level and the ability or 
willingness of agents in S-C interaction to seek adjustment between or reformulate 
logical ideational relations differentiates contingent from necessary incompatibilities. 
The fourth and final form of relation is termed contingent complementarity. 
It is linked with opportunism and in this instance the advocates of proposition A 
when confronted by proposition B (and its advocates) in the S-C realm are at liberty 
to employ, ignore or dispute the alternative proposition without restraint (all 
options are equally open) albeit that once a course of action is initiated, it may 
become difficult to change or alter course at a later date. Thus: `Only the contingent 
complementarity is free from Socio-Cultural manipulation, designed to induce 
avoidance or adoption or aversion' (RST, p. 244, emphasis in original). 
To recap, Archer asserts that four forms of CS logical relation potentially 
exist at T' independently of agents realising or caring to make use of them. 
However, to be known or identified, real people are required in historically 
contingent S-C interaction to utilise (deploy) contradictory or complementary 
propositional knowledge for their own interest informed but not determined 
purposes (P/T). S-C activity is therefore needed to register the ontological reality 
of CS propositional knowledge (ontological existence is demonstrated through 
effect) albeit that observation of a perceived affect does not necessarily demonstrate 
CS existence. Within the analytic cycle, the outcome of S-C interaction determines 
the CS register at T4 so that, relative to T1 the CS at T4 can be modified through a 
process of morphogenesis or morphostatically maintained. In Archer's words: 
As an emergent entity the CS has an objective existence and autonomous 
relations amongst its components (theories, beliefs, values or more strictly 
between the propositional formulations of them) in the sense that these are 
independent of anyone's claim to know, to believe, to assent or to assert 
them. At any moment the CS is the product of historical S-C interaction, but 
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having emerged .. then qua product, it 
has properties of its own. Like 
structure, culture is a human product but it too escapes its makers to act 
back upon them. The CS contains constraints (like new things that can and 
cannot be said in a particular natural language), it embodies new possibilities 
.. and it introduces new problems through the relationships 
between the 
emergent entities themselves (the clash of theories), between these and the 
physical environment .. and between these and 
human agents (makers and 
openers of Pandora's box). 
(ISST, p. 180-1, italics in original) 
Described thus, the CS demonstrates its ontologically intransitive character by 
predating and `shaping' (RST, p. 215) the environment wherein human (mediating) 
activity thereafter affects it. As an emergent entity the CS occupies a rung within the 
stratified system of reality that Bhaskar described in ITS. The CS grounds and is 
anterior to S-C interaction. It supplies agents with conditioning but non- 
determining interests. Yet mutability in the face of S-C action illustrates culture's 
transitive quality and the peculiarly interactive nature of human or social strata. 
Although it is known through its effects, the CS need not produce effects. 
Logical relations (CS or SS) may exist, using Bhaskarian terminology, unexercised 
and unrecognised within the realm of the unactualised real. Indeed, the CS can be 
imagined as conditioning S-C interaction along a metaphorical continuum. Thus, its 
influence might be unacknowledged or misunderstood, partially recognised or 
understood and fully recognised and understood. Viewed in this way Bhaskar's 
theory of knowledge domains and objects as well as auxiliary concepts such as 
powers and normative tendencies can be seen to underpin Archer's claims regarding 
the ontological status of CS propositions (though Archer does not make these 
connections explicit). 
AD is integral to the morphogenetic model of cultural elaboration (figure 2, 
page 64 this thesis) since CS propositions at T' and their instantiation in the S-C 
realm between T2 to T3 remain distinct. Wittingly or unwittingly, agents develop or 
71 
preserve the CS initially present at T' in the period TZ to V. Yet agential freedom 
regarding development or preservation of the CS is enabled and constrained by at 
least two closely related factors. First, historically pre-existent circumstances (e. g. 
role or position occupancy or prior exposure to and acceptance of a belief system) 
suggest that agents enter at T2 with inherited interests that predispose them to favour 
certain contextually defined CS ideas over others. Thus, agents do not enter T2 as 
tabula rasa, they do not take up CS propositions whimsically. Second, assuming that 
agents seek at a psychological level to maintain at least a modicum of logical 
coherence between the most significant conscious ideas that they hold, agents are 
encouraged to orientate themselves towards achieving elaborated outcomes that 
enable coherence to be maintained with pre-existing logical CS relations and the 
situated logics (interests) to which these relations give rise. It is in promoting these 
outcomes that the ontological reality of CS propositional logics make themselves 
known. And thus,. as Archer states: `Systematic relationships (logical) impress 
themselves (causally) on S-C action .. [and] This is the element of truth 
in 
downwards conflation' (RST, p. 246). 
Agency - ontology and MM theory: 
Much has already been said about the concept of agency in MM theory. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to briefly restate Archer's argument on voluntarism and 
determinism vis-a-vis agency in order that the linked concepts of persons and roles 
and primary and corporate agency can be developed. 
For Archer (1990, p. 73), the place and significance of agency `stalks through 
the history of sociological theory'. In contrast to epiphenomenal downwards 
conflationary theories, CR grants that whilst pre-existing cultural and social 
structures provide agents with orientating interests (reasons), behaviour is not 
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determined by structure(s). Agents often lack `discursive penetration' (RST, p. 252) 
into their condition or situation and in such instances they may act without overt (or 
accurately perceived) structural guidance. Further, agents can deliberately and 
knowingly act against structurally generated interests albeit that a charge or penalty 
may be incurred for doing so. Indeed, agency's voluntaristic capacity depends upon 
the ability to act intentionally and this power (allowing both that reasons can be 
causes and that reasons may override structural interests) `demarcates agency from 
structure' (RST, p. 153) and demonstrates humanity's (psychic) emergent ontological 
status. 
Alternatively, in contrast to epiphenomenal upwards conflationäry theories, 
MM allows that structural (SS and CS) interests at T1 enable and constrain the 
actions of free individuals. Actions `presuppose an already existing set of structures' 
(Sayer, 2000, p-18 - commenting on Archer's work) and historically situated 
structural interests thus allow agents to formulate reasons or desires for certain 
actions and debar (as negative realities) the articulation of alternative intentions. tm" 
Archer illustrates agency's emergent status by distinguishing between `the 
`human being', `social agent' and `social actor" (ISST, p. 249)'°° "' as well as primary 
and corporate forms of agency. In this schema, persons beget agents who father 
actors `both phylogenetically and ontogenetically' (RST, p. 255). Persons provide `the 
needed reflexive quality and generalized ability for innovation' (RST, p. 256). 
However, persons, as singular bodies, lack interests and the concept of agency is 
therefore introduced. For Archer, agents are always `agents of something. Baldly, 
they are agents of the socio-cultural system into which [as persons] they are born 
(groups or collectivities in the same position or situations) and equally they are 
agents of the systematic features they transform (since groups and collectivities are 
modified in the process)' (RST, p. 257). 
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Agency is however, a complex entity. Corporate agency describes `self- 
conscious vested interest groups, promotive interest groups, social movements and 
defensive associations [and their] common denominators are articulation and 
organization' (RST, p. 258). Primary agents, on the other hand, do not intentionally 
engage in structural change, albeit that `dumb numerical pressure' (RST, p. 262) can 
force corporate agents to accept unplanned or unintended structural morphogenesis 
or morphostasis...... ` And persons can be simultaneously primary and corporate 
agents at any specific T2 depending on the S-C/SS under consideration. 
Actors, like persons, always exist in the singular. Actors embody roles and 
roles occur in relational role-sets. These can be internal and necessary (e. g. `a pupil 
requires a teacher' RST, p. 275) or, asymmetrical and dependent (e. g. `a schools 
inspector [implies] teachers, but not visa versa', RST, p. 276). Actors `personify' roles 
insofar as they bring their `own ideals and objectives, skills and incompetence, 
dedication or distancing, inflexibility or creativeness to the roles they occupy' (RST, 
p. 187). Personification links individual psychology to or with social expectation. 
Roles pre-exist and are autonomous of the individuals who occupy them. However, 
by interrogating the interplay between actor and role it is possible to `account for 
why some roles are personified in routinized ways whilst others can be cumulatively 
transformed in the hands of their incumbents' (RST, p. 187) xxX'x Thus it is possible 
to plot the double morphogenesis or stasis of roles and their occupants over time. 
Synchronous and non-synchronous development: 
The three analytic cycles proposed by Archer (cultural and social structural and 
agential) operate coterminously and are linked through their T2/T' `middle element' 
(RST, p. 248). Yet each cycle can and to some extent must be described separately if 
the `relative autonomy' (AST, p. 248) of agency and structure is to be respected. 
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society and agency (Archer, 2000, p. 271 - reproduced)" 
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Diagram 3: Cultural and structural configurations generating morphogenesis in 
society and agency (RST, p. 323 - reproduced) 
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As illustrative `extreme instances' (RST, p. 308), diagram 2 (above) depicts uniform 
structural (social) and cultural morphostasis, whilst diagram 3 indicates concurrent 
structural (social) and cultural morphogenesis. Each element may however 
experience stasis or genesis non-synchronously and it is thus perfectly feasible, 
according to MM theory, for morphogenesis to occur in one element of one cycle, 
or one part of a cycle, whilst stasis describes another element. Indeed, non-uniform 
or non-synchronous developmental histories are equally or more likely than those 
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depicted above. For example, structural morphogenesis and cultural morphostasis 
or structural morphostasis and cultural morphogenesis may pertain. 
Conclusion to §1 Chapter 2: 
Archer argues that the value of theory is synonymous with its explanatory power. In 
§2 of this thesis, realist social (morphogenetic) theory determines `the conceptual 
structures of explanation' (Pawson, 1989, p. 192). These conceptual structures frame, 
coordinate and give meaning to data and evidence regarding aspects of hospice 
practice. However, the object of this thesis is theory and, at the conclusion of §2, it 
is the usefulness of MM theory in social explanation that is primarily assessed. 
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Endnotes §1 Chapter 2 
i Margaret Archer's influence and prestige extend far beyond her contribution to realist 
scholarship. Professor of Sociology at the University of Warwick. Archer was elected first woman 
President of the International Sociological Association (1986-1990). She Chaired the International 
Sociological Association's Publication's Committee (1982-1986). She edited Current Sociology (1973- 
1980) and is a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Classical Sociology. In 1994 she became a 
founder member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences and the Academy of Learned Societies 
in the Social Sciences. 
ü Other of her works such as Being Human: The Problem ofAgency (2000), Structure, Agent' and the 
Internal Conversation (2003a) and Making our Way through the World (2007) are considered; however, 
these texts are not integral to the study. 
A claim repeated on p. 167 of RST. 
iv For example, Archer states that her theory `makes no leap from the real to the actual' (RST, 
p. 175). In context these descriptors (real or actual) should be understood as part of Bhaskar's theory 
of domains and knowledge forms (see also RST, p. 343). Other examples concern the impossibility of 
prediction in open systems (RST, p. 159) and retroduction (RST, p. 327). 
V In CAA, what Archer describes as the myth of cultural integration is explored through an 
essentially similar process. 
Vi 
, 
In its developed form, I1M is perhaps more readily associated with RST than CAA. 
Morphogensis and morphostasis are however, fully explained in CAA and the model applies equally 
to both texts. 
w Archer uses the terms social structure and cultural system throughout RST and CAA. 
Moreover, she often distinguishes structure from culture. However, Archer also makes it clear in 
both RST and CAA (Chapter 5) that since: `Culture is approached analytically in exactly the same 
way as structure .. 
it is just as appropriate to speak of cultural as of social structures , 
(EST, p. 179). In 
this thesis, unless otherwise stated, the term structure refers to both cultural and social structures. No 
violence is done to Archer's work by this usage. Carter (2000, p. 93) also references `cultural and 
social structures. ' 
Viii As Downward and Mearman (2007, p. 92) note, the `notion of explanatory power is, of 
course, relative, and reflects the proportion of questions which are left unanswered in any particular 
enquiry. ' 
ix Engholm (1999, p. 27) contests this view and asserts Archer's models are merely `heuristic 
devices'. 
X AD is integral to Bhaskar's work (Carter, 2000). It underpins Bhaskar's 6-point charter for 
TMSA (reproduced in RST, p. 137) and Archer acknowledges that `realism is predicated upon analytic 
dualism' (RST, p. 151 - emphasis in original). However, in Archer's opinion Bhaskar also equivocates 
on AD (RST, p. 141-149) and this leads her to emphasise Lockwood's (1964) `seminal' (RST, p. 67) 
and `germinal' (RST, p. 69) influence on hei theory. 
Xi Differently worded versions of this two part propositional statement appear throughout 
RST, see, for example, p. 76 and p. 89-9. 
x° For example, Wiley (2006, p. 36) commentating on the historic role of Charles Sanders 
Pierce in American sociology and semiotics, states that: The usual micro-macro view is that the 
macro is emergent from the micro. ' It is this view that Archer challenges. 
x"' CAA differs slightly from RST; it performs a comparable function, yet focuses primarily 
upon the inter-relationship between culture and agency. 
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xiv In describing Bhaskar's TDISA and her own NM theory, Archer (RST, p. 159 - emphasis in 
original) states that both `approaches try to provide tool kits, and whilst tools presume that 
practitioners have to do considerable (substantive) work with them, they are also designed to be 
worked with and to be of practical use on the job. ' 
_V The aphorism is Kant's. 
_vi In §1 Chapter 3 Bhaskar is accused of distortion by simplification and similar charges could 
perhaps be levelled at Archer. 
Sawyer (2002) notes that philosophers and theorists identified by Archer with 
epiphenomenalism would defend their position against such charges. 
Xvii Archer references Mandelbaum's essay `Societal Facts'. This first appeared in 1955 in the 
British Journal of Sociology. However, Archer cites a later reprint in O'Neill's (1973) edited Modes of 
Individualism and Collectivism. 
x Originally titled `Explanations in History' and published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
(1956), the essay cited by Archer also appears as `Holism versus Individualism in History and 
Sociology' in Gardiner's (1959) edited text Theories of History (p. 488-503). 
=x Structuration theory continues to attract interest (e. g. Hardcastle et al, 2005; or Stones, 
2005). Archer's critique of this form of theorising therefore remains pertinent. 
xxi Referring to Bhaskar's Reclaiming Reality (1989), Archer notes that: With minor alterations 
the ThISA and bpi diagrams now readily combine' (EST, p. 157). 
%xi Archer quotes Outhwaite (1990, p. 366) approvingly to state that `realist metatheory is 
clearly compatible with a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches' (cited RST, p. 136). 
This permits Archer to distance herself from the political Marxist residue in CR thinking. 
=xw For example, although Stuart Hampshire is un-cited in CAA and RST, it might be argued 
that overlaps exist between Archer's use of AD and the manner in which Hampshire (1960) 
maintains distinctions between internal mental states and external influences and environments (in 
which such states may, but need not, be evidenced). Naturally, in drawing this potential parallel it is 
necessary to place caveats around the differences that separate their works. However, the links 
between both theorists are striking. It may also be noted that Bhaskar obliquely refers to Hampshire 
in relation to the axiological imperative (PN, p. 87), i. e. the idea that: `beliefs are necessitated by the 
condition that what I am to do can never be reduced to, or discovered by scrutiny of the antecedents 
of, what I will do. ' Further, aspects of Hampshire's thought on causal reasoning appear, again with 
caveats, to resemble Bhaskarian ideas concerning nomic tendencies. Hampshire's Thought and Action 
was originally published in 1959. Alternatively, points of contact between Archer and Norbert Elias 
are worth considering (Byrne, 2004, quotes Elias favourably). Again, bar a single cursory reference on 
p. 281 of CAA, Archer does not mention Elias. However, Elias's (1978) focus on social explanations 
that incorporate a temporal dimension, unintended consequences, the importance of differential 
dispositional power relations between individuals and groups in the framing and resolution of 
conflict and game modelling match, to some degree, Archer's theory of ideational relations and the 
situated logics they give rise to. Conjecture upon potential influence can easily spiral off towards the 
consideration of an infinitely expanding range of tangentially related possibilities. Yet speculation on 
the development of Archer's thinking serves two purposes. First, that Archer independently 
traversed the theoretical terrain that Bhaskar subsequently mines may explain or account for the 
form in which she exploits his ontological insights (e. g. see RST, p. 69). And, in this respect, it is 
interesting to note that as early as 1972 (three years before the publication of RT3), Archer outlined 
relations between student groups, educational ideals, social structures and late 1960's political unrest 
using a form of logical modelling and argumentation that embodies or heralds significant elements of 
MM 1 reasoning (Archer, 1972). Second, noting that theorists from varying perspectives were and are 
similarly engaged with `CR' issues or questions is a corrective to overly extravagant realist 
presumptions. That non-CR theorists such as Rosenberg (2001) can reach similar conclusions from 
disparate beginnings is recognised in §1 Chapter 3. 
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%xiv Archer (RST, p. 98) asserts that, for Giddens, structure lives only as memory traces within 
individuals and this, she points out, places a heavy burden on memory. 
xxv Archer recognises similarities between her nomenclature and that of Bhaskar when she 
states: `Morphogenesis and morphostasis are very close indeed to the notions of transformation and 
reproduction, and all four terms only make sense as processes which come 'after' something which 
existed `before' them' (RST, p. 140). 
xxw Archer states that: `In short, when we talk about structural properties and their effects from 
the morphogenetic perspective, we are endorsing the realist notion of emergence and its causal 
powers. Thus we accept that the results of past actions have effects in their own rights later on, as 
constraining or facilitating influences upon actors, which are not attributable or reducible to the 
practices of other agents' (RST, p. 90). Structures therefore exert `systematic causal effects on 
subsequent action' (RST, p. 167). 
xxw Interests produce experiences of problems `or benefits [which] condition different 
situational interpretations and dissimilar action patterns [so that] groups experiencing exigencies seek 
to eradicate them (thus pursuing structural change) and those experiencing rewards try to retain them 
(thus defending structural stability)' (RST, p. 90). Implicit within this schema is the assumption that 
actors `are not responsible for creating the distributions, roles and associated interests with which 
they live' (RST, p. 152). From a non-realist perspective the question of whether individual interests 
can survive death is raised by Masterton et al (2007). 
xxviii The connection between interests and reasons is made by Archer (RST, p. 154) when she 
notes that structure influences human action by `supplying reasons for different courses of action to 
those who are differentially positioned. ' Reasons are not however synonymous with interests since 
actors may formulate reasons to ignore or act against their positional interests. 
: XiX If structure exerts its influence upon social interaction by predating, ordering or enabling 
the context in which agents act, structure might be described as a positive reality. Negative realities 
may also have influence however, by constraining or limiting agential options. Archer acknowledges 
the possible reality and significance of negative powers (in relation to changing literacy rates). Yet 
Collier (1999) most ably develops the concept in relation to moral reasoning (see also Engholm, 
1999). Negative realities describe breaks or blocks upon agential thought or action that result from 
ideational or material absences. Thus, for example, historic failure to invest in certain forms of health 
or illness care inevitably mean that such forms of care are unavailable to patients in the present 
(though with varying degrees of ease, investment can generate future provision). Further, the absence 
of specific forms of care, conjoined with materially existing substitutes (and the rationalisations that 
accompany substitutes), may act to prevent agents recognising that alternatives to current provision 
(i. e. the absent form of care) could become a viable or attractive future option. The ontological status 
of negative realities is, as ever in CR thinking, given by their causal effects. From a non-CR 
perspective Howson (2000, p. 129), recognises the problematic nature of the concept and states that 
philosophers have `worried about the existence of negative facts'. 
=Xx Note however, first, Carter (2003,2000) denies the ontological veracity of race as a 
sociological concept and, second, Archer fails to explore the potential conditioning impact of 
geography (though other social realist sympathisers do - e. g. Sayer, 2000). 
: xx' Subtle differences distinguish claims regarding CS and S-C interaction in RST and CAA. 
See, for example, RST (p. 169) and CAA (p. 143). 
=xx" Archer does not specify whether culture as all inteIk ibilia is synonymous with transient 
knowledge in Bhaskar's sense, though this is perhaps implied. 
xx" §1 Chapter 3 discusses this further. 
""x'° Wiley (2006, p. 42) likewise suggests that ideas, once promulgated `sometimes go their own 
way, regardless of the intent of their originator. ' 
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: X'V An interest can be met without being overtly or consciously identified just as an interest can 
remain unidentified and unmet. However, whether identified and ignored or unidentified and unmet, 
material penalties generally follow such omissions. 
xzx" Structural conditioning exerts effect by `shaping the situations in which later `generations' of 
actors find themselves and by endowing various agents with different vested interests according to 
the positions they occupy in the structures they `inherit' (in the class structure, in the social 
distribution of resources, or in the educational system for example)' (RST, p. 90). 
xxxvii Archer recognises that: `Undoubtedly there are further strata, such as the linking level of 
individual psychology or personality, itself emergent from `consciousness', which in turn emerges 
from `mind', which is emergent from `matter' etc. ' (RST, p. 254-255). These further strata are not 
explored in RST; however, Archer returns to examine aspects of these postulated relationships in 
Making our Way through the World (2007), Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation (2003a) and Being 
Human: The Problem ofAgency (2000). 
xxxVui Carter (2000, p. 111) recognises that primary agents are `to adapt Marx, agents-in- 
themselves, the product of anterior and involuntaristic distributions; the poor, for example, or the 
unemployed may be regarded as primary agents. ' 
xxxix A distinction can also be made between `social relations (as systematically reproduced, 
anterior distributions of material and cultural resources, including institutional roles and settings) and 
social relationships (the actual interactions between real individuals)' (Carter, 2000, p. 26). 
AA slightly different version of this diagram appears on p. 309 of RST. 
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Section 1- Chapter 3 
If Bhaskar and Archer's writings are to fruitfully inform research practice, challenges 
to the credibility and use value of their work must be acknowledged. Detailed 
exegeses of Bhaskar and Archer's work are not here undertaken albeit that a critique 
and commentary upon their respective realisms is presented. As will be seen, similar 
questions can be asked of Bhaskar and Archer's work and problems identified in §1 
Chapters 3 and 4, re-surface in §2. 
Critique and commentary upon the work of Roy Bhaskar 
The following headings are used to structure a critique and commentary on the 
work of Roy Bhaskar: (i) terminological inexactitude, (ii) naturalism, (iii) 
retroduction and (iv) transcendental argument. Thereafter CR's (v) emancipatory 
potential (scientific and political) is explored, (vi) internal debates within CR theory 
are noted and Bhaskar's contribution to social theory is located within the broader 
philosophic landscape of (vii) non-critical realist and (viii) non-realist thought. 
Terminological inexactitude: 
CR argument is developed through a critique of that which it is `against' (PN, p. 6). 
This approach makes `the distinctiveness of Bhaskar's own conception of scientific 
law .. all the more evident' (Groff, 2004, p. 41). However, in precising non-realist 
argument Bhaskar employs the descriptors empiricism and idealism loosely. In 
consequence, whilst generalisation is a legitimate rhetorical device that potentially 
aids understanding, RTS and PN may be charged with assaulting straw dolls and 
distorting through simplification the work of Hume, Kant, Berger and Winch. 
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Bhaskar bums straw dolls when he lambasts unbridled positivism or 
idealism. Few theorists today admit to being positivists without protecting the 
descriptor behind a phalanx of caveats and idealist thought in apost-postmodern age 
is becoming increasingly circumspect (even Derrida `equivocated' on the assertion 
that nothing lies beyond the text, Archer et al, 2004, p. 10). Bhaskar concedes that 
extreme empiricist or positivist and idealist positions have few adherents-and he 
maintains that CR is the `nocturnal' philosophy of scientists in their `spontaneous 
practice' (RTS, p. 255), i. e. he suggests that CR is evidenced notwithstanding formal 
Humean or Kantian theory. ' Nonetheless, for Bhaskar, crude positivist, empirical 
and idealist concepts continue to find expression and these paradigms remain the 
default or embedded orthodoxies that realism disputes. " 
However, simplifying and polarising non-CR theory opens Bhaskar to 
charges of misrepresentation. Recognising this danger, Bhaskar attempts to outflank 
criticism by arguing that CR targets the underlying premises of the attacked 
perspectives and thus: 
for convenience I shall use the term `empiricism' in a generic way so as to 
cover the entire post-Humean tradition of empirical realism, and in 
particular both its positivistic and neo-Kantian wings. No harm will be done 
by this usage as I am here attacking an assumption, viz. that a constant 
conjunction is necessary for a law, common to both. 
(RTS, p. 65) 
Justifying the convenience of simplification in this manner requires that Humean 
causality and law characterises, or is synonymous with, constant conjunctive 
empiricism - yet this assertion of identity is problematic. First, empiricism has a 
diverse heritage. Not all who rally to its standard are Humeans and Hume is capable 
of varying interpretation: " As described, empiricists allegedly ground predictive 
statements upon observed constant conjunctions or quantifiable analogues such as 
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P values. However, Hume recognised, following Bacon, that despite witnessing 
innumerable conjunctions `induction by simple enumeration is not a valid form of 
argument' (Russell, 1961, p. 641). 1' That is, just because the sun has always risen in 
the morning does not prove that it will today and thus, in contrast to many later 
empiricists, Hume did not sanction prediction in the form that Bhaskar suggests he 
does. " Heterogeneity in empiricist thought does not annul Bhaskar's argument '(just 
as diversity of opinion within the CR movement does not invalidate the ideas 
advanced). Nevertheless, by not conceding that Hume should be excused personal 
vilification concerning prediction and in failing to acknowledge that empiricist 
philosophers recognise and have met many of the criticisms that Bhaskar makes, CR 
is perhaps needlessly compromised. 
Second, for Hume, matters of fact, as opposed to ideational relations, 
become known when contiguous and successive events impress themselves upon 
observers as associative cognitive experiences ('causes and effects are discoverable, not by 
reason, but by experience, Hume, 1955, p. 42 - emphasis in original). Observation and 
expectation therefore identify conjunctions. Yet this allows for two interpretations 
of causality - cause as constant conjunction (that which legitimates belief) and cause 
as mental process (how experience forms or justifies belief) (Quinton, 1998; Stroud, 
1981). To some extent this second aspect of causality is recognised in the concept of 
epistemic fallacy. However, Bhaskar's focus is overwhelmingly on the first 
interpretation of causality and this is possibly a mistake since, as will be seen, it is 
this second aspect of causality, the justification of belief, that most troubles the 
work of Bhaskar and Archer. 
Further, it has been suggested that Hume did not commit the epistemic 
fallacy. Bhaskar's critique of Hume (and by implication that of Kant) is thus tested 
by those, such as Zeitlin (1997), who argue that Hume recognises the potentially 
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creative role played by mind in perception when, for example, he grants that 
mechanistic causality is merely a useful customary concept by which we understand 
the world. This reading, which emphasises the second aspect of causal reasoning 
(outlined above) leaves the relation between thought and the world open and, 
contra Bhaskar, in distinguishing between ways of thinking and the world, Hume 
separates experientially derived knowledge from reality. Bhaskar's conception of the 
epistemic fallacy is thus challenged insofar as it rests on the assumption that Hume 
conflates experience with knowledge and knowledge with reality. It will shortly be 
argued that Bhaskar's interpretation of Hume rests upon a flawed concept of 
naturalism (one that merges empiricism with materialism and positivism). But, to 
anticipate this argument, it may be noted that Stroud (1981) considers it a common 
mistake to equate Hume with naive analytic empiricism and early positivism and 
thus, if Bhaskar is guilty of this error, he is not alone in making it. 
To maintain the disputational high ground CR should perhaps attack 
empiricism but distance itself from assaulting individuals (however influential). With 
regard to the epistemic fallacy, Bhaskar, as stated, uses the term empiricism in a 
generic ivay to refer to a widely accepted system of thought that can be accused of 
conflating knowledge with existence and the main thrust of the CR critique is 
therefore correct, even if Hume might be personally exonerated. It should also be 
noted that Zeitlin's (1997) interpretation of Hume is not widely acknowledged and 
support for Bhaskar's reading comes from, amongst others, Groff (2004) and 
Butchvarov (2002). 
In relation to Kant, Groff (2004) argues that Bhaskar misconstrues Kant on 
a number of key issues including empirical realism (as defined by Kant) which, she 
alleges, Bhaskar wrongly equates with subjective idealism. Bhaskar may also be 
mistaken in associating transcendental idealism with relativist idealism since Kant's 
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Categories of the Understanding (Critique of Pure Reason) allow that whilst causality is 
a necessary part of human cognitive reasoning it, causality, is not necessarily a 
required element of the external world" However, most damningly of all, Groff 
(2004, p. 28) notes that Kant fully accepts the existence of an external world (albeit 
that this world can only be, known via mind mediated experience) and she cites the 
Prolegomena (below) to illustrate the force with which Kant sought to distance 
himself from critics who might claim otherwise. "" 
I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but 
we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their 
appearances, i. e., the representations which they cause in us by affecting our 
senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, 
that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in 
themselves, we yet know by their influence on our sensibility .. 
Can this be 
called idealism? It is the very contrary. 
(Hatfield, 1997, p. 36 - Kant [1783] Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics)"" 
The charge against Bhaskar is that, as with Hume, he conflates an attack upon a 
generalised tradition, in this case idealism, with a philosopher whose contribution, 
whilst seminal within that tradition, is not coterminous with it in its developed form. 
And, given the complexity of Kant's writing and its ability to carry multiple 
interpretations, this type of criticism should perhaps have been anticipated albeit 
that, as per his use of transcendental argument, Bhaskar reflects a view of Kant that 
was influential when he wrote (1975 for RTJ). 
Turning to the critique of elisionism, Bhaskar cites Berger's work with 
Pullberg (1966)" and Luckmann (1991 [1967], The Social Construction of Reality - 
henceforth SCR) as examples of what he describes as the dialectical or elisionary 
model of social explanation and this interpretation is supported by, amongst others, 
Layder (1994). However, several passages in SCR appear to contradict Bhaskar's 
reading. For example, it is suggested that phenomena that are not 'specifically 
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human' (SCR, p. 69) may enjoy a substantively different ontological reality and a firm 
distinction is maintained throughout the text between `objective and subjective 
reality' (SCR, p. 183). Moreover, Berger's (1972 [1963]) earlier work Invitation to 
Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (henceforth ISHP) can be interpreted as questioning 
the mutually implicative nature of structure and agency which, if Bhaskar is correct, 
it should maintain (unless of course Berger had, in a short space of time, radically 
altered his opinions). Thus ISHP (p. 101) states that `Our lives are not only 
dominated by the inanities of our contemporaries, but also by those of men who 
have been dead for generations. " And `every institutional structure must depend on 
deception and all existence in society carries with it an element of bad faith' (ISHP, 
p. 107). Berger may therefore be prepared to countenance the reality of material and 
social structures that are external to (separate from) agential projections albeit that a 
strong elisionary thrust is evident within his work. " 
Bhaskar's interpretation of Winch is also open to challenge. Bhaskar targets 
The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (Winch, 1958 - henceforth ISS)"" 
and, to a lesser extent, Understanding a Primitive Society (Winch, 1970b). Yet Horton 
(2000, p. 23) suggests Winch is a victim of oversimplification since ISS never claimed 
`that there is no distinction between what people believe to be the case and what is 
the case, that truth and falsehood are somehow just a matter of opinion, or that 
reality is merely what people believe it to be. ' Authors such as Pettit (2000) who 
fault Winch's social theory for claiming that social relations represent the sum of 
extended internal relations support Bhaskar's general stance. However, although any 
number of constructionists, relativists and postmodernists are, from a CR 
perspective, guilty of committing the linguistic fallacy (see, for example, Swoyer, 
2004), Harre (1998, p. 50) differentiates social constructivism from relativism and 
postmodernism (thus indicating an unwarranted conflation of terms) and argues, 
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against Bhaskar, that constructivism need not licence radical relativism and that 
`radical relativism does not follow from the postmodern insight. '"' 
As can be seen, Bhaskar's attack upon empiric and idealist excess is 
potentially undermined by inaccuracy and terminological carelessness. Brante (2001, 
p. 170) suggests it is sometimes difficult to ascertain what Bhaskarian expressions 
`actually stand for' and Groff (2004) notes irregularities in the use of concepts such 
as the epistemic fallacy which appear capable of carrying several meanings. These 
criticisms contribute to the suggestion that Bhaskar distorts by simplification the 
work of individuals (viz. Hume, Kant, Berger and Winch) who come to shoulder the 
burden of responsibility for errors committed by generalised traditions or research 
cultures. If so, this is a curious anomaly given the centrality within PN of arguments 
delineating agency from social structure since, in some respects, the error implies a 
collapse of these two distinct entities. That is, individuals come to caricature cultural 
structures (systems of ideas) that they contributed to but differ from. 
In Bhaskar's defence, simplifying opposing arguments and the use of bi- 
polar contrasts or models is a frequently used and perfectly justifiable sophist 
technique. Collier (1999, p. 15), a CR theorist, simplifies `historic viewpoints .. 
for 
the sake of clear models' and Berlin (1998 [1960], p. 30) argues that the use of 
models or `deductive schema' can be justified according to `usefulness'. (Indeed, 
Berlin, ibid, suggests that certain forms of investigation or explanation are foisted 
upon the humanities by their subject matter - see discussion on Naturalism below. 
) 
Thus, just as Bhaskar simplifies to explain, Russell (1961, p. 783) distinguishes 
mathematically inspired philosophers such as `Plato, Aquinas, Spinoza and Kant', 
the party of abstract reason, from empirical observers such as Democritus, Aristotle 
and Locke. And Scruton (1994, p. 89) contrasts nominalists, who suppose `universals 
are brought into being by thought', with realists, not necessarily critical, who posit 
87 
the independent existence of universals. In each case, simplification aids 
comprehension though this inevitably results in an unfortunate conflation of 
perspectives and loss of precision. 
Naturalism: 
Applied to the social realm, Bhaskar's philosophy might be understood as a 
contribution to that debate which Bernstein (1979, p. 118), with a nod to Wilfred 
Sellars, labelled `The Scientific versus the Manifest Image of Man'. This descriptor 
alludes to the existence of, at the extremes, two bi-polar world-views (competing 
constellations of ideas) regarding the appropriate forms and objects of social 
investigation. (Bhaskar's analogous distinction is between Humean empiricism and 
Kantian idealism. ) Competing perspectives on naturalism are important to these 
divergent world-views. Indeed, together with associated or allied concepts, 
argument surrounding the definition of the term grounds much sociological 
disagreement. Yet despite the fact that both RTS and PN tackle and engage with 
these issues, Bhaskar's philosophic orientation leads him to possibly underestimate 
the confusion that can occur when the nomenclature of one discipline is used in 
relation to another (where identical terms carry different meanings). And it is 
necessary here to recognise that, in works which advocate the emancipatory 
potential and necessary use value of philosophy, it might have been beneficial had 
Bhaskar taken greater care regarding the use of descriptors (e. g. naturalism) 
particularly when ideological or socio-political consequences are suggested (see 
Emancipatory potential). 
When considering naturalism in CR theory, it should be noted that the first 
edition of PN suggested that despite its emergent status and ontological 
distinctiveness, social structure could not exist apart from the activity it made 
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possible, or the beliefs of the agents who maintain it (which may be erroneous or ill 
formed). However, a postscript to the third edition demonstrates the dynamic and 
evolving nature of CR theory. Therein, Bhaskar recognised that, contrary to earlier 
claims: 
social structures can exist independently of the activities they govern .. 
[when] the activities they govern may not be those which sustain (or 
undermine) them and/or .. they are internally related to other structures 
which are reproduced (or transformed) in human practice. 
(PN, p. 174 - emphasis added) 
This is a significant addendum; it bolsters the argument that society and agency are 
ontologically real but distinct entities and, in sustaining a strong form of AD, it plays 
a major part in supporting Archer's MM theory. Nevertheless, by highlighting the 
separateness of structures from the activities that they influence, this postscript also 
raises questions around Bhaskar's argument for qualified naturalism and, by 
implication, his definition of natural necessity and inter-strata forms of generative 
mechanism. 
These questions are important. It is argued here that the CR conception of 
naturalism and natural necessity might cause researchers to advance descriptions of 
mechanisms that, within the social realm at least, lack precision. (This argument is 
further developed in the discussion on retroduction. ) Moreover, as stated, caveats 
about explanatory specificity inevitably impact on Bhaskar's declaration that the 
practical value of CR, its ability to render accurate scientific descriptions of the 
physical and social world, makes it politically emancipatory. "' This assertion requires 
that CR offers a better (more accurate) understanding of scientific process, 
possibilities and goals than those offered by alternative metaphysical theories. And 
these complex and interlinked claims warrant precision in nomenclature. 
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Despite a measure of overlap, naturalism resonates differently in philosophic 
and sociological circles and Bhaskar's use of the term might be 'considered 
problematic insofar as he transgresses these and other disciplinary (terminological) 
boundaries without, perhaps, sufficient clarity. Bhaskar is consistent in using the 
descriptor philosophically (ontologically) and naturalism does not, in PN, refer to 
ecological, (epistemological or methodological) concerns regarding the location or 
position of researchers vis-a-vis their objects of study (i. e. it does not designate 
study within a natural setting, Punch, 2005). Nevertheless, philosophically, the term 
can refer to both physical and social naturalism and insofar as the descriptor carries 
specialised if approximate meanings in these as in other fields (Alston, 2008), further 
exposition of the concept is required. 
Disagreement and confusion surround naturalism's association with 
methodological materialism, materialism and positivism in both realist and non- 
realist writing. Historically, naturalism in physical science is a form of metaphysical 
realism that evolved alongside (became coupled with) successful epistemologies 
such as scepticism, rationalism and empiricism (Schafersman, 2008a, 2008b - 
alternatively, see de Groot, 2004). Grounded upon methodological materialism, 
naturalism in this general sense defines nature and the factors germane to natural 
explanation through an exclusive focus upon natural material and non-material 
forms. And, although the concepts are often elided, naturalism can be distinguished 
from (Hobbesian) materialism or physicalism (its modern embodiment) as well as 
from positivism (Schafersman, 2008a, 2008b; Butchvarov, 2002). 
Materialism describes a set of philosophies that deny the validity of 
arguments that cite the existence of non-material forms, whilst positivism (muscular 
empiricism) holds that knowledge only derives from the description of sensory 
phenomena. Materialists and positivists therefore refute the existence of non- 
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material and non-observable entities. And this, it should be noted, represents a 
stronger claim than that made by methodological materialists, who merely suppose 
that science is best served by discounting or ignoring dualist non-materialism and 
arguments reliant on purpose, vitalism, ' perseity, X" design, final cause or 
supernatural occurrence (Stephan, 1999). "" 
Naturalism based upon methodological materialism is not, therefore, 
necessarily synonymous with materialism or positivism. It can be agnostic rather 
than atheistic regarding the hypothetical existence of immaterial or non-observable 
entities (Schafersman, 2008a, 2008b). And this less restricted conception of nature 
allows non-reductive but ontologically monist naturalists to include within their 
discourses both material or physical (matter and energy located in space and time), as 
well as natural non-material forms (ideas, values and the logical relations existing 
between those ideas and values) (Schafersman, ibid; Le Boutillier, 2001). 
Nevertheless, within this broad conception, argument continues (e. g. the qualia 
debate) as to whether non-material natural forms are necessarily continuous with 
physically material natural forms (e. g. must qualitative mental or cognitive functions 
in the end be describable as neurological, electrical or chemical brain processes) or, 
alternatively, can non-material forms exist as independent emergent entities (e. g. is 
consciousness ultimately irreducible to physical occurrence) (Rose, 2006; O'Connor 
and Jacobs, 2003; Stephan, 1999). 
In his early works at least, Bhaskar is methodologically materialist regarding 
non-material supernatural forms. "° However, contra methodological materialism, 
he does countenance final causation insofar as agents can determine, within limits 
auses " This caveat and through reason, their own final causes, i. e. reasons can be causes. "' 
aside, PN's qualified naturalism appears to sit within the second broader (non- 
positivist, non-materialist) conception of naturalism outlined above.. Yet, whilst 
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Bhaskar describes a form of non-reductive naturalism - one that accepts the 
existence of non-material social forms - it is also possible to argue that PN makes 
significant ontological distinctions between inter-strata natural necessity and the 
forms of generative mechanism operating between strata. Bhaskar therefore argues 
for a form of dualism (Sawyer, 2002) - specifically, following Rose (2006, p. 20), 
`emergent property dualism' - and CR thereby distinguishes itself from monist 
naturalism. "' Further, in describing Humeam empiricism, Bhaskar appears to elide 
naturalism with materialism and positivism even though his own qualified 
naturalism rejects materialism and positivism thereby indicating that he is aware that 
this conflation need not take place. 
From A CR perspective, physical and social science differ in their objects of 
knowledge and this difference circumscribes the naturalism that Bhaskar espouses. 
Thus, in contrast to physical mechanisms that continue to exist and operate 
irrespective of humankind, social structures only operate in some (possibly 
tangential) relation to the actions, practices and beliefs of agents. And this indicates 
that the physical and social realms are ontologically distinct? '" CR postulates that the 
ontological existence of the objects of physical science do not require or rely upon 
humans (physical, chemical and non-human biological emergent strata can and have 
existed independently of humanity), whereas social forms require the existence of 
people (no people, no society). It might be objected that chemical strata require the 
existence of a physical strata just as, analogously, society requires people. Yet whilst 
higher level strata emerge from lower level strata they do not, in the physical, 
chemical and non-human biological strata, act back upon each other in the way that 
social strata (society) interacts with people (agents). Thus, chemical strata emerge 
from physical strata but chemical strata can only reorder physical entities, they 
cannot change the nature of that entity (its natural kind) in the way that social 
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structure acts upon and is in turn affected (changed) by agency, which is itself 
transformed. 
Differences between the nature of emergence and mechanism identification 
in the social and physical realms may have implications for social researchers. It is 
noticeable, for example, that explanatory examples of emergence or mechanism 
identification frequently refer to experimental methods within certain physical as 
opposed to social sciences and this may mischievously encourage false hope 
regarding expositional clarity in the social realm. (l 
It might of course be argued that society's `natural kind' does not change 
merely because its form changes. Support for this objection comes from Bhaskar 
when he states that: `The Newtonian revolution in sociology consists in coming to 
see that it is not necessary to explain society as such; but only the various structures 
responsible for different societies and their changes' (RTS, p. 196). Here the fact that 
social structures change does not alter their fundamental constitution, i. e. the fact 
that they are structured. Nevertheless, if universals, mechanisms and strata are to 
have a real and independent existence there must be limits to mutability if charges 
of nominalism are to be avoided. Further, whilst physical strata chronologically 
precede biological strata, it is difficult to conceive of people and society in the same 
temporal relationship. This is not to say that society is simply the sum of agential 
activity (structures are not coterminous with the doings of current agents) or that all 
human experience is socially mediated (both represent conflationary positions). It 
merely notes a lesser claim, that people are in part formed by social interaction 
(acting through structures that pre-exist and establish motivating interests), that 
social structures are reproduced or transformed by the actions of contemporary 
(volitionally capable) agents and that this reflexive temporal interplay does not 
resemble that supposed by the physical-chemical-biological chain. 
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These distinctions describe differences in the nature of natural necessity and 
natural kinds between physical and social mechanisms or strata. ""' Whether in open 
or regionally closed systems, physical and social mechanisms possess substantively 
different powers and tendencies because their relative degrees of `freedom' or 
mutability differ. Thus, whilst water must boil given certain circumstances (see, for 
example, RTS pages 202-206), social structures have no such determinacy and the 
clarity or explicitness of their explanation reflects this fact. (Even when being 
reproduced they merely tend to regularity. ) Bhaskar is right to redefine causal laws as 
tendencies since open system indeterminacy forecloses on the possibility of 
inevitable or deterministic event conjunctions irrespective of strata. However, to 
reiterate, the relative independence or separation of different strata differentially 
affect their ontological form and causal potential (natural kinds or generative 
mechanism) and, it is argued here, expositional clarity. 
Thus, physical mechanisms may or may not be actualised depending upon 
the interplay of other mechanisms, but their nature is not altered by the action of 
mechanisms from physical or other strata. Social structural mechanisms differ from 
physical mechanisms however. Social structural mechanisms are intimately 
associated with human activity and the emergent power(s) vested in people allow 
agents to ignore or misidentify the interests (structural mechanisms) that orientate 
them towards certain dispositions and behaviours. At best, people are only ever 
likely to act in certain ways and structural mechanisms are only ever likely to take 
certain ' forms (create certain interests). Therefore, although social structures and 
agency are analytically discrete, their mutually though temporally distinct interactive 
forms constrain or place limits on the mutable generative mechanism(s) that they 
possess or realise within the realms of the real and actual, a situation that acts 
against descriptive clarity and mechanism specificity. "x'° 
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Unpicking the concept of naturalism in relation to CR theory clarifies 
Bhaskar's argument for qualified naturalism; it illuminates his critique of Humean 
empiricism, which (contra qualified naturalism) conflates naturalism with positivism 
and materialism and, in addition, exploring qualified naturalism's dualist form 
(pointing out possible differences in the ontological status of inter-strata 
mechanisms), informs any discussion regarding retroductive reasoning and CR 
claims regarding its emancipatory potential. 
Retroduction: 
Lipton (1999, p. 166), a non-critical realist, poignantly asks `Why should we suppose 
that the account that would be most explanatory if it were correct is therefore most 
likely to be correct? "" This rhetorical question problematises CR's conception of 
scientific progress which is heavily reliant on criterial resolutions such as 
retroductive argument. Further, retroductive descriptive reasoning easily becomes 
tautologous since, even when apt, causal explanations (admittedly now redefined) 
may in open social systems, devoid of the possibility of empiric qualification, come 
to rest upon ad hoc or `contingent generalization' (Rosenberg, 2001, p. 736). In view 
of this recognised danger, Berlin describes the method (1998 [1960], p. 25) as `none 
too reliable' and Harre (1986) promotes caution in theory development so that 
speculation does not outpace plausibility. "" Bhaskar might have been aware of these 
problems since Hempel (1965), with whom he takes issue, addressed similar issues 
(concerning law-like explanation in historical studies). 
Rather than meeting these challenges Bhaskar states that open system 
explanation involves `(i) causal analysis (or resolution) of the event; (ii) theoretical 
redescription of the component causes; (iii) retrodiction via normic statements to 
possible causes of the components; [and] (iv) elimination of alternative causes' 
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(RTS, p. 125). This four stage process (termed the RRRE model) can been criticised 
for permitting the impression to be given that, in the first instance (resolution), it is 
possible to atomistically or objectively identify mechanisms or contexts prior to or 
apart from theoretical re-description (Engholm, 1999). Bhaskar would presumably 
repudiate this interpretation of his work since statements such as: `we cannot 
imagine the production of knowledge save from, and by means of, knowledge-like 
antecedents' (ITS, p. 22) suppose that atheoretical analysis is untenable. Yet this 
issue haunts the work of Archer who advances a social theory that redrafts and 
develops the RRRE model but which, it will be claimed, fails to clarify how 
intransitive social mechanisms can be confidently identified. 
To demonstrate the problematic nature of retroduction, a problem 
exacerbated by the normic form of explanation that qualified naturalism constitutes, 
specific instances of realist writing are examined. It will be noted that respected 
realist theoreticians and researchers encounter significant difficulties in achieving 
expositional clarity. Here contributions to the text Making Realism bVork (henceforth 
MRU7, Carter and New, 2004) by Ray Pawson and David Byrne are discussed. 
" CR in use 
CR's attractiveness rests in no small part upon the claim that it is, in principle at 
least, possible to look past mere occurrence and retroduce the interplay of 
mechanisms generating actual event sequences. Yet retroduction, like other forms of 
post factum explanation, is, as Bernstein (1979, p. 10) notes, open to the accusation 
that the `interpretations and explanations [it produces] are frequently so flexible, 
vague, or open that they can "account" for almost any data. ' Within MRIV 
differences as well as similarities are evident in the way contributors set about 
retroduction and, although the overall thrust of their analysis is compelling, it can be 
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suggested that the postulate mechanisms advanced might benefit from greater 
clarity if they are to repel sustained assault along Bernsteinian lines. 
For example, Ray Pawson (2004, p. 26 - Chapter 1, MRW) investigates `the 
methodology of evidence-based policy. """ His argument is in two sections. Section 
one offers a critique of orthodox systematic reviews and section two uses examples 
from a variety of public disclosure policy initiatives to outline a form of realist 
synthesis. Pawson locates mechanisms at the intersection between structural 
resource availability and agential response when, in exploring the operation of 
health related policy initiatives, he asserts that `it is not programmes that work but 
the resources they offer to enable their subjects to make them work. This process of 
what subjects do with the intervention stratagem is known as the programme 
`mechanism" (ibid, p. 31). More specifically he argues that, with reference to the 
effectiveness (or otherwise) of public disclosure policies aimed at affecting 
behavioural change, `it is the success or failure of the exchange of ideas that is the 
key mechanism .. [and that] The mechanism under test .. is thus the 
integrity of the 
official framing of the problem and whether it holds in the passage to the public' 
(ibid, p. 40). Structural resources in this instance might be interpreted as officially 
framed cultural propositions and agential responses to such claims, the test of their 
integrity, therefore determine whether they `hold'. Finally, Pawson asserts that the 
predominant mechanisms involved in the effectiveness of disclosure policy aimed at 
increasing motor vehicle security (just one of the programmes discussed) are 
`double-headed, with shaming sanctions giving way to consumer forces' (ibid, p. 43). 
In suggesting that sanctions `give way' to forces, Pawson recognises a 
difference between initiating (morphogenetic) and maintaining (morphostatic) 
mechanisms vis-a-vis programme effectiveness. This is an important distinction 
which, as Elder-Vass (2005a) notes in regard to emergence, does not always receive 
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the attention it deserves. Nevertheless, as putative mechanisms it might be 
suggested that `shaming sanctions' and `consumer forces' lack clarity. In PN Bhaskar 
states that `in general, more than one explanation will be consistent with the 
phenomenon concerned' and theorists are thereby enjoined to support arguments 
for hypothetical mechanisms with empirical data. Pawson amply underwrites the 
mechanisms that he identifies with evidence. Yet RTS also claims that mechanisms 
must `endure even when not acting .. [and] constitute the actual states and 
happenings of the world'. And, since Pawson does not make the case, it is perhaps 
less clear how, or in what form, `shaming sanctions' and `consumer forces' endure 
when not acting. Thus, although Pawson presents a persuasive and well supported 
narrative, it may nonetheless be felt that identified mechanisms (or rather their 
descriptors) lack specificity. And, problematically, if generative mechanisms are 
necessary but erratically actualised causal influences, it might be asked (borrowing 
from Kaidesoja, 2005, p. 55) whether: `It is a necessary condition of the possibility of 
X [the reality of the effectiveness of shaming sanctions in this instance] that the 
world -is P,, ..., P' [informed 
by the proposed mechanisms] and not otherwise? 
For, arguably, despite the data used to buttress his argument, Pawson's terms could 
feasibly describe or encompass a number of separate influences, or even discrete 
mechanisms - and it is unclear whether the identified mechanisms are explanandum 
or eplananr. xx"ü 
Regardless of Pawson's emphasis on agential responses to structural (policy) 
initiatives, it is probably fair to say that his orientating or primary interest in middle- 
range theory pitches attention at the corporate or group level and he is not 
particularly concerned with individual variation (Carter and New, 2004). By contrast, 
in Chapter 2 of MRW, David Byrne (2004), who likewise investigates the influence 
of mechanisms operating at the intersection of structure and agency, specifically 
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addresses the problem of how `we can relate causal mechanisms at levels beyond the 
individual to expressed effects in the individual case and consider how change at 
those levels might effect the individual case' (ibid, p. 51). 
Byrne is interested in complex and contingent causation and the 
implications of complex realism for quantitative modelling. He explores the 
interplay of mechanisms across or between strata by examining the relationship 
between poor housing and ill-health. And this concentration on the linkage between 
housing (environment) and health (at both a population and individual level) enables 
Byrne to propose a theory of historically situated and nested mechanisms wherein 
`individual changes (selective resistance), aggregate changes (better fed individuals in 
the mass), and transformations of environment deriving from collective social 
interventions' (ibid, p. 57) interact over time to inform accounts that allow for 
individual wellbeing amidst general ill-health without privileging explanations 
focused on either agency or structure. 
To develop his argument, Byrne (ibid, p. 59) introduces Brown and Harris's 
(1978) work on `housing conditions as an important background factor in the multi- 
causal complex aetiology of clinical depression. ' Byrne claims that Brown and 
Harris's description of the aetiology of depression is `exactly realist' (ibid, p. 59) and 
he suggests that the generative mechanisms in play in Brown and Harris's work are 
`a combination of background misery and life coherence threatening event' (ibid, 
p. 59). Byrne uses his own (Byrne et al, 1985) and Brown and Harris's (1978) work to 
support the intuitively sensible assertion that `movement from a threatening, 
unstable and stigmatised locale to one which is safe, stable and better regarded is 
effective in reducing general depression at the individual level' (Byrne, MRW, p. 59). 
Yet the adequacy or specificity of mechanism descriptions such as `background 
misery' and `life coherence threatening event(s)' as well as the usefulness of the 
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retroductive process from which such descriptors emanate is debatable. What, for 
example, is the ontological status of `background misery'? Does it endure when not 
acting? Is it an absolute or relative thing? 
That realist theoreticians and researchers find it difficult to articulate and pin 
down mechanisms reflects, perhaps, not only the difficulty of the task, but also the 
reluctance of Bhaskar to engage adequately with the difficulties inherent in 
retroductive argument as well as the nomic descriptors allowed by qualified 
naturalism. Kindred problems resurface in the work of Archer. 
" Retroduction and language 
In part, retroductive analytic imprecision involves or mirrors Bhaskar's disinterest in 
language use. Thus Sayer (2000, p. 37) notes that, despite the signal importance of 
`analogies, metaphors and metonymies' in CR explanation, the problematic use of 
these and other linguistic forms in scientific argument (such as the relation between 
metaphor, analysis and narrative) is underdeveloped by Bhaskar (see also Lopez, 
2003). An interest in language is expressed by CR theorists such as Carter (2000) or, 
more provocatively, Collier (1994) who, in a radical departure to realist orthodoxy, 
has `pronounced favourably on Chomsky's linguistics' (Potter, 2003, p. 1 G2) XX'x And, 
from a non-CR perspective, Tudor (1982, p. 82), without referring explicitly to 
Bhaskar (though' he is familiar with his work) explores the intimate relationship 
between models and metaphor and suggests that models are a `sort of simulacrum .. 
simplified, selected, often fictional (at least initially) and sometimes borrowed from 
other domains'. Tudor (ibid) then introduces the work of Harre (1961) to propose, a 
la retroductive argument, that successful rigorous assessment allows the claims 
contained within models to be assigned ontological status (thus shifting the focus of 
explanation from transitive model to intransitive mechanism). Retroductive analysis 
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can therefore recognise the role of simile and metaphor in explanation albeit that 
Bhaskar might beneficially have expanded upon the manner in which this occurs. 
Transcendental argument: 
Groff (2004) faults Bhaskar for failing to provide in either his early or later work a 
sufficiently robust definition regarding truth claims or validatory criteria tm It may be 
that this deficiency derives from or is linked to Bhaskar's reticence to engage with 
Hume's second facet of causality, the process of justifying belief, as well as issues 
around the use of the term naturalism and problems in operationalising 
retroduction. However, it is also a failure that conceivably relates to the 
underdeveloped concept of transcendental argument (TA) in RTS and PN. 
TA was Kant's response to Humean scepticism (Kaidesoja, 2005). It is thus 
anti-sceptical (Strawson, 1985) and, in theory at least, TA is `supposed to 
demonstrate the impossibility or illegitimacy of .. [the] sceptical challenge 
by 
providing that certain concepts are necessary for thought or experience' (Stroud, 
2000, p. 10). Adopting a transcendental perspective allows Bhaskar to circumvent 
what he defines as Hume's epistemic fallacy and introduce retroductive reasoning 
(Kaidesoja, 2006,2005). However, Howson (2000) and Stroud (2000, p. 1) both 
argue that `the true nature of the sceptical threat is still not properly understood' 
and, in failing to present a robust conceptualisation of TA, Bhaskar can perhaps be 
criticised for underestimating the danger that scepticism poses to CR theory (a 
failure that, possibly, ultimately grounds Groff s critique). 
Premised on the `fact' that knowledge of the world exists, TA reasons from 
what is known to the epistemic conditions of such knowledge (i. e. what must be the 
case for this knowledge to be possible). Stern (2000, p. 1) notes that it is `hard to give 
a brief and satisfactory definition of a transcendental argument'. However, 
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Pihlström (2004, p. 291-2) describes TA (in a classical sense) thus: `(1) If A (is 
possible), then C. (2) A (is possible). (3) Ergo, C. ""' And Outhwaite (1987, p. 18) 
more simply (simplistically) states: `Given that we have scientific theories, and that 
on the whole they seem to work remarkably well as an explanation of the world, 
what must the world be like in order for science to be possible? " 
Stern (2000), who points to the importance of TA in the work of theorists 
such as Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, and John Searle, suggests that TA was 
reinvigorated during the 1960s and 1970s through the writings of Peter Frederick 
Strawson (RTS was first published in 1975). x"X"' However, Stern (2000) argues that 
Stroud's (1968) influential essay Transcendental Arguments (and presumably other of 
his publications, see Stroud, 2000) thereafter undermined overconfidence in the 
anti-sceptical potential of TA ". X'" Stem's (2000, p. 44) own contribution to the 
development of TA as an anti-sceptical force has been to `finesse' or deflect the 
force of Stroud's critique. And in so doing, Stem (ibid) illustrates the paucity of 
Bhaskar's conception of TA. 
Stern (ibid) makes a distinction between truth, belief, experience and 
conceptually directed forms of TA. These four TA forms are then contrasted 
against various types of epistemic and justificatory scepticism, each of which has its 
own subdivisions and classifications. The permutations explored by Stern (ibid) are 
described in figure 4 below. It is not necessary here to expand upon the differential 
conceptual relations that exist between the various forms of scepticism and TA. The 
purpose of presenting this schematic is not to provide a detailed description of 
current thinking vis-a-vis TA. The schema here is purely illustrative. Figure 4 simply 
indicates that Bhaskar's definition of TA is relatively impoverished since it is not 
possible to identify which forms of scepticism Bhaskar hopes to outflank through 
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the use of TA and it is unclear what forms of TA he is deploying (i. e. truth, belief, 
concept or experience directed forms). 
Figure 4: Relations between forms of TA and forms of sceptical challenge (Stern, 
2000, p. 124 - adapted) 
Scepticism vs. epistemology 
epistemic scepticism I justificatory scepticism 
normativist II reliabilist 
scepticism scepticism 
foundationalist inferential reliabilist 
TAT strategy TAT strategy TAT strategy 
framework phenomenological meta-level naturalist 
TAB strategy TAE strategy TAB plan 
strong criteriological II coherentist 
TAT strategy TAB strategy 
modest 
criteriological 
TAc strategy 
naturalist 
TAB strategy 
KEY 
TAT truth-directed transcendental argument 
TAB belief-directed transcendental argument 
TAB concept-directed transcendental argument 
TAE experience-directed transcendental argument 
Bhaskar is aware that his use of TA is exposed and it is not therefore surprising that 
criticism of such usage comes from within the CR literature. `" I,,, 'aidesoja (2005, 
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p. 28) for example, states that Bhaskar uses the Kantian concept of transcendental 
necessity in his transcendental arguments which inevitably connects them to certain 
Kantian doctrines that are inconsistent with his transcendental realist ontology .. 
[and thus] Bhaskar's transcendental arguments fail to justify his transcendental 
realist ontology. ' 
Scientific emancipation: 
Every scientific theory contains an implicit or explicit ontology because every 
science proposes some relationship between knowledge and existence (scientific 
endeavour and the world or the knower and what is potentially knowable). Indeed: 
Any form of theoretical reflection .. necessarily relies upon a number of 
explicit or tacit philosophical presuppositions regarding, for instance, what is 
a successful explanation or the nature of causality. 
(Baert, 1998, p. 173) 
This much is non-controversial. However, CR also argues that `science is essentially 
developing; so that the hypothetical mechanisms of yesterday may become today's 
candidates for reality and tomorrow's phenomena' (RTS, p. 159) and this claim is 
more problematic. 
Philosophers of science recognise the divergent and occasionally 
`incommensurable' (RTS, p. 191) nature of scientific theories through time. 
Empiricists (henceforth identified with material positivists) are, Bhaskar alleges, 
exercised by this incommensurability. As noted, they want to claim that 
observations record or describe genuine events. However, having under-theorised 
the status and role of theory in explaining and constructing observations, they 
cannot articulate how understandings of observations change whilst reality is stable. 
From a CR perspective, this problem Arises because empiricism fails to distinguish 
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intransitive reality from transitive knowledge. Empiricists thus find it difficult to 
explain science's incremental development, when today's seemingly correct 
understandings (knowledge) have developed (by revolution or evolution) from 
yesterday's erroneous ones; i. e. how can empiricists be confident that today's 
understandings are correct when yesterday's knowledge and the observations (upon 
which current knowledge is founded) are palpably incorrect by modern standards? 
Idealists (or anti-naturalists insofar as they reject naturalist material- 
positivism), on the other hand, accept that knowledge is humanly generated 
(transitive) without concerning themselves overly -with its intransitive referents. 
Bhaskar argues that they are relatively untroubled by scientific explanatory 
discontinuities which merely indicate the substitution of language games. CR 
criticism of idealism and the judgemental relativism that it allegedly gives rise to 
focuses upon idealism's inability to explain why language games succeed each other, 
or how successful games win. Indeed, from the strong idealist position, it may even 
appear superfluous to ask "why" or "how" questions regarding language games or 
regimes of truth (to borrow an expression associated with Foucault, 1980) since 
answers would inevitably resort to or rely upon external referents, the very thing 
denied by this perspective. 
The possibility of scientific (and moral") progress for Bhaskar revolves 
around the distinction between transitive (changeable) knowledge and intransitive 
reality. Intransitive physical mechanisms do not alter in response to changes in 
transitive understanding. However, human (social and psychological) reality can and 
does evolve in response to developments in transitive awareness and this is the key 
factor or argument supporting CR's emancipatory potential. CR claims that reality 
can in theory be described (judgemental rationality) and that scientific progress can 
be made (i. e. today's models or theories offer deeper and more expansive 
105 
explanations of reality than previous accounts). Both claims are made despite, or 
because of, the fact that acknowledging the contingent nature of transitive human 
understanding means `scientific beliefs can no longer be distinguished by their 
content' (ITS, p. 189). 
To explain how particular theories come to be accepted as and are superior 
to others, Bhaskar notes that redefining the role of experimental experience in law 
formulation (dismissing Hume's epistemic fallacy) allows a plausible understanding 
of the relationship between transitive knowledge and stratified reality to be 
articulated. And the `geological metaphor' (Archer, 2004b, p. 92) of stratification 
permits Bhaskar to argue that scientific progress takes place (in the physical realm) 
when new and lower level mechanisms are discovered (relative to current 
knowledge of existing strata), or when the hypothecated new lower level 
mechanisms lead to `a revision, correction or modification' (RTS, p. 189) in our 
understandings of currently identified strata. The acid test of such knowledge (the 
truthfulness of discovery) is its usefulness in producing fresh and more 
comprehensive explanatory theories (a theory being a `model with existential 
commitment', RTS, p. 192). Thus: 
theory T. is preferable to theory Tb .. if theory T. can explain under 
its 
descriptions almost all the phenomena p, .. p that 
Tb can explain under its 
descriptions Bp, 
.. Bpn plus some significant phenomena that 
Tb cannot 
explain. We can speak in this way .. without falling back on the 
idea of 
certain foundations of knowledge or theory-free experience. 
(RTS, p. 248) 
Putting to one side Groff's (2004) critique of the competence of this argument, 
Bhaskar's appraisal of theoretic adequacy allows the claim that physical `scientists 
are correct in regarding experience as in the last instance the test of theory' (RTS, 
p. 58) without supposing that `its objects are ontologically ultimate' (RTS, p. 38). 
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CR's epistemological relativism and rejection of correspondence theory 
might here be restated. A statement `is true if and only if the state of affairs that it 
expresses (describes) is real. But propositions cannot be compared with states of 
affairs .. There is no way in which we can look at the world and then at a sentence 
and ask whether they fit. There is just the expression (of the world) in speech (or 
thought)' (RTS, p. 249). Scientific progress is therefore authentic, but qualified, i. e. 
there are `no absolutely privileged statements' (RTS, p. 189) and progress `can only 
be shown to have occurred from some substantive theoretical standpoint .. [since] 
There is no Archimedean point outside theoretical time' (RTS, p. 189). 
CR claims that judgemental rationality and epistemological relativity are as 
applicable to the human as they are to the physical sciences. Yet, as stated, because 
the human sciences rarely enjoy the possibility of even regional closure, appeals to 
experience as theory's final arbiter are problematic. As per the physical sciences, the 
power or use value of explanatory theory is the ultimate standard against which 
progress is measured and advancement occurs when investigators describe in an 
intelligible and coherent manner the generative mechanisms (known or unknown to 
agents) that influence phenomena. This being the case it must be acknowledged that 
CR's promise (re progress and, emancipatory potential) largely awaits fulfilment 
(Potter, 2006 and 2003; Lopez, 2003; Blaikie, 2000; Carter 2000). 
Political emancipation: 
Bhaskar not only emphasises the place of ontology in scientific theory, he also 
connects ontic with ideological and socio-political concerns. Bhaskar claims that 
empiricism's epistemic fallacy generates a politically regressive or `conservative 
ideology, in which the current experiences of a science are rationalised in being 
thought of as natural, given or implied by the very nature of things themselves' 
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(RTS, p. 243). This occurs because empiricists view the `ultimate objects of 
knowledge .. [as merely] atomistic events' (RTS, p. 24) (Williams, 2006, p. 88, 
describes empiricist knowledge as `encapsulated') and empiricism produces scientists 
(social or otherwise) who are the passive recipients `of given facts and recorders of 
their given conjunctions' (RTS, p. 16). "x ' Further, Bhaskar asserts that empiricism's 
rise to hegemony occurred during a period (between the mid-eighteenth to early 
twentieth century) when, borrowing Kuhnian (1970) terminology, consolidatory or 
`normal science' was ascendant (RTS, p41) "XX"" And this success, he claims, proved 
problematic when Enlightenment principles solidified into positivist dogma"""" 
As noted, Bhaskar's definition of naturalism conflates empiricism with 
materialism and positivism (though his own theory of qualified naturalism rejects 
this association). And a similar conflation may have contributed to the rejection, in 
sociology, of sociological naturalism (the idea that the society can and should be 
studied in the same way as the natural world) when perhaps the real targets were 
materialism and positivism. 
Sociological naturalists such as Lester Ward (Chriss, 2006) and Robert E 
Park (Deegan, 2006) attempted to access the certitude and kudos attaching to 
physical science by ascribing the form that social scientific argument can take (Ryan, 
1981; Bernstein, 1979). However, for Baert (1998), whilst the early physical 
naturalists provided a radical and inspiring alternative to the tenets of their time, 
' 
ascendant empiricism proved counterproductively regressive when it culminated in 
restrictive anti-metaphysical logical positivism. It is against this empiric imperialism, 
as he would see it, that Bhaskar and others (idealists included) have reacted. And 
thus, for many, sociological naturalism lost its attraction. Indeed, according to 
Bookchin (2008,2007), certain radically inclined groups (e. g. feminists and green 
ecologists) and new academic or social movements (e. g. postmodernism and animal 
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liberationists) have been attracted to anti-naturalism and and-positivism precisely 
because they reject the scientism that is inherent in sociological naturalism. " Yet the 
paradox, as Bhaskar peritropically notes, is that idealism (here associated with anti- 
naturalism and anti-positivism) also produces ideological conservatism (passivity) 
and illiberalism (see also Martindale, 1964). 
For Bhaskar, Kandan idealism like Humean empiricism is politically 
regressive. Idealists, he claims, do not question Humean definitions of event 
conjunction laws and causality, they merely choose not to make overtly generalisable 
statements. "" Idealists, or anti-naturalists, recognise the man made (transitive) nature 
of knowledge. However, according to Bhaskar, they give inadequate attention to the 
intransitive or material referents of such knowledge and this failure leads to 
judgemental relativism (the notion that all viewpoints are, in some meaningful sense, 
equally truthful or valid). Judgemental relativism is politically regressive because, 
perversely, in refusing to admit that disputants can appeal to evidence outside of 
mere discourse (i. e. to an ontologically robust world) it undercuts critical thought 
and political action (Potter, 2003). 
This well rehearsed argument may however, be too rigid. Carter (2000) 
distinguishes between strong and weak versions of idealism (i. e. strong and weak 
judgemental relativism). Weak idealism is, he suggests, useful insofar as it draws 
attention to the `expressive or constitutive role of discourse' (ibid, p. 38). However, 
problems exist with strong idealism (the only version recognised by Bhaskar). 
Strong idealism is not coterminous with the statement that: `if men define situations 
as real, they are real in their consequences' (Thomas and Thomas, 1928, p. 572; cited 
Wiley, -2006, p. 44). Here proof by effect is offered for the reality of the consequence 
of belief and not for the referent of belief. By contrast strong idealism's `chief 
weakness .. is its ontological reduction of social reality to actor's 
beliefs about it' 
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(Carter, 2000, p. 160). Strong idealism (judgemental relativism) is irrational and 
disempowering since if all viewpoints are equal (if subjective reports of belief cannot 
be deemed misguided or false) then factually incorrect or morally repugnant 
statements cannot be distinguished from factually correct and non-repugnant 
statements. From a CR perspective however, empowerment and emancipation is 
potentially feasible because the ontic insights that it uniquely generates may allow 
(or demand) distinctions and judgements to be made regarding truth and moral 
claims m 
Bhaskar's assertion is that epistemological relativism (or freedom), allied 
with the recognition of open system indeterminacy enables CR to advance non- 
deterministic and non-directional (non-conflationary) explanatory rather than 
predictive arguments. With regard to the human sciences, the assertions made in 
RTS and PN against alternative metaphysics suggest that the structures identified by 
realist social scientific theory (transitive knowledge) may purposively and usefully act 
back upon the reality thus described (the intransitive realm) through the `transformed 
transformative praxis of the agents who were reproducing them .. [which 
for Bhaskar 
offers] the possibility of an explanatory and ceteris paribus emancipatory social 
science' (PN, p. 177 - italicisation in original). 
CR's emancipatory potential thus rests upon its ability to enable scientific 
progress (that is, move understanding towards more accurate and expansive social 
explanations). It is a potential that relies upon an interpretation of empiricism that 
conflates naturalism with materialism and positivism in both the physical and social 
sciences (albeit that Bhaskar then redefines naturalism to allow a qualified form of it 
to resurface in PM and it is also a potential that contrasts CR against a definition of 
anti-naturalist idealism that rests solely upon strong criteria. 
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Situating CR - internal dialogues: 
Locating Bhaskar's work amid the spectrum of philosophic perspectives which, in 
part or whole, adopt similar frames is fraught with difficulty. Internal arguments and 
developments within CR, contested boundary disputes between CR and non-CA 
realists as well as overlapping interests between CR and non-realist thinkers 
combine to complicate the mapping of ideas. 
Looking firstly at divisions in CR thinking, whilst this thesis associates CR 
with its founder, not only does Bhaskar's realism remain a work in progress (as new 
texts and revisions to earlier editions attest) but the movement is equally dynamic 
being subject to what Curry (2003, p. 160) diplomatically terms `any number, of 
`internal' dialogues'. "" Fluidity within CR is evident in debates regarding its Marxist 
heritage, spiritual development and the stature of truth claims (exemplified by 
debates concerning correspondence theory). 
Although it is beyond the purview of this study to explore the relationship 
between CR and Marxism (or between CR and Thomist or Durkheimian thought), ' 
it is important to recognise Marxism's influence upon Bhaskar's philosophy. X1" To 
give just one example, Bhaskar's TMSA is, as Layder (1994, p. 55) notes, grounded 
upon Marx's famous dictum that people `make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it under conditions chosen by themselves, 
but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. ' 
At a purely rhetorical level, associating CR with sociological or academic Marxist 
thinking is unproblematic. However, allying CR with political Marxism is 
contentious (Curry, 2003) and calls have been made for a clearer separation to be 
made between them in this respect (Potter, 2003). That said, a Marxist political 
orientation is shared by many if not all CRs (Potter, 2006; Bhaskar and Callinicos, 
2003) and this reflects, to some extent, the manner in which both Marx and Bhaskar 
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conjoin scientific theory (attempts to develop improved understandings of the 
world) with the emancipatory potential of negative-critical thought viz. human 
affairs (see endnote ix, §1 Chapter 1, page 41 this thesis). Thus, as Potter (2006) 
notes, Bhaskar would agree with Marx on Feuerbach [1845], that, whilst 
philosophers interpret the world, `the point is to change it' (Bottomore and Rubel, 
1963, p. 84) and, likewise, Marx's [1845] statement: `The question whether human 
thinking can pretend to objective truth is not a theoretical but a practical question' 
(ibid, p. 82 - emphasis in original) would be supported by Bhaskar (though the term 
`objective' requires clarification in this instance). " 
Without jettisoning this Marxist perspective, Bhaskar (2000) has recently 
evidenced a `spiritual turn' (Collier, 2004, p. 168) and other realists (e. g. Archer et al, 
2004a; Shipway, 2000; Collier, 1999) are also exploring this theme. However, 
whether CR can successfully combine Marxist and spiritual insights is an open 
question. Commentators such as Potter (2006,2003) and Dean et al (2006c) are 
frankly hostile, whilst others remain critical but supportive (e. g. Morgan, 2002b): 
d"° 
Hartwig (2001, p. 162) playfully suggests that a split or rupture may develop within 
CR between `Young (or Left) Bhaskarians' and those who are more spiritually 
inclined. Nonetheless, despite his own misgivings, Hartwig (ibid) acknowledges that 
religion and spirituality's ontological status is under-theorised by social scientists and 
he applauds the audacity of Bhaskar for engaging with such issues. 
Mutability in CR thought is also demonstrated in debates on the subject of 
correspondence theory (CT). Bhaskar's dismissal of CT is central to the argument 
presented in RTS and PN (a position he reiterates in Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, 
2003, p. 211-15). However, in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (1986) Groff 
(2004) notes that Bhaskar appears to favour the concept of metaphysical realism 
that Putnam presents in Reason, Truth and History (1981). Herein, the `Brain in a Vat' 
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dilemma requires that language's meaning and truth potential rest upon the 
existence of definable extra-linguistic natural kinds (Brueckner, 2004). `" Yet 
problematically for Bhaskar, metaphysical realism inevitably, according to Boyd 
(2002), invokes CT. 
In a qualified defence, Groff (2004) proposes that Bhaskar is mistaken in 
supporting Putnam since CR philosophy differs markedly from both metaphysical 
and internal realism (this issue is revisited in connection with Archer). Yet theorists 
sympathetic to CR such as Kaidesoja (2006), Porpora (2004) and Groff (2004,2000) 
do countenance CT. And Groff (2004, p. 48) suggests Bhaskar can be read as 
adjusting his position in Plato, Etc. (1995), so that `the claim is not so much that the 
correspondence theory of truth is indefensible as that it captures only one of a 
number of different definitions of the concept [of truth]'. More forcefully, 
Fumerton (2002) proposes that realism's (not just CR) truth value relies upon CT 
and, as if to demonstrate the vibrant and complex nature of CR, even Archer 
(2004a), in discussing man's transcendent experience of God, appears initially to 
accept correspondence (p. 67) before recanting (p. 68). 
Situating CR - within realism(s): 
Conventionally, realisms are associated with two approaches to the problem of 
universals. Platonists situate universals in an abstract or separate realm and, in this 
tradition, language or thought substitutes or stands for these abstract things. 
Alternatively, Aristotelians grant ontological reality to universals, but limit this reality 
to cases in rrm (i. e. the `hotness' of the coffee next to me is a real feature of the 
drink, but it is a realness that must be actualised and `hotness' does not exist prior to 
or separate from instantiation) (Scruton, 1994; Russell, 1961). Bhaskarian realism is 
associated by Groff (2004) with Aristotle insofar as both philosophies display 
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similarities in relation to the concept of material cause(s). And Sklar (2002, p. 9) in 
noting that: `For Aristotelians .. There are many kinds of properties of things, and 
properties can inhere in things both in actuality and mere potentiality', supports 
Groff (2004). 
Bhaskar however, does not, in RTS or PN, formally locate CR in either 
tradition and it is perhaps possible to identify both strands of thought within his 
work. Thus, the concept of generative mechanisms (which are ontologically real 
regardless of actualisation), the associated distinction between transitive knowledge 
and intransitive reality and his position on CT suggest Platonic overtones (though 
Bhaskar would dispute the abstractedness of the realm in which these mechanisms 
exist). 
Alternatively, Aristotle recognises both final causation (Sklar, 2002; Charles, 
2001) (though in a different form from Bhaskar) and the possibility of multiple or 
overlapping causation(s) (Barnes, 2000), a facet of Bhaskar's theory of tendencies. 
Further, Aristotle, like Bhaskar, interested himself in questions around the potential 
underlying unity of knowledge, a unity superficially cloaked by apparent diversity 
amongst the independent sciences which `work in different domains, discuss 
different objects, and follow different methods' (Barnes, ibid, p. 40). Attempts to 
construct a common conceptual apparatus to link or coordinate the knowledge 
forms of disparate disciplines match Bhaskar's project in PN and Aristotelian 
thought therefore supports the principle if not the detail of qualified naturalism. 
In contrast to early Greek archetypes, modern realisms overlap, vary and 
diverge (Wainwright, 1997) and differentiating realists from non-realists is not 
always straightforward. This creates a terminological quagmire that, for CR, is 
exacerbated by Bhaskar's loose use of alternative descriptors. 
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Situating CR - non-realist perspectives: 
To demonstrate the manner in which realist and non-realist thought interweaves, it 
is interesting to contrast Jacques Maritain with Bhaskar. Like Bhaskar, Maritain 
engaged with metaphysical, social and spiritual or religious issues. He labelled 
himself a critical realist and, as per Bhaskar, is closely associated with Thomist 
conceptions of philosophy that emphasise the role of a priori reasoning in scientific 
explanation and practice (Scruton, 1994). Similarly, Maritain took up arms against 
empiricism's hegemony in scientific thinking (Evans and Ward, 1956) and 
recognised that scientific organisation and method reflect what exists and can be 
known (an argument analogous to that advanced in PN). The similarities between 
both men are therefore striking albeit that, contra Bhaskar, Maritain is identified 
with nominalism and foundationalism' (Sweet, 2004). 
Alternatively, it can be equally challenging to position CR in relation to 
overtly non-realist perspectives. For example, support for CR concerns and theory 
comes from non-realist scholars and despite the need for circumspection, 
differences between such scholars and Bhaskar are often marginal. Thus, Rosenberg 
(2001, p. 737), in a paper titled How is Biological Explanation Possible?, asserts from a 
Hempelian vantage that `there are no biological laws'. As per CR, Rosenberg (ibid) 
recognises that formal inductive empiricism collapses before the absence of 
constant event conjunctions in biological systems. Further, Rosenberg (ibid, p. 737) 
states that the `most common response to this problem [the non-Humean nature of 
causal explanation in biological science] has involved redefining law so that those 
grammatically general statements which biologists [and others] invoke in 
explanations can be counted as laws. ' This proposition encapsulates or summarises 
the CR agenda and Rosenberg (ibid) demonstrates additional similarities between his 
and Bhaskar's work by outlining, without explicitly using the terms, a proto-theory 
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of tendencies, norms and historical reasoning (akin to retroduction) from a 
significantly different philosophic standpoint - thus indicating that the problem 
field ploughed by Bhaskar is well turned. 
Just as criticisms of Bhaskar's writing must be acknowledged if his 
contribution to social explanation is to be adequately judged, so appreciating the 
interwoven nature of theoretical viewpoints is similarly vital in any assessment of 
CRs importance within the global configuration of competing perspectives. As will 
be seen, understanding the strengths and weakness of Bhaskarian CR informs 
discussion of Archer's work. 
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Endnotes §1 Chapter 3 
i Bhaskar claims that Hume and Kant combine erroneous epistemologies with `sensible 
realist methodology' in their writings (RTS, p. 40). See also PN (p. 15 - emphasis in original) which 
says `scientists, when they are practicing science, are implicitly acting on transcendental realism. But it 
does not follow .. that they realise that they are. ' 
i See, for example, Schubert's (2006) discussion of Humean and Kantian thought in the work 
of Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert Mead. 
w Stern (2000, p. 181) recognises that Hume's argument: `is complex and many-layered, as well 
as itself being open to contrasting interpretations .. ' 
iv Howson (2000, p. 35) discusses Bacon's condemnation of induction by enumeration, realism 
and the No Miracles argument (i. e. the fallacious claim that it is implausible or would require a miracle 
for an overwhelmingly supported hypothesis to be disproved). 
v Contrasting `matters of fact' from `relations of ideas', Hume (1955, p. 40 - IHU [1748] 
emphasis in original) states that: `The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can 
never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if 
ever so comfortable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition and 
implies no more contradiction than the affirmation that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore 
attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. ' Hume thus `challenged the very idea of causal explanation' 
(Alexander, 2007, p. 122 - see also Broackes, 2001). 
Vi From a non-CR standpoint, Stroud (2000, p. 89) offers an authoritative discussion on the 
subject of Kantian transcendental idealism and transcendental realism which problematises Bhaskar's 
interpretation. Alternatively, Kaidesoja (2005, p. 44), an author sympathetic to realism, suggests that 
Bhaskar uses `Kantian terms without clarifying their precise meaning' in novel or divergent ways and 
that, in consequence, the descriptors become `incomprehensible' (ibid, p. 45). This, Kaidesoja (ibid) 
argues, undercuts or confuses CR claims regarding its own transcendental status (see critique of CR 
transcendentalism). 
vi Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1990 [1781]) is the key text here; Stem (2000) examines the 
Refutation of Idealism and its relation to realism (non-critical) and Brook (2006) explores realism in 
the refutation of idealism. 
Vifi Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics - First Part Of The Main 
Transcendental 
Problem: How Is Pure Mathematics Possible? Remark II (Kant, 1783). 
Originally Berger and Pullberg (1965). 
This passage is reminiscent of Archer's (1995, p. 73) reference to Auguste Comte's 
aphorism, `the majority of actors are dead'. 
xi A distinction can be made however, between Berger's spiritual (non-constructivist) and 
sociological (constructionist) writing (Porpora, 2006). 
x° See also Winch (1970a). 
x"' Constructionism and postmodernism are variously interpreted. Constructionism or 
constructivism is associated with the interlinked ideas that (scientific) theory is or can be 
underdetermined by evidence and that, in consequence, values or power relations often guide 
(unwittingly) judgments regarding truth claims. Postmodernism, on the other hand, designates 
(amongst other things) an alleged historic rupture in social, cultural, political, economic and artistic 
production, consumption and forms of reasoning and legitimation. Postmodernism assumes a 
constructivist orientation although the reverse is not necessarily the case. Both concepts are 
commonly associated with idealism (Bird, 2005; Kellner, 2005; Blackburn, 1994). However, see also 
Tissaw (2003), and Harre (2002) who dispute this association. 
xrv See pages 111-2 this thesis regards Bhaskar and Marx, Marxism and Feuerbach. 
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xv `The doctrine that .. some feature [e. g. soul or complex emergent relationship] of 
living 
bodies .. prevents their nature being entirely explained in physical or chemical terms' 
(Blackburn, 
1994, p. 395). 
_vi Where a thing acts upon its own inner nature. 
xvi Wide debate continues however regarding the relevance or value of these non-material 
entities (e. g. Alston, 2008; Arsuaga and Martinez, 2005; Smith, 2005; Ward, 2004; Plantinga, 1993, 
1990, and 1974). 
xviii `It is of course true that it is impossible to prove that cases of ex nihilo production and 
miracles cannot ever happen. All we can say is that they cannot be known to happen' (RTS, p. 205). 
xiX Final causation only, of course, applies to human agency. Social structures or forms (e. g. a 
capitalist economy) may appear to purposefully direct the likely actions that individual corporations 
within it will perform. However, it is illogical to suppose that social forms possess intentionality. 
That is, social forms do not choose their final goals because they cannot reason (i. e. a capitalist 
economy may be defined by the perceived-observed or logical need of the majority of its constituent 
corporations to expand and maximise profits, but it is wrong to suggest that an economy chooses). 
xx Cruickshank (2004, p. 567) notes `slippage' in CR theory between two definitions or forms 
of ontological reasoning and Bhaskar, as Carter notes (2000, p. 65), recognises `some ontological 
differences between social and natural structures. ' 
xxi Legitimate differences of opinion divide those sympathetic to CR on the implications of this 
claim. For example, The South West Critical Realist Reading Group (12.08.05. ) discussed the matter 
and the view expressed here represents a minority opinion at that meeting. 
=xri Kaidesoja (2006, p. 40) makes a similar point when he says: 'Bhaskar's description of 
scientific experiments is one-sided, because it deals only with experiments in physics and chemistry. 
It totally ignores experiments in, for example, the life sciences, medicine and psychology. ' The 
critique of retroduction elaborates upon this point. 
=x It should be noted that Bhaskar uses the term strata in two ways. First, to refer to 
differences between natural kinds (physical, chemical, biological etc). Second, to distinguish between 
strata of historical explanation within kinds (see RTS, p. 169). 
xxiv A further limit to social naturalism is offered by Bhaskar when he states that social 
structures are often temporally limited: `so that the tendencies they ground may not be universal in 
the sense of space-time invariant' (PN, p. 38), or, social structures are `more highly pace time specific than 
natural (e. g. biological or geological) ones (PN, p. 175, emphasis in original). However, the claim that 
social structures are inevitably less enduring than natural mechanisms has been contested (see for 
example Engholm, 1999) on the grounds that some physical events (e. g. a land-slide or sub-atomic 
collision) are less enduring than many social practices (e. g. marriage and warfare) and even stable 
physical structures are only relatively enduring. 
xx° Likewise, Howson (2000, p. 206) notes that although simplicity in argument is highly valued 
this does not entitle it `to the status of a part of the logic of inference'. 
Xxvi McEvoy and Richards (2003) develop, within a realist framework, similar arguments 
regarding contingent generalisation. And, perhaps more powerfully, Howson (2000, p. 97) quotes and 
critiques Miller (1994, p. 37 - italics added) on similar lines when he notes that: `The 
difficulty [of 
Goodman's Grue Paradox] entirely disappears once we discard the mistaken idea that empirical 
support is significant, and that it is empirical support that makes a hypothesis eligible for admission 
into the body of science .. It is whether our hypotheses are true or false that matters, not whether 
they are empirically supported; and we all know that All emeralds aregme'is false. [But as Howson adds] 
How do we know? No answer. ' It might also be argued that Ostovich's (2005, p. 41) discussion 
regarding the problematic nature of memory in `attempts to master the past when history is 
understood as a neutral medium for revealing the integrative forces of reason' likewise undercuts, to 
some extent, elements of simplistic retroductive theory. 
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=xw Pawson elaborates upon these examples in his later work Evidence-based Policy (2006). This 
text also identifies the earlier studies upon which the examples in MRW and Evidence-based Policy draw. 
__vifi The use of `vague words' or `vague predicates' in explanation is discussed by Aune (2002, 
p. 140) who notes that: `Although such words can perfectly well express vague concepts or ideas, they 
cannot stand for definite properties or items in reality, because nothing definite or determinate is 
connoted by them. ' For Aune (ibid, p. 140-141) concepts denoting `fuzzy classes' fail to specify `a 
definite totality of things' and they are thus `poor candidates' for certain universal descriptors. For 
CR sociologists the challenge in using such descriptors (and their use is inevitable) arises where 
mechanisms are synonymous (if they are) with universals. 
x= Jones (2003c) argues against Collier (1994). 
xxx Groffs (2004) position, that truth is a necessary regulative ideal is challenged by Wellmer 
(2003); see also Bryant et al (2003). 
xxxi Pihlström (2004) rejects the idea that TA can be distinguished in any meaningful way from 
other forms of philosophic argument. 
x==ii Archer (RST, p. 166) provides a similarly innocent and contentious definition: 
Transcendentally, the world has to be ordered for science to have success as a practice and its 
cumulative successes (not construed as undeviating linear progress) furnish increasing warrants for 
this metaphysical assertion. ' Devitt (2006, p. 100) critically deconstructs this `success argument'. 
xxx Curiously, during this historical resume, Stem (2000) does not identify the particular 
Strawsonian text(s) that initiated interest in TA during the 1960s and 1970s (he only mentions 
Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985, at this point). However, Stem does discuss Stroud's 1968 essay on TA 
(as a response to Strawson) and from this essay (republished in Stroud, 2000, Understanding Human 
Knowledge) it is possible to locate Stem's focus on Strawson as the 1959 publication Individuals, An 
Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (republished 1990). 
xxxiv Stroud's (2000) attack upon Strawsonian forms of TA argument begins by delineating 
factual statements from justificatory ontic premises. This allows Stroud (2000, p. 15 - italics in 
original) to introduce what he calls the `verification principle', or, as Stem (2000, p. 50) describes it, the 
`weakening assumption'. Stroud (2000) then re-couples TA with idealist reasoning and, to meet 
Stroud's (2000) challenge, Stern (2000, p. 51-52) cites Harrison (1982, p. 52) (in terms that Bhaskar 
could presumably endorse) to suggest that: `we can argue from the fact that the world must conform 
to particular conditions in order to be experienceable by us, but we do not have to hold (with Kant) 
that the way in which the world meets these conditions is through any constitutive activity on our part, and so 
we are not required to treat the conditions as imposed by the mind on reality. Thus it seems possible 
to accept the claim that transcendental arguments .. get from how we must conceive things to 
how 
they are, by treating the former as conditions the latter must meet for us to be aware of them, but 
without endorsing the further idealist suggestion that they meet these conditions as the result of the 
activity of the synthesizing subject. ' 
xxxv In a postscript to the second edition of RTS (p. 258-259), Bhaskar states that whilst `the 
transcendental method employed is, in general, sound. It is certainly the case that the book contains 
no adequate defence, or meta-philosophical justification of the latter. ' Bhaskar considered this 
omission `the most serious in the work' (RTS, p. 259). And although, as Kaidesoja (2005, p. 43) notes, 
Bhaskar did try in his later outputs to `specify and defend the `transcendental method", he is not, in 
Kaidesoja's view, ultimately successful in this task. However, see also Morgan (2006 and 2005). 
1 
xxxv'' CR's asserted ability to advance moral understanding is developed in works other than RTS 
and PN. 
xxx"' That is, the erotetic logic of empiricism blocks investigation into unobservable normic 
tendencies and their underpinning mechanisms. As argued and contra Bhaskar, non-materialist and 
non-positivist naturalists need not perhaps be so encumbered. 
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xxxvifi Bhaskar's claim is contentious since Kuhn's (1970) theory of paradigmatic scientific 
development is widely contested (e. g. Trigg, 2001; Archer, 1995; Giddens, 1995; Collier, 1994; 
Bourdieu, 1990; Bernstein, 1979). 
: xxiX For Bernstein (1979, p. xxiii): `What were once great liberating ideals .. [eventually] turned into suffocating straightjackets. ' 
xA For example, August Comte argued for sociological naturalism as part of his attempt to 
reconcile the forces of order and progress in early nineteenth century Europe (Zeitlin, 1997). 
xli Scientism here `refers to the (positivistic) view that science produces objective knowledge 
through the consistent application of the hypothetico-deductive method, that is through neutral 
observation of reality and the accumulation of the data arrived at to the point at which some general 
law or pattern can be discovered' (Carter, 2000, p. 162). 
Yil However, see- comments re generalisability and idealist or qualitative research - 51 Chapter 
1, page 22 this thesis. 
Rlw Though see Groff (2004) and Dean et al (2006a). 
X11° Dean et al (2006b, p. 2) also note an `absence of consensus' regarding Bhaskarian realism. 
xlv It should be noted that Durkheimian and Thomist concepts infest RTS and PN. Durkheim 
is of course condemned by Bhaskar. Yet Durkheim can be read as developing ideas central to the CR 
project. Caveats must be placed around the following interpretation. Yet, at various points in his 
writings Durkheim arguably promotes a theory of emergence, the independence of social and cultural 
structures from agency, the temporal precedence or scene setting nature of structure vis-ä-vis agency, 
proof by effect, the impossibility of predictive sociology and the indeterminacy of social explanation 
(Thompson, 2004). Likewise, although Thomist thought is capable of varied interpretation, parallels 
can be drawn between Thomism and CR (for example, Aquinas viewed causality as `a metaphysical 
principle and not an empirical phenomenon', Haldane, 2002, p. 100 - see also Smith, 1995). 
xlvi Alternatively, Joseph (2006) suggests that Marxism has much to learn from CR. 
alp Variations in translation account for differences in the wording of these and other Marxist 
aphorisms between texts (Arthur, 1974). 
xlviii A midway position between outright support and condemnation is taken by Porpora (2006) 
who argues that it is epistemologically illogical for sociologists to decline to acknowledge the possible 
ontological reality of spiritual phenomena whilst allowing that perceptions regarding such 
phenomena may have non-supernatural causes. 
'1'x See also Norris (2002) regarding CR and Putnam. 
Variously defined, foundationalism is associated with Descartes and sceptical philosophy. It 
describes the empiricist proposition that experience is the basis of knowledge only if beliefs about 
observation (experience) are accurate (Scruton, 1994). For Stroud (2000, p. 126) foundationalism `is 
the view that knowledge of an independent world must be inferred or derived from prior knowledge 
of the deliverances of sense-experience alone which themselves imply nothing about such an 
independent world. ' 
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Section 1- Chapter 4 
As per the critique of Bhaskar's work, where difficulties with MM theory undermine 
or impinge upon its credibility, engagement with such issues is necessary. 
Critique and commentary upon the work of Margaret Archer 
Whereas Bhaskar might be accused of misrepresenting the arguments of Hume, 
Kant, Berger and Winch, Archer can be charged with demonising Giddens's (1976) 
Structuration Theory (ST). Thus, despite the persuasiveness of Archer's overall 
assessment of ST, that it is fundamentally elisionist, sections of Giddens's New Rules 
of Sociological Method (ibid - henceforth NR) can support alternative readings. 
Thus whilst NR does, as Archer argues, deny or downplay the claim that 
, given' universe 
of structure pre-exists agency (e. g. `Sociology is not concerned with a pr_ 
objects, but one which is constituted or produced by the active doings of subjects', Nß, p. 160 - 
emphasis in original), statements such as: The realm of human agency is bounded. Men 
produce society, but they do so as historically located actors, and not under conditions of their 
choosing' (NR, p. 160 - emphasis in original) may carry an emergentist, Durkheimian 
or Marxist spin. Cherry picking quotations can unfairly discredit texts. Yet passages 
such as: `The production of society is brought about by the active constituting skills 
of its members, but draws upon resources, and depends upon conditions, of which 
they are unaware or which they perceive only dimly' (NR, p. 157) are not antithetical 
to CR (albeit that the first clause requires clarification). It might therefore be 
suggested that in denouncing ST, Archer overstates differences between it and MM 
so that, perhaps, her own position can be more clearly delineated. 
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Questions may also be asked about the form in which Archer presents 
arguments concerning micro-macro and agent-structure relations. As she 
acknowledges, MM's relational component is based upon a typology by Münch and 
Smelser (1987), wherein only one of the seven definitions offered (i. e. Peter Blau's, 
1977), does not invoke some form' of size or complexity criteria. The synopsis of 
Blau (ibid) provided by Münch and Smelser (1987, p. 357): `Micro as social processes 
that engender relations among individuals and macro as the structure of different 
positions in a population and their constraints on interaction', therefore represents a 
minority opinion within the original typology. Two points regarding Archer's 
utilisation of Blau's (1977) definition require consideration. 
First, just as it is unnecessary to cite Lockwood (1964) in support of AD 
(since the idea is already contained within RTJ), so Blau (1977) is not required to 
sustain a relational conception of micro-macro or agent-structure linkage. RTS deals 
overtly and at length with internal and external relations and Archer might have 
adopted and expanded upon Bhaskar's insight, which she does elsewhere in any 
case, without recourse to Minch and Smelser (1987). Using Bhaskar' in this way 
could have saved her from having to elasticate, perhaps overly, Blau's (1977) original 
definition (which is absent from ISST). ' It would also have presented a more 
consistently realist approach and (see below) it might have facilitated recognition 
that differential importance attaches to logical CS relations and the situated S-C 
logics that they generate, depending upon whether such relations are internal or 
external - symmetrical or asymmetrical. 
Second, it could be suggested that rejecting all size and complexity criteria 
regarding micro-macro and agent-structure distinctions is excessive since other 
authors favourably inclined towards CR (e. g. Layder, 1994) recognise the 
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significance and importance of relational criteria in social explanation without 
rejecting definitions that employ size or complexity principles. 
Concerns about nomenclature or the nature of argumentative construction 
might be considered minor quibbles. However, these concerns point towards 
kindred but more fundamental challenges to MM theory. As will be noted, Archer's 
work reproduces many of the problems discussed within the preceding critique and 
commentary on Bhaskar. Transposed to or reflected in MM theory these problems 
surface as a series of overlapping or interrelated issues that are here examined under the 
headings: (i) the form and ontological status of CS propositions, (ii) hypothesis 
equivalence and CS expositional clarity, (iii) proof by effect and relational strength, 
(iv) the researcher's position or role in MM theory, (v) emergence and structural 
identification and (vi) contexts and mechanisms. 
The form and ontological status of CS propositions: 
For Archer (ISST, p. 180), `the CS is distinguished as the sub-set of items to which 
the law of non-contradiction can be applied - this is propositions, 
for only 
statements which assert truth or falsity can be deemed to be in contradiction or to 
be consistent with one another. ' This is unambiguous. However, the CS leaves 
much outside its remit (i. e. culture as all intelligibilia) and the assumption of identity 
between CS propositions and the cultural register to which they refer may be 
problematic. Three points are made here. 
First, it must not be assumed that CS statements asserting truth or falsity 
claims can or should be verifiable in principle for, self-evidently, many truth claims 
(e. g. God is omn potent) can be contradicted but are unverifiable and un-falsifiable. 
Second, normative or moral propositions (e. g. it is wrong to steal) differ from 
propositions that lack an overtly evaluative element (e. g. two and two equal four) in part 
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because they are in principle unverifiable" As noted, Archer emphasises the 
importance of keeping the CS register to those things held to be `true or false in 
society at any given time and place' (CAA, p. xviii). That said she does not wish to 
exclude normative or moral propositions from the CS and in arguing for the 
emergent nature of the CS as a discrete ontological entity she broadens its remit to 
include `theories, beliefs, values or more strictly the propositional formulations of 
them' (RST, p. 180 - pages 70 and 71 this thesis). This is reasonable. Yet whilst 
moral or normative values may be perceived as correct they cannot in a formal sense 
be true and this should perhaps have been made clearer. 
Third, despite the above caveat regarding propositional formulations (that 
propositions need not be true - they merely need to be expressed as if they are true), 
Archer appears, in some instances, to conflate the expression of CS propositions 
with factual truth or knowledge claims. Thus, in the quotation below (cited earlier, 
page 66 this thesis) fallible transitive understanding is elided with intransitive or true 
knowledge (i. e. descriptions are not here distinguished from their objects). 
.. all knowledge was certainly activity dependent for its genesis and 
elaboration. Nevertheless, once recorded .. it constitutes 
knowledge without 
a current knowing subject. It is knowledge because it retains the 
dispositional character to be understood, though it persists unrecognized, 
sustaining potential powers (of contradiction and complementarity with 
other cultural items) which remain unexercised. Ontologically it exists and if 
the theory is true, if the technique it describes works, or if the belief it 
articulates is justifiable, these remain the case quite independently of current 
actors knowing it, using it or believing it. We know that they are real by 
virtue of their releasable effects .. (RST, p. 144)'ä 
Archer is of course aware that propositions can be factually incorrect. However, just 
as Bhaskar tends to rely upon or make use of examples from the physical sciences 
when arguing for the applicability of CR in the social realm, so Archer employs 
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examples that have, at a minimum, the capacity for correct, justifiable or truthful 
decoding. RST might therefore be said to link the ontological status of transitive CS 
propositions with their 'apparent correspondence to intransitive reality and a 
capacity for decipherment. 
It [CS propositional knowledge] exists and if it works, if it is true or false, 
this is the case independently of agents knowing it. Certainly they can 
activate it or leave it to gather dust, but its ontological status is not 
determined by which they do. Knowledge without a knowing subject would 
be ruled out in elisionism, but would still leave many questioning what the 
Rosetta Stone was before it was discovered and decoded, yet was capable of 
decoding. 
(RST, p. 98-99) 
It is here argued that Archer inadvertently merges epistemological truth claims with 
the ontological substance to which they refer and, where CS propositions refer to 
events (e. g. decoding the Rosetta Stone), Archer should perhaps have considered 
more thoroughly the nature of factual status in explication so that a clearer 
distinction could be made between transitive description and the intransitive reality 
described. 
It might also be noted that neither Bhaskar nor Archer adequately explores 
the problematic status of event-identity (discussed below). This is an important 
omission. For, if it is accepted that `an event cannot be a fact .. [because] events 
have positions in space-time, whereas facts do not' (Bennett, 2002, p. 44), then it 
should also be noted that minor differences in the statement of CS propositions can 
produce radically divergent fact assertions which allow or permit different event 
identifications and explanations. Archer recognises that social and cultural structures 
can, but need not, generate actual events and following Bhaskar, events may, but 
need not, be recognised in empiric experience. This schema rests on the assumption 
that intransitive mechanisms and their actualised events are interpreted fallibly in 
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transient explanation and it therefore follows that researchers must be cognisant of 
the manner in which seemingly trivial variations in the statement of CS 
propositional content can produce significant differences in mechanism description. 
Recognising this potential raises the question or spectre of hypothesis equivalence. 
Hypothesis equivalence and CS expositional clari ty: 
It is not necessary to hold that evidence in any ultimate sense proves or disproves a 
hypothesis (broadly defined as an explicit or implicit model or proposition 
concerning the physical or social world) to acknowledge that evidence is valuable 
insofar as it supports or suggests error in a hypothesis (model or proposition). This 
statement belittles the difficulty attendant in meaningfully linking evidence with a 
hypothesis; however, if it is granted that this linkage is possible, then it may be 
argued that whilst evidence cannot prove a hypothesis, evidence lends credence to a 
hypothesis and, moreover, hypothesis credibility is enhanced when diverse 
supportive evidences are available. This is intuitively sensible, it is a claim that might 
support epistemological relativism (where this implies the use of diverse evidence) 
and it also holds in logic: 
All other things being equal, the hypothesis (H) that a given treatment 
retards the advance of a given disease in all patients is more highly 
confirmed by 100 positive instances that include men and women, young 
and old, than by 100 positive instances consisting exclusively of men 
between 35 and 45 years of age. . 
(Lange, 2007, p. 31) 
Here support for the value of diverse evidence of positive instances of disease 
treatment rests on agreement regarding the relevance of evidence (its role or function) 
in hypothesis confirmation and indeed: 
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while certain "inductivist" accounts of scientific procedure seem to assume 
that relevant evidence, or relevant data, can be collected in the context of an 
inquiry prior to the formulation of any hypothesis, it should be clear upon 
brief reflection that relevance is a relative concept; experiential data can be 
said to be relevant or irrelevant only with respect to a given hypothesis; and 
it is the hypothesis that determines what kind of data or evidence are 
relevant for it. 
(Hempel, 1945, p. 3) 
Hempel's (ibid) focus on the relevance of evidence in hypothesis support, broadly 
defined, is important. Relevance here denotes an asserted relationship between 
evidence and hypothesis and this putative relationship must hold between. 
equivalently formulated hypotheses to avoid the illogic or ludicrousness that would 
ensue were different evidence(s) required for equivalent but differently formulated 
versions of the same hypothesis. 
The equivalence condition, as Hempel (ibid) termed it, is primarily linked 
with natural or physical science. However, equivalence is relevant to social science 
(in general) and MM theory (in particular) insofar as its potential absence raises 
questions about hypothesis (model or proposition) formulation and validation. 
Problematically a hypothesis can often be worded in more than one way and subtle 
semantic nuances between formulations may direct researchers to seek different 
supporting evidence(s). This highlights the significance of textual or linguistic 
factors in descriptions of social reality (Gauker, 2006). It is a problem exacerbated 
for MM by the normic and retroductive forms of reasoning allowed by CR. 
Further, since hypotheses exist within frameworks of interlocking ideas and 
since, within frameworks, the conceptual endpoint of one hypothesis forms the 
starting premise of another hypothesis set (Hempel, 1945), epistemological 
relativists must be cognisant of the threat to logical inference that occurs when 
radically different and possibly incommensurable supportive criteria and arguments 
are confused. That is, since it is illogical to require equivalence to apply to some 
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parts of an argument (or system of interleaved theories) but not to others, logic 
demands that equivalence must be maintained in analysis. Hempel (ibid), from a 
non-CR perspective, therefore re-emphasises the risks that exist where conflicting 
epistemologic premises are conjoined without adequate thought. 
The significance of Hempel's equivalence condition for MM theory is now 
apparent. Cultural structures occupy an ontological realm whose existence is 
demonstrated tautologically through the situated logics they create for agents. 
However, insofar as intransitive cultural structures are known by and identified with 
transitive CS propositional statements, minor or unintended differences in the 
wording of CS propositional statements can generate radically different impressions 
of that realm and, moreover, researchers may be directed to look for different 
supporting evidences (which would be illogical). 
As knowledge or truth claims and interest bearers, it is crucial to MM theory 
that CS propositions denote a realm that is irreducible to `present tense' agency and 
this requirement feeds Archer's assertion that a CS strata exists independently of 
agential awareness or use. CS propositions are therefore described as residing, both 
figuratively and actually, within humanity's `Library' (RST, p. 98). However, four 
points require clarification here. 
First, although Archer allows that non-truthful and non-factual, non- 
justifiable CS propositions can provide agents with interests, she does not explicate 
the relationship between false interests and false consciousness (which may perhaps 
be easily merged). Second, where agents are accused of acting upon false or 
mistaken interests, Archer does not address the question of who is to adjudicate 
between contested interpretations or the criteria that should be used in judgement 
(discussed below). Third, Archer concedes that genuine contradictory and 
complementary' propositions need not be influential. As noted, it is a Bhaskarian 
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orthodoxy that intransitive reality need not be realised in transitive human 
understanding (since generative mechanisms need not cause actual events, and 
events need not be empirically recognised). However, propositional relations that 
are never identified and which never generate interests are, by definition, unable to 
demonstrate status via effect and their ontological standing therefore remains 
indeterminate (albeit that observation of erratically actualised mechanisms may 
usefully hint at the existence of an otherwise hidden reality). Fourth, the existence 
and significance of negative realities (negative causation) is perhaps under-explored 
in RST where, in relation to the CS register, it is feasible that a lack of developed 
propositional knowledge may be as influential, if not more influential, than actual 
(existing) contradictions or complementarities. 
Anything that casts doubt upon the ontological status of cultural or social 
structures is problematic for researchers who wish to pin down the philosophic 
basis and form of morphogenetic explanation. The disputed position of 
correspondence theory in CR and Groff's (2004) commentary on the lack of a 
developed theory of truth or justification in Bhaskar's thinking perhaps underpin 
some of the ambiguity noted above. Pointing towards the possibility that mutually 
under-theorised elements exist within the work of Archer and Bhaskar illustrates 
where additional conceptual work is required. It also demonstrates the value of 
consecutively describing the theories of both authors. 
Proof by effect and relational strength: 
Putting to one side the circular nature of arguments for ontological status by proof 
of effect or consequence, Archer here employs a form of reasoning that is integral 
to CR. Nevertheless, she asserts rather than demonstrates that the CS takes the 
form described and even using her own vocabulary it might be suggested that the 
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CS contains (i) more logical relations, (ii) different forms of relations or that (iii) 
some relations may be more significant or powerful than others. 
Regarding points i and ii above, Archer suggests proof by outcome only for 
the existence of certain CS powers and the inference that a more general realm 
exists awaits corroboration. Thus the four CS logical relations and their situated S-C 
logics may not capture the complexity of actual concrete relations and logics. Archer 
acknowledges that alternative relations and logics could be proposed to extend or 
develop the four ideal types described. " Yet she does not explore, for example, 
relations involving three or more CS propositions or their differential impact upon 
S-C interaction. " 
Further, regarding point iii above, perhaps due to an over-reliance on 
Munch and Smelser (1987), Archer inadequately distinguishes between internal and 
external relations vis-a-vis logical CS relations despite self-evident differences 
between them. For example, contingent compatibilities have, at least initially, no 
necessary logical relation but are opportunistically connected by agents in S-C 
interaction. In Bhaskarian parlance they may be, in the first instance, externally 
related, whereas all other relations are internal and, symmetric or internal and 
asymmetric. Bhaskar claims that internal relations carry greater explanatory force 
than external relations and Archer should perhaps have developed this aspect of her 
methodology further since, in practical application, theory needs to link the 
identification by investigators of forms of relations (CS or SS) pertaining at T' with 
their relative significance in order to inform explanations of emergence. 
The researcher's position or role in MM theory: 
§1 Chapter 3 proposed that Bhaskar underplays the role allotted to mental or 
perceptual processes in Humean causation and, thereafter, CR theory. Likewise, it is 
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here argued that, whilst acknowledging the influence of `investigator's constructs' 
(RST, p. 178), Archer fails to engage sufficiently with the impact of preconceived 
researcher values-interests on the research process. The significance of this lacuna 
for MM researchers may be illustrated through a consideration of temporal and 
structural identification. 
Accurate structural identification is vital in MM theory. Social and cultural 
structures are abstractly recognised on a priori grounds. More specifically, whilst `the 
existence of effects cannot serve to explain origins' (RST, p. 167-8), individual or 
corporate agential actions between T2 and T3 may provide retroductive evidence for 
structures at T'. " Interpreting structural and agential interplay between T2 and T3 in 
order to clarify the situation at T1 inevitably introduces extra-research assumptions 
(as background theories - see §2 Chapter 1) regarding past relations. Archer 
acknowledges that S-C or SI interaction (T2/T') cannot be discussed without 
reference to V's conceptual framework and MM recognises the theoretical nature of 
explanation by demanding that explanation must always begin with structural 
identification. However, an element of circularity enters MM theory at this point. 
Archer suggests that `transcendental arguments' (RST, p. 177) can identify CS or SS 
at T', yet identification presumably relies upon the interpretation of S-C and SI 
actions at TZ/T3 and researchers are enjoined to identify structural formation at T' 
before they interpret agential interaction at T2/T3. This aside, Archer largely ignores 
the difficulty investigators face in situating their own value-choices within the 
research process and, with regard to structural recognition at T', she sidesteps the 
significance of researcher subjectivity in the research process. 
Since `all data and observations are theory-laden, none are value-neutral' 
(Porpora, 2006, p. 66) and researcher values-interests inevitably therefore influence 
temporal and structural identification. Stern (2000), from a non-CR standpoint, 
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highlights the perceiver's (here researcher's) role in perception for, to be identified, 
the concepts, things or objects of perception must already, though not necessarily 
pre-conceptually, exist or have been identified as object attributes by the perceiver. 
And Gorner (2000) makes an analogous point when, in an exposition of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, he notes that meaning-making or understanding can 
never be acontextual because it is impossible to escape `one's own horizon .. [and] 
one's own horizon is not a contingent property of an abstract self .. [it] 
is 
constitutive of one's being' (ibid, p. 148). 
The problem for realist researchers is that they ambitiously assert that it is 
possible to transitively reach out towards intransitive reality. To enable this MM 
theory not only aims to identify `structures as emergent properties, it must also 
supply an analytical history of their emergence which accounts for why matters are 
so and not otherwise' (RST, p. 167). In this process researchers elaborate upon 
agential explanations and, in so doing, they must establish structural relations at T1 
irrespective of agential descriptions regarding TZ/T' interplay. Yet in practice it is 
not clear how, in the absence of established and justifiable rationales (i. e. some 
degree of consensus), this can be achieved. Archer may legitimately anticipate that 
her audience will be familiar with the theory laden nature of description and 
analysis. However, a brief review of Groff s (2004) critique of Bhaskar on the 
theoretician's contribution to theory development may usefully illustrate the manner 
in which Archer trails Bhaskar in failing to address important questions regarding 
the researcher's contribution to understanding. 
Groff (ibid) cites Hilary Putnam's (1981) distinction between metaphysical 
and internal realism to open up debate around the role and place of cognition and 
language in CR theory. "' Bhaskar links CR with Putnam's definition of metaphysical 
realism; however, as Groff (2004) notes, metaphysical realism, which underplays the 
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theoretician's contribution to explanation, is criticised by Putnam. Groff (ibid) 
argues that Bhaskar's identification with metaphysical realism and Putnam's critique 
are both flawed. She instead asserts that CR can readily accommodate Putnam's 
insight, denied by metaphysical realism, that causal explanation incorporates 
cognitive or intentional elements. Indeed, Groff (ibid, p. 59 - emphasis in original) 
suggests that causal explanations cannot but introduce inquirer interests so that 
`explanation is inherently intentional'. And although she distances herself from 
Putnam's ontological claims, Groff (ibid) clearly believes that his focus upon the 
dual nature of knowledge, that it is both mediated product and mediator, is valid, 
recognised by Bhaskar, but under explored in either RTS or PN. 
It would be disingenuous to suggest that Archer is unaware of knowledge's 
mediated character. However, as stated, she fails in RST or GAA to substantively 
engage with the dilemma that theoretician or researcher generated interests present 
in or for the process of mediation. Indeed, if logical relations at T' cannot be 
identified without introducing preconceived researcher ideas concerning those 
relations, then subjectivity informs the identification process. That the researcher's 
gaze will be directed by and introduce personally held opinions regarding structural 
(CS or SS) relations (i. e. which relations are likely to exist as well as their relative 
significance) is unsurprising - social theory's under-determination by evidence 
is an 
oft-quoted truism. Yet if, as Bhaskar asserts, it is in principle possible for transitive 
human explanations to make sense of intransitive reality and if, as Archer declares, 
MM theory can employ analytic histories to reliably describe social flux or stasis, 
then the contribution of the researcher, for example in determining time periods, 
cannot be ignored (discussed further §2 Chapter 2). 
Problematically, since MM theory presumes that reality is structured, 
stratified and emergent and that retrospectively if not prospectively social 
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explanation but not prediction is feasible. It is presumably important to maintain 
that analytic histories cannot encompass purely capricious time periods, that they 
should delineate material from immaterial logical relations and that the events 
described should have identity. At a practical level Archer suggests that temporal 
intervals will be determined by investigators according to the `problem in hand' 
(RST, p. 76). However, Carter (2000) acknowledges that the choice of where to 
`slice' (ibid, p. 94) history is, to some extent, `arbitrary' (ibid, p. 98). 
Archer, it may be noted, demands unconditional assent on the part of users 
to `each and every' MM principle (ISST, p. 168) albeit that the four principles by 
which `practical application' (RST, p. 168) of MM is to be achieved do not clarify 
how, bar researcher fiat, the beginning (T) or end (T'd) of any particular analytic 
cycle is to be identified, or whether incomplete or ongoing cycles can be described 
using this theory. Archer might have given more attention to these issues and, in 
view of the emphasis given by CR theory to the possibility that agents may be 
ignorant or misled about their interests, the relative absence of reflection around 
kindred methodological issues vis-a-vis researchers is surprising. 
Understanding the researcher's contribution within the explanatory process 
may be clarified if Geertz's distinction between `the need to grasp and the need to 
analyse' (1973, p. 24-5, cited Hammersley, 2005a, p. 17) is considered. Interpretation 
(grasping) and analysis are, of course, intimately referential or Janus-faced (so that it 
would be foolish to draw too distinct a line between them). Nonetheless, it could be 
suggested that Archer's focus upon the analysis of relations and interactions 
pertaining within and between structure and agency inadvertently sidetracks or 
ignores the problem of interpretation. Thus, as described, RST and CAA provide 
limited guidance on how structures can be identified (grasped) by their emergent 
influences upon agency and, whilst Archer may be correct in stating that `we do not 
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identify structures by interviewing people about them' (RST, p. 177), the lack of 
engagement regarding the interpretation of agential statements and actions is 
problematic since researchers are thereby pushed to assume Nagel's (1986) `view 
from nowhere' with regard to their object(s) of study. 
In Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation (2003a) Archer does speak to 
some of the problems associated with interpretation. Here she explores the 
possibility that tacit assumptions regarding the homogeneity of individual reasoning 
may be mistaken and in CAA she discusses and dismisses idealist or postmodern 
concerns regarding incommensurability and translation. Yet MM theory does not 
explicitly survey discourse analysis or the role of, narrative structure in the 
construction of 'analytic histories (Sayer, 2000). No rationale is given for these gaps. 
However, similarities with Bhaskar's reluctance to engage with issues around 
terminology and language use are noted and it might be wondered whether Archer 
avoids these issues because, in part, she perceives a need to distance MM from 
idealist positions that do take such matters seriously. That is, having critiqued 
idealism's ontological credentials Archer may find it difficult to re-engage with their 
subject matter, a focus upon language use and its indeterminate nature and, within 
the realist frame, it is left to theorists such as Joseph and Roberts (2003) and Lopez 
(2003) to address such issues. 
Emergence and structural identification: 
The difficulty that MM encounters with structural identification at T' reproduces or 
embodies problems inherent in retroductive analysis and Bhaskar's RRRE model 
(see page 96 this thesis). These problems are exacerbated by Archer's imprecise 
definition and use of the concept of emergence and they have, at their heart, the 
problem of the researcher's role in research practice. 
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Archer uses the term emergence in Bhaskar's sense (i. e. referring to the 
emergence of new strata) when ephemeral and inconsequential contextual 
happenings are contrasted with `a special sub-class .. [of such happenings] that 
is 
emergent properties, whose differentiating features are relative endurance, natural 
necessity and the possession of causal powers' (RST, p. 167-8). ` However, Archer 
also refers to emergence as the product of the interplay of entities which themselves 
possess ontologically distinct emergent properties and whilst this definition can 
encompass emergence in the Bhaskarian sense, it may simply refer to the outcome 
of structural and agential interplay through analytic cycles, i. e. outcomes that need 
not represent new or distinct strata. Indeed, at points in Archer's writing structure 
and emergence appear to become interchangeable terms and this ambiguity is 
reminiscent of Groff's (2004) suggestion that Bhaskar allows the concept of 
emergence to carry a multiplicity of overlapping and divergent meanings. Within 
Archer's work the descriptor is used to differentiate between at least two separate 
processes (see above) and, perhaps, lucidity would be advanced if this was 
acknowledged in her writing. As noted, the effects of definitional imprecision are 
most keenly felt when, at T1, researchers are entreated to identify structures (the 
outcome of interplay between contexts, mechanisms and agendal interaction in 
previous analytic cycles) as well as operative emergent generative mechanisms. In 
this process, it is crucial for the practical applicability of MM theory that 
theoreticians should be able to clearly distinguish contexts from mechanisms. Yet 
social realists differ about how this longstanding problem should be accomplished. 
Contexts and mechanisms: 
To illustrate the difficulties attendant in delineating contexts from mechanisms, 
problems which once more hark back to Bhaskar's use of retroductive reasoning 
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and the underdeveloped RRRE model as well as the researcher's role in MM theory, 
it is useful to consider New's (2001) report on the ESRC funded seminar series 
Social Realism and Empirical Research. Therein, New asked `when is `context' context 
and when is it mechanism? ' (ibid, p. 44) of Ray Pawson's claimix that `mechanism + 
context = outcome' (ibid, p. 44) and, in a review of Pawson's argument regarding 
`voting intentions, housing tenure and .. class' (ibid, p. 44), she notes that whilst, 
for 
Pawson, class structure formed part of the context in which voting decisions were 
made, for others (e. g. Byrne), class was a mechanism that motivated voting 
behaviour. " 
To paraphrase New's (ibid) commentary, whilst empirical researchers might 
portray class and housing tenure as interlinked variables that correlate with voting 
behaviour, from a realist perspective, variables do not cause behaviours, people vote 
and insofar as they act as role occupying agents, realists seek to reveal the webs of 
structural (social and cultural) relations that (as mechanisms) generate reasons 
(interests) for their actions. " Yet it remains unclear whether class (definitional 
problems aside) or housing tenure form part of the context in or through which 
mechanisms work; or whether, class is itself a mechanism. If class is a mechanism 
that generates interests for agents then class causes, as a nomic tendency, voting 
behaviour. However, if class is merely part of the context in which voting decisions 
are made then it need not be a mechanism and it loses causal status in this instance. 
The ability to distinguish contexts from mechanisms is therefore an 
important issue for realist social theory (as it is for others) and yet, as previously 
noted, Archer rarely uses the term mechanism in her writing. " Instead she specifies 
that the key feature of emergent properties is homogeneity between internal and 
necessary components (viz mechanisms) `rather than seemingly regular 
concatenations of heterogeneous features - of unknown provenance, undetermined 
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internal influence and uncertain duration' (RST, p. 173). And it might be argued that 
in so doing she offers researchers a means to make this distinction (since contexts 
need not evidence this internal and necessary homogeneity). Nevertheless, Archer 
can be accused of allowing context an interest forming role (insofar as this is not 
prohibited) and, in addition, mechanisms and the interests they generate are, 
perhaps, too easily elided. 
One way through this dilemma, is to re-focus upon the distinction between 
transitive knowledge and intransitive reality. Thus in both the social and physical 
realms mechanisms erratically cause events that may, or may not, be identified 
empirically. x'° Intransitively, processes and interactions happen however, when 
researchers: 
select those parts and aspects of the -complete causal structure that are 
relevant to a given situation .. [the process of selection 
is necessarily] 
context dependent, and for that reason, they are not independent of human 
knowledge, interests and desires. 
(Salmon, 2002, p. 37) 
Interrelated questions about (i) context-mechanism delineation, (ii) the place of 
researcher interests in MM theory and (iii) the difficulty of delineating the temporal 
span of study emanate, in part, from the failure of Bhaskar and Archer to engage 
with the question of event- or (where numerical modifiers apply) sortal-identity, that 
is problems of identity, persistence and change in the events or objects being 
described. 
Dealing first with (iii); Bennett (2002), a non-CR theorist, suggests that 
event-identity (i. e. locating the degree and nature of coherence between, for 
example, a temporal period of study such as T' to T4) requires agreement regarding 
the zonal fusion of event sortals (that is, clarifying how or when two or more 
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separate episodes or happenings constitute one event) as well as the principles that 
govern when an event can be described by the partial explanation of some aspect of 
it (distinguishing illustrative event elements from the event whole). Bennett (ibid), as 
described earlier in relation to CS propositional status, distinguishes between events 
and facts. (In CR parlance, intransitive reality and transitive explanation where facts 
are interpreted as CS propositional statements or SS descriptions. ) This allows him 
to maintain (a) that it is the pur pose of explanation that allows two or more event 
sortals to be combined under a single event rubric. (For realists the success of this 
enterprise depends upon the reality of the coherence thus postulated. ) Whilst (b) 
disaggregating events from facts `frees us to hold that it is sometimes right to refer 
to an event through a phrase which gives only some of the truth about it, that is, 
immediately refers to some non-zonal [i. e. constituent] part of it' (ibid, p. 59-60). 
Salmon's (2002) quotation (above) emphasises the purposiveness of research 
and echoes Groff s (2004) comments regarding the intentional nature of 
explanation. It implicitly acknowledges and accepts the impact and significance of 
the determining role of researcher interests in this process (point ii above) 
suggesting that it is the researcher who identifies - must argue for - event-identity. 
Likewise, from a realist perspective, it might be supposed that the researcher must 
support arguments for mechanism identification through partial event description 
since the full range of nomic interactions operative during any temporal period 
(event sequence) will, in all probability, forever be inexplicable (see also Bennett, 
2002). Similar arguments can be made regarding the identification of substance 
sortals, that is, the identification of unitary mechanisms, objects or things, or phase 
sortals, which refer to `a substance only during certain phases of its existence' 
(Whiting, 2002, p. 192). 
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Salmon's (2002) citation might also suggest that mechanisms differ from 
contexts (point i above) insofar as researcher interests represent or focus on 
contextual cause-effect relations that can, as stated, only encompass a fragment of 
total mechanism interaction. ' And yet, as Rescher (2002) argues, allowing 
purposiveness such an important and overt role in explanation is problematic for 
realists since this reintroduces idealist themes into the process of investigation. 
.. commitment to realism is .. not a product of our inquiries about the world, but rather reflects a facet of how we conceive the world .. Realism thus 
harks 
back to the salient contention of classical idealism that values and purposes 
play a pivotal role in our understanding of the nature of things. And we 
return to the characteristic theme of idealism - the active role of the knower 
not only in constituting but also in the constitution of what is known. 
(Rescher, 2002, p. 255-256 - emphasis in original) 
Neither Bhaskar nor Archer explore the place or role of the researcher in realist 
inquiry and this absence, particularly in the work of Archer, is problematic insofar as 
it impacts upon mechanism identification and the disaggregation of mechanisms 
from contexts - procedures required by those who seek to apply MM theory in 
practice even if, as in the case of Archer, one must talk about emergent properties 
and contexts. Researchers using MM have therefore to become theoreticians. They 
must look beyond Bhaskar and Archer for guidance and, in making this move, the 
potential for idealist or constructivist themes to re-enter MM practice is evident 
insofar as the values and purposes of the researcher rather than the phenomena being 
researched may now take precedence. Thus whilst New (2001) succinctly states the 
realist position regarding realist research practice: 
the first thing a researcher will do is to identify her ontology. The realist 
researcher will take the stratification of social reality .. as 
her theoretical 
starting point, and will identify which elements .. apply to the social context 
.. 
As a realist, our researcher is not interested in establishing .. 
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incomprehensible links [between events] .. but in teasing out what internal 
and necessary relations obtain .. and specifically what generative 
mechanisms have, in this particular context produced. . 
(New, 2001, p. 44) 
In actuality: 
Deciding what and how to study is a matter of deciding on what to abstract 
from the myriad relations, practices and processes which make up human 
life. The question of abstraction is .. an important question for the whole of 
the social sciences and humanities even if on many occasions the method of 
abstraction is not discussed explicitly. 
(Dean et al, 2006b, p. 13) 
Speaking from within a realist perspective Dean et al (ibid) here acknowledge the 
problem of subjectivity insofar as abstraction must perforce be guided by researcher 
interests. However, it is not clear that the focus given here to the researcher's role in 
MM or CR theory (as well as the introduction of alien concepts such as `sortals) 
would be welcomed by either Bhaskar or Archer. As will be seen, §2 finds it 
necessary in describing realist research practice, to reference these and other issues 
raised in §1 Chapters 3 and 4. In particular, it is asserted that practising researchers 
must recognise the purposiveness of their orientating gaze, as well as the potential 
usefulness of notions such as sortal descriptors if they are to usefully work through 
the MM. =" As ever, the problem for social realists is that whilst they claim that it is, 
or should be, possible to reach robust and fallibly accurate explanations of structural 
and agential development or reproduction, difficulty continues to surround the 
move from theory to practice. xv' 
Conclusion to critique and commentary upon MM theory: 
At one level, the challenges to MM theory are those which confront all sociological 
theory, i. e. what forms of explanation are defendable, what do concepts and 
language actually depict and how is causation or change to be described? Specific 
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criticism must be met. However, it would be inappropriate to single out MM theory 
for failing to resolve the riddles that beset all forms of social theorisation. 
Archer, like Bhaskar, does create avoidable problems (e. g. through the use 
of imprecise concepts). Yet the very lucidity of Archer and Bhaskar's reasoning 
makes these shortcomings evident. Thus realism, `unlike some other approaches, is 
upfront about its ontological presuppositions' (New, 2001, p. 43) and it therefore 
compares favourably with postmodern or idealist writing that declines to engage in 
the detail of causal argument as well as empirical work that denies the implications 
of open system indeterminacy (Collier, 1999). 
Despite the problems identified here with Archer's work, MM theory makes 
headway in developing Bhaskar's insights concerning causality and the relational 
nature of social relations into a workable, if imperfect, model for use by researchers. 
MM theory demonstrates concordance with CR at every point in its development 
albeit that Archer does not always use Bhaskar's nomenclature or explain the links 
between MM and CR as clearly as she might. 
MM can be criticised for remaining at an abstract level. However, Archer 
acknowledges this and, insofar as MM shifts CR from philosophy towards 
methodology, critics should recognise the tentative or provisional nature of this 
enterprise as well as the difficulty attendant in moving from the rarefied ontological 
heights into the lowlands of methodological and practical implementation. As 
Bourdieu (1990, p. 19) notes, only those who refuse to get their `hands dirty in the 
kitchens of .. [actual] research' can maintain the purist or aristocratic 
demeanour of 
abstract theoreticians and, in this study, the messiness of applied theory is hereafter 
explored in §2. 
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Endnotes - §1, Chapter 4. 
i Though see RST, p. 302 footnote 3. 
fi Although it is analytically important to distinguish between first order (ethical) moral and 
normative from non-moral, non-normative propositions, it should be noted that: `The majority of 
descriptions of human activities contain explicit or implicit evaluations' (Trusted, 1987, p. 17). These 
evaluations frequently contain second order (moralising) judgements and separating facts from values 
is, in practice, often difficult. 
fii A presumed typographical error is corrected in this quotation -'is' appears in place of `it'. 
iv Like Bhaskar, Archer ignores Russell's `canonical account' (Butchvarov, 2002, p. 284) of 
propositional relations. Butchvarov (ibid, p. 284) cites Whitehead and Russell (1962) in stating that 
according to Russell, `propositions are either atomic (e. g., "Socrates is human"), or molecular (e. g., 
"Socrates is human and Plato is human"), or general (e. g., "All humans are moral") in respect to their 
logical form. ' Significantly, relations between propositional statements can be influenced by the form 
of their expression (form and content may be variously allied) and ignoring this aspect of argument 
can produce logical anomalies. Regarding alternative views, Archer notes that if the basic principles 
of realism are accepted then disagreements `can flourish about which structures, what types of 
interplay and what outcomes should be prioritized and how they ought to be analyzed, but without 
any discord over the nature and format of explanation itself (RST, p. 160). 
V Howson (2000, p. 96) takes issue with Karl Popper when he notes that 'Popper's idea of 
logical' probability is a function defined on sentences which reflects just the purely logical relations 
subsisting between them. The trouble with this suggestion is that there seems to be an infinity of 
such functions, as many indeed as there are functions satisfying the probability axioms. ' Although 
this comment occurs within a radically different form of discourse it is clearly salient to Archer. 
vi This is not a denial of proof by effect. Archer here wishes to carry the argument that the 
purpose of retrospective analysis is not simply to identify structures; rather it aims to develop 
histories of emergence. Carter (2000, p. 93) makes a similar point when he suggests that at TI 
researchers 'need three levels of analysis. ' These are: (i) identification of structural emergent 
properties and causal powers, (ii) definition of agential experience and (iii) the linking of structural 
properties and powers with agential action(s) 'the who and where questions' (ibid, p. 93). 
Vii See also page 113 this thesis. 
Alternatively, Elder-Vass (2005b) suggests that Archer misuses the term emergence in 
Bhaskar's sense since RST illustrates the concept using examples that more appropriately describe 
effects by aggregation rather than the emergence of new and ontologically distinct strata. For an 
extended discussion regarding Archer's use of the concept of emergence and the relation between 
emergence and social structure see: Elder-Vass (2007a, 2007b), King (2007a), Porpora (2007) and 
Varela (2007). 
Developed Pawson (2006) and Pawson and Tilley (1997). 
Archer claims that class is properly defined as a structural emergent property (SEP) since 
class emerges from social roles, institutions and systems. Moreover, she distinguishes SEPs (which 
are materially grounded, have generative powers, are irreducible to the actions of agents and are 
relatively enduring) from mere `taxonomic' categories (e. g. class as constituted by the Register 
General) which only record aggregate consequences (or similarities) and lack relational mortar (RST, 
p. 178). However, it remains unclear how, in practice, researchers are to confidently identify whether 
the object of consideration is a structural or cultural emergent property. 
Xi Cruickshank (2003a) concurs. 
Ii The term mechanism is present (e. g. RST pages 71,90,295,296 and 326) though 
`mediators' is preferred (RST, p. 153). 
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Iii Empiric here refers to identifiable events and occurrences. These can be qualitative or 
quantitative. 
_iv Likewise, New (personal communication - August 2005) suggested that contexts and 
mechanisms are essentially synonymous, being differentiated in practice by the investigator's 
perspective or research gaze (the position proposed within this text). This approach has the merit of 
cutting the Gordian knot of overwhelming complexity. Yet it might be argued that, metaphorically, 
the difference between mechanism and context may alternatively be likened to that between tidal 
currents and surface flotsam since mechanisms refer to phenomena operative in the intransitive 
realm of the real (they are the `way of acting of a thing' RTS, p. 51) whereas context, in the common 
sense, refers to the total coincidental arrangement of contingent relations. Responding to this 
suggestion New (personal communication - October 2005) allowed that context can take two forms. 
Causally effective context could directly or indirectly trigger or influence mechanism operation, 
whilst non-causally effective context would be essentially inert. Defining context in this way accords, 
New (ibid) proposes, with Ray Pawson's position in A Measure for Measures (1989). This definition 
differs markedly from that advanced above and is here rejected. Permitting context a role in 
mechanism operation is problematic. It seemingly (i) grants causally effective context mechanism 
status in a manner that (ii) permits context to function within the realms of the real, the actual and 
the empiric and, if this is the case, (iii) non-causally effective contexts can presumably exist 
unexercised within the realm of the real. It is this last element (iii) that may be seen as illogical or, at 
least, contentious and New (personal communication - April 2006) has now reverted to the 
argument of August 2005 specifically because `context is a vague term which doesn't specify levels 
and therefore excludes events. ' If the context-mechanism relation is defined according to researcher 
interest, then New's move back to the position of August 2005 appears to have been made on 
illogical grounds albeit that the position now taken is defendable. This is clearly a complex and 
difficult area. 
xv Grandy (2007) perhaps undercuts this claim when he criticises sortals on the grounds of 
imprecision. 
xvi To complicate matters further, attention might be directed to the nature of chance in MM 
theory for, in noting that `contingency is not random, but arises out of the differential realisations of 
earlier outcomes', William and Dyer (2004, p. 83) suggest that contingency and context may be more 
closely aligned than is usually conceded. Howson (2000, p. 219) notes that `there is still ... controversy 
about the nature of chance'. 
144 
Section 2- Chapter 1 
Theory and Practice 
§1 described MM theory and the philosophy upon which it rests and, in §2, MM 
theory structures an investigation into aspects of hospice activity at one organisation 
in central England. §2 Chapter 1 bridges the theoretical and applied elements of this 
thesis and, to this end, it is arranged under the following headings: (i) Permission to 
proceed (gaining formal access), (ii) Ethical responsibility, (iii) Ethical responsibility, 
a critique, (iv) Data, evidence and theory, (v) Interviews, data collection, (vi) 
Interviews, data analysis, (vii) Template analysis, (viii) Template analysis, aptness for 
realist research and (ix) Situating the researcher in the research. 
Permission to proceed (gaining formal access: 
The researcher was employed as a full-time staff nurse at the hospice study site from 
April 2000 to December 2002. However, data collection did not commence until 
November 2001 when the researcher was registered as a research student and 
permission to proceed was given by the sponsoring University and hospice. 
Ethical approval was granted by the Cheltenham and Gloucester College of 
Higher Education (subsequently the University of Gloucestershire), as part of the 
RD1 higher degree registration process (Appendix A) and, after a period of 
intermission, following administrative changes that prompted the departure of the 
researcher's Director of Study and two Supervisors to other locations, the 
University of the West of England re-granted approval when the researcher 
transferred between Universities and secured a new Director and Supervisor (June 
2004) (Appendices B: 1-2 and C: 1-4). 
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Permission to proceed with research at the hospice was sanctioned by duly 
authorised personnel who included but were not limited to the Chief Executive, the 
Medical and Nursing Directors and lead Chaplain. Before approval was given, 
discussions took place concerning possible disruption to clinical practice, anticipated 
findings-conclusions, questions regarding confidentiality and anonymity and 
protection of the hospice's reputation. Following approval (Appendix D), staff at 
the research site were notified in broad terms about the study's aims and methods at 
an open meeting and via internal hospice documentation. The study did not require 
NHS ethics committee approval - the hospice is an independent charity, only a 
small fraction of its income comes from statutory sources, no patients were 
involved and the work was privately funded. 
Ethical responsibility: 
Interviews with clinical, administrative and managerial hospice employees provided 
study data and, for researchers, interview recruitment, conduct and data use carry 
ethical obligations. 
Purposeful recruitment was employed to access a diverse range of staff 
groups (see `Interviews, data collection' page 166 this thesis). However, it might be 
objected that, for a variety of reasons (e. g. imbalances in power relations or the 
demands of friendship), some staff may have felt compelled to consent or 
participate (Liamputtong, 2007; Arraf et al, 2004; Mueller, 2004; Stevens et al, 2003). 
Hopefully this was not the case and it can equally be argued that familiarity with the 
researcher, a co-worker, would embolden those who wanted to decline to do so. 
One person did say no when asked to participate and nobody withdrew following 
the researcher's departure from the study site. This could indicate that coerced 
recruitment did not occur. 
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Participating staff were re-informed about the study at two points. ' First, 
information was given before written consent was obtained (Appendix E). Second, 
discussion about the study formed part of the interview process. Interviewees were 
made aware of their `right' to withdraw from the study at any time and, following 
transcription, a verbatim interview report was offered to participants so that they 
could identify comments that, upon reflection, they might wish to retract or clarify. 
Allowing interviewees the chance to check and review comments probably 
enhanced participant confidence in the research process since it suggested that 
interviewee interests were being respected. Further, this procedure arguably bolsters 
descriptive data validity or factual accuracy (but not interpretive validity) albeit that, 
following Sjöström (2002), it is here recognised that transcription inevitably distorts 
and reduces data complexity and richness and no singly correct transcription is 
possible (Cohen et al, 2000). Recordings were destroyed following transcription. 
From the researcher's perspective it was desirable that interviewee remarks 
could be linked with role or position descriptors. However, this generated 
difficulties insofar as a significant number of participants occupied roles or positions 
that are unique or held by comparatively few people. In consequence, quotations 
potentially identify speakers to anyone aware of the identity of role or position 
occupants. This possibility was brought to the attention of interviewees, those at the 
hospice charged with granting permission for the study and it is discussed in the 
RIB 1. 
The relatively small size of the hospice and the specificity or distinctiveness 
of hospices (Lawton, 2000; Connor, 1998; Clark et al, 1997) also contributes to the 
problem of maintaining interviewee anonymity since descriptions of the hospice, 
however circumspect, might yield information that would enable informed readers 
to locate the study site and, hence, participants. The possibility and implications of 
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site identification were brought to the attention of those charged with granting 
permission for the study to proceed as well as prospective interviewees. To 
minimise but not eradicate this risk only a brief description of the hospice is 
provided (§2 Chapter 2). 
To protect participants from embarrassment associated with unwitting 
identification, interviewees were asked to imagine that, regardless of formal 
anonymity, they were at all times speaking to a public audience that included work 
colleagues and, where, applicable, senior staff. Thus, as a protective device, 
participants were asked to speak in a considered manner that presumed 
identification. Interviewees were also made aware that comments could have a wide 
audience if embedded in study outputs such as journal papers. Participants were 
assured that quotations would only be linked with roles or positions when, in the 
researcher's opinion, no harm to them would occur. Interviewees were thus asked 
to trust that the interviewer would protect their interests. 
It is beyond the purview of this study to explore, in depth, the effect upon 
data capture and analysis of the mutually interacting personalities, expectations and 
understandings of researcher and interviewees. However, prior familiarity, 
collegiality and in many instances friendship between researcher and participants 
was both a benefit and potential hazard in data collection and analysis. 
Positively, good relations between interviewer and interviewee can engender 
trust (see above), help negotiate informal access to participants, reduce anxiety 
regarding the interview process (e. g. surrounding the recording of dialogue) and 
enhance communication as descriptive terms, abbreviations, slang and exemplar 
stories are easily shared among work colleagues (an example of positive benefit is 
provided later in this Chapter). Negatively, prior `familiarity' and preconceived 
expectations on the part of the researcher regarding participants can lead 
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interviewers to make assumptions that a naive or unfamiliar researcher would avoid 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 103) and, in consequence, a limited or distorted 
range of `questions' (discussion themes) may be posed to interviewees. 
Likewise, prior familiarity and preconceived expectations on the part of 
interviewees regarding the interviewer might lead them to construct or curtail 
utterances in a manner that would not occur were an unknown researcher present. 
Interviewees may thus reveal or disclose more or less about their thoughts or 
feelings to a familiar rather than unfamiliar interviewer. Interviewee restraint is a 
threat to research that relies upon frank disclosure, whilst overexposure potentially 
risks participant embarrassment and censure. 
Recognising that the researcher has a responsibility to protect participants 
from overexposure, all interviews, as stated, commenced with a recommendation 
that interviewees consider their comments as being made within the public domain 
and, as noted, participants were invited to review interview transcripts. The success 
of this procedure might be inferred from the fact that no participants asked for 
transcript cuts or alterations to be made (although this could also indicate naivety or 
disinterest on the part of interviewees). A critique of this process is advanced below. 
Interviews were not conducted with patients or their families or hospice 
volunteer workers and their anonymity is maintained absolutely. However, despite 
requesting interviewees not to use patient names or the names of non-clinical or 
non-professional staff such names were, on occasion, mentioned. When this 
happened it was possible, in some instances, to replace the identifier with a 
pseudonym so that meaning was preserved. However, since hospice personnel 
might read outputs from the study, since the incident being described might be rare 
or distinctive and since, in a small organisation, most staff had a good overview of 
what occurred, it could not be guaranteed that pseudonyms safeguarded anonymity 
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and, to ensure that patients, families or others were not identified to hospice staff as 
well as the readers of study outputs, it was often appropriate, despite the loss of 
data, to omit transcript passages in which patient or family or other names or details 
appeared. As will become clear, participants robustly expressed conflicting attitudes 
on a range of issues and, inevitably, co-workers with whom they disagreed are 
identified. Pejorative comments were rarely made and are not here reproduced. 
In addition to interview data, the researcher, as participant observer, kept a 
limited number of observational notes. These notes tended to be reflective rather 
than procedural or descriptive and individuals were not identified in these writings. 
Where procedural or descriptive notes involved staff, the individuals concerned 
were informally (verbally) asked whether they objected to anonymised note taking - 
none did. Following Seale (1999), distinctions between procedural, descriptive and 
interpretive records were maintained albeit that distinctions between these 
categories are often of degree rather than kind. 
Ethical responsibility -a critique: 
The actions outlined above hopefully indicate that reasonable measures were taken 
to protect from harm the individuals and organisation who kindly agreed to 
participate in this study. Nevertheless, at least two critiques of this process must be 
noted. First, the role played by researcher judgement in protecting participants from 
overexposure requires explication. Second, it might be suggested that an 
unnecessarily individualist or biomedical model of ethical good practice is here 
assumed. 
Researcher judgement was exercised when interviewees made reference to 
their extra-professional lives or revealed details about extreme emotional reactions 
to witnessed events at the hospice. Where personal disclosure had no bearing on the 
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study and when disclosure did bear upon the study but the sentiment expressed was 
at a level or depth that might be considered unusual or `out of character' then it can 
be argued, given the privileged status of individual experience in Western society, 
that such data should be omitted from transcripts to protect interviewees from 
`overexposure', a term that here denotes potentially damaging unwitting or 
inadvertent self-disclosure. 
That the interviewer has a duty to protect participants from overexposure 
rests upon linked assumptions regarding the naive status of interviewees and the 
potential for harm to result from making public that which is deemed private. 
Regarding naivety, Bulmer (1982) questions the degree to which interviewee consent 
can ever be truly informed and Bosk (2001) suggests that the `cover stories' (ibid, 
p. 204) researchers advance to gain access to subjects and the implicit `flattering' 
(ibid, p. 206) that occurs to encourage data disclosure inevitably generates 
`insuperable ethical problems' (ibid, p. 200). Here, despite being as `open' as possible 
about the research's aims and methods, interviewees were probably unaware that 
interview techniques sought to encourage disclosure (a process facilitated, in part, by 
prior familiarity with the interviewer) and oblivious to the ways in which recorded 
data can be manipulated. 
Very occasionally interviewees indicated, during an interview, that they did 
not want to be recorded (e. g. they stated comments were "between us"), ' 
alternatively, other interviewees gesticulated or nodded towards the microphone in a 
manner that suggested the off-record nature of remarks. When statements or 
indicators were unambiguous the interviewer treated them as instructions and 
appropriate edits were made. A bracketed `[edit]' appears in transcripts at such 
points. However, excepting the obvious, relying upon interviewers to recognise and 
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adjudicate on whether interviewees are revealing `too much' about themselves is 
procedurally, emotionally, ethically and technically problematic. 
Procedurally, deciding whether personal revelatory material is or is not 
relevant to a study is difficult because relevance is not generally decided until an 
advanced stage in analysis and theory building and, at that point, material may 
already have been used. Emotionally, prior familiarity or friendship can exacerbate 
discretionary dilemmas since researchers may assume an overly protective attitude 
towards participants and information can, in such instances, be discarded 
unnecessarily (Anspach, 1993). Ethically, balancing legitimate research interests 
against the need to protect participants is complex. It is here assumed that the 
ethical status of research is compromised if interviewees are overexposed regardless 
of whether data are then used exploitatively. 
It is also technically difficult to decide when interviewee comments are 
overexposing and out of bounds, or freely given admissible study data. §1 Chapter 4 
emphasised that researchers exercise personal judgement vis-a-vis data identification 
and use. Researchers choose how and in what ways they will inform participants 
about the full, real or true purposes of study just as they decide `what they are to say 
(or not to say), what to record (or not to record) and what to write (or to censor)' 
(Anspach and Mizrachi, 2006, p. 723). None of these issues is straightforward and 
poor choices are easily made. To compound the difficulty, extra-research interests 
and `competing expectations .. [exist about] what to reveal or conceal 
in the 
interests of confidentiality' (ibid, p. 713). Research careers may best be served 
through the exposure of new and novel findings and self-interest as well as a desire 
to do good work inevitably creates an `intractable dilemma .. [between] 
doing good 
work and doing good' (ibid, p. 714), where doing good implies or requires the 
suppression of revelatory material. Hopefully, few researchers wittingly exploit 
152 
participants and, erring on the side of caution, suspected instances of overexposure 
are not here reproduced. Nevertheless, ambiguity inevitably exists where acceptable 
revelation shades towards unacceptable overexposure. 
Remarks by participant B: a illustrate one form of potential overexposure. 
This participant expressed, over the course of several minutes, intimate and detailed 
fears regarding their own death in relation to certain forms of witnessed violent 
death. It is unlikely that B: a would have been aware of the visceral or dramatic post- 
transcription nature of these comments and, were 'this material used injudiciously, 
B: a might justifiably feel exploited. Given the subject matter of this research, similar 
types of revelation were not unusual and, for example, participant C: a used near 
identical descriptors and examples to describe forms of witnessed death that, in 
C: a's words, `fills you with sheer panic. ' 
Protecting participants by omitting material from research reports is 
relatively straightforward once the potential for exploitation is identified. However, 
researcher ethical responsibility need not end with omission. It is, for example, 
recognised that staff anxiety concerning own death can distort staff-patient 
communication thereby impoverishing care delivery (Heaven and Maguire, 2003). 
When, as happened, participants disclosed anxiety about their own death it could be 
proposed that, to protect patient care, the interviewer should alert participants to 
the potential clinical or practice implications of their anxiety. Further, if the 
researcher's ethical duty extends to non-participants then, regardless of 
confidentiality, relevant managerial staff should perhaps be informed. 
In actuality neither of these courses was taken and, following Fisher et al 
(1996), this study may be criticised for inaction albeit that, from a medical ethics 
perspective, Kipnis (2007) supports the maintenance of participant confidentiality 
over societal rights. This divergence in outlook, between researchers and ethicists 
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who privilege restricted conceptions of participant or individual rights and those 
willing to address broader non-participant or collective rights is significant. Mill 
(1985 [1859]) argued that individual rights require social or collective support just as 
social goods derive from or rest upon the protection of individual rights. However, 
the relationship between social and individual rights is complex and contested. Here 
societal claims are contrasted with or against a problematised ethical individualism. 
Valid and widely accepted arguments support the claim that vulnerable 
people (and presumably institutions) should be defended against exploitation (e. g. 
Simmons, 2007; Sellman, 2005; Creswell, 2003). However, unbounded 
commitments to protecting study participants are problematic when protection acts 
to safeguard wrongdoers from exposure. Should this occur, realism's emancipatory 
aspirations may be thwarted as intransitive social reality remains hidden and unequal 
power relations (or `bad' or dangerous practices) continue undisturbed. 
Putting `death anxiety' to one side, in conducting this study a limited amount 
of restricted information was given to the researcher by powerfully placed 
individuals in the hospice that, the researcher believes, ought to have been widely 
shared. That unease can be engendered in researchers occupying conflicting, 
discrepant or dual roles (e. g. colleague and friend and privileged or knowledgeable 
outsider-enquirer) is recognised (Tinney, 2008; Simmons, 2007; Wilkes and Beale, 
2005; Francis, 1999; Jones, 1996; Goffman, 1990 [1959]). In this instance high moral 
principles were not at stake. However, the unrestricted nature of assurances given to 
both participants and organisation foreclosed on several avenues of enquiry and this 
study's investigative prearrangements were thus, perhaps, too constraining. 
Moral, legal and professional injunctions govern ethical behaviour in health 
and social research. Fixed as standards or guidelines (e. g. BSA, 2007; DH, 2007; 
ESRC, 2007; NHS, 2007; SATSU, 2007), these injunctions are, where they apply to 
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health care, augmented by a strong individualistic focus in much nursing and 
medical ethics discourse (Battin et al, 2007; Steinke, 2004) and a criticism of this 
thesis is that prior professionalisation and its attendant privileging of individualism 
led this investigator to initially overplay the importance or place of one reading of 
individual rights in relation to ethical research practice. 
However, if research is a part of nursing (Hek and Moule, 2006) and if `there 
is not and should not be any unified, single, and coherent angle from which to judge 
what ethical perspective is relevant to nursing practice' (Nortvedt, 2006, p. 109) then 
it can be argued that, from both moral and professional regulatory perspectives, an 
ethics of social and political responsibility might, in exceptional circumstances, 
override individual rights (e. g. rights to anonymity or protection against 
overexposure). 
A more fulsome discussion of this topic would explore ethical distinctions 
between grades or levels of individual right infringement. Thus it might be 
suggested that serious breaches of individual interests (e. g. forced recruitment into 
potentially harmful drug trials) are more difficult to justify on social grounds than 
lesser breaches (e. g. anonymously accessing hospital employee data to assess staff 
age profiles). `Rights' interpretation is however, socio-cultural and historically 
contingent. The relative value given to individual and social rights has varied hugely 
over the recent past (Halpern, 2001) and distinctions regarding degrees of rights 
infringement are therefore mutable. 
Further, discussion of method or research process acceptability must 
delineate ethical issues from what is permitted since an act or method may be ethical 
and permitted, unethical and not permitted, ethical but not permitted or unethical 
but permitted. This schema assumes however, that agreement is possible on what is 
ethical or permitted as well as who decides (Miola, 2007; Hoefler, 2000). Yet ethical 
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assumptions not only differ over time and place, they also vary between disciplines 
(e. g. sociology and medicine). Ethical assumptions influence research design by 
allowing or excluding methods from consideration (Anspach and Mizrachi, 2006). 
Physician and nurse interests may diverge on ethical as on other issues (McBurney, 
2001); nevertheless, putting inter-professional differences to one side, it is 
interesting to note that: `Sociologists who do field work in medical settings face an 
intractable tension between their disciplinary field, which takes a critical perspective 
towards medicine, and their ethnographic field, which often includes physicians' 
(Anspach and Mizrachi, 2006, p. 713). 
Potential ethical dissonance between clinicians (here physicians and nurses) 
and sociologists might. involve the legitimacy or otherwise of, for example, complete 
participant research. As described by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 105) 
complete participants conceal their inquisitive role so that they may access and pass 
as authentic members of a study group. In anthropology this method has long 
generated controversy. For example, Bulmer (1982, p. 6) notes Franz Boas's 1919 
outrage at the supposed misdemeanours of covert government anthropological 
researcher-spies and Darnell (2008) and Willis (1972) pursue similar themes. In 
modern clinical research, the non-revelation of researcher identity and activity 
would probably be viewed negatively, as denying the right of those researched to 
absent themselves from study (Simmons, 2007; Denzin and Erikson, 1982). 
Nevertheless, despite such qualms, startling and important exposes such as 
Caudill et al (1952) and Rosenhan's (1973) investigations into psychiatric institutions 
have been generated by this type of investigation and it may therefore be argued 
that ethical norms should not tout court dictate method acceptability. Indeed, whilst 
ethical customs undoubtedly influence research practice, dominant norms can be 
challenged. For example, assumptions linking respect for autonomy with informed 
156 
consent have been criticised (Kristinsson, 2007) and, more provocatively, Hoeyer et 
al (2005) challenge health care researchers to consider whether social or political 
interests might, on occasion, trump individual rights when they note that, complete 
participation notwithstanding, utilitarian rationales and politically radical ideas have 
been employed by anthropologists and social scientists to justify a different 
approach to ethical practice from that celebrated by most healthcare researchers (see 
also Hoeyer, 2006, Hoeyer et al, 2006 and de Vries et al, 2006). Thus, despite much 
commonality, differences regarding the ethical acceptability of research practices 
exist between disciplines and, to illustrate this claim, it is for example startling that, 
in contrast to the generality of clinical research (nursing and medical) discourse, 
Saillant and Genest's (2007) text on medical anthropology is effectively silent on the 
issue of subject or participant rights. 
Scholte (1972, p. 431) notes that: `Intellectual paradigms .. are culturally 
mediated, that is, they are contextually situated and relative. ' Insofar as disciplinary 
ethical norms contribute to such paradigms and insofar as norms prescribe the 
acceptability or otherwise of investigative practices, researchers who cross real or 
imagined disciplinary boundaries should perhaps overtly consider and acknowledge 
the underpinning ethical orientation that their work imbibes. This study combines 
philosophy and theory with sociological investigation in a clinical setting. 
Philosophically, CR has, as acknowledged, strong Marxist roots and it might 
therefore be suggested that, whilst not all realists are Marxists, politically many 
realists, indeed many sociologists, will be receptive to the idea that, in undertaking 
research, group or collective as well as individual interests deserve ethical 
consideration. That said, the practical arm of this study was planned and conducted 
using a version of research ethics (biomedical and nursing) that overwhelmingly 
valorises individual autonomy. Reflection upon this dichotomy suggests that, 
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although participants must be protected against the unwarranted intrusions of 
feckless researchers, too blinkered a focus upon individual rights in health related 
studies may have a malfeasant effect upon societal interests as well as research 
investigative choices. 
Biomedical and nursing assumptions regarding the inviolability of 
participant or subject rights, assumptions that appear to be lodged widely in nursing 
research and ethics texts (e. g. Lindsay, 2007; Johnson and Long, 2006; Parahoo, 
2006; Watson, 2006; Andanda, 2005; Bowling, 2002), can and perhaps should 
therefore be questioned. Two forms of critique are here advanced. 
First, these texts conflate or link biomedical and nursing ethical assumptions 
regarding the primacy of individual rights in research with or to all health related 
research. Thus, for example, Andanda (2005, p. 14) cites the Declaration of Helsinki 
(WMA, 2004) and the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS, 2002) International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects to support the claim that: `Any medical treatment, healthcare activity or 
research requires the consent of the patient or person directly affected by such 
activity. ' Echoing the point made earlier, whilst strong arguments support the claim 
that individual consent should generally be sought for medical and pharmacological 
research that involves potentially harmful interventions or treatments, it is not 
necessarily clear whether, or on what grounds, the same level of protection must be 
assigned to the subjects of health related social science investigations where no 
significant, immediate or obvious risk is imposed. 
Second, the British Sociological Association's (BSA, 2007 [2002]) Statement of 
Ethical Practice sanctions' research behaviours that might be viewed as problematic by 
some nurses. For example, it recognises that `where power is being abused, 
obligations of trust and protection may weigh less heavily"` (ibid, clause 15) and it 
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suggests that whilst `covert methods [e. g. complete participant research] violate the 
principles of informed consent' (ibid, clause 32) they `may be justified in 'certain 
circumstances' (ibid, clause 31) (see also Bulmer, 1982). Situated alongside 
comments from Howarth and Kneafsey (2005,2003) on the unnecessarily 
constraining impact of the Research Governance Framework (DH, 2007,. 2001b) as 
well as suggestions that conscience, rather than legislation, must ultimately arbitrate 
on ethical practice (benzin, 1970), the BSA's willingness to consider practices that 
run counter to much current healthcare thinking challenges the ethical norms that 
many nurse researchers accept. 
To recap, in undertaking this study, dis ease on the part of the researcher in 
obtaining information that, in his view, should have been widely available, did not 
raise matters of high conscience. Nonetheless, reflection on the researcher- 
participant and researcher-organisational relationship indicates that the pursuit of 
critical lines of investigation was marginally hampered by three factors. First, the 
need to assure study site access probably encouraged overly prescriptive assurances 
to be given regarding the study's remit (e. g. it was tacitly agreed that some forms of 
personnel and role difficulties would not be pursued). Second, individual friendships 
with participants as well as personal loyalty to the hospice may have unwittingly 
restricted the candour with which problems were identified and addressed (i. e. in 
contrast to Lawton, 2000, this researcher cannot claim an outsider's critical gaze). 
Third, prior professionalisation into the role of nurse influenced the manner in 
which ethical obligations were recognised and met. 
Data, evidence and theory: 
It is important to clarify the relationship between data, evidence and theory. §1 
Chapter 4 argued that data and evidence recognition or `grasping' and theory 
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informed analysis or `interpretation' are intimately linked. Data and evidence here 
come from three sources. Primarily, data and evidence come from interview 
transcript analysis. In addition, hospice and palliative care literature and observations 
and reflection made in and on clinical practice constitute data and evidence. Non- 
transcript data and evidence is recognised because, following §1, data becomes 
evidence when related to theory and neither data nor evidence exists apart from 
theory. Theory thus directs the identification and ordering of data and evidence and, 
in this process, limits need not be placed on the sources theory utilises 
(Cruickshank, 2003a). 
In this study theory has four distinct meanings. First, theory refers to high 
level philosophical discourse (CR theory), second, high level methodological 
discourse (MM theory), third, research generated theories regarding structural and 
agential interaction at the study site and fourth, interview transcript data coding and 
organisation. "' Research narratives that coordinate explanation across these theoretic 
levels honour the logical ties that, realism claims, bind ontology, epistemology and 
methodology. 
Realist research begins with the transcendental question: What must the 
world be like for this to be possible? Here `this' refers both to empiric" occurrences 
and transitive theories about those occurrences, whilst `the world' refers to 
postulated intransitive structures that generate empiric occurrences. Explanation in 
MM involves the identification and temporal `mapping' of relations between social 
(SS) and cultural (CS) structures via or through descriptions of social (SI) and socio- 
cultural (S-C) interaction (i. e. establishing the complementary or contradictory 
situated social and cultural logics that pertain between agents). To support this 
process §1 emphasised MM theory's grounding in Bhaskarian realism and, although 
Archer is reluctant to use these terms, it is henceforth assumed that, in plotting the 
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links between structure and agency, researchers using MM disclose (retroduce or 
retrodict) the generative causal mechanism(s) that he behind empiric occurrences. 
Data are therefore `read' within a complex system of theoretic presumptions. 
Retroduction and retrodiction does not `await' data collection or analysis. Indeed, 
inferential looking back or looking beyond accompanies and directs data collection and 
analysis because theory is not separate or apart from data. 
Background theories Empiric events 
Quantifiable and 
measurable or qualitative 
and descriptive- 
interpretative 
MM theory 
Informed by background 
theories - MM identifies and 
interprets empiric events 
(interview and observational 
data) and constructs transitive 
explanations of intransitive 
mechanism relations via 
retroductive or retrodictive 
inference 
Mechanism interplay causes 
events 
Generative mechanisms 
Diagram 4- Mechanisms, events and MM theory (from an idea by Mearman, 2008) 
The research process followed here, linking empiric events with their generative 
causes through MM modelling, is pictorially represented above. Diagram 4 suggests 
that `the empirical level is the access point to the transitive dimension' (Downward 
and Mearman, 2007, p. 88). Reconceptualised by MM theory as evidence, empiric 
data thus acts as a `bridge' (ibid, p. 92) between transitive or theoretically informed 
understanding and intransitive generative causal mechanisms. 
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Although realists can and do advocate complex statistical and mathematical 
modelling (e. g. Williams and Dyer, 2004; Pratschke, 2003), this study is 
representative of realist research insofar as data and evidence are predominantly 
qualitative in form. That said realism's approach to analysis differs in some respects 
from other qualitative approaches. 
Qualitative research takes place across a wide and disputed theoretical 
spectrum (Cresswell, 1998) and it is misleading to describe qualitative research as a 
homogenous entity (Giddings, 2006). Nevertheless, Strauss's (1987) emphasis on 
the need to ground the theories generated by qualitative analysis in data (mostly but 
not exclusively textual) would be endorsed by many similarly situated researchers 
albeit that terms such as `ground', the nature of analysis and what counts as data, 
vary according to theoretic disposition. Realists likewise recognise the importance of 
empiric occurrence since without such occurrences generative mechanisms cannot 
be retroduced or retrodicted. However, uncritically accenting the status of primary 
data is, from a realist perspective, mistaken insofar as this accenting ignores the 
directive role played by background theories in data identification and analysis. 
Indeed realists must reject Polit and Beck's (2006, p. 404) claim that qualitative 
theory emerges bottom up `from the data' if this suggests that analysis proceeds 
atheoretically. 
In abstracting empirical data from interview transcripts, realists seek to 
avoid the methodological or idealist individualism which, from their perspective, 
invests forms of transcript comparison (Downward and Mearman, 2007). Realists 
achieve this by recognising and building into analysis the missing other of social and 
cultural structure and, in this way, substance is given to the `context upon which the 
opinions of the interviewees, etc. were formed' (ibid, p. 95). That said and, as noted, 
realist explanation is transient, provisional and fallible. Gorner (2000, p. 147) 
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suggests that, for Gadamerian hermeneutics, `understanding .. takes place within 
the happening of tradition' and realist investigators similarly recognise that 
theoretically informed explanation is necessarily limited by its reliance upon 
historically situated socio-cultural understanding and knowledge. Where this 
understanding and knowledge is considered developed retrodiction rather than 
retroduction occurs (see §1 Chapter 1). 
Procedural differences between realist and non-realist researchers should 
not, however, be overdrawn. Irrespective of avowed allegiances or stated 
assumptions, in practice, most qualitative researchers proceed realistically for, as 
Scale (1999, p. 157) notes: " `The attempt to use language to refer to, describe or 
explain aspects of the social world .. is a basic commitment .. [that] must ultimately 
depend on some modified form of realism' and even phenomenologists, whose 
focus upon unique individual perceptions and experience inevitably minimises the 
role played by external structural forces, generally produce research whose 
`concluding moment .. almost always makes implicit claims about reality' 
(Paley, 
2005, p. 106). Indeed, often `without full awareness' (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
p. 10) non-realist qualitative researchers impose top down ontologic ' and 
epistemologic frameworks onto the data when they situate or position that data 
within, for example, social or psychological understandings. (Hammersley, 1990, 
makes a similar point regarding certain forms of ethnography. ) 
Realists thus deny that a datum can `speak for itself (Strauss, 1987, p. 216). 
For, as §1 Chapter 4 argued and as Scale (1999, p. 148) asserts: `No act of 
observation can be free from the underlying [interpretive] assumptions that guide it. ' 
Data cannot speak outside of a theoretical framework and realist researchers do not 
begin analysis (data reduction) as blank slates upon which data's meaning can be 
inscribed. Rather, realists approach their objects of study with developed ontic, 
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epistemic and methodologic understandings that orientate and scaffold the 
interpretative process. 
Recognising that the researcher's outlook cannot and should not be 
bracketed out from the interpretative process goes beyond suggesting that data and 
evidence are theory laden, for, as Pawson (2006) states, realism allows that theory 
can legitimately drive data collection and interpretation and, in consequence, the 
phenomenological insistence that data analysis must focus upon `lived 
interpretations and not interpretations of interpretations' (Levering, 2006, p. 451) is 
rejected. 
Acknowledging the focal role of CR philosophy in this study (theory in the 
first sense) therefore permits MM methodology (theory in the second sense) to 
overtly steer middle range theory development regarding postulated generative 
mechanisms (third level theory) as well as data collection, coding and ordering (e. g. 
transcript production and interpretation or theory in the fourth sense). The danger 
here is that theory prescriptively imposes upon the study object whereas, ideally, 
theory, data and evidence should mutually or cyclically inform and support each 
other. Where this ideal is realised analogies with Schleiermacherian hermeneutics 
may be made. " 
Reflexivity and transparency on the part of the researcher might ameliorate 
such prescription. Pellatt (2003, p. 28) asserts that reflexivity allows researchers to 
recognise that they are an `integral part of the social world being studied' and 
Murphy (2005), whilst gently parodying procedural attempts to demonstrate 
research goodness via reflexivity, likewise describes reflexivity as `vital' (ibid, p. 55), 
as one means by which the researcher can `acknowledge' (ibid, p. 55) their impact 
upon the study. Reflexivity cannot, of course, as hermeneutics attests (Malpas, 2005; 
Gorner, 2000), prevent the researcher's outlook and ability from influencing the 
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analytic process, since reflexivity is itself informed by that outlook and ability. 
However, combining a critically reflexive disposition towards data collection and 
interpretation, process transparency and overt theoretic positioning at the very least 
opens the work to refutation. The success or otherwise of this endeavour must be 
judged in relation to the thesis as a whole and, hopefully, a reflexive spirit informs 
the entirety of this work. 
In addition to interview data, observational data were collected by the 
researcher in his role as participant observer. Garfinkel (1984) and Bernstein (1979) 
suggest that participation brings investigative benefits and Simmons (2007) claims 
participant observation allows researchers to comprehend social environments in a 
manner that is denied to non-embedded researchers (albeit that the means by which 
embeddedness privileges comprehension is generally under-explored). As might be 
expected, the theoretical position here pursued inevitably influenced how the role of 
participant observer was interpreted and, for example, assumptions are made about 
the limits and function of description that non-realists might reject. 
Thus, according to Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 5) naturalist 
ethnographers do not aim to explain or `go beyond' cultural description and their 
performance, as participant observers, therefore differs from realists who aim to get 
behind social description to reveal the structural and agential factors that reproduce 
or transform social life. That said, ethnographic approaches vary hugely (Murphy, 
2005). Savage (2000, p. 1401) broadly defines ethnography as, in part, `any small 
scale social research that is carried out in everyday settings' and Maggs-Rapport 
(2001, p. 376) cites Denscombe's (1998) distinction between (descriptive) naturalist 
and (generalising) reflexive forms to illustrate a major fault line among ethnographic 
approaches. Thus reflexive ethnographers, such as Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1995), distance themselves from overly limiting interpretations of ethnography and, 
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given such flexibility, realist and ethnographic approaches may successfully combine 
(e. g. Porter and Ryan, 1996, Porter, 1993). On balance, and bearing in mind the 
relative nature of descriptors, realists will probably generate more interpretive notes 
than naturalist ethnographers who will record proportionally more procedural and 
descriptive notes. 
Interviews, data collection: 
Thirty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty-six clinical and 
administrative or managerial participants. Interviews lasted between fifty-five and 
eighty minutes. They generally took place in the interviewee's private office (for 
managerial and administrative staff) or in a side room away from the ward (for 
clinical staff). Three off-site interviews occurred when workload pressures 
prevented on-site meetings. A second interview was arranged when interviewees 
appeared to require more time to complete what they were saying (see interview list 
overleaf). 
MM theory guided data collection and analysis. Data collection was 
informed by theory since MM established, a priori, the forms of structural and 
agential relations and the nature of interaction between those relations that might be 
encountered and thus, mindful of their position, role and interests within the 
hospice, interviewees were questioned with a view to revealing the situated nature of 
interaction and relations at the study site. 
Interviewees were not expected to identify interactions or relations directly 
or in abstract; instead an interview guide (Appendix F) was used to flexibly steer 
conversations that, it was hoped, would allow structural-agential relations to be 
retrospectively recognized. This guide may, at first sight, appear prescriptive. 
However, it was not formulaically `worked through'. Rather, in use, it merely 
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prompted or reminded the interviewer to bring forward topics for discussion and 
interviewees often expanded upon or talked about other issues. 
Table 3- Interview list" 
Role title or position 
Interview 
1"t 
Interview 
Code 
Duration Interview 
2nd 
Interview 
code 
Duration 
Nursing Assistant 15.04.02 A: a 70 
Registered Nurse 27.04.02 B: a 60 
Charge Nurse 28.04.02 C: a 55 27.05.03 C: b 65 
Nursing Assistant 11.05.02 D: a 60 
Registered Nurse 12.05.02 E: a 60 
Ward Manager 27.08.02 Fa 80 
Nursing Director 30.08.02 G: a 75 10.01.03 G: b 60 
Doctor 09.09.02 H: a 70 
Educationalist 10.09.02 I: a 70 10.01.03 I: b 60 
Day-hospice mgr (Nurse) 11.09.02 :a 70 
Social Worker 27.01.03 K: a 80 
Doctor 28.01.03 L: a 75 
Special Minister of the Eucharist 31.01.03 M: a 70 20.06.03 M: b 80 
General Manager 31.01.03 N: a* 60 19.06.03 N: b 55 
Medical Consultant 11.02.03 O: a 75 
Full-time Chaplain 06.06.03 P: a 70 
Occupational Thera ist 06.06.03 Q: a 65 
Fundraiser 06.06.03 R: a 55 
Physiotherapist 16.06.03 S: a 55 
Head of Administration 16.06.03 T: a 65 
Charge Nurse 19.06.03 U: a 65 
Charge Nurse 19.06.03 V: a 60 
Registered Nurse 27.06.03 W: a* 65 
Assistant Chaplain 15.07.03 X: a 65 
Medical Registrar 04.08.03 Y: a 75 
Medical Consultant 19.09.03 Z: a* 60 
Initially the guide comprised four themes labelled: (i) change, (ii) 
admissions/discharges, (iii) consultant differences and (iv) treatment/interventions. 
As a clinically situated participant-observer the researcher was, in advance of the 
interviews, aware that `change' within the hospice was viewed as significant by 
clinicians albeit that the form and implications of change were variously described 
and interpreted. Familiarity and involvement in ongoing ward debates also 
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permitted the researcher to identify admission and discharge practice as, in some 
respects, contentious and, likewise, discussions about the evolving and contested 
nature of clinical treatments and interventions and variations in consultant attitudes 
and behaviours were widely seen as important. 
Interviews were therefore guided by interviewer identified themes and the 
identification of themes was influenced by the researcher's interests and position 
within the organisation. By implication, alternatively positioned staff might identify 
other issues or themes as significant and awareness of this possibility encouraged a 
reflexively conversational" approach to be adopted in interviews. Reflexivity 
permitted fifth (v) `spirituality-religion' and sixth (vi) `external relations/consultant 
attitudes/care standards' themes to be added to the guide in response to unforeseen 
interview comments. The imprecision or clumsiness of this last descriptor probably 
reflects then unfamiliarity with the issues being raised. 
Insofar as pre-established background theories located within the palliative 
care literature and experientially derived ideas about hospice organisation, clinical 
care and agential relations informed the construction of the first four interview 
topics, it might be argued that inferential retrodiction best describes the process of 
morphogenetic modelling pictorially represented in Diagram 4 (this thesis page 161). 
Alternatively, the fifth and sixth interview topics outlined above were not 
anticipated before interviews occurred and, to that extent, it would probably be 
more accurate to describe the process by which these themes were accommodated 
within the interview schedule and developed in §2 as inferential retroduction. 
As §1 Chapter 1 made clear however, the role played by background theories 
in distinguishing retroduction from retrodiction is `relative'. The ability of the 
researcher to identify in initial interviews that the fifth and sixth interview topics 
were of interest and potential importance must rest on exposure to prior but 
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hitherto unarticulated ideas and theories - whilst the understanding and knowledge 
that informed interview topics one to four was refined, amended or finessed by data 
collected in interviews. 
Interviews, data analysis: 
MM theory directed data analysis by providing the analytic framework in which data 
became evidence. Following the SS/SI and CS/S-C propositional models described 
in this thesis (§1 Chapter 2) it is assumed that internal and necessary relations exist 
within and between social structures and that similar relationships pertain amongst 
components of the cultural system. As stated, in this study data came predominantly 
from interview transcript analysis. Archer does not comment on such issues and it 
was therefore necessary to locate a suitable interpretive method. 
Template analysis (described below) is used in this study to code and order 
transcript data. As noted above, interviewees retroductively alerted or allowed the 
researcher to identify key structural factors which might otherwise have been 
overlooked. "' Thus, for example, the conflictual nature of certain forms of 
asymmetric SS relations was not recognised in advance of interviews (i. e. relations 
exposed in interaction between the hospice and County Palliative Care Directorate). 
Alternatively, whilst the relationship between demographic change and evolving 
health needs is recognised (Alcock, 1996; Allsop, 1995; Fennell et al, 1994), the 
possible significance of demographic change on admission and discharge practice at 
the study site was under-appreciated by this researcher before interviews took place. 
Further, hostility by some local NHS palliative care consultants towards hospices in 
general and the study site in particular would not have been realised without 
interviewing senior hospice staff 3 
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Analysis was also affected by interviewer-interviewee relations. In this study, 
interviewees, as work colleagues, were aware of the interviewer's opinion on a range 
of subjects and, although Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 109) dismiss too 
fastidious a preoccupation with `outsider and insider myths' as unhelpful, lacking the 
distancing formality that may accompany interview by an outsider, a noticeably 
unceremonious or relaxed atmosphere generally prevailed during interviews. As 
noted, prior familiarity may lead interviewees to limit or censure responses. 
Positively, prior familiarity can, as in this example from C: a, allow the interviewer to 
discover in the mutual interchange of opinions, ideas and beliefs that the participant 
was not known to hold. 
C: a Well, you've got to, I remember you saying now, is it the system's 
organisational fault or is it an individual's fault. Is that what you said? 
ML Well.. 
C: a You see I was listening. 
ML (Laughs) Well if a mistake happens once in a blue moon it seems reasonable 
to say an individual made a mistake. But if a consistent series of errors occur 
it seems to me that you're looking at a structural or organisational problem. 
To which, I presume, name bands etcetera are a response? 
C: a (Pause) Yea (pause). I'm just trying to think whether it's been the same 
person who did it or (pause) whether it's been different people. 
ML I thought it was a small group of people? 
C: a (Long pause) So you possibly think we should look at the small group of 
people and their practice? 
ML I don't know. I've changed my opinion a bit .. But I can understand why 
it's 
been done. 
C: a But you still don't like it? 
ML I don't, no. 
C: a I don't like it. I don't like it but I quite like having them there. Probably 
because I'm part-time whereas you don't get as many days off as I do. But I 
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know I can come back in and administer drugs, drugs safely to people that I 
don't know very well (pause). And know that I won't make a mistake. That 
I'll give them to the right person. And that makes me feel more comfortable. 
In this except C: a upturns interviewee-interviewer roles and questions the 
interviewer about pre-interview `trolley-side' conversations regarding the then 
contentious introduction of patient identity or name bands. A great deal of shared 
background knowledge is assumed in this passage. For example, name bands were 
introduced largely at C: a's insistence and their introduction was opposed by some 
staff. Interviewer-interviewee familiarity is therefore important in understanding this 
passage. Before the interview, the researcher believed name bands were a response 
to a series of drug errors by identified individuals (this was the advertised rationale 
for their introduction), that appeared to accompany a rise in high dependency 
admissions (predominantly patients with complex symptom control needs) and 
increases in the number and intricacy of prescribed treatments and interventions 
(described more generally as `increasing busyness'). However, here it is apparent that 
C: a also sees them as a personal protective device. 
From a realist perspective, for the actor C: a, name bands are, in part, a 
response to changes in risk perception that attend her part-time status. They also, 
physically, highlight or make overt an aspect of symmetrical but unequal internal 
clinician-patient SS relations. Further, their introduction coincided with the 
placement of observation charts and care plans (kardexs) at the end of patient beds 
(similar SS changes) and, taken together, these developments challenged the deeply 
held CS values of some agents (mostly long-service nurses) regarding desirable 
forms of hospice care (i. e. values emphasising the importance of non-hierarchical 
relationships as well as the maintenance of a `homelike' rather than `ward-like' 
environment). At a S-C level, agents opposing the new developments were in a 
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minority and their views were `trumped' by rationales accentuating the need to 
safeguard patients and staff (values universally supported). In addition, the SS power 
inherent in C: a's role as senior nurse enabled enforcement of her will in SI. 
This description is out of place insofar as it runs ahead of the analysis of 
data and evidence that §2 Chapter 2 presents. It is included here to illustrate the 
close connection between interpretation and theory that this study attempts. It also 
demonstrates how, by allowing opinions and beliefs to be easily exchanged, prior 
familiarity enabled the interviewer to rectify misconceptions. Ease of exchange is 
evidenced by the playful inversion of normal workplace etiquette and the teasing 
comment "You see I was listening" (usually the interviewer would listen to C: a) as 
well as C: a's questioning of the interviewer ("Is that what you said? "). Of course an 
unfamiliar researcher would not have held preconceived ideas about the interviewee 
and yet, given the back-stage (Goffman, 1990 [1959]) or non-public nature of 
disagreement about identity band introduction, a non-participant or unfamiliar 
researcher may have remained unaware of the existence of such controversy. ' 
The example also illustrates that pre-interview discussion and reflection by 
the interviewee upon a topic subsequently raised in the interview had occurred. 
Here the interviewee uses what might be termed sociological concepts when she 
juxtaposes organisational and individual fault. In this instance the interviewee 
attributes these concepts or ideas to the interviewer and, although the interviewee is 
here reinterpreting or translating earlier comments into a sociological idiom, rather 
than simply repeating them, the descriptors `organisation' and `individual' are 
thereafter employed by the interviewer to continue the dialogue. 
For Carr (2008, p. 121): `Allowing people to tell their story is more than a 
semi-structured interview, it is also a conversation' and, as part of this conversation, 
researcher ideas about hospice activity developed over a considerable period of 
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time. Thus, whilst the study primarily presents data from formal interviews, 
conversations and reflection on conversations were not limited to interview 
episodes. The themes developed in §2 Chapter 2 often occupied part of the 
informal and everyday discourse of hospice employees and, for the researcher, 
discussion of such issues thus preceded and continued after `official' interviews 
concluded. No violence is done to CR or MM theory or the authenticity of 
interviewee comments by this. CR and MM aim to reveal, via retroduction or 
retrodiction, the interplay of social (structural and cultural) and agential factors in 
societal change or stability. Inference regarding the interplay of such factors - by an 
analysis of interview transcripts - is not compromised if the ideas informing 
inference are supported by concepts and understandings from without the 
interviews. Likewise, from a realist perspective, it cannot be assumed that the 
authenticity of participant responses is enhanced or degraded by prior sensitisation 
to and reflection on the issues discussed in interviews. (Archer appears to support 
this argument in CAA, see also Baert, 1998, p. 205, on `second-order reflection'. ) 
Template analysis: 
Template analysis (henceforth TpA), as described by Nigel King (2007b, 2004), is 
here used to thematically order or code interview data. Templates describe the: 
themes identified in .. textual data. Some of these will .. 
be defined a priori, 
but they will be modified and added to as the researcher reads and interprets 
the texts. The template is organised in a way which represents the 
relationships between themes, as defined by the researcher, most commonly 
using a hierarchical structure .. 
(King, 2004, p. 256 - italicisation added). 
Following King (ibid), initial or primary template themes and codes were identical 
with a priori identified interview guide headings (Appendix F). Given that these 
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headings formed the basis for each interview, it was, unsurprisingly, possible to 
locate a great deal of information within or against them. However, as will be 
shown, interview codes were disaggregated and reordered in the process of analysis 
and new codes were also developed. A series of appendices are here used to 
demonstrate the analytic process. 
Table 4- List of appendices (G to M) 
Appendix 
G Pre-coding interview summary A: a 
H Pre-coding interview summary B: a 
I Interview coding process A: a 
J Interview coding process B: a 
K Template A: a 
L Template B: a 
M Master template (all interviews) 
Appendices G and H present post-interview transcript summaries from interviewees 
A: a and B: a. Summaries were compiled shortly after interviews took place. They 
were formulated before TpA coding occurred and they were part of the process of 
pre-coding transcript familiarisation (described Appendix D. Summaries contain 
interviewer comments (early and provisional interpretation or analysis) and they 
illustrate the distinctiveness of interviewee discursive or conversational forms. Thus, 
interviewee A: a, a nursing assistant who had worked at the hospice almost from its 
inception, spoke in what might be described as a direct manner. She `answered' 
questions and her comments can be represented as a series of binary contrasts 
(Appendix G). Alternatively, B: a a registered nurse with previous nursing home 
experience, spoke in a more fulsome manner. As noted, transcript cuts were made 
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to protect B: a from over-exposure and her effusive style is reflected in a summary 
that is less `bulleted' than A: a's (Appendix H). 
To illustrate the coding process transcript passages from interviews with A: a 
and B: a are reproduced in appendices I and J together with a commentary. 
Appendix I outlines the importance of pre-coding transcript familiarisation. The 
procedure for applying coding labels to a short series of remarks from interviewee 
A: a is described. Appendix j interprets a longer passage of dialogue from 
respondent B: a. It carries forward themes raised in Appendix I by arguing for the 
importance of inter- and extra-transcript contextualisation in interpretation. 
Appendix K and L present TpA templates for interviewees A: a and B: a. 
Templates code and order data hierarchically. Different templates may have 
different numbers of hierarchical code ordering levels and, within the same 
template, different codes can be assigned different numbers of levels. Coding levels 
refer to degrees of abstraction. 
Code levels: Increasing detail and 
123456 decreasing abstraction 
Detail increases and abstraction decreases as code levels rise. However, codes with 
six levels (e. g. Appendix K- Change to financial crisis necessitated practice changes) 
and codes, with two levels (e. g. Appendix K- Treament/interventions to rise in 
interventions linked to change from terminal to palliative care status) can share 
similar degrees of detail and abstraction in final code levels - i. e. `financial crisis 
necessitated practice changes' (level 6 code) and `rise in interventions linked to 
change from terminal to palliative care status' (level 2 code) both contain the same 
approximate level of detail relative to the transcript source. 
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Coding exposes agreement and disagreement between respondents. For 
example, although A: a and B: a both talk about professionalism, interviewee A: a is 
saddened by a professionalism that, she believes, reduces the quality of staff-patient 
relationships whereas B: a welcomed professionalism as a means of, in part, reducing 
her emotional exposure to the high number of encountered deaths. Concepts such 
as `professionalism' carry a variety of meanings. However, in this instance A: a and 
B: a affectively diverge and conceptually agree that professionalism, as they use the 
term, `distances' staff-patient relations. 
Appendix M presents the master template (adapted and abridged below - 
figure 5 overleaf. This template combines and further interprets or orders 
individual transcript templates. Combination was facilitated by the use of 
overlapping or complementary codes when coding individual transcripts. Yet 
interviewee comments varied in style (Appendices G and H) and content 
(Appendices K and L) and, in combining individual templates, researcher 
interpretative discretion was required. Thus every transcript contained unique data 
and every individual template contains specific codes. Template specific codes are 
excluded from the master template when, in the researcher's opinion, their content 
is irrelevant to those aspects of activity here under review. 
For example, interviewee B: a juxtaposed nursing home care against hospice 
care to illustrate, what to her, were deficiencies in hospice care (Appendix J). Other 
interviewees did not make similar allusions however and thus, whilst `nursing home' 
appears as a code in B: a's individual template, it is not represented in the master 
template (Appendix M). 
King (2004) supports code or data winnowing. He also recognises that 
novice researchers in particular find it difficult to balance the need for clarity and 
comprehension against the need to capture as much detail as possible. 
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Figure 5: Master list of codes - abridged from Appendix M 
Structures and institutions 
State/NHS relations 
Department of Health 
Clinical Governance 
Care Standards Act 
Primary Care Trust 
County Palliative Care Directorate 
NHS Palliative Care Consultants 
GPs 
Macmillan Nurses 
Demographic relations 
Admissions 
Discharges 
Relations within the hospice 
Organisational re-designation as a Specialist Palliative Care Unit (SPCU) 
Hospice (historic) 
SPCU 
busier - less time for non-physical care 
patients - `sicker' 
staffing - changes in numbers, ratios, roles and functions 
Consultant differences 
Treatment/interventions 
Increasing use of treatment/interventions 
Admissions - Discharges 
Admissions -'sicker', more dependent 
Discharges - conflict 
end stage patients 
Professionalism 
Bureaucratisation 
Medicalisation 
Doctors more powerful/influential - nurses less powerful/influential 
Spiritual-religious issues 
Religious withdrawal - spiritual claims made 
Nevertheless, it should perhaps be recognised that, since TpA does not assume `that 
the frequency of a code in a particular text corresponds to its salience' (ibid, p. 256) 
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jettisoning superfluous codes and data for the sake of clarity is problematic. It is 
problematic because, as discussed earlier in relation to `editing out' over-exposing 
comments (this Chapter), it is not necessarily clear how immateriality or redundancy 
can be established in advance of full analysis and kindred issues are raised later in 
relation to this study's self-imposed limitation to `aspects' of hospice practice. 
In summary, TpA advances through a number of stages. In the first instance 
and prior to coding the researcher reads interview transcripts mindful of the 
template that is being applied (here theory's `downwards' influence on the data is 
evident). Pre-coding familiarisation enables the researcher to form a mental picture 
of the relationships within and between interviews (discussed Appendix I). TpA 
coding then assigns labels to words, phrases and passages within each interview (see 
Appendices I and J). Labels identify ideas and events in accordance with template 
themes. However, by focusing on the detail of interviewee comments, labels also 
inform or `clothe' template themes and in this way empiric data exerts what might 
be termed `upwards' pressure on theory. Labels are then ordered and combined in 
individual transcript templates (Appendices K and L) and, at this point, original 
template themes re-emerge albeit that they are now `fleshed out'. Individual 
templates are then combined in a master template (Appendix M) and the influence 
of MM theory is here most visible as data or evidence is ordered and coded under 
two headings (`Structures and institutions' and `Relations within the hospice'). 
Theoretical elaboration, abstraction and researcher judgment is evident 
throughout this process. For example, although the master template (Appendix M), 
situates `Professionalism' under the key heading `Relations within the hospice', 
earlier versions of the master template used alternative codes and code ordering 
sequences (e. g. at one time `Professionalism' was positioned under the heading 
`Hospice - Internal Change') and, although alternative schemas did not diverge 
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radically from that finally established (the schemas were essentially commensurable), 
recognising that data and evidence can be variously ordered is important. 
It is important because minor variations in the coding and ordering of data 
or evidence potentially alters the conclusions or findings that are reached and this 
analytic difference may contribute to the generation of hypotheses (broadly defined) 
that fail to meet Hempel's (1945) equivalence condition (discussed §1 Chapter 4). 
Here it is recognised that all description necessarily involves systematising narrative 
structures and tropes (Bruner, 1990) and a narrative's power or persuasiveness can 
rely upon plot coherence and plausibility rather than logical rigour or the 
truthfulness of claims made. (Bruner, ibid, p. 44, labels this narrative's `indifference 
to extralinguistic reality. ') 
Thus, whilst both coding and sequential transitive description (11- T'4) meet 
a need for order that, in realism's case, rests on transcendental claims regarding the 
nature of reality, it is acknowledged that presentational forms may, in themselves, 
unwittingly distort or bolster the particular description of intransitive reality that is 
proposed. For Fernandez: 
figurative devices .. lie at the very heart of discourse, defining situations and 
grounding our sense of what is to be taken as real and objective and, 
therefore, entitled (by means of the figurative elements we employ) to have 
real consequences. 
(Fernandez, 1991, p. 1) 
In this study, the master template links transcript analysis to MM theory by 
structuring the descriptive and interpretive statements of interviewees under 
headings that thereafter form the themes or topics explored in §2 Chapter 2. As 
noted above, not every identified code is utilised because not every code informs 
those aspects of hospice activity that are discussed. Thus, in contrast to some 
varieties of ethnography, this study does not seek to develop a `holistic' (Simmons, 
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2007, p. 9; Maggs-Rapport, 2001, p. 376) view of the organisation or its work (this 
thesis has repeatedly stated that it is looking at aspects of hospice activity). Indeed, 
realist theory asserts that mechanism interplay can and often does occur behind the 
backs of actors (mechanisms need not be actualised and actualisation need not be 
observed or identified as events) and it may therefore be unrealistic to assume that a 
totalising overview is ever possible. Nevertheless, not only does the choice and 
presentational ordering of codes inevitably influence the manner in which data and 
evidence thereafter informs MM modelling and social explanation, but, further, 
whilst it is legitimate to look at aspects rather than the totality of interactions within 
a social setting, problematic questions remain regarding the coherence or delineation 
of those aspects under review (see §1 Chapter 4 regarding event or sortal-identity). 
Template analysis. aptness for realist research: 
Here, a brief description of the aptness of TpA for realist research is advanced. TpA 
has been employed in palliative care research (King et al, 2003) and King (2004) 
argues it that might be valuable where realist qualitative investigation seeks, contra 
idealism, to discover the hidden or underlying causes of action but where 
researchers do not wish to become locked into overly prescriptive frameworks. 
King (ibid) distinguishes TpA from other forms of qualitative method. He 
suggests, for example, that TpA differs from phenomenological textual analysis in 
two respects. First, whilst phenomenologies often engage in detail with a small 
number of texts, TpA organises data, perhaps more superficially, across larger 
numbers of texts or transcripts. Second, King (ibid) argues that, contrary to the 
stated practice of phenomenologists, researchers using TpA initially generate coding 
templates, as stated, on an a priori basis and researcher interests thus overtly set the 
framework within which subsequent analysis occurs. However, unlike quantitative 
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content analysis, where coding frames may be applied inflexibly to generate 
statistical data, researchers engaged in TpA, as in this study, alter or develop initial 
codes as analysis progresses. 
According to King (ibid, p. 268) `Template analysis works very well in studies 
which seek to examine the perspectives of different groups within an organisational 
context' and, as will be seen, retroducing and retrodicting the causes of group 
conflict and interaction form a major part of §2 Chapter 2. 
King (ibid) also argues that TpA's current lack of a substantive literature is 
beneficial since it is, perforce, unencumbered by epistemological baggage. Attempts 
have been made to link TpA with relativist-contextualism (e. g. Madill et al, 2000); 
however, King (2004) suggests the method is incompatible with strong relativist 
positions that demand fine textual analysis as well as those forms of discourse 
analysis that dismiss coding as overly limiting. King (ibid) also argues that TpA is 
inappropriate for quantitative or qualitative research that seeks to code text as 
analytic units since, as stated, the frequency with which a unit of code is noted does 
not, in TpA, correspond to the importance or significance of that code or theme. 
TpA thus appears to complement MM methodology. 
Situating the researcher in the research: 
The person and role of the researcher is overtly situated in this text at several points. 
The introduction identifies three personal factors or interests that direct the content 
and form of the subsequent work. §1 Chapter 4 argues that subjective criteria are 
necessarily involved in using MM constructs. The potential significance of prior 
nurse socialisation is linked, in this Chapter, to research ethics and, again in this 
Chapter, reflexivity and the researcher's influence on data collection and analysis is 
discussed. 
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Looking ahead to §2 Chapter 2- where this thesis focuses on the hospice as 
a voluntary organisation, where ' it discusses treatment or intervention 
appropriateness and where spiritual matters are investigated - it is here 
acknowledged that extra-research factors may have influenced the analysis offered. 
For example, earlier social policy studies and a varied employment history 
comprising commercial and administrative experience in non-health related private 
industry and government, as well as the performance of nursing roles (clinical and 
research) in England, Holland and New Zealand, in both state and third sectors, 
presumably affects the way this researcher approached issues around the hospice's 
voluntary status. Further, whilst D'Antonio (2006) argues that nurse researchers are 
socialised to ask questions that others may not, so personal interest in treatment or 
intervention appropriateness at the end of life may have been encouraged, in part, 
by pre-hospice enculturation within `high-tech' clinical environments (e. g. oncology 
and haematology - see Introduction, this thesis) that allow and advance different 
values to those associated with palliative care. And, discussions regarding the role 
and place of religious or spiritual values at the study site cannot but be influenced by 
personal atheism, naturalistic beliefs and, following Paley (2008a, 2008b), rejection 
of the conceptual validity of the descriptor `spirituality'. 
Presenting personal narratives that acknowledge the influence of subjectivity 
within qualitative investigations is now commonplace (Holliday, 2005; Nelson, 2005; 
Baert, 1998; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) albeit that the prevalence of self- 
reflexivity varies between disciplines and approaches (Pennycook, 2005). Thus, 
whilst Canagarajah (2005, p. 309) states that: `Even quantitative studies now make a 
gesture toward acknowledging the personal', situating quantitative or qualitative 
researchers within their research continues to challenge traditional or deep rooted 
concerns regarding objectivity and bias minimisation (Drew, 2006). 
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Given the recognised significance of researcher choices and decisions within 
this work it can be argued, following Ramanathan (2005a, 2005b), that the 
researcher must be, or inevitably is, part of the field of enquiry and Dean et al 
(2006c) berate, from a realist perspective, researchers who lack an interest in the 
contribution of the pre-research self to study construction. For Nelson, positioning 
the self within research is: 
a means of expanding or enriching one's data sources; tracing one's complex 
and fraught positionings vis-ä-vis the research participants or the subject 
matter; or recognizing one's own limitations as a researcher. Yet at the same 
time, texts in which the researcher's subjectivity is foregrounded can be 
perceived as irrelevant, self-indulgent, or insufficiently critical. 
(Nelson, 2005, p. 315) 
Arguably, all three of Nelson's (ibid) justificatory criteria are, to a limited extent, met 
in the above reflexive confessional. However, again following Nelson (ibid), a 
criticism of this study is that the approach taken is insufficiently critical and more 
attention should have been given to understanding the extra-research components 
that the researcher brought to the work. 
Rigorous exploration of the researcher's contribution might focus on any 
number of overlapping factors including age, ethnicity, sex, gender, social and 
cultural positioning, role or workplace values and psychological outlook or 
temperament. Such an investigation would however, be time-consuming and, given 
the `complexifying' (Ramanathan, 2005a, p. 291) and contested nature of many of 
these variables, (see, for example, Drevdahl et al, 2006, on the conceptual misuse of 
race and ethnicity descriptors in nursing research) it is likely that reflection upon 
these issues would inevitably remain speculative and partial. Therefore, whilst some 
combination of researcher social and cultural situatedness, psychological 
disposition(s) and, presumably, physical or biological attributes (i. e. genetic makeup) 
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informs, at various levels, the identification and analysis of those aspects of hospice 
work hereafter discussed, these issues are not pursued further. 
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Endnotes §2 Chapter 1 
i "Us" and "we" were used of and by the researcher who, as participant observer, was a 
member of the organisation under study. 
ri Problematically however, this requires that abuse be identified in advance of the research that 
will `out' it. 
in This fourfold division differs from but has similarities with Cruickshank's (2003b, p. 114) 
`levels of realist theorising' - see page 270 this thesis. 
^' Empiric is used here in the realist sense to designate all occurrences and events that can be 
known or identified (see §1 Chapter 1). Qualitative or phenomenological occurrences and events are 
not excluded. 
V Following Habermas (2008), Malpas (2005) and Ramberg and Gjesdal (2005), Schleiermacher 
[1768-1834] emphasised the interpreter's role in interpretation. He argued that textual analysis does 
not occur outside of an interpreter's psychological disposition and historical situation. Meaning is 
thus culturally and socially mediated. However, contra what would now be termed idealism or 
postmodernism, Schleiermacher allowed that interpretation occurs relative to an external world and 
that, whilst knowledge is perforce a product of experience, experience is informed by judgement and 
judgement, if theoretically sound, can provide knowledge of external reality. 
Vi Three interview recordings were in part or full corrupted due to technical errors or 
malfunctions. These recordings are identified with an * in the interview list. 
w Conversational is here used in its everyday or non-technical sense. The descriptor does not 
refer to forms of conversational or discourse analysis as described, for example, by Silverman (2005). 
Vii A caveat must be inserted here however. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted 
(US DoD, 2008 [12th February 2002]) that there will always be `unknown unknowns. These are the 
things we don't know we don't know' and, whilst interviews provided data or evidence for aspects of 
hospice activity previously unknown to the researcher, much undoubtedly was overlooked. It has 
repeatedly been stated that realist claims are provisional and fallible. Here it is acknowledged that 
realist research - like all other research - inevitably misses or is blind to unknown unknowns. 
Clearly more detail is required to substantiate the claim that these examples embody SS and 
CS level conflict. They are asserted here simply to illustrate that interviews provided or permitted 
insights that would not otherwise have been easily gained. 
See Appendix I regards data analysis and familiarity. 
'" The terms `holistic' and `holism' are variously interpreted. Neural and psychological theorists 
counterpoise holistic or neural network theories against, for example, modular homuncular 
functionalism (Rose, 2006). Sociologists, on the other hand, use the descriptors to refer - as here - 
to the notion that: `The complex reality of society might appear visible only in its entirety' (Trigg, 
2001, p. 57). (Archer associates the term with the dissolution of personal identity - RST, p. 249. ) 
Alternatively, in §2 Chapter 2 the terms are employed in a third nursing or clinical context. There it 
denotes an approach to healthcare that incorporates psychological, social, spiritual and physical 
dimensions or interests (Jackson, 2007; Sarkis and Skoner, 1987). Holism or holistic care in this sense 
seeks to distance itself or `move away from a biomedical model' of care (Earle, 2005, p. 61). 
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Section 2- Chapter 2 
Study findings 
§2 Chapter 2 begins with a brief scene setting description of the organisation and 
layout of the hospice or, as it became, a hospice that claimed specialist palliative care 
unit status. To ease description the term hospice is generally employed. (This 
descriptor was generally used by study site participants and others in everyday 
conversation. ) The T' - T4 timeframes used in this study are then specified and 
problematised and, thereafter, the `findings' of this investigation into aspects of 
hospice activity are presented under two headings titled `Structures and institutions' 
and `Relations within the hospice. ' In presenting the findings, TpA data ordering 
and coding (Appendix M), informed by MM theory, provides evidence for the 
retroductive and retrodictive identification of social (SS) and cultural (CS) structural 
relations that, during the study period(s), undergo reproduction (morphostasis) 
and/or elaboration (morphogenesis). Forms of agential social (SI) and socio-cultural 
(S-C) interaction are detailed that illustrate the existence of contradictory and 
complementary situated logics. Differential SS/CS morphogenesis is also 
recognised. 
The hospice: ' 
Situated a few miles outside the county capital and built on land originally provided 
at nominal cost by an adjacent but now closed nunnery, the hospice or specialist 
palliative care unit offers patients and visitors pleasing views over rolling farmland. 
Physically the hospice is a two storey building (first, ground and basement floors). 
The first floor contains office and managerial space. Storage, additional 
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administrative space and hairdressing facilities are located in the basement. Clinical 
activity occurs on the ground floor. Attractive gardens surround the facility. 
On the ground floor, a day-patient facility occupies one end of the building. 
This has its own entrance, seating areas, bath-shower, lymphodema-dressing and 
office spaces. A lounge area with dining tables, settees and television separates day- 
and in-patient units. Two family overnight suites and a compact self-service patient 
and family kitchen abut the lounge. The in-patient unit is approached through the 
lounge (from day-patients) or via a separate main reception and entrance. A chapel 
and gift shop face each other across this space. The in-patient unit comprises three, 
four bedded bays and four single rooms (sixteen beds). Staff dining, kitchen, clinical 
common room and office areas are situated at the far end of the building. A `chapel 
of rest' is located within, but apart from, the main building. A combined library and 
meeting room is sited within the grounds. 
Hospice organisational structures reflect and are influenced by government 
policy and healthcare practice (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2004; McGuire et al, 
1991). A Chief Executive, appointed by the charity's trustees, provides day-to-day 
and long-term strategic leadership. Administratively, the Chief Executive oversees a 
team that includes secretarial, accounting and logistical support, a fundraising 
department, a part-time media unit, an estates department and a volunteer 
coordinator. 
Annual expenditure on salaries and fixed running costs is approximately two 
million pounds. Less than twenty percent of income comes from statutory sources 
of any sort and year-on-year statutory funding is declining relative to total 
expenditure. Throughout T2 - T3 
bequests, were a vital but erratic source of income. 
More consistently, revenue comes from eleven shops and a professional fundraising 
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department of seven full-time equivalent staff generate income from the local 
community. Thirty-seven commissioned field canvassers promote a hospice lottery. 
Clinically, a full-time (trained) social worker and part-time (untrained) social 
work assistant care for ongoing (e. g. bereavement follow-up) and specialist (e. g. 
child) emotional needs. Pastoral and religious or spiritual support is provided by a 
full-time clergyman and two part-time unpaid voluntary clergywomen. One and a 
half full-time equivalent educators run courses for external clients (e. g. nursing 
home personnel). 
Clinical staff hierarchies mirror NHS medical and nursing establishments, 
albeit that staff-patient ratios are good compared with state sector provision. For 
example, during most of TZ - T3, in-patient morning shifts were covered by a mix of 
seven registered nursing and nursing auxiliary staff and afternoon shifts used four 
registered nurses and nursing auxiliaries. Towards the end of the study period this 
ratio rose to eight: five. It was always possible to bring in additional staff as required. 
The day unit has dedicated registrar medical cover (frequently augmented by 
a senior house officer or specialist registrar trainee) and the in-patient unit has a full- 
time Consultant, a part-time Consultant (shared with a local NHS county hospital) 
and two or more senior house officers or specialist registrar trainees. Additional 
medical cover is provided as needed (e. g. over bank holidays) by general 
practitioners who are familiar with the hospice. Visits to outlying clinics are made by 
Consultant and other medical staff on a rotational basis. 
Nursing staff are headed by a Nursing Director and, for part of the study 
period, a nursing ward manager liaised between the Nursing Director and ward 
charge nurses and staff (this person left to become a Macmillan nurse at the end of 
2001). The in-patient unit had two charge nurses but this was upped to three 
following the departure of the ward manager. The day care unit has one charge 
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nurse. More than forty registered and auxiliary nursing staff are employed in the 
day- and in-patient units and, of this number, at least thirty percent work part-time. 
The hospice relies upon the goodwill and efforts of large numbers of 
volunteers. The trading wing uses more than two hundred volunteers to staff shops. 
Volunteers collect and deliver supplies, transport (some) patients and raise funds in 
innumerable ways. Within the hospice, voluntary (unpaid) registered and auxiliary 
nursing support is informally available and non-nursing volunteers perform multiple 
roles. For example, the day unit uses four to six volunteers each morning. These 
people welcome patients and their carers, help make patients and visitors 
comfortable, prepare and serve refreshments and engage in friendly conversation. 
They also provide entertainment and run activities on an ad-hoc basis. Likewise, the 
in-patient unit uses about six `home-maker' volunteers each day. Home-makers 
circulate refreshments (including home-baked cake), talk with patients, assist at 
mealtimes in food distribution and collection, offer morning and afternoon drinks 
(alcoholic and non-alcoholic) and help tidy up. Volunteer receptionists greet visitors 
and answer incoming telephone calls during working hours. 
Specifying and critiquing T' - T4 timeframes: 
With one exception (see below), T' refers to the period prior to November 2001, T4 
is placed after September 2003 and T2 - T3 occupies the intervening time. 
Figure 6- Study timeframe 
Pre-November 2001 
T1 
November 2001 to September 2003 
T2 'I3 
Post-September 2003 
T4 
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In `Structures and institutions', forms of social interaction are described that, it is 
argued, reveal structural relations that generated for the hospice a situated logic that 
contributed towards the decision to re-designate the organisation, in 2000, a 
specialist palliative care unit. 
Importantly, re-designation was not caused by the forms of social interaction 
described in `Structures and institutions' (some of the events outlined occurred after 
re-designation took place) and it is not the T4 outcome of the timeframe specified in 
figure 6 above. Rather, interviewee comments (obtained between T2 - T) describe 
forms of pre- and post-2000 interaction (empiric events), these interactions permit 
contradictory structural relations to be retroduced, and it is these relations, known 
by their effects on specific entities, that prompted organisational re-designation. 
§1 Chapter 4 recognised that event identities might be difficult to demarcate. 
Here, to ease and aid explanation, page 215 of this thesis presents the structural 
conditioning forces which led to organisational elaboration as a discrete yet partial 
analytic (T' - T') history. Re-designation is structurally elaborative insofar as it 
potentially alters relations with, for example, state and NHS institutions (though the 
structures precipitating re-designation existed before and remain after 2000) and it 
accelerates change in agential relations within the hospice. 
The somewhat elaborate procedure outlined above allows organisational re- 
designation to be situated, following figure 6 above, at Tt in `Relations within the 
hospice'. Here the meaning and consequents of re-designation and its correlates are 
described for hospice agents in an analytic history that corresponds with the 
timeframe of figure 6. This timeframe accords with researcher study site access. 
Thus, permission to proceed was granted in November 2001 and frequent contact 
between researcher and study site ceased in September 2003 when the last interview 
was conducted (§2 Chapter 1). Establishing study periods according to access is not 
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unusual. However, it is problematic. For, although §1 Chapter 4 suggested that time 
descriptors should not be allocated capriciously, access and therefore study periods 
were contingently determined by the researcher according to personal, rather than 
hospice, criteria. 
Fortuitously, three events occurred just prior to November 2001 that may, 
retrospectively, validate the timeframe employed. First, 2000 saw the passing of the 
Care Standards Act (Department of Health - DH, 2000). Implemented in England 
in 2001 (DH, 2005) this act is seen as a serious potential threat to organisational 
independence by some senior hospice staff. Second, around 2000 the hospice re- 
designated itself, as stated, a specialist palliative care unit and this change promotes, 
it will be argued, significant ideational dispute within the organisation. Third, 2001 
saw the appointment of a new and, for some, controversial part-time consultant 
(henceforth Con2). Con2 introduced clinical practices at the hospice that were 
variously resisted or welcomed and, in this way, he exposed and challenged 
established shibboleths. Con2 also chaired the County Palliative Care Directorate 
and, as such, he played a major role in brokering the hospice's future relationship 
with external and potentially antagonistic local NHS `partners'. Con2 left the 
hospice towards the end of 2003. Draft publication of the County Directorate's plan 
also occurred at this time and T4 can reasonably be situated in late 2003 since this 
document heralds a new phase in hospice-Directorate relations. 
Nevertheless, determining study periods according to access meant that, for 
example, it was not possible to fully evaluate the elaborative potential of 
organisational re-designation vis-a-vis state and NHS relations (since insufficient 
time elapsed in which transformation could be observed) and, moreover, despite 
retrospective justification, fixing timeframes (temporal boundaries) at set points is 
problematic insofar as this disregards alternative event or analytic histories. Indeed, 
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from an interviewee's perspective dating change is largely a function of service 
duration. 
Thus, long service interviewees recognise that the pace of change increased 
post-2000 and they describe the impact that events such as organisational re- 
designation or Con2's arrival had on clinical practice as part of their description of 
change in the same way as shorter service colleagues. However, long service allows 
perspectives on change to be advanced that undercut explanations focused simply 
on recent events. For example, A: a's normative views on what hospice care should 
be or encompass enable her to describe developments in staff-patient relations that 
took place over decades and, as part of this, she outlines a movement away from 
overt religiosity or the easy expression of religious sentiment, evident in the 
hospice's founding years, to the present atmosphere in which religious succour has, 
in some circumstances, to be offered covertly. 
A: a I find it very sad really. Because, well it's not for me to say but, you know, it 
was nice for people who had sat with their relative dying for, you know, 
hours on end, and then they died, and then for somebody to say to them, 
would you like to say a little prayer? Would you like to say a little prayer? 
You know, would you like to say a little prayer, maybe not for the person 
who's died, but just for you, to shut your eyes and think, it's all over, you 
know. 
ML Would you feel comfortable saying that to anybody now? 
A: a (Pause) Not if anybody's looking, no (laughs). 
ML Would you say it if they weren't looking? 
A: a (Laughing) Probably. 
Accounts such as this highlight the evolutionary character of aspects of change and 
commentaries by long service staff force the researcher to acknowledge that dating 
and interpreting events or, when numerical modifiers apply, sortals, is occurrence or 
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topic specific. Thus, it will be argued that a consideration of changing ideas about 
spirituality and religious expression at the study site, such as those described above, 
may helpfully add to understanding and that explaining spiritual-religious change 
requires longer timeframes than 2001 - 2003 to be considered (albeit that recent 
developments exacerbate the withdrawal from overt religious expression that was 
already advanced before that time). 
§1 Chapter 4 suggested that questions about event identity and persistence 
are underexplored by Archer and Bhaskar. Negatively, the argument presented here 
opens up the possibility of unbounded regress and stultifying complication as 
individual event sortals may reference unique T' - T4 histories and each event sortal 
may be further subdivided into phase sortals that require alternative T' - T4 
histories. Positively, recognising the interlocking but distinct nature of event 
histories extends the concept of differential morphogenesis outlined in §1 Chapter 2 
and, perhaps, reflects or captures the complexity of real world events. 
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Structures and institutions 
Social structures and institutions are variously described in the sociological literature 
(Lopez and Scott, 2000). Some realists (e. g. Elder-Vass, 2008) highlight integrative 
links between relational structures and institutions whilst others (e. g. Fleetwood, 
2008) mark their difference. Following Fleetwood (ibid), institutions are here 
defined as systems of coordinating rules and conventions. These rules and 
conventions are both external to agents and embodied by agents as habits and 
practices. Organisations such as the hospice under study represent a subset of 
institutions (Elder-Vass, 2007a; Hodgson, 2006). Social structures, here synonymous 
with Archer's SS and CS, describe internally emergent constraining and enabling 
`latticeworks' (Fleetwood, 2008, p. 29) of interest bearing relations. In this study, 
social structures evidence causal influence when the interests they generate are taken 
up or mediated through the projects and actions of situated agents. 
Organisationally, the hospice is an independent third sector voluntary or 
charitable healthcare provider. Structurally, it sits within systems of SS and CS 
relations that are dominated by state run or sponsored forms of health and social 
care. Thus, on a daily basis the hospice cooperates with GPs, district nurses, local 
NHS trusts and social service departments. It also interacts with charitable non- 
governmental organisations such as Macmillan and Marie Curie nurses. However, 
these organisations are substantively integrated into NHS and other governmental 
infrastructures and the hospice's focus is thus directed towards state bodies that, 
from its perspective, can be classified as clinical and/or regulatory. (Though, to 
complicate matters, "there are different relationships with different parts of the 
same organisation", G: b. ). 
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The existence of structural relations between the hospice and socialised or 
state sponsored healthcare is here revealed through a description of interaction with 
(i) the County Palliative Care Directorate and (ii) Department of Health. The effects 
of (iii) demographic change on the hospice are also considered. It is argued that the 
structures revealed (mainly but not exclusively SS) exerted and continue to exert 
pressures on the hospice that, in 2000, contributed to the creation of a situated logic 
favouring organisational re-designation. This was a significant event and the 
emergent consequents of organisational re-designation and its correlates for agents 
are later described in `Relations within the hospice'. 
The County Palliative Care Directorate 
The County Palliative Care Directorate (henceforth Directorate)° is a standing 
"strategic planning body for the creation, for the development of all palliative care 
services" (N: b). Set up in the early 1990s "at our expense" (N: b) with the then 
Health Authority (now and henceforth Primary Care Trust - PCT) the Directorate 
was to be "a mechanism that would highlight the deficiencies in service and address 
those deficiencies and ensure that they somehow got the resources to be improved" 
(N: b). 
Despite the small size of the hospice relative to the PCT it need not be 
considered a micro referent if Archer's relational theory is accepted (§1 Chapter 2) 
and, insofar as both bodies shared a common purpose (resource procurement) and 
both were mutually co-dependent (in establishing the Directorate) the relationship 
between hospice and PCT could, initially at least, be described as symmetrically 
internal. However, once established SS and CS contradictions emerged and, by 
2000, the Directorate and hospice were related internally but asymmetrically. To 
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describe the nature of asymmetry and explain how it came about (i. e. to retroduce 
from interview statements the factors defining and producing such relations) three 
overlapping topics or themes are considered. These are labelled, (i) divergent interests, 
(ii) challenges to independence and (iii) NHS palliative consultant hostility. 
Divergent interests: 
By and post-2000, divergent interests and powers characterised or underpinned the 
nature of relations between institutions. Thus, whilst the hospice sees itself as a vital 
regional asset, from the Directorate's perspective it is of marginal concern. This was 
graphically conveyed by one non-hospice Directorate member who sketched the 
diagrams reproduced below (diagram 5). 
Diagram 5- Contrasting Hospice and Directorate perspectives. 
Hospice perspective 
Hospice 
County Palliative Care 
Services 
Directorate perspective 
County Palliative Care Services 
Hospice 
The schema on the left places the hospice at the centre of activity and this, 
according to the Directorate member, is how the hospice presents itself. 
Alternatively, the schema on the right illustrates the Directorate's viewpoint. Here, 
the hospice is significantly less relevant for, in financial and other terms (i. e. annual 
countywide deaths), in-patient NHS acute and palliative care and community 
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situated GP, District nurse, Macmillan, Marie Curie, supporting social and 
community services and nursing or rest homes are simply more important. 
Asymmetrical relations are produced by divergent interests. However, the 
consequence of asymmetry for the hospice derives from the unequal power(s) held 
by each organisation and the Directorate's willingness to wield its superior power. "' 
Challenges to independence: 
The Directorate has been and is seeking to guide providers and, perhaps inevitably, 
this directive role is seen as a challenge to organisational independence. 
G: a I think you will find and, there're a lot of fights going on, that we are being 
pushed more and more towards, by the NHS .. And I see that through the 
Directorate. I mean you only have to look at some of the stuff coming out 
of the Directorate and how they feel we shouldn't do `x' unless the 
Directorate says so. Well, sorry, we will do `x' whether the Directorate says 
so or not. Because, the hospice is here for the patients and if we wanted to 
spend `x' million on upgrading the hospice it's got nothing to, to, for the 
Directorate to say whether we do it or not. 
At a national level the main challenge to organisational independence comes, senior 
interviewees believe, from the Department of Health and Care Standards Act (DH, 
2000) (described later). However, locally, as the above excerpt indicates, the 
Directorate is viewed as the chief force pushing the hospice towards the NHS. 
The Directorate's willingness and potential ability to "integrate" (O: a) the 
hospice into overall service provision was, initially, unforeseen. The Directorate's 
function is to plan, coordinate and resource palliative care. Originally, hospice 
-personnel thought they would play a significant role in developing such plans and, 
to advance this process and in keeping with then recommended practice (e. g. Clark, 
1994), it was decided that a needs assessment was required. However, despite `the 
longstanding duty placed on health authorities to develop strategic plans for 
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palliative care' (Seymour et al, 2002, p. 5) production of this document stalled during 
the 1990s and, much to the hospice's chagrin the Directorate became, in this period, 
little more than a "talking shop" (G: b). 
This changed when Con2 (O: a) arrived. Con2 works for both the NHS 
(three and a half days a week) and hospice (one and a half days a week). He also 
chairs the Directorate and in this capacity Con2 expedited completion of the needs 
assessment. However, as the passage below makes clear, the assessment and its 
associated plan threatens to restructure the conditions under which palliative care is 
organised and delivered in a manner that runs counter to hospice interests. The 
significance of asymmetric hospice-Directorate relations is apparent in this excerpt. 
O: a [The needs assessment has] .. created a whole new model of 
delivery and 
care which I don't think will suit the hospice very well. And I think (name) 
and myself have been the driving forces in doing that. But we've been 
allowed to do that by the PCT and they've encouraged us. 
ML Can I ask you why you don't think it will suit (hospice)? 
O: a Well it means that (hospice) will be very much, well financially, will have to 
explain itself and its actions and its investments and what it does if it wants 
to get any money, then it's going to have to put forward a much better case 
than it does at the moment. If it wants to develop and change in its own 
particular ways then it's going to have to demonstrate that that fits in with 
the countywide needs rather than just (hospice) own perception. So it's got 
to, it'll have to show that what goes on outside its own walls fits in with 
what goes on inside its walls and that there's a mutual benefit there. Now 
currently that isn't what they want at all and they're very upset with the 
Directorate and I think they're going to make it very difficult for the 
Directorate. But at the moment we have got a fantastic, I think, a fantastic 
and exciting development plan for the next three years that's very workable 
and it will actually be financially viable. 
Con2 (O: a) takes personal credit for directing the assessment and its associated plan 
in a direction unlikely to find favour with the hospice, a direction "encouraged" by 
the PCT. Con2's motivation as an actor is explored later under `Relations within the 
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hospice'. Here it is merely noted that needs assessment is an `inexact .. [and] 
pragmatic' (Ingleton et al. 2001, p. 398) activity and Con2's "ambivalent" (see below) 
views regarding hospices match those of the corporate group (i. e. NHS palliative 
care consultants) to which he primarily belongs. 
NHS palliative consultant hostility: 
Senior hospice interviewees claim the Directorate offers a platform to antipathetic 
local NHS palliative care consultants. Medical hostility to the hospice is not new. 
Conflict, reportedly centred on the development of in-patient facilities, erupted as 
early as 1979 when a hospice fundraising foundation was established. 
R: a (Trustee) has said that when he and (Trustee) were looking to set up the 
hospice, there was immense opposition to it from the medical community. 
This hostility may, in part, reflect divergent state-NHS and independent sector SS 
and CS interests. However, other influences were also evident insofar as some 
original Directorate members even queried the need for palliative care. 
G: b I remember going to a [Directorate] meeting and hearing a very senior [edit] 
saying that she didn't believe in palliative care. And I thought then, what the 
hell are you doing sitting on a, committee that's actually planning palliative 
care! 
Nevertheless, although by 2000 the value of palliative care was recognised, NHS 
consultant antipathy towards the hospice and Directorate pressure appeared to 
coalesce. Asked what "we" now wanted from the Directorate, G: b replied: 
G: b .. to say that we should exist .. Why do I say it? Because, there 
is a, a 
national move afoot amongst some (pause) palliative care consultants to 
move palliative care beds into acute hospitals. 
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Confirmation of the existence of antipathy towards the hospice from local NHS 
palliative care consultants came from a number of sources including Con2 (O: a). 
O: a Well, and I'm sure I'd get absolutely shot down (pause). To be very 
controversial, there's probably something to be gained from looking at 
whether or not we need hospices. And, and by having hospices we're 
creating an unequal service. So the minority can get excellent service and, 
you're absolutely right, they, they are NGOs and they have charitable status 
and the money the funding is from local people. Would we be better 
pumping some of that money if you like into services in a different way? It's 
just the model that we have certainly in the UK, and that has been rolled out 
worldwide, in many cases, is of a fairly large inpatient units. Large not so 
much in the number of beds but large in the number of people involved 
with them. And should we be actually using that, that money that service in 
a completely different way to support people in hospitals, to support people 
primarily at home? So, I have a fairly sort of (pause) ambivalent attitude 
towards hospices. 
In this excerpt Con2 (O: a) articulates two criticisms of the hospice movement that 
are here interpreted as being representative of those voiced within (and without) the 
Directorate by local NHS palliative care consultants pre- and post-2000. First, it is 
suggested that hospice resources could be used more effectively if channelled into 
the NHS. Second, questions concerning equity are raised. 
9 Resources 
Against Con2, the Chief Executive (N: b) argued that redirecting resources would 
not improve utility. He claimed Con2's perspective was "narrow" (N: b) and asserted 
that the hospice was more efficient and therefore more effective in deploying 
resources because, compared with the NHS, flattened management structures and 
the use of unpaid volunteers allow a greater percentage of funds to be spent on "the 
front line" (N: b). That hospices direct a high proportion of income into clinical 
services may of course be true without undermining the claim that disproportionally 
elevated spending on independent sector patients occurs relative to NHS or state 
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expenditure (though this simply begs the question: What is adequate or appropriate 
expenditure? ). More concretely, the Chief Executive (N: b) challenged the feasibility 
of sequestrating hospice funds as well as the amount of money available. 
N: b .. all they could have of the resource that we acquire is that bit of it that 
comes from the public purse. They couldn't have the rest of it because that 
is given to charity and it is given to a charity because it is not (emphasis) part 
of the NHS. That's why people give us money. 
ML .. why wouldn't people give to a statutory body such as the NHS? 
N: b Because they pay their taxes. It's as simple as that. 
The constellation of arguments suggesting that charitable donations fall, volunteers 
depart and organisational behaviour alters as state intervention and funding 
increases are well rehearsed (Seddon, 2007; Lewis, 1999; Lewis, 1996a; Leat, 1995; 
Powell, 1992; Prochaska, 1988) though contested (for a historical perspective on the 
relationship of state-voluntary activity-see Barry and Jones, 1991; for a discussion on 
volunteers in the public sector see Merrell, 2000). " The politicised nature of many of 
these arguments may indicate that structural tensions have and continue to affect 
state-independent institutional relations. Nevertheless, if the feasibility of redirecting 
resources is open to question, several interviewees accept aspects of Con2's second 
censure and the problem of inequity is more difficult to shrug off. 
" Equity 
Discussion regarding the equity of hospice and palliative care provision takes many 
forms. " A consideration of the literature on this issue extends debate beyond local 
consultant rancour and, introducing the literature here (as elsewhere) illustrates, 
first, that many interviewee identified themes (Appendix M) have wide resonance, 
second, that these themes often pre- and post-date re-designation study timeframes 
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and third, by informing the analysis offered here it highlights the catholic nature of 
data and evidence in realist theorising (§2 Chapter 2). Arguments from the literature 
are therefore important. They often mirror interviewee insights and comments and 
they assist identification of the social and cultural structures which shape and reflect 
relations between the hospice and state-NHS institutions (here consultant opinions 
on the equity question) 
Definitional problems notwithstanding it may be argued that patients with 
equal need should receive equal treatment or, given finite resources, at least an equal 
chance of treatment (Williams, 2003a; Homer, 1998; Tadd, 1998; Kukathas and 
Pettit, 1990; Harris, 1985). Yet if hospices and palliative care services - independent 
or state-NHS - are in some respects superior to NHS non-palliative services, then 
the uneven distribution of hospice and palliative care provision throughout the 
country (St Christopher's Hospice and Help the Hospices, 2008) means that equal 
need (assuming demographically corrected geographic distributional parity) is being 
met unequally. Further, if independent provision is partly responsible for a lack of 
NHS services (for example, PCTs may be disinclined to invest in a service provided 
`free' by others) then the independent sector should, perhaps, shoulder some 
responsibility for the ensuing inequity. 
This last point implicitly informs statements by non-consultant medical staff 
at the hospice who note that, although new NHS consultant posts are being created, 
NHS palliative care and NHS medical palliative posts (their primary source of future 
employment) remain, allegedly, under-resourced (medical interviewees tend in 
conversation to conflate palliative care with palliative medicine). Local NHS 
palliative care consultants are keen to establish a palliative department so that they 
can "have their own beds in acute Trusts, so that they admit to their own beds" 
(G: b). And, taken together, these perceived shortcomings in NHS provision might 
202 
explain consultant antipathy if it is allowed that resources channelled to hospices 
prevent or handicap, directly or indirectly (as negative realities") the development of 
NHS palliative services. That the relative dearth of UK NHS palliative care units 
`may be the result of the large number of hospices that were built' (Abu-Saad and 
Courtens, 2001, p. 18) is noted in the literature and, as stated, local medical hostility 
to the prospect of a hospice focused, in 1979, on the creation of non-NHS in- 
patient beds. However, whilst resource covetousness may explain consultant 
antagonism at a corporate level, the assumption that the state is held back from 
investing in palliative services in those areas where the independent sector is 
inoperative or insufficient is hardly credible. 
More damagingly the literature recognises that, within the UK and overseas, 
hospice services are not equitably available to all patients. For example, more 
services are provided to patients with cancer than, for example, degenerative 
disease, disablement or HIV/AIDS (Seymour, 2007; Kristjanson et al, 2006; 
Stienstra and Chochinov, 2006; Harding et al. 2005; Rucker, 2005; Ryan and 
McQuillan, 2005; George and Sykes, 1997; SMAC/SNMAC, 1992). Hospices are 
exclusionary insofar as disadvantaged groups find access difficult (Ahmed et al, 
2004; Wood et al, 2004). Where available, hospices predominantly evidence or cater 
to middle-class values and tastes (Sandman, 2005; Walter, 1994). Minority ethnic 
and racial groups are under represented in hospice admission records (Ahmed et al, 
2004; Fountain, 1999; Corner and Dunlop, 1997) and, when seen, minority cultural 
needs can be poorly met (Dein, 2006). Out-patient and community palliative care 
may be under-funded because small in-patient units are resource hungry (Reynard, 
1993). Focusing upon hospices might have hampered the development of 
alternative forms of palliative provision (Seymour, 2001) and, in synopsis, it is 
claimed (Douglas, 1992, p. 579) that hospices inequitably provide `de luxe dying' to a 
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privileged minority. Significantly, this conclusion is accepted by several interviewees 
and the genteel and exclusionary nature of the organisation is acknowledged. 
F: a Where are the mentally handicapped people? .. the chief executive 
is very 
keen on small tidy chairs .. I would like my house to be, comfortable, where 
people can sit down. You don't get that here. It is, it is too neat and tidy. 
J: a [Regarding volunteers] .. they are nearly all very well `accessorised' .. [and] 
it's kind of excluding if you're sitting there feeling absolutely awful and you 
haven't had time to, I mean you haven't had the energy to iron your shirt 
and you don't possess any accessories anyway, and you're sick and you're, 
you're surrounded by people who have got very nice nails and perfect 
diction and a chic haircut. 
Y: a .. it's the same for all hospices .. you do only have a small number of 
beds 
and so .. it is a very exclusive group of patients that actually get the 
input 
from palliative care .. it's a problem with palliative medicine that we are not 
wholly inclusive .. I think it is recognised that we don't properly address 
people from ethnic minority backgrounds or very low social classes. It's very 
much .. well you know, the people who have access to it are from a very 
(emphasis) closed (pause) community .. Not everyone's going to 
feel happy 
here. I don't know if I would (laughs). 
That said, every interviewee thought the standard of care provided by the hospice 
was generally superior to local NHS provision, every interviewee enjoyed working at 
the hospice and some, but not all interviewees, expressed views commensurate with 
apologists in the literature who assert that, for example, the creation of independent 
hospices spurred on the development of NHS services (Hockley, 1997) by 
generating interest in a hitherto underdeveloped branch of care (Bass, 2006; 
Costello, 2004). Those in receipt of hospice or palliative services benefit (Help the 
Hospices, 2008), unhelpful taboos about death are being demolished (Buckingham, 
1996), total provision is increasing (Lawton, 2000) and, more generally, charitable 
and voluntary organisations are valorised as vital components of civil society - e. g. 
political support comes from the left (Field, 1997; Gamble, 1995; Deakin, 1994), 
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centre-left (Deakin, 2008), neo-liberal right (Marsland, 1996) and communitarian 
other (Whelan, 1996; Etzioni, 1995; Green, 1996; Green, 1993). 
Alternatively, interviewees who highlight the advantages of NHS hospital 
care, that is, allowing that hospital care might be superior to hospice care in certain 
respects, present a different perspective to that outlined above. For example, 
palliative patients located in large acute settings are inequitably advantaged insofar as 
they can access more services more quickly than hospice patients in geographically 
isolated settings. Until recently access to what would once have been described as 
complex or acute treatments and interventions was not a problem at the study site 
because, in the hospice's early years, care primarily involved non-interventionist 
support to patients at the end of their lives. However, as will be argued, changes in 
admission practice as well as new forms of treatment now necessitate that more 
patients make more frequent journeys to the County hospital and the significance of 
physical "isolation" (F: a) is thus increased. 
C: b .. we are right out on a limb here and it's very difficult to get 
ill people to 
the County hospital. To hang around in an ambulance, wait for it to come 
back, whereas if we were attached to the County hospital in, in a unit, things 
would happen much easier. 
The three factors outlined above (divergent interests, threats to hospice 
independence and medical or NHS palliative consultant antipathy or criticism) 
coalesced to create for the hospice, by 2000, asymmetric SS relations and a situated 
logic of SEP (structurally emergent properties) necessary contradiction (correction). 
Relations between the PCT and hospice are asymmetric because the PCT 
(speaking through the Directorate) no longer requires the hospice in the same way 
that the hospice requires the PCT. Moreover, the PCT/Directorate's ability to set 
the structural environment in which the hospice functions and its power to direct 
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finance and exert sanctions makes the hospice a minor and potentially dependent 
rather than major and leading element in service provision. Further, powerful 
antagonistic corporate agents (NHS palliative consultants) deploying forms of 
critique (e. g. regarding equity and the exclusiveness of provision) that find 
resonance at the study site, exacerbate the hospice's political remoteness and, 
perhaps, internal division. 
Figure 7- CEP (cultural emergent properties) and SEP (social emergent properties), 
logical relations and situational logics - see page 67 this thesis (RST, p. 303 - 
adapted) 
Contradictions Complementarities 
Necessary Contingent Necessary Contingent 
(Situational logic) (Correction) (Elimination) (Protection) (Opportunism) 
CEP's 
C. S. level Syncretism Pluralism Systematization Specialization 
S-C level Unification Cleavage Reproduction Sectionalism 
SEP's 
S. S. level Compromise Competition Integration Differentiation 
S-I level Containment Polarization Solidarity Diversification 
Recognising that the Directorate is pursuing what to it are threatening policies (i. e. 
against its perceived interests) led senior hospice personnel to engage in SI strategies 
of containment and, at the SS level, compromise (though alternative competitive 
responses were considered). "' Containment is evidenced insofar as the hospice 
deliberately and self-consciously attempts to assert its presence and interests beyond 
the Directorate by influencing national, regional and professional palliative care 
agendas. To this end hospice representatives have sought admittance to a wide 
range of organisations and bodies (see Appendix N) for, as the Chief Executive 
states, "If you're not in the ring you don't get heard" (N: b). 
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Compromise is evidenced, possibly, by organisational re-designation as a 
specialist palliative care unit. Re-designation is discussed under the heading 
`Relations within the hospice'; however, occurring shortly before progression of the 
needs assessment, re-designation might reasonably be interpreted as a move towards 
meeting or heading-off existing, foreseen and continuing Directorate (and other) 
pressures, since it promotes and positions the hospice as a necessary part of county 
palliative services. Politically deft, re-designation spikes, to some extent, calls by 
NHS palliative care consultants for the creation of a specialist palliative department 
within the local hospital. Indeed, it might almost be described as `integrationist', a 
term associated with protective necessary complementarities. 
More `competitively', a term associated with eliminative contingent 
contradictions, post-2000, the Chief Executive proposed that, in the future, overt 
forms of spiritual and emotional care could be consciously and deliberately 
emphasised or marketed in order that the hospice might publically differentiate itself 
from competitor NHS provision (CS pluralism). 
M: a (Chief Executive) was very worried .. 
if they have a palliative care 
department in the hospital. That then, well, (hospice) will become (pause) 
unnecessary. So our, if we `up' our spirituality, then the people who want the 
spiritual side of it will come to (hospice). 
That options such as `spiritual branding' are being considered may be significant. It 
might indicate that the hospice remains pressured (i. e. pre-2000 social relations are 
reproduced and not elaborated by re-designation) and it raises questions about 
organisational decision making. 
Awareness of the three topics described above (divergent interests, 
challenges to independence and NHS palliative consultant hostility) is widespread 
but not universal amongst interviewees. Senior staff such as the head fundraiser is 
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party to such knowledge "because I'm a part of the management team" (R: a) and, 
unsurprisingly, non-consultant medical interviewees can comment on, for example, 
NHS consultant antipathy even if they know little about the Directorate. However, 
only one of four charge nurses (also termed Sisters) is privy to such information and 
no (interviewed) nurse below the rank of charge nurse was cognisant of these issues. 
That such matters remain sub-rosa may be important. 
Although the situated logic generated for the hospice by structures such as 
the Directorate and agents such as NHS palliative consultants is here described as a 
necessary contradiction, alternative and radical scenarios were aired that might, if 
enacted, be described using the situated logic of elimination. Given the contentious 
nature of such scenarios, senior staff let it be known that open discussion of these 
options would, at this stage, be unhelpful (limited details are therefore given here). 
Thus senior hospice managers believe the organisation faces two interlinked 
problems. First, a future funding crisis is anticipated if rises in spending continue to 
outpace rises in income and, second, from the hospice's perspective, the Directorate 
is becoming unmanageably prescriptive. In response, the hospice could withdraw 
from the PCT/Directorate and accept direct user payment for services. The Chief 
Executive indicated that this option is under review and Con2 described this as his 
(the Chief Executive's) "ultimate threat" (O: a). Further, the topic was broached 
"within the management team, it has been discussed" (R: a) and a small and discreet 
working group is established to look at all fundraising options including direct 
payment. However, if pursued, withdrawal from the PCT/Directorate means 
withdrawal from engagement with the NHS and accepting payment would herald a 
revolution in structural relations. The move would create a situated logic of open 
competition with `rival' NHS institutions and polarisation at the SI level could be 
expected between workforces. 
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O: a .. one of the things that it's capable of doing and might do it quite happily 
would be to opt out of primary or the primary care trust funding and 
direction and somebody mentioned that they might actually sort of start 
charging for their, for their (pause) .. So .. the rich can pay for it and the 
poor don't. But I think it would change the whole ethos of palliative care. It 
would completely disengage the hospice from the rest of palliative care .. 
Finance is crucial here. If statutory funding was cut or removed without warning the 
hospice would face immediate financial peril. The hospice also believes it is 
underfunded by the state for the work that it does and it initially anticipated that the 
Directorate would help remedy this situation. Yet, paradoxically, the option of 
absenting itself from the PCT/Directorate can only be considered because statutory 
funding forms a relatively low proportion of overall income (hence the hospice has 
some latitude or freedom). 
In reality it is unlikely that this course will be pursued. It is acknowledged 
that both developments would need to be introduced to staff sensitively, clinical 
resistance could be expected within the hospice and "Once you've moved the 
goalposts .. you can never move them back .. my great fear as a 
fundraiser is if you, 
in effect, became private, you would get another organisation, a charity, coming and 
doing what we did" (R: a). 
Morphogenetic modelling allows and encourages distinctions to be made 
regarding the forms of SI response offered (e. g. between actual and potential 
necessary and contingent contradictions). The ability to advance such gradations is 
here seen as a strength of this approach. 
The Department of Health 
Reportedly, the main legislative threat to hospice independence comes from the 
Department of Health in the guise of the Care Standards Act (DH, 2000) and its 
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method of implementation. Part II, Section 11(1) of this Act requires that non-NHS 
healthcare providers such as the hospice register with the National Care Standards 
Commission (after 2004, the Healthcare Commission, 2008). Registration depends 
upon certain standards or procedures being demonstrated (Campbell, 2005) and it is 
anticipated by interviewees that new regulatory frameworks associated with devising 
and monitoring these standards will align hospice and NHS practices. 
G: b Basically, I think, they're doing a 1948 on hospices. 
ML What do you mean by `a 1948? 
G: b Well that was when the National Health came into being. 
ML Yes. 
G: b And they grabbed all the local little community hospitals and things and 
cottage hospitals and dragged them all into the NHS. 
ML And many of them lost their voluntary status. 
G: b Yes. 
ML .. But they can't grab usl 
G: b They're trying, they're trying to grab us through the inspectorates. 
ML So they can force us to comply, or rather, the things they measure can force 
us to comply and change our behaviour? 
G: b They might think so .. Because we have to, here, comply with what they're 
going to say. 
Consequent to the Care Standards Act (DH, 2000), Section 11 (Hospice Standards 
H1 to H15) of the Department of Health's Independent Health Care National 
Minimum Standards Regulations (DH, 2001a) generate significant bureaucratic 
burdens for small organisations not previously used to detailed record keeping or 
audit functions. These demands threaten to compromise current clinical and 
administrative expenditure ratios and, for the hospice, such regulations are 
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indicative of the Department of Health's disobliging nature - "they wouldn't 
understand the, this organisation" (G: b). Section 11 (DH, 2001a) prescribes and 
regulates almost every aspect of care and insofar as `standards will be closely 
linked with the development of NICE [National Institute of Clinical Excellence] 
guidelines' (ibid, p. 126) prescription is only likely to increase. 
The reality of this threat remained untested during the study albeit that, 
perceptually, it (i) presents a clear and imminent danger to senior hospice personnel 
and (ii) continues and entrenches trends and relations established in earlier 
encounters between the hospice and Department of Health (e. g. surrounding 
Clinical Governance, DH, 1999,1998,1997). The Care Standards Act (DH, 2000) 
again illustrates the asymmetric nature of SS hospice and state-NHS relations and, as 
before, the hospice's reaction at an SI level involves attempting to work with 
similarly placed institutions to exert influence on those national, regional and 
professional bodies and organisations that it has access to (Appendix N) in an 
attempt to mitigate future clashes. However, this approach has recognised 
limitations and regarding, for example, NICE guidance "I think there is, or might 
become, the seeds of conflict as to whether we should comply" (G: b). 
Demographic change 
Interviewees suggested that changing family and gender relations (e. g. more divorce 
and remarriage, greater geographic mobility and increasing female labour market 
participation) mean that fewer "good families" (G: a) are available to fulfil 
supportive domestic healthcare roles. Evidence for the existence of such trends is 
widely attested within the literature (Arksey, 2002; Hirst, 2001; Lawton, 2000; Field 
and James, 1993). However, the politicised nature of commentaries on family and 
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gendered roles, values and responsibilities in health and social care complicates 
discussion of such factors (see for example, Morgan, 1999, or Davies et al, 1993, for 
a neo-liberal free market perspective or Graham, 1993, or Finch and Mason, 1993, 
for a feminist left of centre viewpoint). Curiously, although reduced domestic 
support could, if real, only be experienced by the hospice at an aggregate level, `rest- 
room' conversations readily linked non-traditional family structures with premature 
admission and delayed discharge in particular instances. 
Several respondents also noted (and it is generally assumed) that, at 
admission, patient symptom severity or dependency had and is rising. Assessing 
dependency is difficult (Quinn et al, 2004) and respondents could be mistaken in 
their observations. Nevertheless, if correct, demographic factors might be partially 
responsible for changed admission patterns. " For example, longer life expectancy in 
the general population (Hirst, 2001), treatment survival advances among cancer 
patients (Griffiths et al, 2007; Doll and Boreham, 2005) and, paradoxically given the 
above noted changes in family structure, `re-domestication' (Exley and Allen, 2007, 
p. 2317) of end of life care and improved home and community support, could all 
produce worsening dependency or symptom severity on admission. 
However, the evidence is confusing (the literature here undermines or places 
caveats against interviewee comments). Subsidiary assumptions must be made about 
the nature of older and later referrals if rising dependency is to be associated with 
these factors and, whilst improved post-diagnosis cancer survival is linked with 
heightened dependency levels in hospice admissions (Bruera et al, 2000), palliative 
symptoms are often diagnostically specific for cancer patients (Guest et al, 2006) and 
minor and possibly contingent fluctuations in referral and admission patterns could 
account for the change. Further, factors other than those noted above could 
produce similar results. For example, it is suggested that the rise in hospice 
212 
treatments and interventions results, in part, from societal public pressure (G: a 
"we've raised the expectations of the general public" - see also Elsayern et al, 2004, 
or Connor, 1998) and it is recognised that, with a largely agricultural catchment area, 
seasonal influxes of migrant foreign workers may eventually produce new demands 
upon the hospice if these groups settle and access its services (the need to engage 
with under-served migrant and diverse populations is acknowledged, e. g. BEN PCT, 
2007; Morris, 2005). Alternatively, cited influences can be disaggregated and, for 
example, increased female labour market penetration and greater general mobility 
should perhaps be treated separately. 
To compound the difficulty inherent in distilling demographic influences on 
patient referral and admission patterns, it is later argued that organisational re- 
designation publically signalled and permitted a change in admission practice. 
Further, improved general palliative and end of life care in the community might 
reduce the number of non-complex or non-dependent patients available for 
admission whilst clinical success might raise the profile and reputation of the 
organisation amongst referring GPs who would then, in turn, submit sicker patients. 
Moreover, actors such as Con2 actively sought, not always successfully, to open up 
access to previously excluded groups (discussed later). 
Whatever the mix of causes involved, changing demographic SS probably 
contribute to changes in SI referral and admission practices as well as discharge 
difficulties. Indeed, the need to accelerate stalled discharges that, in some instances, 
are associated with non-supportive and non-traditional family structures is 
frequently commented on. It is here suggested that SS demographic trends exert 
causal influence on SI insofar as they contribute to the rise in patient dependency 
(symptom complexity) and discharge difficulties (as home support diminishes). It is 
not possible to quantify these developments and, given the lack of concept clarity, 
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the role played by these factors must be treated with caution. Demographic SS 
relations prompting SI elaboration are, if genuine, internally asymmetric. 
Conclusion to `Structures and institutions':. 
Morphogenetic modelling (figure 8 below, overleaf) describes the relations outlined 
above (note comments on page 190 regarding the use of T' - T4 descriptors in this 
model). SS rather than CS factors are emphasised here since, although, for example, 
consultant hostility was influenced by or represents SS and CS mechanisms, overall, 
SS tendencies that might be labelled `threats to hospice' appear to dominate 
relations with both the Directorate and Department of Health. Further, all three of 
the topics outlined above are pushing the organisation in ways that, ideally, it would 
resist or tame and since, in realist theory, `the actual outcome of a tendency will 
generally be co-determined by the activity of other mechanisms' (Porter, 1993, 
p. 604), the overall consistency or synergy between tendencies is important. 
Two forms of social structural conditioning influence are identified. First, 
demographic change is associated with worsening patient admission severity and 
discharge delays at the hospice. Room for manoeuvre in the face of demographic 
pressure is limited. Second, structural relations between the hospice (as an 
independent healthcare provider organisation) and state-NHS (in the guise of the 
local PCT/Directorate and Department of Health) are evidenced by perceived 
`threats' to hospice independence. Policies of `containment' are pursued 
(`competition' is considered) and structural elaboration and reproduction occurs. 
As the elaborated outcome of T1 pressures (demographic and state-NHS), 
organisational re-designation (2000) at V (figure 8) represents transformation or 
morphogenesis. In describing structural pressure (notably regards the state-NHS) 
institutional interactions after 2000 (e. g. completion of the needs assessment and 
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implementation of the Care Standards Act, 2000) are detailed and, for this reason, 
specific dates are not ascribed to earlier T' - T¢ timeframes. This may appear 
illogical. Yet descriptions of institutional interaction provide evidence for the 
retroduction of structural relations and it is these structures rather than specific 
interactions that are the focus of realist investigation. The effect of re-designation 
on agential interaction is hereafter described in `Relations within the hospice'. 
Figure 8- SS factors acting upon the hospice at T', their T2 - T3 SI consequents 
and T4 outcomes (Note: Refer to page 190 regards T' - T4 timeframes used in this 
model) 
Social structural (SS) conditioning 
T1 
Demographic 
Affects admission dependency and ease of discharge 
State-NHS 
County Palliative Care Directorate 
Seeks to direct hospice activity - threatens hospice independence 
Hostile NHS palliative consultants challenge hospice 
Department of Health 
Presents regulatory threat to hospice independence 
Social interaction (SI) 
T2 T3 
Response Containment - hospice actively and deliberately engages 
with institutions producing (or that might affect) Tl pressures 
Response Competition - hospice considers alternatives to current 
SS 
relations 
Increasing focus on discharge planning 
Increasing numbers of treatment/interventions 
Structural elaboration - relative to 7 
Organisational re-designation (2000) 
T4 
Structural reproduction - relative to 'P 
Conditioning TI SS remain unchanged 
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Morphostasis is also apparent. Relations between the hospice and those 
conditioning structures listed against T' are reproduced essentially unchanged at V 
(albeit that, in time, (i) re-designation may alter relations between the hospice and 
state-NHS or (ii) existing state-NHS structures may exact further relational change 
from the hospice). Forms of SI identified above continue to be reproduced post- 
2000. 
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Relations within the hospice 
Following the T' - T4 timeframe detailed in figure 6 (page 189), it is argued that SS 
developments - notably organisational re-designation - promoted SI changes within 
the hospice that expose S-C dispute and CS contradiction. Relations within the 
hospice are here explored under sub-headings labelled (i) Organisational re- 
designation, (ii) Agents, actors, persons, (iii) Increasing medical engagement, (iv) 
Treatment/interventions and (v) Spirituality-Religion. Sub-headings differentiate 
only loosely between themes and overlap between descriptions occurs. 
Organisational re-designation 
Although the Chief Executive, senior management and medical teams were 
involved, it proved difficult to pinpoint when the decision to re-designate the 
hospice a specialist palliative care unit was taken (re-designation or re-description 
occurred `around' 2000). ' What is apparent is that some agents hold opposing views 
about organisational identity (where identity defines the apposite role or function of 
the organisation), that these views directly impact upon or influence clinical practice 
and that interviewee reactions against or acceptance of re-designation and its 
correlates is a tangential referent or talisman in disputes about appropriate 
organisational identity (role and function) and clinical practice. 
Evidence highlighting the importance of organisational re-designation 
appears in most interview transcripts and illustrative quotations struggle to convey 
the richness of discussions from whence they come. Here, the ward manager (F: a) 
specifies what, to her, specialist palliative care entails: 
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F: a Our hospice `deems' itself to be a place where we offer specialist palliative 
care. So it's largely for those patients who have complex needs .. [However] 
there are not enough specialist palliative care patients for us to fill our beds 
with .. And I, I see that as meaning patients where they have complex 
symptoms .. for me it's [specialist palliative care] the complexity of the 
symptoms .. Terminal is for someone who is very soon to die (pause). 
And 
what do I mean by very soon to die? Someone who comes in for terminal 
care I would expect to die within (pause) three or four weeks perhaps. 
Terminal to me means that you're at the end-stage .. Specialist palliative care 
or palliative care could be much further down the line. 
It is important here to differentiate between the descriptors terminal, hospice, 
palliative and specialist palliative care. The terms `hospice' and `palliative care' are 
often used interchangeably in the literature (Bass, 2006), as they are by study site 
personnel. However, across transcripts interviewees generally associate specialist 
palliative care with complex symptom control (`complex' is, of course, a relative and 
non-specific term). F: a notes that palliative care may be appropriate in advance of 
the terminal phase (terminal care is tautologically defined as short duration end- 
stage care). Yet the majority of interviewees went further than this and linked 
specialist palliative care, in both the pre-terminal and terminal periods with, 
contentiously, complex phyrical symptom control. (Interviewees did not necessarily 
agree that this conflation should occur). Significantly, whilst terminal care may be 
complex, proximity to death does not, in itself, automatically signal the presence of 
complex needs (physical or otherwise) and, though terminal, hospice or palliative 
care ideally involves cross- or multi-disciplinary physical, social, psychological and 
spiritual care; " specialist palliative care, when associated with complex physical 
symptom control, is predominantly viewed by interviewees as a medical speciality - 
i. e. care in which medical direction and biomedical discourse frame activity. 
This perspective is reflected in the hospice and palliative care literature 
where, for example, specialist palliative care has been associated with the care of 
patients with complex symptoms (Woods, 2007) and, moreover, when `palliative 
218 
medicine and the palliative approach' are not delineated (Doyle, 1993, p. 253 - 
emphasis in original), complex and physical symptoms may be conflated (see, for 
example, Randall and Downie, 1999). That said, terminological classifications are 
contested and, as the Nursing Director (G: a) notes, defining specialist palliative care 
in juxtaposition with or against terminal care is problematic since, first, this 
approach makes implicit assumptions about traditional or apposite hospice activity 
and, second, it is uncertain what hospice practice actually entails or should be. 
Indeed, "the' problem with defining hospice care is that there are .. three hundred 
and something hospices around the country" (G: a) and considerable difference 
exists between organisations (Lawton, 2000). 
Thus, regardless of the production of authoritative taxonomies (e. g. WHO, 
2008 and 2002; Stjernsward, 1997, Saunders, 1996) the difficulty in delineating 
between hospice, terminal, end-stage, symptom control, complex symptom control, 
palliative and specialist palliative care is well documented (Doyle, 2003; Clark et al, 
2002; Clark and Seymour, 1999; Connor, 1998). 
At the study site, four patient groups are admitted. Terminal or end-stage 
patients and those designated as having symptom control needs (complex or 
otherwise) form the bulk of admissions. A limited number of social admissions 
occur when symptom control and family support needs coincide and a very small 
number of short-stay respite patients are also taken. Excepting respite patients (a 
few respondents thought this group should be excluded), interviewees accept that 
each patient group has a legitimate place within the hospice. 
That said, respondents who define specialist palliative care in opposition to 
terminal care also tend to express a strong preference for terminal patient care and, 
where this occurs, interviewees disagree on normative grounds with organisational 
re-designation or its correlates. Indeed, descriptions of the form in which 
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organisational re-designation occurred and explanations regarding the implications 
of re-designation made by those favouring terminal admissions highlight, it is 
argued, -forms of T2 - T3 SI change and S-C interaction that retrodictively point 
towards T' SS and CS influence. Evidence supporting this claim is presented 
throughout this section. (Developments in identity and practice took many forms 
and these forms are not easily disambiguated. ) Here it is merely noted that re- 
designation recognised and catalysed several existing pre-2000 Tl trends. 
Claiming specialist palliative care unit status publicly signals that the 
hospice's focus is directed towards complex symptom control and this formally 
alters the SS of the organisation relative to other institutions and agents. In practice, 
re-designation affects SI within the hospice by promoting pre-established shifts in, 
for example, the balance between patient groups admitted (e. g. increasing 
admissions for complex symptom control at the expense of non-complex terminal 
patients) that, in turn, produces a busier environment (which alters staff-staff and 
staff-patient relations), clinical innovation (it sanctions the use of different and more 
numerous treatment and intervention regimes) and staffing change (e. g. (i) in-patient 
nursing numbers rose, as stated, from seven: four to eight: five during the study 
period, (ii) the proportion of registered nurses employed increased relative to 
auxiliary nurses, (iii) auxiliary nurses were invited to expand their roles and (iv) more 
doctors were engaged). 
Where these developments produce discord (described hereafter) emergent 
SI containment or polarisation may be operative and contradictory SS level 
compromise or competition may be evidenced. Alternatively, re-designation affects 
S-C interaction because clinical change (sketched above and developed later) is 
promoted by - and exacerbates ideational conflict amongst - staff holding pre- 
established and divergent views about the proper purpose of organisational activity. 
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(For disaffected staff both the `regulative and constitutive' rules of institutional 
activity are broached, Fleetwood, 2008, p. 15. ) The suitability, or otherwise, of 
practice change is thus assessed by agents according to their `fit' with ideas 
concerning appropriate organisational activity and insofar as S-C interplay between 
T2 - T3 suggests the presence of individuals and groups within the organisation who 
hold competing views about such activity, re-designation can be linked at T' to a CS 
situated logic of contingent contradiction. . 
Thus, virtually every interviewee stated that having time to engage personally 
and emotionally with patients and families distinguished hospice and palliative care 
from NHS non-hospice and non-palliative care. However, re-designation and its 
correlates are associated with increasing clinical activity and those opposed to re- 
designation and the changes it wrought, lament the distancing in staff-patient 
relations that busyness forces or threatens. Personal experience verifies that activity 
is increasing. In 2000 and the earliest part of 2001 time was occasionally available to 
sit with patients and engage in non-clinical activity (e. g. playing chess). By the end of 
2002 workload pressures meant this was rarely feasible. 
SS changes in, in-patients, such as the introduction of patient name bands 
and the transfer of kardex notes to patient bedsides (§2 Chapter 1) are, in part, 
responses to the consequences of rising activity and several established traditions, 
such as leaving the bed space of deceased patients empty for twenty-four hours as a 
mark of respect, were abandoned in the T2 - T3 study period as busyness rose. 
V: a .. some of the things which I'm sure people have said [nfe»ing to the 
researches] are things like, Oh patient dies and the room was left for twenty 
four hours before another patient comes in and that just doesn't really 
happen now and it can't with the fast turnover of patients that we've got. 
When we've got five patients on the waiting list to come in. 
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In contrast to the position of interviewee V: a (who favours change) these and other 
events are interpreted negatively by some interviewees. Those opposed to change 
suggest the in-patient unit now appears more ward-like, busyness limits 
opportunities to form emotionally intimate or therapeutic relationships and the 
cessation of traditional post-mortem practices (now seen as resource wasteful) 
offend those for whom relationships with the living include implicit promises of 
particular forms of after-death care. Indeed, interviewee A: a's comments in 
Appendix I such as "just let's sit" and "that isn't part of it any more" articulate a 
sense of sadness and loss at change that may be associated with re-designation and 
point towards CS level ideational contradiction. 
Disagreement with the manner in which organisational re-designation 
occurred comes predominantly from long service clinicians. For example, 
depreciatory sentiments are lodged in the term "deems" (F: a - page 218) and phrase 
"gradually one discovers" (E: a - page 224). Criticism ultimately reflects full or 
partial rejection of the implications of change. However, re-designation occurred 
without widespread discussion or consultation and in so doing it possibly 
contradicts important CS precepts regarding what might be termed the ownership 
of organisational identity. Thus, although `most charities were never intended to be 
democratic institutions' (Kirkland, 1996, p. 107), the legitimacy of decision makers is, 
on occasion, openly challenged. Here, the social worker (K: a) questions whether 
relatively short stay medical staff should be involved in policy matters. 
K: a .. there are a lot of Cjunior] doctors and they're all leaving. Do you 
remember that meeting? I said, I pointed out you're all leaving. You'll, every 
doctor around the table will be gone within a year. And what are we doing 
forcing our (pause). Or planning our (pause). That's what really bugs me .. 
[medical staff] around here are very short term. They're actually paid a lot as 
doctors. And actually have a big impact on what happens. 
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Following Rochester (1995, p. 193) on `internal accountability', if long service 
employees believe they might legitimately contribute to decisions about 
organisational identity (appropriate role and function), it is not unreasonable to 
assume that they will react against the denial of such input, particularly when the 
change envisaged contradicts strongly held ideas about what hospice care should be. 
Support for this interpretation comes from several non-interviewee sources. The 
hospice and palliative care literature records that early pioneers valued collegiate or 
multi-disciplinary decision making (see comments on holistic care below) (Parker- 
Oliver et al, 2005; Lawton; 2000). Non-hospice third sector literature notes that 
whilst sector definitional problems abound (Kendall and Knapp, 1995), in the start- 
up period, decision making and role boundaries are frequently fluid within charitable 
organisations (Gann, 1996). Post start-up however, mature organisations can display 
managerial and bureaucratic tendencies and, if this occurs, roles may be formalised 
(Lewis, 1996b; Kirkland, 1996; Smith, 1996); a process that can encounter internal 
resistance (Merrell, 2000; Flynn, 1996) such as that demonstrated explicitly by K: a 
(above citation) or implicitly by A: a (Appendix D. 
Long service clinicians also suggest that professional and role boundaries are 
becoming more prescribed. This theme reappears later under the heading `increasing 
medical engagement'. However, K: a notes that "people who choose to work in an 
organisation that's small and struggling are perhaps people who are prepared to give 
it a little bit more" and, in recounting how she and other clinicians took the lead in 
seeking community support during a period of financial turmoil (mid/late 1980s), 
nursing auxiliary A: a contrasted contemporary role rigidity with historic role 
elasticity. xli 
In addition to role prescription, organisational re-designation is associated 
by some interviewees with changes in staffing numbers, ratios and role remits. 
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Rising total numbers of rostered nurses have already been noted and the expansion 
in medical numbers is discussed later. However, during T2 -- T3 ratios of auxiliary 
nurses fell relative to registered nurses as, it was believed, technical demands 
increased. Thus charge nurse C: b states that, towards the end of the study period, 
nursing auxiliaries were invited to expand their roles to meet the new demands that 
an influx of "sicker" patients created''" - and nurse interviewee E: a (below) plainly 
links re-designation to concrete changes in nurse ratios when she states that acute or 
specialist palliative care needs "So many trained and untrained". "' 
E: a .. gradually one discovers, that we are going to be an acute palliative care 
unit and therefore we need `x' number of people at our end. So many 
trained and untrained to do this and that (pause) .. I don't particularly 
feel 
that's how it should be done. I don't say the wrong decision's been made. 
But I do think we need to know and decide what we are so that we can be 
that, instead of being, a bit of each (pause) .. When I came 
back, which was 
four and a half years ago (pause - sighs) my, my gut feeling was that the 
hospice is now not really a hospice. And we actually need another hospice 
now. To do what we were doing before. Because everything we are doing 
here is valid and useful and (pause) all those sorts of things .. 
but we, we 
lost a lot of what we had .. when we first opened, it was sort of, we'll 
love 
you, you know, you come here we'll look after you and we will see it 
through. And, we, we'll always be there for you. And that's gone. And I feel 
we need a sister unit where .. people (pause) can be, 
if they're going to be 
here for longer .. There are very few people here who were 
here when it 
opened. There are very few people who could relate to that feeling. When 
you walked in through the door (pause) the feeling was (pause) it was a 
feeling of love, and I don't, I make no apology for using that word for that's 
how you felt. Now.. when you walk in, it's different. It was (pause). It's lost 
something. It's gained a lot of other things and I'm not saying those things 
are unimportant. A lot, a lot of them are important. But it has lost the 
essence of being a hospice. 
This extract acknowledges that formal change in organisational identity continued 
pre-established trends (see earlier commentary on Tl - T4 timeframes) and, 
in 
suggesting that the organisation is now "a bit of each" (i. e. a hospice associated with 
"loving" care and a specialist palliative care unit) E: a allows that the process of 
change is incomplete or underway. Reservations about. the success of re-designation 
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are likewise voiced by G: a (Nursing Director) who responded to an interviewer 
statement about the organisation's specialist status with an acerbic "Are we? " and 
F: a's statement (page 218) that "not enough" patients with complex symptoms exist 
to fill the beds implies, perhaps, that a percentage of beds must continue to be 
occupied by patients with non-specialist needs (i. e. non-complex terminal patients). 
However, the idea that not enough palliative patients with complex needs exist 
appears intuitively erroneous and in the passage below, Con2 (O: a) expresses 
frustration with T2 - T3 admission practice. Here, attempts to admit a patient 
apparently meeting specialist palliative but not traditional study site admission 
criteria are initially rebutted. This may indicate that re-designation is a process rather 
than event. It perhaps indicates that re-designation is not universally accepted. 
O: a I've just recently tried to get somebody in and was not allowed to bring 
them in. And (pause). 
ML Well you're only the Consultant. 
O: a (Laughs) Yes, well, exactly, too rightl So it was then taken, having rejected 
me I had a massive strop about it. It was then taken back to the Chief 
Executive, the lead nurse and the educationalist and then finally the patient's 
GP to see if it was appropriate for this patient to come in and once everyone 
had been consulted the decision for him to come in was finally agreed upon. 
He was allowed to come in. Having actually been turned down. 
ML May I ask, vaguely, what was the criteria for turning him down? 
O: a They didn't have any, apart from being eighty-nine with, sort of, immobility 
and multiple crush fractures to the vertebrae. He didn't fulfil the life-limiting 
illness criteria. (Said with strong irony - the patient, who did not recover had numerous 
complex physical needs and died shortly after admission. ) 
This extract illustrates that current admission criteria are confused, contested or 
undecided. Dissonance is evident between traditional hospice admission practices 
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and specialist palliative care's more expansive remit (which, for example, appears 
more willing to `take' non-cancer patients). Further, interviewee E: a (page 224) 
conveys, through strong emotional affect (see Appendix I), sadness at the changes 
she witnesses, changes Con2 wants to expedite. E: a claims that change has now 
advanced so far that another "sister" organisation is needed to fulfil the function 
originally performed by the hospice and, invoking the concept "love", she suggests 
that the non-physical and spiritual components of care have been devalued. 
Interestingly, this last point is mirrored by long service doctor H: a who concludes 
comments remarkably similar to those presented above by E: a with the statement: 
"I'm quite convinced that in ten years time somebody will reinvent the hospice. " 
Practice changes associated with re-designation are later explored further. 
Here it is noted that accentuating forms of care prioritising physical symptom relief 
may contribute to both medicalisation, if this term implies increasing biomedical 
activity and a concomitant diminution in non-medical aspects of care" and 
secularisation, if this means that the `secularizing impacts of a process of cultural 
and social rationalization' (Habermas, 2008, p. 2) produce spiritual disengagement. 
In both instances it is assumed that an increase in one form of care (here physical 
symptom control) leads to the withdrawal of other forms of care. If this is permitted 
then shifting the balance in care delivery towards physical symptom control 
inevitably undercuts forms of working and holistic or spiritual care that have 
(despite G: a's comments regarding organisational difference) traditionally been 
associated with hospice care. Thus, at its inception, the modern hospice movement 
placed great store in what is now termed holistic care and multi- or interdisciplinary 
working'"' (West, 1990). Cicely Saunders's earliest writings stress the importance of 
multi-disciplinary care (2006d [1959]) or `casework' (2006c, p. 4 [1958]) as well as 
non-physical social, psychological and spiritual care (2006e [1961]). ' References to 
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God's love and care's spiritual dimension infuse these publications (e. g. Saunders, 
2006b, 2003,2002a and 1990) and, contra those who would now prioritise physical 
symptom control, she asserted that: 
if we do not look beyond these things [phyrical needs] to see a person of 
eternal value, then our work is no more than the use of techniques of relief. 
(Saunders, 2006a, p. 37 [1961]). 
Contemporary challenges to naive or unreflective holism come from a variety of 
sources. Reference texts such as Portenoy and Bruera's (2003) Issues in Palliative Care 
Research are overwhelmingly medical or physiological in content. Lawton's (2000, 
p. 128) influential description of the difficulties of administering to physically 
disintegrating or `unbounded' bodies emphasises the dominance in practice of 
physical care needs. And Randell and Downie's (2006) critique of overly ambitious 
palliative psychological and spiritual claims reassert traditional medical views 
regarding priorities and prioritisation. 
Nonetheless, as works by Stanworth (2004), Rumbold (2002b), Cobb (2001), 
Kearney (2000), Sheldon (1997) and Jewell (2004) attest, interest in palliative non- 
physical and spiritual end of life care continues and, mirroring these contradictory 
perspectives within the literature, at the hospice, whilst the benefits provided by 
improved techniques of relief are welcomed by all, some interviewees challenge physical 
care's ascendant pre-eminence. Moreover, where organisational re-designation 
appears to undermine certain forms of holistic care, it must also be acknowledged 
that multi-disciplinary decision making (or decision blocking) continues - as is 
evidenced in the requirement that Con2 speak with the General Manager, 
educationalist and lead nurse before a `non-standard' patient was admitted? ""' 
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These issues are developed further below; here it is noted that SS re- 
designation formalises and accelerates pre-established SI practice changes within the 
hospice and two S-C `networks' (Cruickshank, 2003b, p. 122) or groups are 
identified whose constitution reflects CS ideational divergence. Thus, some 
individuals, constitutive of a group, oppose organisational re-designation and the 
changes this encourages (changes that are "diluting the non-physical components of 
care" I: a) whilst other recognisable individuals, constitutive of a group, actively 
support such changes (for example, it was suggested that change offers the welcome 
opportunity to "concentrate on physical symptom control", Y: a). Assuming the 
reality of what might crudely be termed `pro-' and `anti-change' groups, it is here 
suggested that S-C interplay points towards CS contradiction and SI interplay points 
towards SS tensions and insofar as SS change precedes and prompts CS 
contradiction, a form of differential morphogenesis may be indicated (i. e. structural 
change has, for the anti-change group at least, outpaced cultural acceptance). The 
major SS and CS premises identified in this section are outlined below. 
SS organisational re-designation at T' altered SI between T2 - T3 insofar as: 
1. Organisational re-designation caused the number of patients admitted for 
terminal end-stage care to decrease relative to patients admitted for non- 
terminal specialist symptom control. 
2. Patients admitted for specialist symptom control generally have complex 
physical needs. 
3. Focusing on physical care reduces the time and resource available for non- 
physical care. 
4. Patient groups with complex physical symptom control needs necessitate 
and legitimate the use of more treatments and interventions. 
5. Clinical staff numbers, ratios and roles altered in response to changing needs 
and pressures. 
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Organisational re-designation and the SI changes noted above also alters T2 -- T3 S- 
C interaction by exposing pre-established T' CS ideational contradictions. Following 
Archer, S-C agential positions are stated propositionally. Propositions may focus 
upon detail (e. g. concerning `time' or `post-mortem practices of respect') or, as 
occurs here, they can seek to capture more general perspectives. In this thesis it is 
suggested that pro- and anti-change groups can broadly be differentiated according 
to two criteria. First, whether holistic or physical care is prioritised and, second, 
whether terminal and complex (physical) symptom control or complex (physical) 
symptom control patients are prioritised. Thus, the two key T' CS differences or 
distinctions between groups exposed in T2 - T3 S-C interplay are: 
Hospice/palliative care, involves physical, social, psychological and spiritual 
components - in practice no one aspect of care will or should be prioritised. 
vs. 
Hospice/palliative care involves physical, social, psychological and spiritual 
components - in practice physical care will and should be prioritised. 
and 
Hospice/palliative care should primarily focus upon end-stage terminal rather 
than pre-terminal complex (physical) symptom control care. 
VS. 
Hospice/palliative care should primarily focus upon complex (physical) 
symptom control irrespective of whether this occurs in end-stage terminal or 
pre-terminal stage patients. 
Agents, actors, persons 
The following extended extract from interviewee I: a supports the assertion (made 
above) that escalating busyness and heightened patient symptom acuteness is 
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stimulating SS level practice change. It also exemplifies the CS/S-C position of that 
group of hospice employees resistant to SS change. 
I: a [When I first came here] (Pause) It was lovely. In the sense that you could 
focus very definitely on individual patients. There were lots of staff for the 
numbers of patients. And so it was possible to give a lot of time to each 
individual patient and family surrounding the patient. A lot of the time the 
patients were poorly (pause). But they weren't as acutely poorly as they now 
are. They were generally poorly in a weak, cachexic, reaching the end of their 
day's sort of way. And so there was lots of need for hands-on nursing care. 
But there was also the time to spend talking with people in a way that's not 
now possible. There was time to, for example, there was time to sit and be 
(emphasis) with someone through the experience of a breathless panic 
attack. Where now, probably, you might spend a minute or a minute and 
quarter and have to make the decision that : you're not going to be able to 
spend three quarters of an hour getting that person through that. So you 
would then go to the drugs trolley. Or you would use oxygen to try and 
ameliorate that, or placate it (pause). 
ML Has patient dependency changed as well then? 
I: a Patient dependency has changed because of acuteness (pause). Yes, I think it 
has because actually if, if the majority of people who are with you are there 
for the last phase of life, you know, less than ten per cent went home, so we 
were talking about the last couple of weeks of life. And because we saw 
people with what would now be called general palliative care needs as well as 
the one or two who really had very complicated difficult problems, palliative 
care symptom wise they (pause) needed a lot of general nursing care. And 
they needed (pause) what probably we would now see as fairly basic 
symptom control. But that meant that because we had the staffing numbers, 
we did have the time to put into the sorts of psychosocial and spiritual 
explorations with them that may or may not have been helpful but certainly 
that, that was what we perceived we were there for .. [Now 
however] I 
think what we haven't quite lost, but run the risk of losing is, is the vision of, 
that roundedness, that for me palliative care is about. That we run the risk 
of (pause), because as we do more and more interventions, inevitably we will 
attract into the team people who are comfortable and competent 
undertaking those interventions. And although we haven't lost it yet, I do 
have a fear that in ten or fifteen years down the line, when the old codgers 
like me go, that actually there will be much more, there will be many more 
of the technical-rational people in post in all different sorts of things here. 
And that we might then loose, that horrid word `holistic', but that we might 
then loose that real rounded approach that palliative care is. 
I: a states that change risks "losing" what "palliative care is about. " She proposes 
that new hospice recruits undervalue non-physical care because they have 
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undergone prior socialisation in acute care environments and change within the 
hospice now allows and fosters an acute approach. It is suggested that change has 
produced an environment conducive to the recruitment of "technical-rational 
people". By definition such people are disinclined to prioritise emotional non- 
physical care and it is noted that, as "old codgers" like I: a retire, fewer people 
remain to protect "holistic" hospice principles. I: a's. perspective differs from the 
bleaker outlook of E: a (page 224) in which the hospice's "essence" is already "lost". 
Nevertheless, I: a's position is compatible with E: a's and others similarly disposed 
insofar as she explicitly values holistic care (as something more than physical care) 
and distances herself from technical-rational care (here equated with specialist 
palliative biomedical care). Further, I: a implicitly presents herself as part of a 
rearguard action against emerging practices (associated with organisational re- 
designation) and, it is argued, such evidence supports the claim that at least some 
staff (mostly but not always long service nurses) champion the first of each of the 
two CS propositional statements stated above (page 229). 
Interviewees like I: a who are critical of emergent trends tend to emphasise 
their distinctive outlook by highlighting alleged differences between the personalities 
and behaviours of early ("old codgers") and modem ("technical-rational') hospice 
recruits. For example, interviewee J: a stresses past collegiality and the relegation of 
routine physical to emotional care when, to the detriment of current study site 
practice, she favourably recounts previous experience at another hospice. 
J: a We were a very homogenous group of nurses, we were all, you know, 
members of Greenpeace and Amnesty and (pause) often people were 
Quakers for some reason .. You know, you could come and 
hand over and 
say you hadn't washed him and that was okay .. 
And it really was okay .. I 
think, I mean early hospice nurses were, were a type, because things in the 
health service were not that bad. And, but my sensing of it was that they 
were more humane. 
231 
Strong normative judgements are contained in these statements. However, rather 
than focusing on individual morality or responsibility, interviewees stress the more 
abstract role played by pre-hospice socialisation in explaining why early and modern 
recruits differ: "I mean it's all to do with our backgrounds isn't it, it has to be? " Q: a). 
Hospice clinicians always came from the NHS. However, as noted, new recruits are 
now seen, by those antagonistic to change, as being acutely rather than hospice 
orientated - i. e. more willing to treat and intervene physically and more willing to 
accept the second of each CS propositional statement (page 229). (Clark and 
Seymour, 1999, offer putative support for this argument. ) Further, as new staff are 
engaged, the percentage of those holding "old codgers" views inevitably declines. SS 
change (i. e. recruitment) thus exposes and exacerbates CS discord regarding 
appropriate forms of hospice care for that group antagonistic to new developments. 
Importantly, those indifferent or predisposed to accept change need not be aware of 
CS discord to the same extent and, therefore, whilst the relationship between groups 
(crudely those pro- and anti-change) is internally symmetric, their influence differs 
(those in favour of change are less vocal but `politically' ascendant). 
Most interviewees, but invariably those hostile to change, comment upon 
contrasting consultant behaviours at the hospice and, given the importance of these 
particular agents within the organisation, addressing differences in the way 
consultants embody their roles advances discussion of the variation between new 
and old recruits by focusing attention upon distinctions between agency (interest 
laden positions and roles), actors (how positions and roles are filled) and persons 
(the self who is an actor) (described §1 Chapter 2). 
As agents both consultants occupy similar positions and roles. However, 
senior consultant 1 (henceforth Coni) works at the hospice full-time and this might 
predispose him to envisage the organisation differently to Con2 who is jointly 
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engaged by the NHS and hospice (as stated, Con2 has an "ambivalent attitude 
towards hospices" and only visited the study site for a day and a half each week). 
Significantly, virtually every interviewee, including Conl and Con2, suggested that 
differences in pre-hospice socialisation and personality-psychology contributed to 
the way they embody, as actors, their agential roles. Thus, Con1 like senior doctor 
H: a came to the hospice from a rural county hospital or GP background whilst 
Con2 came from acute urban settings. Specifically, Conl states that GP experience 
sensitised him to the limitations in community and familial support for discharged 
patients (see earlier comments regarding demography) and this stays his hand when 
considering options. Alternatively, Con2, having spent most of his career in large 
metropolitan hospitals enjoys trying new procedures and seeks to help patient 
groups not usually seen at the hospice - e. g.: 
O: a .. high immigrant, high sort of deprivational indices .. the under-resourced 
the marginalised groups in society and .. patients who were, you 
know, 
prisoners, HIV, refugees and, you know, sort of people who were, that 
weren't particularly pretty and didn't fit into the nice sort of cancer model 
that we've built up [here]. "' 
Interviewees stress that they personally like both consultants. However, whereas 
Con1 is "conservative" (F: a) in his medical practice, non-interventionist and 
disinclined to hurry patient discharges, Con2 is, by hospice standards, radically 
innovative and interventionist, inclusionary rather than exclusionary (see above) and 
active in promoting swift discharge. Thus, despite occupying analogous positions or 
roles, contrasting (actor) styles (role embodiments) concretely effect practice and 
occasionally produce sharp differences in professional opinion. For example, 
meetings have been held to discuss and diffuse tension amongst medical staff and, 
where nurses query or challenge divergent or novel clinical decisions, both 
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consultants have attended formal and informal debriefing sessions to talk through 
and explain or justify their respective actions (e. g. concerning analgesic dosing, the 
use of blood products and antibiotic administration in terminal stage patients). 
Interviewees who defend what they see as traditional hospice practice 
favour, unsurprisingly, Con1's approach; they criticise the product of consultant 
tension: "So you've got people in the red team whose discharge is totally different 
from, to the blue team"" (C: a) and they challenge medical decisions made by Con2 
or junior medical staff who follow his lead: 
I: b I mean I guess "I am trying to do what I can. So when I appear at 
multidisciplinary meetings. And I hear that patient `x' has had his 
hypercalcaemia"" treated .. I think (e <pletive)! What are we doing here? 
What 
are we doing here? I raise the question by saying when this happens again, in 
the next week or two's time, would it be your plan to retreat this? Because 
that's my gentle way of saying to (Cons), for God's sake sort your medical 
staff out. Okay! 
Conversely, tension between consultant (actor) styles is described as "healthy for the 
organisation" (F: a) when it promotes modernisation or debate. And, in this vein, 
Con2's arrival challenged the "inward looking .. [and] precious" 
(F: a) nature of 
some hospice practices. Moreover, interviewees not antagonistic to change (or all 
aspects of change) suggest that the new forms of care are gaining acceptance. 
V: a .. you still get some (pause) grumblings that should, should we really 
be 
doing this. But I think that that has changed over the last few years. That it's 
not new. That we're doing more to patients. That's been happening since 
you've come really, since you've been here. You know, hasn't it? So it's not a 
new thing. So if someone turned up with an epidural for pain control or a 
(pause) were giving antibiotics for symptom control even though they're 
dying, I think people are getting to grips with that a little bit now. 
More provocatively those favouring change propose that hostility results from 
limited experience. 
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D: a A lot of people who have been here a long time have only ever worked here 
and never worked elsewhere (pause). They haven't seen this [treatment or 
intervention] .. So it's all new to them and they can't adjust to new things .. 
Because it wasn't a hospice thing. They'd never had anything like that in a 
, 
hospice. It was just basic nursing care and the patient died pain free without 
interventions. So they see these as unnecessary interventions. 
And even those hesitant about change recognise that limited experience plays some 
part in generating reticence. 
H: a Very few people here have worked in other palliative care institutions and so 
we just assume this is how it's meant to be. 
Suggesting that socialisation (past employment experience) influences attitudes 
(psychological dispositions) to current change seems plausible and evidence for the 
exertion of `downwards' SS mechanism pressure on individual persönhood 
surfaced, in this study, when some clinical interviewees made unrequested 
disclosures about the emotionally disturbing nature of witnessed violent deaths. 
Details of these disclosures are not described because they are deemed overly 
exposing (§2 Chapter 1). Nevertheless, where altered SS (e. g. demographic change 
or organisational re-designation) contributed to a rise' in acutely ill admissions 
(patients requiring specialist physical symptom control) - and assuming that the 
deaths of these patients are more traumatic for staff than those historically 
witnessed -- it - might be argued that new forms of SI between staff and patients 
(involving staff exposure to more violent deaths) led some clinical personnel to 
experience psychologically adverse reactions. And, in consequence, the ability of 
actors to fulfil agential role expectations (e. g. offering emotional support to patients) 
may be compromised if or when personhood is damaged by, in this instance, 
contact with multiple violent or traumatic deaths (see comments by interviewee B: a 
Appendix J on professionalism and emotional disengagement). "" Alternatively, the 
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`upwards' influence of individual psychology on SI may be evident where 
personality (definitional problems notwithstanding) affects the manner in which 
actors such as Con1 and Con2 embody or experience agential roles. However, 
linking psychological attitudes or dispositions to experience and social explanation 
in the manner outlined above is problematic because this can allow or imply 
reductive individualism or social determinism. 
To avoid both over-socialised and over-rationalised concepts of humanity, 
CR theorists such as Archer (2007,2003a, 2003b, 2002,2000) are exploring the 
place of extra-social personal psychology or 'selfhood' (Gronow, 2008, p. 243) in 
mediating or interpreting social and cultural conditioning structural interests. ""' 
Archer's taxonomy of persons, actors and agents provides a way into discussing the 
`projects' (Mutch, 2004, p. 384) that agents involve themselves in. And, in such 
discussions, geological metaphors (see above) can usefully suggest causal directive 
influence. However, the mechanisms of interaction between psychological and 
social strata remain under-theorised' and, whilst individual psychology 
(personhood) and prior (agential) socialisation contribute to and must be 
acknowledged in any description of actor difference, categorical statements about 
their interaction would require clarification of the mechanism(s) of interplay 
between, for example, genetic, mental-psychic and environmental or social factors 
as well as conjecture regarding the nature of consciousness and free will. Such 
explanation is beyond the purview of this study and, as both the Introduction and 
§1 Chapter 1 assert (see, in particular, references to Kane, 2007), the version of free 
will apparently lodged in CR and MM theory may be queried and, as Rose (2006) 
makes clear, discussions involving or invoking the concepts of selfhood and 
consciousness are complex and undecided. 
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At CEP (cultural emergent property) level, the situational logic operative 
between consultants and the pro- and anti-change groups that may loosely be 
associated with their respective behaviours is one of necessary contradiction and 
compromise. Those opposed to or hesitant about new forms of treatments and 
interventions and the prioritisation of physical care recognise that patients benefit 
from some new practices - whilst those promoting or acquiescing in change often 
acknowledge the importance of `older' hospice values. Thus, although the SS 
mechanisms promoting change and CS values linked with that change are 
ascendant, neither pro- nor anti-change group can or wants to ignore the other. 
(Though, as noted, those antagonistic to change must engage in SI and S-C 
interactions that they find irksome whereas the reverse is not always the case. ) 
Over time (T2 - T) both positions showed signs of compromise albeit that 
greater movement was required of those antagonistic to change. Thus in speaking 
about the relationship between Conl and Con2 interviewee F: a noted that "we are 
inevitably (pause) changed by our environment. And those with whom we work. We 
can't not be". And, towards the end of the study period, whilst Conl had, it was 
widely-thought, become more like Con2 in his behaviour, even Con2 evidenced, on 
occasion, a slightly less interventionist approach. 
F: a (laughs) "Is chemotherapy appropriate for this patient? " (laughs). Were you 
here? .. (laughs) I've never heard him [Con2] say it before! 
I couldn't believe 
it! 
Albeit that, at T3, significant differences remain between consultants and pro- and 
anti-change individuals and groups. 
C: a .. this is just an example, because (Sister) was going to do one of my.. team 
meetings the other day and she said "Oh, oh what's the plan for this lady". 
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And I said "Oh I expect (Conl) will just say, oh we'll just keep her for 
another two weeks before we do anything" and (Sister) was tutting saying 
"Oh we need to do this and that". And I said later, "Oh what did (Con1) say 
about this lady", and she said "Oh we are to keep her for another two 
weeks. " And I knew that's exactly what he'd say and I was happy with that. 
Increasing medical engagement 
The number of medical staff engaged at the hospice rose dramatically between 'T2 - 
T3 in, it is believed, response to SS change (organisational re-designation) at T'. x" 
G: a We have a phenomenal amount of doctors at the moment. I mean that's, 
this last twelve months, isn't it, really, if you look at it. 
For nurses, engaging more medical staff produced two forms of contradictory 
situational logic. First, insofar as the presence of more medical staff contributes to 
the development or focus upon physical care, it exposes, in S-C level interactions, 
those CS contradictions previously described. For most agents (medical and 
nursing) these contradictions remain necessary and corrective. However, in relation 
to medical engagement, nurses strongly antagonistic to the second of each of the 
propositional statements detailed on page 229, describe forms of SI and S-C 
interaction that might, in the forcefulness of their presentation, suggest 
commensurability with eliminatory contingent logics. 
Second, increased medical engagement is itself a SS development since it 
alters the dynamic of doctor-nurse corporate or professional relations within the 
hospice. In disturbing the respective authority, power or `territorial mandate' (Taube 
et al, 2003) of medical and nursing positions and roles within the organisation, raised 
medical engagement provoked contradictory forms of SI among doctors and nurses 
that appeared to exist irrespective of previously described pro- and anti-change 
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perspectives. Thus, even nurse interviewees not antagonistic to other changes, 
critically note the consequences of the expansion in medical input. 
Doctor-nurse relations have long attracted professional and sociological 
interest (e. g. Fitzsimmons et al, 2005; Coombs and Ersser, 2004; Manias and Street, 
2001; Ashworth, 2000; Oughtibridge, 1998; Porter, 1998; Warelow, 1996). Attention 
has focused, amongst other things, on gender (Davies, 2003; Gjerberg and Kjolsrod, 
2001; Jones, 1994), conflict (Mackay, 1993) and the effect that changing doctor- 
nurse relations have on other professional groups (Jones, 2003a). In discussing 
positions and roles, sociological texts tend to link commentaries regarding medical 
power to descriptions of the medicalisation thesis (e. g. Nettleton, 1995; Armstrong, 
1994)' and, whilst these issues are not overtly explored in this study, the palliative 
literature recognises their potential significance (see, for example, Woods, 2007; 
Sandman, 2005; Janssens et al, 2002; Woods, 2002; Cobb, 2001; Hockey, 2001; 
Seymour, 2001; Clark and Seymour, 1999; Corner and Dunlop, 1997; Mola, 1997; 
Field, 1994; and Biswas, 1993). Here it is merely noted that, first, the descriptors 
`medicalised' and `medicalisation' are often used loosely and without clarification. ' 
Second, it has been claimed that medical training in the UK and elsewhere is, with 
regard to palliative care, erratic, sparse and bio-medically focused and, in 
consequence, non-specialist medical staff may lack a holistic or social perspective 
(what Macleod, 2003, p. 123, terms the `art' of palliative care) (Löfmark et al, 2006; 
Oneschuk et al, 2004; Schulman-Green, 2003). Third, not only do nurses associated 
with the anti-change group believe there are now "Far too many" (I: a) doctors at the 
hospice, others, less hostile to developments, record a shift in "intimacy" (F: a) and 
role or professional boundaries as more medical staff appear. Indeed, for nurses, 
rising medical numbers equate with diminished nursing "power" (I: a). 
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F: a .. it was more intimate many years ago. Because it's a changing period now, 
I think that has perhaps caused some distancing between the doctors and 
the nurses, seeing themselves as different groups. By intimate I mean that I 
think that (long pause) they felt more a part of the, of the nursing team. 
There, there didn't seem a difference. That's from a nursing perspective. I 
think the doctors relied more on the nurses. And I think that where you've 
got more doctors they don't have to rely so much on the nursing staff they 
can (pause). Because, there are enough of them to do what they're wanting 
to do and they'll do more of the doctoring .. And therefore the nurses may 
tend to do more of the nursing. 
I: a As you get more doctors involved you get more doctors doing doctor stuff. 
And.. [we are now] much more medicalised. There's no doubt about that .. 
We were much more, in the early days, we were extremely informal and 
there was a huge amount of overlap in our roles and (pause) certainly in 
professional terms .. nursing staff had far more decision making power. 
To some extent medical staff agree with this analysis. 
Y: a I suspect people have got used to having more doctors around .. and .. 
people then change their roles .. when there aren't so many 
doctors around 
nurses, you know, quite, you know, more than capable of getting on with 
things on their own. But when there are more doctors around to ask you 
just sort of ask for their, and, and it can be a little bit more support. 
In response, self-conscious efforts are being made to recapture nursing's lost 
authority. For example, the Nursing Director and other senior nursing personnel 
have suggested to the consultants that medical staff are now "duplicating" (G: a) or 
taking over what had previously been nursing duties. Furthermore, it is claimed that 
the present situation causes communication difficulties. 
V: a I suppose communication is sometimes less good because there's more 
people to go round. There used to be just, like, two of them and now, you 
know, but when you're trying to liaise between them you just spoke to 
(doctor) or (doctor). And you knew that the information was getting along. 
But now, you've got two consultants who are very busy, and then you're like 
pressing on their time. And you've got junior doctors who, perhaps, are just 
here a year, and how much do they own? You know. They come in to do 
just their bit and so communication is sometimes perhaps a bit harder. 
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The transient nature of some medical staff has been noted (e. g. interviewee K: a 
challenged the authority of short-term doctors to make policy decisions - see page 
222) and junior medical staff (e. g. L: a) agree that, despite the organisation's small 
size, lack of professional doctor-nurse familiarity hampers communication. For 
nurses, the loss of collegiate intimacy and trust, evidenced by deteriorating 
communication and reduced autonomy, negatively impacts on patient care. 
A: a I think the doctors have tied the nurses' hands behind their backs in some 
cases .. [referring to analgesic use at night when medical staff are not present] whereas before if somebody was in pain, the nurses that we had were (pause) so 
experienced (long pause) that the doctors then, (pause) trusted them, trusted 
them to do their job and not, and they felt that if anything did go wrong, 
well they knew they didn't feel they knew, that if anything did go wrong, 
they would have total support of the doctors behind them (emphatic). And I 
don't think people feel that now. 
If more doctors are equated with heightened levels of treatment-interventions and 
changed professional boundaries reduce nursing role remits, then even those nurses 
who are not against all forms of change now face new challenges in promoting or 
protecting non-medical (non-interventionist) care. 
F: a .. it's a danger, perhaps, with having more doctors. They're terribly 
keen to 
do things where they, sometimes you can get carried along. You want to be 
active when you really need to step back and think, do we really need to be 
intervening now and is this for the benefit of the patient? And I think that's 
when nurses actually have a very important role to play in encouraging 
doctors to stop .. The interventions are a changing thing. 
And the number 
of doctors are a new and changing thing. And I think it's for us to say, you 
know, "hang on a minute, is this appropriate? " 
More dramatically nurses associated here with the anti-change group were, when 
faced with instances of what to them were unwarranted interventions, able to cite 
examples of overt nurse-doctor confrontation (e. g. surrounding refusal to comply 
with instructions to undertake formal observations on a patient undergoing blood 
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transfusion) and, in this vein, I: b argues (below) that significant numbers of senior 
nurses should continue to attend weekly multidisciplinary meetings (MDMs) in 
order that they might form a counterweight to medical numerical superiority. 
I: b I was having a conversation yesterday with (Sister) and (Sister). And they 
were saying, (Sister) particularly, that she feels that for an E grade,.. "" plus 
(Nursing Director), plus herself to be in a multidisciplinary meeting is a 
waste. And I said: "well hang on a minute" if you want to make an impact, if 
you want to turn things round, if you want to regain some ground, you need 
a presence there. And you need a presence that's senior enough and 
confident enough to say: "hang on a minute, what is this about. " (Pause) But 
I'm not sure that, I'm not sure that she really took on board what I was 
getting at .. Anyway, I think it's quite difficult .. It's quite 
difficult to say. . 
What the hell were we doing? What were the issues there? Who made the 
decision? How was the decision made? And would we do that again? " 
The MDM structures and organises patient care for that week and, in view of the 
above commentary it is, unsurprisingly, a site of inter-professional confrontation. 
From a medical perspective, Con2 notes that extended discussions - such as I: b 
seeks to initiate - are "pathenomonic [indicative o, ff of people having a process that. . 
[they] don't understand" (O: a). For Con2 the MDM is a medically led, medical 
decision making meeting and not a policy debating forum. It should ideally follow 
the "medical model" (O: a) of problem identification and solution seeking (a model 
that clearly fits with previous statements about Con2's preferred way of working) 
and this view is supported by junior doctor's such as L: a for whom ill-focused 
MDM discussions and timing overruns are an "irritating.. grievance". 
La's perspective conflicts with those mostly long service nurses who 
maintain holistic ideals that extend the legitimate boundaries of discourse beyond a 
rationalised (unemotional) approach to non-physical care. "' Indeed the loudest 
voices against increasing medical engagement come from nurses antipathetic to 
change in general (i. e. a subset of the group likely to subscribe to the first of each T' 
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CS propositional statement described on page 229) albeit that, as stated, almost 
every nurse interviewed, even those inclined to support other developments, 
problematised rising numbers of medical staff at the hospice. Nurses as a corporate 
group thus appear to be threatened (their power to direct patient care is limited) by 
increasing medical engagement. A situated SEP (social emergent property) logic of 
SI contradiction is therefore evidenced between medical and nursing professional 
groups (T2 - T3). Recognising this contradiction, or rather the manner of its 
expression, suggests that, at T', the balance of power between medical and nursing 
staff was, if not equal, then (i) more favourable to nurses or (ii) qualitatively 
different than it subsequently became. (`Power' is a difficult concept; it is used here 
simply to refer to nurse perceptions regarding their ability to make or block 
decisions. ) Retrodiction is, perforce, tentative. However, this analysis is consistent 
both with previous `readings' of the evidence and the literature. It supports earlier 
suggestions regarding differential SS-CS morphogenesis since, again, SI change 
(between doctor-nurse relations) brought about by SS amendment (rising medical 
engagement) precedes and ferments S-C/CS contradiction. 
Treatments and interventions 
Numerous references have been made in this Chapter to increasing levels of 
treatments and interventions. Virtually every clinical interviewee said that, compared 
with T', more and more complex treatments and interventions are being performed 
in the TZ - T3 period. Specifically, interviewees say that more IVIs, " antibiotics, 
blood and blood products are being administered (necessitating staff re-training and 
the procurement of new machinery for storage, preparation, agitation and delivery), 
more DXrXX' and chemotherapy is given (for palliative purposes), long duration 
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epidural infusions are becoming commonplace, stentsxxx" arc inserted more 
frequently, Sp027'ý and blood gas monitoring is now routine and other forms of 
observations are habitually being performed. 
Various factors might account for this increase. For example and as 
suggested, raised physical patient dependency on admission (if genuine) means 
`need' has increased, emphasising physical care consequent to organisational re- 
designation as a specialist unit suggests (caveats aside) that new needs are 
organisationally welcomed and recognised, acutely orientated staff supply the means 
by which treatments and interventions can be ordered and delivered (needs are 
met), increasing medical engagement (more doctors) may in itself act to raise 
intervention levels and the absence of blocks to change from acutely recruited 
nurses (but not resisting "old codgers", I: a) could all be involved. 
Unsurprisingly, interviewees hostile to change deplore the rise in treatments 
and interventions albeit that they acknowledge some limited patient good ensues, 
whilst those favouring change accentuate the benefits new procedures allegedly 
bring. Here, rather than simply reiterating the now well-rehearsed dichotomy 
between pro- and anti-change groups the position of treatments and interventions 
within the palliative care literature is discussed. As will be seen, identified tensions 
within the hospice again mirror those in the wider palliative community. ""' 
The decision making processes involved in determining treatment and the 
legitimacy or appropriateness of specific palliative interventions are both contested. 
Glaser and Strauss (1968) argue in relation to non-hospice care that staff attitudes 
towards and decisions about the treatment of dying patients vary according to staff 
perceptions of the position of patients on dying trajectories. Staff perceptions are 
therefore important and yet, as this study attests, staff perspectives can differ 
markedly. Further, in the absence of agreed criteria regarding appropriateness and 
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given that concord need not exist between staff or staff and patients it has, in the 
modern hospice and palliative care context, been suggested that - although patients 
have always, to some extent, been involved in decision making - greater input into 
decisions about their own care should be encouraged (Sargeant et al, 2007; Oliver et 
al, 2005; Nunez Olarte, 2003; Small, 2003, Walter, 1994). Aspirationally such moves 
can be applauded. However, where patient ideas about treatment appropriateness 
conflict with the views of hospice and palliative clinicians and commentators who 
hold and express firm opinions regarding good or fitting treatment and good or 
fitting ways to die (e. g. McKechnie, 2006; Roy, 2004; Kastenbaum, 2000; Stoddard, 
1979) questions about how disagreement should be resolved remain unanswered. " " 
At issue in rsuch disputes is the idea, implicitly evidenced by some i 
interviewees, that there exists `a `thanatologically correct' way to die' (Nunez Olarte, 
2003, p. 76 - see also Sandman, 2005). Thus, like many palliative scholars, Connor 
(1998, p. 79) suggests that `death is a natural part of life'. Natural here suggests 
something uncontrived, non-technological, traditional (Kearney, 2000) and, in the 
hospice context, peaceful, accepted, unhurried and unmedicalised (Seale, 1998; 
Walter, 1994; Parkes, 1986)... X" Someone experiencing a natural death is not over- 
treated and the "amateur dramatics" (E: a) of last ditch rescue and curative medicine 
have been laid aside. 
Because the good or natural death excludes interventionist `depersonalised 
science' (Kübler-Ross, 1973, p. 10), Connor (1998, p. 123) is able to state that: 
`Hospice has been set up in such a way that patients must renounce further attempts 
at curative treatment. ' This setting up occurred when hospices dealt primarily with 
end-stage terminal patients and yet, today, the requirement that patients must 
relinquish curative aspirations may appear somewhat imperious to those admitted 
significantly in advance of the terminal stage. Indeed, as medicine successfully 
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extends and alters disease trajectories, patients might reasonably want and be given 
radical interventions for symptom and disease control. 
Thus, not only can the naturalness of hospice deaths be queried (even non- 
complex deaths typically involve the use of Graseby pumps, ' " elaborate drug 
cocktails, pressure relieving mattresses, catheterisation and monitoring and support 
by trained personnel), it is also recognised that some patients (e. g. end-stage AIDs 
patients) simultaneously seek to access curative and palliative services (Connor, 
1998; Buckingham, 1996) and, as public expectations change (see earlier comments), 
patients do request what are by general hospice and palliative standards `high- 
technology interventions' (Clark and Seymour 1999, p. 102)"xx"" Indeed: 
Even patients who are terminally ill are prepared to accept invasive 
procedures and treatments more readily than are their nurses .. Care must 
be taken to ensure that the judgements and attitudes of staff are not denying 
patients the opportunity of simple tests and therapeutic interventions from 
which they may obtain clinical benefit. 
(Meystre et al, 1997, p. 1202) 
Meystre et al (ibid) do not explain why elaborate as opposed to simple tests and 
interventions should be denied if these procedures deliver patient sought clinical 
benefit; nevertheless, this type of finding challenges the position of study site 
interviewees who seek to resist the expansion in treatments and interventions. 
Patients and staff can differ about the appropriateness of curative and palliative 
goals (Dekkers et al, 2002) and, it is here suggested that, in the literature and at the 
study site, at least three problems invest treatment-intervention or technology use. 
First, as interviewee G: a points out, hospice activity varies markedly between 
institutions and this might indicate that consensus regarding appropriate treatment 
`limits' is absent. Second, if consensus does not exist because it is illogical or 
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meaningless to construct or insist upon boundaries, then those wishing to maintain 
or create non-interventionist forms of care must perhaps resort to or rely upon 
normative exhortation in making their case and, third, if the focus of hospice or 
palliative care moves away from terminal care towards symptom control (as 
evidenced at the study site) then the rationale for non-interventionist treatment 
substantively collapses. 
The hospice community varies considerably in its medical sophistication. 
On one extreme are programs that refuse to do any "intrusive" 
interventions 
.. On the other extreme are hospices that set no limits on the 
types of treatment administered .. Arrogance comes into play when 
hospice 
thinks it knows what is best for the patient .. [However] 
Removing all 
limitations to treatment in hospice leads to hospice care that is 
indistinguishable from care provided in the rest of the health care system. 
(Connor, 1998, p. 113-114) 
Fears that external pressures are propelling the study site towards a close and 
perhaps indistinguishable relationship with the NHS were outlined earlier. Within 
the literature Foggo (2006) suggests that palliative patients not in the terminal phase 
could profit from the dismantling of barriers between categories of care (e. g. 
hospice patients may at times beneficially transfer to and from specialised NHS 
acute settings) and, in extending the range of treatments available to patients, 
interviewees such as Con2 appear ready to blur the distinctiveness or difference 
separating hospice and palliative from mainstream care. Moreover, in a move that 
further authorises the use of interventionist treatments, Randall and Downie (2006) 
attack what might be seen as core traditional hospice values when, contra accepted 
wisdom and WHO (2008,2002) definitions, they suggest that life prolongation is or 
can be a justifiable aim for palliative clinicians. 
As stated, those hostile to change at the study site tend to conflate terminal 
with non-specialist (non-complex) hospice and palliative care and, within the 
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literature, similar conjunctions abound (e. g. Roy, 2004; Lishman, 2003). Such 
linkages privilege terminal care. Yet pecialirt palliative care introduces non-terminal 
patients to the ward. 
Cicely Saunders (2002b [1959], p. 14) noted that problems ensue for end- 
stage care when terminal and non-terminal patients are mixed since: `The latter are 
often in a younger age group and their problems are not by any means the same. ' 
James and Field (1992, p. 1372) link the expansion of organisational roles (e. g. 
extending care beyond terminal support) and the influx of new or later generation 
staff (i. e. staff inattentive to early hospice ideals) to `goal displacement'. And Gracia 
(2002, p. 30) argues that hospice care historically represented the antithesis or 
`corollary of intensive care'. Thus, what is displaced for these authors and the anti- 
change group at the study site is a conception of hospice activity that primarily 
involves holistic low-intervention or non-intensive end-stage care. Clearly, 
`removing all limitations to treatment' (Connor, 1998, p. 114) violates this 
conception and, to resolve ambiguity, Webb (2000) suggests - somewhat 
unrealistically - that clinical, palliative and experimental treatment or technologies 
should be delineated. 
The desire to draw boundaries around what is permissible and what is taboo 
litter the literature. Roy (2004, p. 267), for example, regrets that end-of-life palliative 
care is now delivered `in a technological age. ' This presumes that past ages 
(decades? ) were less technological and, as so often, end-stage and palliative or 
hospice care are here conflated. Roy (ibid, p. 267) goes on to claim that technology 
and the treatments it describes are part of ascendant `mechanical or instrumental 
reason' and that this is both `monstrous' (ibid, p. 267) and immoral. It is likely that 
such sentiments would resonate favourably with those at the study site who wished 
to limit or draw back from the new procedures and interventions. 
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Less emotively, philosophers of technology such as Dusek (2006) 
distinguish between hardware, rule and system technologies. Under this schema 
treatment interventions (e. g. inserting a stent) involve hardware (the artefact itself 
and the accompanying tools for placement and patient monitoring), rules (e. g. 
norms determining who decides upon recipients) and systems (e. g. healthcare 
systems or social and cultural assemblages of people and knowledge that enable 
processes to occur). For Timmermans and Berg (2003), three sociological 
perspectives interpret these technologies. Technological determinism describes the 
political force of technology's existence to shape social relations and behaviours. 
A 
Essentialism, on the other hand, situates technology as `neutral tools to be 
interpreted in social interactions"' (ibid, p. 97) and technology-in-practice highlights 
the `relationship between technology and its users in health care' (ibid, p. 97). 
However, it is here asserted that judgements about the appropriateness of 
technology (treatments and intervention) use are (contra essentialism) ultimately and 
necessarily evaluative, normative and political rather than objective (Dusek, 2006; 
Kleinman, 2005) XI" 
Preliminary conclusion to `Relations within the hospice': 
The final sub-heading within this section `Spirituality-Religion' follows. Here a 
preliminary conclusion to `Relations within the hospice' is proposed. 
Organisational re-designation produced SS morphogenesis and stasis within 
the hospice (see figure 9 below). Re-designation both reproduced existing relational 
trends and elaborated new staff-staff and staff-patient relations. Morphogenetically, 
organisational re-designation was, in part, responsible for the engagement of more 
medical staff and, in consequence, during V- T3 and at T4, nurses as a collective 
group have lost power (broadly defined) relative to doctors (compared with T1). 
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Figure 9- SS factors acting within the hospice at T', their T2 - T3 SI consequents 
and projected T4 outcomes 
Social structural (SS) conditioning 
T1 
Organisational re-designation (hospice becomes specialist palliative care unit) 
Social interaction (SI) 
Tz T3 
Changes balance between patient groups admitted 
More patients admitted with complex physical care needs 
Creates busier environment 
Less time available to engage in non-physical care 
More registered nursing staff engaged 
Changes ratio of auxiliary and registered nursing staff 
Auxiliary nurse remit expanded 
More medical staff engaged 
Power balance between medical and nursing staff alters 
More treatments and interventions performed 
Social elaboration - relative to 1V 
Relations between professional staff 
groupings altered 
Relations between professional staff and 
patients altered 
T4 
Social reproduction - relative to P 
Continuation and entrenchment of 
existing (pre-organisational re- 
designation) trends 
Re-designation and the engagement of more medical staff also encouraged the 
deployment or use of treatments and interventions previously unseen at the hospice 
(or seen less frequently) and enabled changes in admission practice (allowing the 
intake of more physically dependent patients) and this, at T4, contributes to changed 
staff-staff and staff-patient interaction. Staff-staff relations are altered as 
professional or role remits and organisational focus shift in response to increased 
treatment and interventions and a growing emphasis on physical care. Staff-patient 
250 
relations alter insofar as rising busyness and more treatment-interventions are 
indicative of a heightened interest in physical care and this reduces the time available 
for non-physical emotional care. 
Significantly, ' SS change (exemplified or captured in the process of 
organisational re-designation) causes, in SI, competitive corporate groups to emerge 
within the hospice and, in S-C interaction, competition based around the ideational 
CS positions stated on page 229 of this thesis describes relations between these 
groups. The reproduction or transformation of corporate and primary agency within 
the organisation can be modelled apart from CS morphostasis or genesis (figure 10). 
However, excepting changes in doctor-nurse power relations (here associated with 
SS/SI change), agential elaboration or reproduction is, in this thesis, closely 
intertwined with CS ideational positioning and the description of corporate and 
primary agency is therefore conjoined or subsumed within a diagrammatic 
representation of CS transformation and reproduction (see figure 11, overleaO. 
Figure 10 -- Corporate and primary agency in the morphogenetic sequence (RTS, 
p. 264 - adapted) 
Socio-cultural conditioning ofgmups 
T1 
(Corporate agency and Primary agency) 
Group interaction 
P 'I'3 
(Between corporate agents and primary agents) 
Group elaboration 
(Increase of corporate agents) 
T4 
In figure 11 competitive and propositionally described ideational sets are identified 
at T'. Following Archer, CS logical relations have ontological existence within the 
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literature but, to exert causal effect, they must be taken up and concretely embodied 
in S-C agential habits and practices. It is here asserted that corporate groups holding 
contrasting ideational sets evidence disputation in S-C TZ - T3 interaction and it is 
this disputation that allows CS structures and corporate groups at Tl to be 
retroduced/retrodicted. 
Figure 11 - CS factors acting within the hospice at T', their T2 - T3 S-C consequents 
and projected T4 outcomes 
Cultural Structural (CS) conditioning 
Ti 
Contradictory ideational structures exposed. Competition revealed between groups 
favouring. 
1. Holistic vs. less-holistic approach and 
2. End-stage/terminal vs. specialist palliative (biomedical physical) focus 
Sodo-Cultural interaction (S-C) 
's T3 
Pro-change group (focus less on end-stage care and holistic 
practice) appear ascendant and confront anti-change group (focus 
more on end-stage care and holistic practice). Anti-change group 
lack exchange power but present `rearguard' resistance to change 
Dispute evident in, for example, NIDM, the refusal to 
perform certain observations etc., and verbalised reactions 
to increasing treatment-interventions and (for nurses) 
medical engagement 
Cultural elaboration - relative to 7y 
CS elaboration = evident 
Corporate and primary agents (most 
nurses and doctors) indicate at least 
some acceptance of aspects of change 
T4 
Cultural reproduction - relative to 71 
CS reproduction evident - ideational 
fault lines apparent at Tt remain in place 
and intact at T4 
Corporate and primary agents maintain 
CS allegiances (pro-change group appear 
ascendant whilst anti-change rump 
remain) 
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Cultural elaboration is not identified. The ideational sets described by the 
propositional statements on page 229 of this thesis are not amended at T4 relative to 
T'. CS reproduction or morphostasis therefore occurs. No evidence was uncovered 
to suggest that primary (indifferent or unaligned) agents had, between T2 - T3, been 
recruited to either of the corporate groups associated with the previously described 
ideational sets and corporate agency is therefore reproduced unaltered. Limited S-C 
compromise did occur (e. g. see comments by V: a page 234 or F: a page 237). 
However, corporate groups remain intact between T' and T4. As stated, since SS/SI 
developments precede and expose and exacerbate CS/S-C dispute, differential 
morphogenesis is, again, claimed vis-a-vis those opposed to change. 
Spirituality-Religion 
Spiritual and religious discourse is important at the study site for three reasons. 
First, an exercise in what might be termed `spiritual branding' has been proposed 
(page 207). Second, nurses may use spiritual talk to advance professional interests. 
Third, and most contentiously, it is here suggested that a consideration of the 
concept of spiritual suffering and the location of meaning in suffering may help 
retroduce part of the motivation or interests of the and-change group (i. e. why 
beliefs are held). Comments regarding this third theme are especially tentative and 
for that reason a discussion of spirituality-religion within the organisation is 
considered apart from the rest of this section. 
Study site trends: 
The hospice stands on land donated by a religious order (page 186). Key founding 
trustees were, in part, religiously motivated, prayers were once said before MDM 
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meetings (A: a) and, historically, long service interviewees (page 192) recall staff 
praying openly with the relatives of deceased patients. Sunday services were once 
held. in the chapel and a hand bell was irregularly rung during weekdays to invite 
attendance at a semi-formal reflective prayer meeting during which staff and 
patients would "think about .. hospices all around the world and patients suffering" 
G: a). These practices had ceased by T' and following T2 - T3 changes in busyness 
(page 220), post-mortem procedures (page 221), staff ratios (page 223) and the 
influx of acutely orientated staff (page 230) their resurrection would now be 
incongruent. 
A: a: As more and more trained staff came in it became (pause) less 
sympathetic to religion. 
Contradictory impulses are evident. Upon appointment, the Chief Executive funded 
a full-time clergyman (replacing the organised but informal visits of local clergy) and 
non-denominational services continue on alternate weekdays. However, religious 
influence is now reduced, albeit that spiritual themes have, to some extent, emerged 
in religion's place. Thus, moves are afoot to relocate and develop the chapel into a 
less formal `sacred place' and the Chief Executive, recognising that spiritual care is 
currently (TZ - T`3) sidelined relative to physical care, now believes it was a mistake 
to appoint a "dog-collar" (N: a) wearing Anglican, since the conflation of religion 
with spirituality that this represents might be considered exclusionary. 
Most interviewees are interested in the spiritual component of care (fewer 
spoke about religious matters). Interest cut across professional position and role 
boundaries and this could appear to challenge previous claims regarding those, often 
medical staff, who support and actively advance change within the hospice since, as 
suggested, change appears to emphasise physical rather than holistic and spiritual 
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care. No anomaly obtains however. Interest reflects the sustained attention given to 
such issues in the professional and palliative literature (see table 5 below) (Coyle, 
2002). Further, doctors and nurses in their professional (corporate) capacities may 
be interested in spirituality for different reasons and those associated here with the 
anti-change group (irrespective of professional position or role) arc employing 
spiritual language and symbolism in a distinctive way. 
Table 5- Spirituality and Religion within the nursing and palliative care literature: an 
e-search of databases AMED, BRNI, CINAHL and Medline using truncated 
keywords spiritual$ and religio$ - all fields (search performed 23.05.08. )XIiii 
Databases 
Truncated Year 
keywords 
2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Spiritual$ 156 152 175 142 159 135 136 135 
ED AM 
Religio$ 65 63 95 67 86 84 75 84 
Spiritual$ 103 97 68 84 43 60 53 50 
NI B R 
Religio$ 240 212 220 215 165 155 122 105 
Spiritual$ 744 876 720 684 638 569 633 428 
CINAHL 
Religio$ 708 821 632 547 480 435 403 271 
Spiritual$ 839 733 654 593 488 482 425 355 
dli ne Me Religio$ 1524 1482 1375 1345 1206 1239 1232 1127 
Although most interviewees discussed spiritual issues, medical staff tend to be more 
reticent than nurses in claiming jurisdiction or competence in such matters (a few 
nurse exceptions to this trend were identified). Thus, whilst doctor Y: a thought 
spiritual care important, she did not think it part of her remit because she lacked 
"training" in such matters and, professionally, such training would be inappropriate. 
Y: a .. you can't have doctors training about spirituality you 
have to have (pause) 
kind of, people who are, who know what they're talking about (laughs). 
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Alternatively, nurse interviewees are, on aggregate, more willing to accept 
responsibility for spiritual and even, in some instances, religious care. This 
acceptance mirrors proclamation and discussion within the UK and international 
nursing (e. g. Cavendish et al, 2006; Callister et al, 2004; Henery, 2003; Theis et al, 
2003; Tanyi, 2002) and palliative literature (e. g. Narayanasamy, 2007; Hermsen and 
ten Have, 2004; Nelson et al, 2002). It may indicate that nurse interviewees define 
spiritual care more broadly than their medical colleagues (e. g. as ordinary kindness, 
in which case "training" is not needed). And it should be noted that claiming 
spiritual competence also serves to advance nursing's professional interest. 
The extension of spirituality into secular domains is part of a 
professionalization project in nursing, a claim to jurisdiction over a newly 
invented sphere of work. 
(Paley, 2008c, p. 175) 
As discussed, increased medical engagement produces, it is believed, a diminution in 
nursing power (SS) relative to historic levels. However, serendipitously, nurses who 
profess an interest in spiritual matters (S-C) tap into and reproduce established (CS) 
precepts located in the palliative literature and meet contingent (SI) needs to protect 
and develop professional (SS) interests. Situated logics of complementary necessity 
(page 206) are here demonstrated and this interpretation - claiming spiritual 
competence serves nurse structural interests - is recognised in the (non-realist) 
palliative literature. Specifically, spiritual discourse is seen to offer nurses: 
a means for challenging the authority of medical science and of regaining 
some agency, some autonomy, in situations that otherwise would be defined 
as scientifically determined .. [it is or can be] a tool 
for preserving or 
enhancing the status of a particular discipline or distinguishing it from 
another. 
(Rumbold, 2002a, p. 8) 
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The importance of spiritual discourse in advancing professional interests at the 
hospice should not be over-emphasised. However, study site trends resonate closely 
with the wider palliative literature and the relationship between societal 
modernisation-secularisation and spiritual influence may therefore be significant. 
Spirituality-religion and secularisation: 
Spirituality and religion are elusive concepts (Coleman, 2004). Spirituality has been 
linked to a personal search for meaning or value (Pesut, 2008a; Stanworth, 2004; 
van Hooft, 2002) (though Paley, 2008b, deconstructs the coherence of such 
descriptors) whilst religion is, amongst much else, associated with creedal theology, 
ritual, deity and organised or socially positioned faith communities (Dein, 2006; 
Seale, 1998) (however, Gunn, 2003, argues that religion escapes definition and, from 
a historic and philosophic vantage, Sell, 1996, describes the descriptor's dynamic 
nature). Spirituality and religion may depict discrete concepts (Mohan, 2004) though 
this is contested (Cobb, 2001) and they often collapse in use (e. g. Bouchal, 2007). 
Definitional caveats aside, many early hospice pioneers were religiously 
motivated (Clark and Seymour, 1999) and religious conviction continues to propel 
new hospice and palliative care developments in Eastern Europe and Asia (Clark 
and Wright, 2003). However, within the literature, an interest in spirituality rather 
than religion emerged among commentators in the 1970s as secularisation produced 
or accompanied a decline in formal religious observance (Rumbold, 2002a) "''" 
Secularisation is, of course, as difficult to classify and characterise as that which it 
opposes. Cupitt (1984), for example, chronicles secularisation in Christian Europe 
from the twelfth century whilst, more contemporaneously, Habermas (2008) states: 
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During the period since the end of World War II all European countries, 
with the exception of Ireland and Poland, have been gripped by a wave of 
secularization that goes hand in hand with modernization. ' 
(Habermas, ibid, p. 116) 
Linking secularisation with modernisation is important if modernisation is associated 
with biomedical advance and technological ascendency. Cobb (2001), who accepts 
this conflation, suggests that palliative clinicians' interest in spirituality and holism 
arose as a counterpoint to secularising and modernising tendencies and the 
biography and writings of Cicely Saunders (e. g. Saunders 2006b and 2002a) might be 
said to evidence kindred themes. Significantly, the language of spirituality offers a 
non-sectarian alternative to reductive rational and bureaucratic medical discourse 
(Bradshaw, 1996) and, thus, those who want to discuss or engage with forms of 
holistic care that prioritise emotions, values and existential meaning may find in 
spiritual talk a more inclusive and acceptable vehicle than, what many perceive as, 
narrow religious discourse (Lavoie et al, 2008; Confoy, 2002). For Bergman (2006, 
p. 5), spirituality provides a `non-contentious term somewhere in between religion 
and scientific psychology' for those interested in the existential or humanitarian 
dimensions of extra-physical care. 
Meaning in suffering - why the anti-change group resist change: 
From a nursing perspective Henery (2003, p. 550) claims that the `literature on 
spirituality tends to agree that modem science is relatively powerless to address the 
loss of personal meaning experienced by people facing death, suffering and loss. 'x'° 
However, irrespective of professional allegiance, antipathy to change at the hospice 
is, in large measure, a reaction against changing forms of staff-patient relations. 
Idealised and preferred relations were variously described. Yet a recurrent and 
apparently significant aspect of such relations involved, for the anti-change group, 
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`being with' patients who were suffering emotionally or spiritually and `being with' 
appeared to require that suffering's potential meaningfulness also be valued. 
Thus, whilst good technical and clinical skills are necessary attributes for 
hospice carers, they are not, for the anti-change group, sufficient. J: a emphasised 
that a willingness to be "with people who are suffering" is also required. However, 
organisational re-designation threatens this capacity, since, for example, the 
increased busyness that it produces reduces the time available for non-physical care 
and acutely-orientated recruits are now less inclined to value non-physical care. 
J: a I would like us to be much more freer as professionals to say okay, you 
don't want a shave, you don't want a bath, you don't want to whatever, but 
you'd like me to sit with you under that tree at the bottom of the garden and 
talk about the pain in your past life, or whatever. I would like us to be much 
freer to do that. But I think, I think if I did that, that it would raise a few 
eyebrows. 
`Being with' a patient was also linked with a particular view of holistic care. 
I: a I think holistic care is about trying to attend in your heart and in your head 
to not only the physical elements of the things that you can `do' for the 
people in your care, but also how you can `be' with them. 
And it was recognised that staff exposure to patient suffering incurs personal costs. 
A: a I, I never turned away; I never turned away, ever. I never tried to escape it. 
You didn't. It was, you know, what you were all there for. 
Appendix I describes how, for A: a this aspect of care was now in abeyance and 
Appendix J notes that conscious or deliberate emotional withdrawal in the face of 
repeated traumatic death was an option for some healthcare professionals. 
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Nevertheless, for A: a and E: a `being with' remained a vital component of care. It 
was also described as an act of love. 
E: a .. we'll love you, you know, you come here we'll 
look after you and we will 
see it through. And, we, we'll always be there for you. And that's gone. 
Most nurses here associated with the anti-change group appeared to link the object 
of care or `love' with `suffering'. Moreover, notes made as a participant observer 
record that members of this group talked in everyday conversation in a manner that 
might easily hold or connote a spiritual interpretation (e. g. patients were now `at 
peace' or their `souls' were 'still `troubled'). As §2 Chapter 1 states, personal 
researcher atheism presumably influences the analysis presented here. Nonetheless, 
this thesis tentatively suggests that, wittingly or unwittingly, interviewees associated 
with the anti-change group (doctors and nurses), who described patient suffering 
using what are here termed spiritual concepts, also believe that certain forms of 
suffering might feasibly serve some beneficial or redemptive purpose. For these 
staff, suffering was not something that should necessarily be obliterated or avoided 
and, to assist patients in their experience, it was claimed that staff had a duty to `be' 
or `stay with' sufferers. Needless to say, the developing emphasis on physical care 
and expansion in treatment-interventions marginalised this discourse. 
There is of course nothing new in evaluating suffering positively. Western 
Christianity traditionally valued particular forms of suffering as a route to Christ 
(e. g. Julian of Norwich, 1998 [1388]) and, outside of the Church(s), many 19`h and 
20th century European existential and phenomenological thinkers explored dolorist 
themes (Lipscomb, 2003). The concept is deeply lodged in the palliative and end of 
life literature (e. g. Kearney, 2000; Johnson and Seholler Jaquish, 2007; Jewell, 2004) 
and it may intuitively appeal to people who have experienced personal trauma or 
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witnessed the trauma of loved ones. Likewise, from a realist perspective, Collier 
(1999) develops a line of reasoning through St Augustine, Spinoza and Heidegger to 
argue that all being (human and natural) has intrinsic and objective (i. e. non- 
subjective) worth or value. 
If the validity of Collier's (ibid) argument is accepted (and this does not 
require agreement with its premises or conclusion) then being has worth and worth 
is good (since being is good) and thus even suffering can be good insofar as it 
reaffirms or constitutes being in its fullest or authentic essence. Essential to this 
form of argument is the idea that in the act of suffering it is possible (but not 
determined) that some benefit, growth or blossoming (to invoke horticultural 
metaphors) might occur in some but not all patients and that where it occurs this 
benefit is a good (albeit unrequested) which may not find form in those whose 
suffering (experience) is taken away (e. g. by chemical means) or ignored or 
undervalued by carers. 
Perhaps significantly, every member of the hospice clergy accepted that 
suffering might potentially bring spiritual, religious or psychological gains to patients 
- although the difficulty and appropriateness of engaging in conversation about 
such matters was acknowledged. 
M: b .. if you are a Christian and have a faith .. [then] 
if you suffer, you 
automatically draw closer to Christ because you are, you would call upon 
him and you would unite yourself more with Christ to help you through this 
suffering. 
P: a People often speak to me of, when the suffering is at its worst, that's when 
they sense a presence of God most .. they quite often speak of that 
presence of God `in' the suffering and they, they value that. They don't 
necessarily value the suffering because that's obviously not very pleasant. 
But what, what the suffering has brought to them in the sense of spiritual 
experience is immensely valuable. 
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X: a [Suffering may bring benefit] .. Yes, I think 
it is a valid notion and it is 
within Anglicanism. 
The argument proposed here should not be over-egged. However, it is suggested 
that SS change (organisational re-designation and its correlates) altered doctor-nurse 
relations in SI. Interest in spiritual matters is expressed by doctors and nurses. 
However, the nature of expressed (S-C) interest differs. Nurses find, in the CS 
register (library) ideas regarding spirituality that, in SI, potentially offer a means of 
protecting or advancing lost professional privilege. (Though this may not happen. ) 
Further, staff identified here with the anti-change group (all professions); 
appear to use spiritual or religious metaphors to describe forms of care that are 
threatened by the consequents of re-designation. Ideas lodged in the CS register are 
available which, if taken up, might help protect those forms of care that are 
perceived as threatened and, as stated, the potential redemptive dimension of 
suffering (Pesut, 2008b) is accepted by members of the study site clergy (albeit that 
the acceptability of such ideas to non-spiritually inclined staff might reasonably be 
doubted, Lipscomb, 2007a). 
Despite these possibilities, CS and corporate group reproduction rather than 
elaboration is evident at T4 (relative to T'). The ideas outlined here did not undergo 
transformation between T2 - T3 and, as previously stated, pro- and anti-change 
groups remain substantively unaltered. The CS logical propositions here associated 
with the pro- and anti-change groups are stated below. However, these propositions 
can be described in a variety of ways and the problems raised in §1 Chapter 4 and §2 
Chapter 1 regarding expositional clarity are here particularly pertinent. In their 
defence, the propositional statements presented below do not contradict those 
described on page 229 and the schema here outlined could easily be overlain on 
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figure 11 page 252 (CS factors acting within the hospice) without compromise to 
arguments presented earlier in this section. 
Certain forms of suffering experienced by hospice patients may be linked 
with spiritual benefit and hospice staff should support patients achieve this 
benefit through the provision of holistic spiritual care. 
vs. 
No benefit accrues from the experience of suffering and hospice staff should 
seek to obliterate or remove suffering. 
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Endnotes §2 Chapter 2. 
i Unsurprisingly, hospice organisational structure varied during the T2 - TS study period. For 
example, towards the end of T3 a part-time Chaplain retired and an additional part-time social work 
assistant was recruited. The following details are nonetheless substantively correct. 
n Frequent service reorganisation led to this group being variously reconstituted and titled. 
Here, to aid clarity, the term Directorate is consistently applied. 
Ui Unequal power is here synonymous with size-importance and, contra Archer; by TI micro- 
macro differences of bulk also exemplify institutional relations. 
iv It might be objected that voluntary or charitable and non-state independent sector 
provision are not necessarily coterminous. However, in the interests of expositional clarity the 
descriptors are here conflated. 
V Space precludes engagement with the full range of equity debates. For example, the 
International Association for Hospice and Palliative Care's promotion of equitable provision within a 
socially contextualised framework (Bruera et al, 2004) and Aoun and Kristjanson's (2005) discussion 
of discipline specific research equity are not progressed here. 
vi It might be objected that NIIS palliative care consultant antipathy instances professional 
medical rather than state-NHS-hospice relational structures. However, this view is rejected since it 
appears to be the location of consultants within the NHS that is significant. 
Vi Negative realities were discussed in §1 Chapter 2. Here it is suggested that the presence of 
one form of service organisation (independent hospices) could as a negative reality foreclose on the 
possibility of alternative provision (e. g. creating an `in-house' NHS hospice at the County hospital). 
viý Ward based clinicians are also aware of cultural isolation. For example, interviewee F: a 
stated that: "I think (pause) isolationism, does (pause) encourage us to think that we are `pretty good' 
and that we know lots. But we don't. We only know a bit about this aspect of care and we should 
recognise in other [non-hospice] professionals what they know. " 
ix A `stretched' definition of demographic factors is admittedly used here. 
The term `hospice' continued to be used to describe the organisation and its activities. 
xi This widely made claim (e. g. Callahan, 2005; Mino and Lert, 2005) is explored further later 
in the thesis. 
xi See also Clark and Seymour (1999) on re-professionalisation. 
x No contradiction exists between role prescription (the idea that remits are tightly defined 
and enforced) and an expansion in role remit (the specific tasks or functions to be performed). 
xiv `Untrained' here refers to auxiliary nurses. More correctly auxiliaries are trained but not 
registered with the Nursing and Midwifery Council. 
IV See endnote xxvi below. 
xvi Whilst multi- and interdisciplinary work may designate different entities the terms are often 
conflated - e. g. see West (1990). 
_vi Although Saunders's ideas about religion and spirituality's relation to care evolved, the 
emphasis she placed upon the importance of Christian values in caring for the dying is apparent in 
statements made about wanting St Christopher's to be a `really Christian foundation' (Saunders, 
2002c, p. 16 [1959]). As such, Saunders initially considered establishing a Trust specifically 'so that it 
didn't get into the hands of cranks or non-Christians in years to come' (ibid, p. 16). 
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xviii Griffiths (2001) discusses (from a mental health perspective) the relation between 
appropriate referrals and exclusion or service rationing. 
xix Towards the end of 2003 Con2 left the hospice and county, returning to work in 
metropolitan palliative care with the "marginalised groups" that, in his opinion, the study site 
ignored. 
xx Each consultant's patients and the nursing teams attached to them are differentiated by 
colour codes. 
xxi Elevated levels of blood calcium (Hope et al, 1993). 
xxii Self and society interact, Archer claims (2003a, p. 131), when agents activate or encounter 
`causal powers of constraint and enablement'. The impact of structures and powers is mediated by 
agents who consider and interpret options via internal reflective conversations and, in this repect, 
agents are free to act within limits (Archer, 2003b). Insofar as interviewee B: a (Appendix J) claims that, 
in response to numerous witnessed violent deaths, she self-consciously ascribes to a version of 
professionalism that distances her from patient emotional suffering (she states that she does not 
"allow myself to feel a great deal here"), it might be suggested that B: a sidesteps the otherwise 
disturbing (constraining) power of structure to cause her psychological harm. She is enabled to do 
this by SS/SI changes between V- T3. See also Abendroth and Flannery (2006). 
xxw (1) Gronow (2008, p. 244 - emphasis in original) argues that Archer presents an 
`undersocialired picture of selfhood and agency. ' (2) Similar themes are being pursued in non-realist 
literature. For example, from an allegedly constructionist perspective and to avoid social 
determinism, Clouder (2003, p. 213) examines 'the scope for individuals to exercise personal agency 
within the professional socialization process' of health and social care workers. 
=xiv This is particularly the case vis-ä-vis brain function (body) and experience or mind (Rose, 
2006). See also §1 Chapter 3 regards naturalism and the qualia debate. 
xxv Short term fluctuations in numbers preclude declarative statements. However, whilst the 
hospice engaged two doctors in its early years, between T2 - T3 six and seven full- and part-time 
consultant and non-consultant medical staff were engaged at any one time. 
xxvi Sociologically, the medicalisation thesis connotes a critical stance taken by social theorists to 
medicine's ideological and control functions. In this sense medicalisation is associated with `the 
disempowerment of individuals .. [and] an increasing tendency to define 
`normal' aspects of life as 
medical problems' (Clark and Seymour, 1999, p. 113). More loosely, medicalisation describes the 
unwarranted usurping of power or authority by members of the medical profession, extensions in the 
use of clinical technologies and an emphasis upon biophysical care. 
xx%ii For example, without further explanation MZcKechnie (2006, p. 255) states that designating 
palliative care: `a medical speciality has influenced the way in which end-of-life care is provided and. 
[it] has become routine and medicalised. ' 
x=vii Hierarchically, `E' grade nurses outrank 'D' grade nurses but are junior to 'F' or `G' grade 
nurses. Post T4 this grading system changed. 
xx The descriptors `rationalised' and `unemotional' are used because, whilst medical staff do 
discuss psycho-social and even spiritual care, their approach differs in tone and content from nurses 
holding views here associated with the anti-change group. These nurses, in contrast to their medical 
colleagues, are noticeably effusive and expressive in discussing non-physical needs and they readily 
make evaluative or normative judgements about patients and patient care. 
zxx Intravenous infusion. 
xxxi Deep x-ray treatment or radiotherapy 
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xxx° A lattice-shaped metal tube inserted into an artery or body conduit to maintain function. 
Used to support end-stage palliative patients with, for example, gastrointestinal cancer (Bowles and 
Benjamin, 2001). For a critical perspective on stent use in palliative care see Neale et al (2004). 
xxxw Optical pulse oxinietry measures blood oxygen (SpO2) by passing red light through 
(normally) a finger. Algorithms derived from applied plethysmography and spectrophotometry allow 
light absorption and thereby oxygen concentration to be calculated (Smiths Medical, 2008). 
x=xiv Several old references are cited here. It may be that the contradictions now being 
experienced at the hospice are long recognised within the wider hospice and palliative community 
and literature. 
___V See, for example, Hoefler (2000) on artificial feeding at the end of life. 
=xxvi Whilst Hinton's (1967) Dying does not specifically address hospice deaths (the book was 
written before St Christopher's opened) it is tempting to add his name here because, as is clear, 
Hinton (ibid) validates this list. 
xxxw Proprietary name for a make of, in this context, portable slow release syringe driver - used 
to deliver continuous medication including, normally, opiates. 
xxxvi" Tong et a! (2003) provide an alternative perspective. 
xxxix The presence of younger patient groups also affects staff. At the study site it was proposed 
that old (80 years plus) and young (30 to 50 year old) patients now present with complex conditions 
and co-morbidities that, until recently, would already have caused death. Further, when "average age 
goes down .. psychological dependency goes up" (G: a). Within the context of G: a's transcript 
it is 
clear that psychological dependency has two meanings. It refers to heightened emotional tension 
amongst clinical staff who care for those dying "at the wrong age", those in "our age group" (G: a) 
and it refers to the increased workload that accompanies the care of "three generations" when 
"you've got parents losing children" who themselves have children (G: a). See also Alexander (2004). 
xA Technological determinism may be evidenced at the study site when interviewees linked the 
availability of equipment (e. g. SPO2 monitors) with the perceived need or imperative to use that 
equipment. 
xv This position was perhaps taken by those favouring change when they emphasised the 
patient benefits that accrued, for example, from new treatment-interventions. This is not to say that 
the interventions are value neutral. 
xlii More could be said about the relationship between technology and treatment-intervention 
use. For example gender may have been a factor when male medical staff promoted technical or 
rational solutions to problems against female nurse resistance (Dusek, 2006; Kleinman, 2005 - see 
also Davies, 2003). See Heath et al (2003) for a review of technology and medical practice. 
XW e-search of databases: (i) AMED Allied and Complementary Medicine Database, includes 
palliative care literature, (ii) BRNI British Nursing Index, (iii) CINAHL Cumulative Index to Nursing 
and Allied Health Literature Databases and (iv) Medline, Ovid Medline, the United States National 
Library of Medicine Database. 
xvv Paley (2008c) highlights differences between UK-European and US religious and spiritual 
beliefs and practices. Rumbold's (2002a) observations describe secularisation in a Western European 
and Christian context. 
xlv Davis et al (2000) however, suggest that clinicians can enable meaning identification. 
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Conclusion 
The Introduction asserts that the realisms of Bhaskar and Archer have much to 
offer nurse theorists and researchers with an interest in social explanation and, 
although this claim is not explicitly discussed within this thesis, hopefully the above 
assertions are justified and substantiated throughout the text. Nevertheless, to 
conclude, these claims are explored under the headings: (i) Critical realism, (ii) 
Morphogenetic theory, (iii) Realism applied and (iv) Summation. 
Critical realism: 
CR philosophy beneficially informs nurse theory and research in three ways. First, 
Bhaskar provides a powerful critique of what he terms the epistemic and linguistic 
fallacies in positivistic Humean-empirical and Kantian or idealist phenomenological 
and hermeneutic inquiry. This negative critical function challenges all theorists and 
researchers - even those who reject other CR claims - to reconsider their grounding 
beliefs, argumentative forms and investigative procedures. Reflection of this sort has 
worth even if Bhaskar's other metaphysical claims are rejected. 
Second, emphasising the importance of ontology and the implicit links that 
bind ontology, epistemology and methodology in natural and social scientific 
explanation enables Bhaskar to provide a corrective to perspectives that underplay 
or ignore such linkages and, as the Introduction argues, studies that respect these 
logical chains are more likely to generate coherent and robust explanations than 
those that do not (see below). 
Third, if Bhaskar's arguments are accepted, CR theory redcfines and clarifies 
the problem field and goals of scientific endeavour. In the social field this involves 
delineating emergent agential from structural (social and cultural) relations, abjuring 
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prediction in favour of explanation andre-describing, as nomic, causality and the 
nature of law-like statements. 
Negatively, as §1 Chapter 3 outlined, Bhaskarian argument and philosophy is 
vulnerable to a variety of challenges and these identified weaknesses perforce detract 
from CR. Moreover, it might be objected that, to date and with notable exceptions, 
relatively few CR (or MM) studies have been performed and those that exist often 
evidence theoretical rather than practical or applied interests. Further, realist studies 
with a health and social care component tend to be exhortatory or aspirational in 
tone (e. g. Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
Speculation regarding the cause of this situation might cite the complexity of 
issues raised, the non-theoretical orientation of researchers in practice based 
disciplines such as nursing or CR's relative newness. However, following Bhaskar's 
suggestion that science is often implicitly rather than overtly realist (§1 Chapter 1), 
Williams (2003c, p. 61) identifies `realist leanings' in Lawton's (2000) study of 
palliative care, Popay et al: r (1998) work on health inequalities and Kelly and Field's 
(1996) investigation of chronic illness and disability. Likewise, Nash (2003, p. 43) 
claims that `notwithstanding .. theoretical and conceptual weaknesses, 
' Bourdieu's 
ideas concerning inequality and difference may be assimilated within CR (e. g. see 
Bourdieu, 1977). And Williams' (2003b) work into the structural, contextual and 
agential determinants of health can readily be designated a neo-realist text. Realist 
research practices may therefore be commonplace even if researchers fail to make 
this explicit: 
Morphogenetic theory: 
Archer's specialist nomenclature and the extended use of acronyms (e. g. SS, SI, CS, 
S-C and T) are, in theory and practice, somewhat cumbersome and occasionally 
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confusing. Nevertheless, building on Bhaskarian philosophy, MM providcs the 
outline of a realist conceptual methodology that potentially allows researchers to 
achieve (despite the problems identified in §1 Chapter 4) significant degrees of 
expositional clarity. In particular, the integral nature of temporality in 
morphogenetic modelling forces researchers to consider not only the timeframes 
involved in description but also the histories and nature of events therein described. 
Moreover, this focus on temporality, when conjoined with analytic dualism and a 
theory of situated logics, allows structures (social or cultural) and agents (corporate 
or primary) to be analysed discretely but relationally. As §1 Chapter 2 outlined, h1M 
provides researchers with evaluative tools that are denied to non-emergentists and 
the benefits of this approach stand even if the illustrative study in this thesis fails to 
exemplify them. 
Negatively, insofar as those anxious to describe or resolve `real world' 
problems may consider it diversionary, theorists and researchers (including nurses) 
who exploit MM, also need to engage with Bhaskarian philosophy since many of 
Archer's underlying concepts, premises and assumptions - ideas needed to 
understand her work - are located in CR rather than MN I texts. Further, Archer's 
`methodology' might be considered abstract or rarefied insofar as it provides little 
prescriptive direction to researchers and, as §1 Chapter 4 made clear, problems 
identified in respect of Bhaskar's work resurface in morphogcnetic theory (notably 
around expositional clarity, the specification and nature of propositional statements 
and the problematic of researcher bias). 
Realism applied: 
Figure 12 (below - adapted from original) illustrates how philosophy and research 
practice are linked in this thesis. Here the oft-repeated claim that logical ties 
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between ontology, epistemology and methodology must be respected arc made 
good as metaphysical philosophy (CR) and meta-theoretical methodology (MM) 
combine to inform the development of study site or domain specific theories as well 
as (via template analysis) the identification of empirical data. 
Figure 12 - levels of realist theorising (Cruickshank, 2003b, p. 114 - adapted) 
Metaphysical realism 
(Bhaskar's claim that a reality exists beyond our representations of it, that this reality can be 
understood, but with no substantive claims about that reality beyond its general form) 
Realist meta-theory 
(Archer's emergentist and relational social morphogenetic theory) 
1 U') 
Domain-specific meta-theory 
(Specific theories regarding the study site - described here under the headings `Structures 
and institutions' and `Relations with the hospice) 
1$ 
Empirical research and the development of specific theories 
(Data collection/analysis using Template Analysis) 
Archer and Bhaskar both stress that the measure of any theory lies in its use value 
and, it is here suggested, MM theory does in use appear to meet its objectives or 
potential. 
In respect to those aspects of hospice work detailed in §2 Chapter 2, NM 
modelling permits social and cultural structures operating upon and within the 
organisation under study to be distinguished, the mediating responses of agents to 
structural influences are described and, in reaction to external structural pressures 
and internal change, forms of relations that indicate situated logics of contradiction 
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and compromise are identified. Specifically, the hospice re-designated itself a 
specialist palliative care unit in response to external pressures and internally, pro and 
oppositional groups emerged in response to the clinical impact of re-designation 
and its correlates. Differential morphogenesis is observed insofar as, for the anti- 
change group, causal SI changes are outpacing S-C acceptance and this indicates at 
least partial disjuncture in the temporal development of SS and CS logical relations. 
It might be objected that these `findings' match ideas already located within 
the literature. However, not only would it be surprising if this was not the case but 
concordance itself lends credence to the conclusions here offered. "' Further, 
adopting a MNI/CR approach uses or assembles the literature in new ways. Thus, if 
it is granted that the above insights are genuine, that they accurately accord with 
aspects of hospice activity, then it must also be conceded that MM offers social 
researchers advantages in explanatory power over perspectives grounded in the 
literal application of empiric and idealist metaphysics (detailed §1 Chapter 1) as well 
as their reified and elisionist correlates (detailed §1 Chapter 2). This is a significant 
achievement. Elisionists, for example, refuse to delineate structural from agential 
interaction and they cannot, in consequence, identify differential morphogenesis - 
and epiphenomenalists overemphasise the significance of agential or structural 
influence (depending on orientation) thereby omitting their interplay. 
Self-critically and with hindsight, it might be argued that in this study, 
despite some realist suspicion of quantification (Willmott, 2003), group allegiance 
and degrees of group allegiance amongst agents here associated with pro- and anti- 
change groups could and should have been quantified to bolster evidence for their 
existence and the forcefulness with which opinions or positions are held. Moreover, 
retrospectively a longer study period might have been employed so that emergent 
structural and agential developments could have been more clearly identified. 
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Indeed, had a longer study period been used, the affect of Con2's departure could 
have been plotted on the development of relations within the hospice (to further 
illustrate the significance of agential mediation on structural influence). 
More damningly, it might be argued that the CS propositional statements 
presented on pages 229 and 263 fail to capture the full complexity of positions held 
by or within pro- and anti-change groups at the hospice. (The difficulty of defining 
propositions is discussed in §1 Chapter 4. ) And, as per §1 Chapter 3 (page 97), it is 
not necessarily clear that the SS or CS descriptions offered here would sustain 
assault along Bernsteinian lines. Specifically, other unexplored interpretations might 
be made of the data and the mechanisms or structures in operation remain obscure 
(e. g. the tentative nature of spiritual or religious influence upon members of the 
anti-change group is emphasised - §2 Chapter 2). 
Summation: 
Bhaskar identifies defects in Humean empiricism and Kantian idealism and from 
this critique he. constructs a realist philosophy for science that, whilst open to 
challenge, nonetheless offers new and valuable insights for theorists and researchers. 
Bhaskar (like Archer) possibly overstates the deficiencies in other perspectives so 
that his own position might be better delineated and, outside of literal positivist 
empiricism and uncompromising idealism, realists and realism should perhaps 
concede that these older doctrines generate powerful insights of their own. Indeed, 
Rescher (2002) takes this more considered line when he suggests, in terms which 
flatter and recognise the contribution of metaphysicians like Bhaskar, that: 
when discordant doctrines [viz., idealism and empiricism] manage to 
maintain themselves over many generations - it transpires that there 
is really 
much to be said on all sides and that the most appropriate and tenable view 
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of the matter is one that somehow manages to combine the best elements of 
both. Accordingly, the challenge that confronts the metaphysician in such 
cases is the shaping of a more complex doctrine that manages to effect a 
higher synthesis among the conflicting contentions by introducing whatever 
distinctions and sophistications are needed to achieve a reconciliation that 
accommodates the strong point of each rival position. ' 
(Rescher, ibid, p. 242) 
RTS and PN arguably present a version of this higher gntheris. However, as stressed, 
significant theoretical holes remain to be plugged in CR philosophy and, in warning 
against overly inflated ambition, Hedström (2005, p. 38) notes that: `Believing that 
theories can accurately represent reality in all its complexity is an empiricist illusion. ' 
Regarding morphogenetic theory, Archer has developed an authoritative set 
of conceptual tools to guide exploration in the social realm and, in so doing, she 
reconfigures philosophic realism to create the framework of a usable methodology. 
Much still needs to be done before researchers can simply turn to and apply MM in 
the same way that other theories and techniques are currently utilised. And, 
compared with other non-realist or less nuanced approaches, the complexity of 
some of the ideas associated with MM inevitably forecloses upon easy `accessibility'. 
Nevertheless, although within the literature MM is most often used to 
describe relations and interaction between large corporate groupings over 
substantial time periods, morphostasis or genesis may equally be identified `in a 
sports club or `defensive associations' in a parish church' (RST, p. 274). Here the 
illustrative study undertaken for this thesis focuses on one such `small' organisation. 
The study seeks to demonstrate the use value of MM theory and, if successful, it 
meets three aims. First, it contributes to the developing corpus of realist and 11M 
research, second, it adds something to hospice and palliative care literature and 
third, it may encourage nurse theoreticians and researchers to look more closely at 
critical realism and morphogenetic methodology. Hopefully these ends are achieved. 
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Endnotes - Conclusion. 
i However, embracing non-CR studies in this manner is problematic. Criteria for co-option 
are subjective and, regardless of possible authorial objections, realism's elasticity permits the rubric to 
promiscuously engulf numerous and disparate works. A paper by Hussey (2002) may stand as an 
example of the excess that can occur if articles sharing an orientation or interest with CR are 
carelessly brought within its compass. Hussey's paper discusses the importance of historical 
reasoning in understanding the development of medical and other health sciences, competition 
between philosophic theories and concepts (p. 242), the danger of deterministic argument (p. 248) and 
genetic fallacy (p. 249). It might be argued (erroneously) that taken together these themes match or 
adorn CR concerns and, in consequence, the author is a closet realist. This logic would however, 
allow very little to escape CR labelling. 
ü The bracketed `upwards' facing arrow might here represent the potential of theory `in use' 
to inform the development of theory `in abstract'. 
iii Alternatively, this could simply be an instance of confirmation bias. 
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. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
This form must be typewritten, and applicants should read carefully the attached Notes of Guidance. Two 
passport-sized photographs must be attached. The pagination must not be altered. Once signed, the 
completed form and any attachments should be forwarded to the appropriate Faculty Research Director. 
1 SURNAME Lipscomb TITLE Mr FIRST NAME(S) Martin 
ADDRESS Browning Road 
Ledbury 
Herefordshire HR8 
" Telephone No 01531. 
ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE (if different from above) 
Postcode Telephone No 
DATE OF BIRTH 23.06.62 GENDER Male 
NATIONALITY British SOURCE OF FEES Self funding 
2 QUALIFICATIONS (higher education only) 
If 
l 
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(eg BA Sociology) 
Main subject(s) Classification 
(eg 2i) 
Date of 
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Awarding Body 
Iniversity of Master of Sociology and Distinction 1998 University of 
Southampton Science Social Policy Southampton 
Jniversity of Bachelor of Clinical First 1993 University of lournemouth Science Nursing Bournemouth 
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PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT, TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE (please give details relevant to this application, 
Including details of any research or other relevant publications) 
Research Officer of the New Zealand Centre for Evidence Based Nursing, November 97-98. 
Research Nurse at St George's Hospital Medical School, Department of Psychology, (Tooting, 
London, SW17 ORE), 1999-00. 
REFEREES (these should normally be the names of the TWO referees given on the RDA form, at least one of 
whom must be an academic referee. Please include details of: position, workplace, address and relationship to 
applicant) 
1) Professor Clare Ungerson 2) Dr Tony Rees 
Dept of Sociology and Social Policy Dept of Sociology and Social Policy 
Southampton University Southampton University 
Personal Tutor Dissertation Tutor 
COLLABORATING ESTABLISHMENT (if any; see Note 1) 
'ý. ... 
FACILITIES (please give details of special facilities available for the research, eg laboratory, database, specialist 
equipment etc) 
Access to IT and library facilities; shared office space. 
POSTGRADUATE CERTIFICATE IN RESEARCH METHODS (please specify which courses will be taken, or 
indicate if exemption has been given by the Faculty Research Director and the grounds for this) 
Exemption based on Masters qualification 
REGISTRATION: 
Proposed start date of registration: 1" November 2001 
Hours per week on average allowed for the programme 
Expected duration of programme (in years) to PhD: 
15 hours 
6 years 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Mode of study: Part-time 
1. How do hospice employees within one organisation understand or construct their work (in terms 
of its aims, purpose, scope and boundaries)? 
2. How might these Understandings 'relate to broader' social and cultural processes such as the 
evolution of hospice and palliative care as a distinct discipline, NHS restructuring, clinical 
advances, alterations to charitable sector legislation and activity, changes in family structure, 
demographic transformation, etc.? 
3. How useful is realist social theory in providing a comprehensive framework for the analysis of 
culture, agency and structure in regard to hospice work? 2 of 6 
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TITLE OF PROPOSED PROGRAMME OF RESEARCH 
Culture, agency and structure in hospice work: an exploration of professional perspectives on 
care. 
12 PROPOSED PLAN OF WORK (See Note 2; maximum 1500'words, minimum 10 pt typeface) 
Background 
Since its inception in 1967, modern hospice and palliative care provision has expanded rapidly. In 2000, the UK 
had 146 voluntary or non-governmental organisations and 56 NHS specialist units providing such care. In-patient 
admissions exceeded 56,000 and over 120,000 patients were seen at home by palliative care nurses (Jackson 
and Eve, 2000). Major additional growth is expected to accompany implementation of the Calman-Hine Report 
(DoH, 1995) and NHS Cancer Plan 2000 (DoH, 2000). 
However, the practice, effectiveness and rationale of hospice and palliative care work remains under-investigated 
(Bosanquet and Salisbury, 1999; Field, et al, 2001). For Connor (1998) 'What is striking Is the lack of serious 
research being done in the field' and a recent literature review by Abu-Saad and Courtens (2001) identified 
significant shortcomings in palliative care's evidence base. Walter (1999) also notes a dearth of sociological (as 
opposed to clinical) research. Seale (1998), Lawton (2000), and Seymour (2001), inter alia, are now addressing 
this lacuna in the literature. Yet, rather than settling outstanding issues, their work appears to suggest that many 
of the basic premises underpinning the hospice ideal (such as the assumed superiority of hospice care, society's 
alleged 'denial' of death, the efficacy of bereavement counselling, and the unwarranted Invasiveness of hospital 
care) may be more problematic and open to challenge than many practitioners currently acknowledge. 
Furthermore, not only can the services provided by hospices differ markedly between institutions, but significant 
variations in attitudes and values towards hospice work may exist within organisations (Clark, Hockley and 
Ahmedzai, 1997). Hospice work is thus a nebulous and contested concept. 
The Study 
Research Question I This study will examine hospice work's problematic character by exploring employees 
understanding or construction of their work (its aims, purpose, scope and boundaries) within a single institution. In 
contrast to much current literature, which assumes that the goals and practices of hospice workers are 
unambiguous and clear, it is expected (based on the researcher's experience as a hospice nurse and trained 
social scientist) that the understandings and constructs of hospice employees will evidence varying degrees of 
homogeneity (consensus) and heterogeneity (conflict). For example, recent advances In clinical knowledge have 
the potential to generate staff discord by challenging hospice's traditional non-interventionist posture (beneficially 
reclassifying for some but not all employees, end of life treatments which had hitherto been perceived as 
'aggressive'). In the light of such developments, this study will explore the extent to which staff subscribe to one 
coherent, shared body of ideas and practices, representing a distinctive ideology of hospice care; and, if not, (1) 
what differences in their objectives, norms and values are apparent and (2) what effects might such differences 
have on patient care. 
Research Question 2 The study will locate these agential understandings and constructs within a range of 
broader, macro-level, social and historical factors. It should be noted that hospice expansion occurred within an 
environment of great fluidity. 'External' influences greatly affect hospice work, but these are largely neglected 
within the literature. This study will assess the importance to hospice work of factors such as the volatile nature of 
charitable financing, and changes to voluntary sector legislation (Billls and Harris, 1996). Additionally, the 
movement, which was always intimately entangled with state health provision, has been dramatically affected by 
NHS and community care restructuring, influencing financing, and inter-agency relations (Sheldon, 1997). 
Developing professional aspirations and new treatment options have cost and 'mission' implications. The ageing 
population is linked with increasing patient dependency and a higher incidence of cancer (Clark and Seymour, 
1999). Changes in women's employment and expectations mean fewer non-employed women are available to 
provide unpaid care, a situation exacerbated by greater familial geographic dispersal as well as the revolution in 
household structure (Fennell, Phillipson and Evers, 1994). The continued decline in traditional religious 
observance and rising consumer expectations may also have consequences for hospice practice (Seymour, 
2001). 
Research Question 3 Following Layder's (1995) recognition of the central and enduring importance of macro 
and micro interaction within social enquiry (dualism), this study will draw upon the ideas and models developed by 
-'Margaret Archer (Archer; 1995,1996,2000) to 'structure the' exploration of hospice work. Described as a 
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morphogenetic approach to Realist Social Theory, Archer (1995) uses 'analytic dualism' as a method of 
differentiating between and within 'levels' of society (cultural, agency and structure). This approach links ontology 
with explanatory methodology and is described as 'non-conflationary' and 'non-directional'. Realist Social Theory 
opposes: (1) elisionary or 'central-conflationary' theories such as Giddens's (1993) structuration theory which 
confounds structure and agency, precluding their disentanglement and critique; (2) 'upwards-conflationary' 
theories (i. e. 'crude' ethnographic or phenomenological studies) which underplay structure; and (3) 'downwards- 
conflationary' theories, such as Althusser's Marxism, which over-determines structure. A non-conflationary 
approach differentiates between culture and agency and structure when describing social reality. It recognises 
'emergence', the impact of temporal discontinuity between levels of analysis and provides a useful commentary 
upon the problem of 'false consciousness'. Realist Social Theory (and Critical Social Realism in general) will be 
critiqued by this work. However, the impact and resonance of this study is expected to benefit from such 
modelling. 
Method 
Data from within the hospice will be gathered by means of two interrelated processes. Firstly, using participant 
observation (the researcher is a full-time staff nurse at the study site), ideas regarding the 
understandings/constructs of hospice workers will be recorded as they occur in everyday activity. This will be 
done overtly and explicitly, with the informed consent of all parties. Initial impressions suggest that staff appear to 
situate their understandings of hospice work around topics such as: admission and discharge criteria, the degree 
and nature of acceptable 'intervention' and attitudes to non-clinical aspects of care. Secondly, these observations 
will inform a series of semi-structured interviews with: doctors, nurses, nursing auxiliaries, physio- and 
occupational therapists, chaplaincy and other key administrative and managerial staff. To obtain a broad but 
manageable mix of viewpoints, between 16 and 20 volunteers will be sought. Each participant will be interviewed 
on approximately 3 occasions (see below). Staff appear supportive towards the study and interviews are 
scheduled to begin in early 2002. 
Experience to date suggests that participants are thoughtful about their practice and, in some instances, staff 
have developed sophisticated private and/or collectively articulated 'theories' concerning hospice activity. Staff 
also appear to be aware that colleagues may hold alternative viewpoints. Conscious of these 'positions', 
participants evidence a degree of 'reflexivity' in discussion regarding their work. For some ethnomethodologists 
(including Hammersley and Atkinson, 1993), reflexivity is a nuisance that should be strenuously avoided. 
However, Archer (1996) disagrees; and Baert (1998, p. 205), who identifies reflexivity as an under-researched 
phenomenon, suggests that participant reflection 'should play a central role in any social theory, especially one 
that aspires to contemporary relevance'. This study will assay reflexivity by inviting participants to attend a series 
of interviews. During these interviews, participants will be challenged to explain and expand upon earlier 
statements and previously expressed ideas concerning hospice work. If appropriate, and with due regard to 
anonymity, participants will be introduced to the ideas of colleagues which potentially conflict with their own. 
Throughout the interviews, participants will be asked to situate their ideas and comments within the wider context 
of hospice development. 
The study acknowledges that disadvantages and advantages attend the role of participant observer. Authors such 
as Creswell (1998) claim that too close an involvement with the study site inevitably hinders the 'distancing' 
necessary for effective research. This critique cannot be ignored (and will be explored within the study). However, 
Bernstein (1979) and Garfinkel (1999) emphasise the benefits that accrue from intimate and thorough knowledge 
of the study situation. Likewise Hammersley and Atkinson (1993) dismiss as unwarranted 'moral rhetoric' too 
fastidious a preoccupation with 'insider-outsider myths'. 
Ethical issues - see also Addendum following references 
The study will not involve or identify patients, their families, volunteers or non-professional staff. Professional staff 
who agree to participate will be required to sign a written consent form explaining the intended aims and methods 
of the study. This will state that participants will remain anonymous and where disclosure of a professional 
designation might inadvertently reveal the identity of a participant (e. g. a role occupied by a single individual), then 
the issue will be fully discussed with that participant before any interview data is collected (see Addendum). 
Participants will receive a copy of the consent form and remain free to leave the study at any time. The focus on 
reflexivity (see above) suggests that participants should be well informed about the study, and hence capable of 
giving or withdrawing their informed consent. 
Observational data will consist of un-attributed notes describing ideas concerning the nature of hospice work. 
Formal permission, for this. study has been granted by the hospice (see attached letter). NHS Ethics Committee 
approval is not required. 
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Anticipated outcomes 
This study will make an original contribution to the understanding of hospice work and should yield Insights and 
Ideas with resonance for other, similarly positioned, Institutions. The use of Realist Social Theory In relation to 
hospice practice and ideology is believed to be novel. It Is hoped that application of this theory to a study of 
hospice work will produce a useful framework for gathering and Interpreting material, as well as providing an 
opportunity for the critical review and development of the theory. Recognising the value of reflexivity In 
participant's commentaries, the work will articulate the 'voice' of front-line staff whose contribution Is not always 
evident within the existing, clinically oriented literature. Most importantly, by exploring the Ideas that inform and 
direct hospice activity (at both macro and micro levels), it is hoped that the study may, In some small way, enable 
those who actually deliver care to better comprehend and thereby to improve upon current practice. 
Work Schedule 
Literature review Ongoing 
Field work, including conducting interviews Months 6-18 
Assessment and analysis of interview data Months 6-24 
Examination of socio-cultural influences impacting on hospice work Months 24-36 
Writing up and submission of thesis Months 36-72 
References 
1. Abu-Saad H and Courtens A (2001) Evidence-Based Palliative Care Across The Life Span Blackwell 
Scientific, Oxford 
2. Archer MS (1995) Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach Cambridge University Press, 
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12 PROPOSED PLAN OF WORK (continued) 
Addendum - Ethical Issues 
1 Patients and their families/informal carers: 
Patients, their families, friends and informal carers will = be involved or identified in the study 
(they will not be named or interviewed or observed as part of the data collection process). 
If participants in the study refer to individual patients or their families social or clinical 
circumstances during data collection (e. g. in an interview), then patient/family names and other identifying 
details will be omitted from transcripts and/or other records. 
2 Participants: 
Data collection at the study site will predominantly involve recording (making public) frequently 
expressed/discussed (private) opinions and ideas regarding hospice work (typical common-room talk). 
The very 'typicality' of such discussions however, presents its own dilemma. It must be noted that (1) 
participants may be naive regarding the public or revelatory nature of research, (2) health related studies 
often focus upon sensitive topics and (3) the researcher's collegiate or participant-observer status may, in 
itself, encourage participants to be more 'open' than discretion would otherwise advise. To protect 
subjects from any misunderstanding, interviews will be prefaced by a statement strongly emphasising the 
public nature of the research process. Interviews will take place under friendly but 'formal' circumstances 
away from the ward/clinical environment. Participants will no be named in the study (indexicals will be 
used) and written consent will be obtained before interviews occur. 
Anonymity can easily be compromised within a small institution if comments are linked to staff 
occupying unique professional roles. Participants vulnerable to this form of unwitting revelation will be 
advised of the possibility prior to inclusion in the study. In addition, comments that link staff to unique 
roles/positions and which explicitly refer to actual instances of direct 'hands-on' patient care will not be 
reproduced regardless of consent. 
Subjects will be offered a copy of transcripts at the end of each interview. If participants feel that 
data in the transcript might inadvertently compromise them, a substitute wording will be negotiated. 
,_, 
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enrolment. 2. CG 
19 February 2001 
CHELTENHAM 
GLOUCESTER 
College of Higher Education 
Research Administration 
Mr Martin Lipscomb 
Herefordshire 
Dear Mr Lipscomb 
Re: Enrolment for research degree 
Cornerways 
PO Box 220, The Park Campus 
The Park, Cheltenham 
Gloucestershire GL50 2QF 
Telephone: 01242 543497 
Fax: 01242 543355 
I am pleased to inform you that Student Records Office has now formally enrolled you for research study, and 
issued the following Student Reg No to be quoted in future correspondence with the College and for use of the 
library, Students Union, etc. 
Student Registration No: 0012217/1 
Faculty of: Education and Social Science School or Unit: Social Science 
Date of enrolment: 1.3.01 with effect from 1.3.01 
Please check carefully the enclosed form, sign, retain the yellow copy and return the remaining sections to me. 
You will need to retain your copy as proof of student status and to present it at Learning & Information Services 
In order to collect a student identity card from the ID Card Administrator. If liable for payment of tuition fees, 
you will receive an Invoice from the Finance Office, Corporate Services, in due course. Details of all tuition 
fees are listed in the postgraduate prospectus held in all reception areas of the College, or available from the 
above address, if you do not already have a copy. 
You should contact your first supervisor soon after arrival at the College to meet with her or him and to discuss 
preparation of a formal research proposal on form RD1. S/he will advise you of the best time to submit your 
proposal to the Faculty Research Committee which must approve your proposed programme of study. If you 
have not done so already, you should also contact your Faculty Research Director to ascertain whether you will 
be required to undertake the Postgraduate Certificate in Research Methods as part of your research degree 
study. 
Please note that your continuing enrolment as a research student is subject to a satisfactory level of 
performance, and to your completion of regular progress reports. 
It you have any queries concerning your registration, please do not hesitate to contact the Research 
Administration Office at the above address. 
We look forward to meeting you in due course. 
Y rs sincerely 
ROBERTA STEVENSON 
Graduate School Administrator 
Enc 
Copies: Supervisor: 1 of 1 
Faculty Research Director: -:: 4 
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UNIVERSITY OF 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE 
,t 
Tel: 01242 544016 
email: abrocklehurst@glos. ac. uk 
25 February 2004 
To whom it may concern 
Re Martin Lipscomb 
The above-named student was enrolled for a PhD in the Faculty of Environment and Leisure at the University 
of Gloucestershire from 1 March 2001. His research proposal (RDI) was approved by the University 
Research Committee on 1 November 2001. 
Mr Lipscomb suspended his studies from 1 July 2003 and later informed us of his decision to withdraw and 
transfer to another institution. We have therefore deemed his date of withdrawal to be the last day of his 
approved period of suspension, 1 January 2004. 
Throughout his time here, Mr Lipscomb and his supervisors have submitted bi-annual Progress reports, all of 
which have been entirely satisfactory. 
Yours faithfully 
1 
Anne Brocklehurst 
Research Officer 
Academic Registry 
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Our Ref: DP/djj/students/letters/1lipscomb 
17 May 2004 
Martin Lipscomb 
Herefordshire 
Dear Martin 
Faculty of Health 
and Social Care 
BRISTOL 
Dean Professor Steven West BSc MPodA FChS MIPEMS 
Glenside Campus 
Blackberry Hill, Stapleton 
Bristol BS16 1DD 
Telephone 0117 958 5655 
Facsimile 0117 9 
Direct Line 0117 9 
PHD TRANSFER - OFFER, REGISTRATION & ENROLMENT 
I have pleasure in confirming that your recent application to transfer a research 
degree from University of Gloucester to Faculty of -Health & Social Care, UWE has 
been approved. The Terms and Conditions of the offer are attached. Although you 
have accepted the offer verbally, I would be grateful if you would confirm your 
acceptance in writing. 
As we discussed at interview, the Faculty recognises that you have already carried out 
considerable work on your PhD whilst registered at Gloucester. We shall be crediting 
you with the 19 months of study undertaken at Gloucester and this will be deducted 
from the overall registration period here at UWE. In order to make the administrative 
process here at UWE cogent and coherent we shall make your UWE project 
repistration start date 1$ November 2002, this allows you to continue your work from 
1s October 2004 without a break. These arrangements mean that you will have 53 
months of study left in total, but there is an expectation that you will submit your thesis 
by 41 months (please see below for actual dates). 
The next step towards embarking on your studies is to enrol with the Faculty. To that 
end, I enclose an enrolment form for the academic session (2003/4). This form needs 
to be completed, signed, dated and returned to Deb Joy. You will also need to 
complete and return Section A of the enclosed "Complete Guide to Paying your Fees 
2003/04", attaching a copy of the letter confirming support from the Staff Development 
Committee for 2003/4. 
Following enrolment you will be registered with the University for your research degree 
for which there is a one-off fee payable of £410 (which will be met from staff 
development monies). As we discussed at interview, we shall be suspending your 
studies until 1st October 2004 and adding these months to your registration end date. 
This is to allow you to make the necessary adjustments to your workload schedule in 
discussion with your Head of School. When you re-enrol in October 2004 your official 
registration end date will become 1St April 2009, with an expected completion date of 
15 April 2008. Also in October you will also receive a Research Student Resource 
Folder and University-wide support programme for research students 2004/5, amongst 
other things. 
Continued/. 
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Appendix C: 1 
Additionally, confirm that your recen in erview c itüf6-d'ä successfüi Prögressiön 
Examination and you will not be required to undertake anything further in this regard. 
As we discussed at the interview, I am consulting with the Academic Secretariat with 
regard to the 60 credits research training at level M. I shall contact you as soon as 
possible with this information. 
I will be informing Gill Hek that you will be liaising with her on the ethical aspects of the 
next phase of your research project in the near future. 
I look forward to receiving your acceptance letter and all the other necessary 
paperwork by return and would like to take this opportunity to welcome you as a 
research degree student to the Faculty of Health and Social Care. -- 
Yours sincerely 
0 
Dr David Pontin 
Director Postgraduate Research Studies 
cc: Dr Margaret Miers, Director of Studies 
Dr Theresa Mitchell, Supervisor 
Enc: Enrolment Form 
The Complete Guide to Paying your Fees 20003/04 
2 
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Our Ref: MM/djj/students/letters/Iipscomb 
10 June 2004 
BRISTOL 
Mr Martin Lipscomb 
Herefordshire 
Dear Martin 
Faculty of Health 
and Social Care 
Dean Professor Steven West BSc MPoda FChS MIPEMS 
Glenside Campus --- 
Blackberry Hill, Stapleton 
Bristol BS16 1DD 
Telephone 0117 958 5655 
Facsimile 0117 9 
Direct Line 0117 9 
RESEARCH DEGREE REGISTRATION: CULTURE, AGENCY & STRUCTURE IN 
HOSPICE WORK: AN EXPLORATION OF PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CARE 
I am pleased to inform you that your PhD project has now been registered with the 
University. Your period of registration is from 1 November 2002 to 1 November 2008. 
As already agreed, the £410 project registration fee will be met through Faculty Staff 
Development Funds. We will now arrange to suspend your registration until October 
2004, as also previously agreed. 
Please note that you must re-enrol with the University in September each year until 
completion of your candidature. It is a condition of registration that you, and your 
supervisors, produce annual reports on your progress and that progress is shown to 
be satisfactory. You will be sent the relevant form each spring term. 
Confidentiality: lt is rare for a research student's thesis to need to be kept confidential 
(for a limited period). Grounds for such confidentiality appear in both the Academic 
Regulations and Academic Procedures Handbooks. If you have not applied for such 
confidentiality, and, as your work progresses, you or your collaborating establishment 
come to consider that confidentiality may be necessary, you should discuss the matter 
with your supervisor, and, if necessary, make a special application immediately. 
Please note you should not wait until you actually submit your thesis for examination 
before requesting confidentiality. 
The Faculty website includes a section for research degree students. If you are willing 
to include a synopsis of your research (and we hope you are) please email text to Deb 
Joy. The synopsis layout is available from the S drive (S: hsc/Faculty 
Info/Research/Studfms). 
Continued/... 
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Please feel free to get in touch with me if there are any administrative matters which 
you would like clarified, or any other help I can give. 
Yours sincerely 
Dr David Pontin 
Director of Postgraduate Research Studies 
cc: Dr Margaret Miers, Director of Studies 
Dr Theresa Mitchell, Supervisor 
2 
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UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST OF ENGLAND 
FACULTY OF HEALTH & SOCIAL CARE 
RESEARCH STUDENT (TRANSFER) - TERMS & CONDITIONS 
Name: Martin Lipscomb 
Level of degree: PhD 
Mode of study: Part-time 
= Place of study: Hartpure/Glenside Campus 
Period of study: Transferring Into Year 2 
Maximum registration period 72 months 
(expected completion within 60 months) 
Fees: Annual Faculty tuition fee (subject to annual review): £839 
One-off University registration fee: £410 
[Both to be met by the Faculty] 
Transfer start date: 1 June 2004 
Title of study: Culture, agency and structure in hospice work: An exploration of 
professional perspectives on care 
Outline of study: To be c nfirmed 
Supervisory team: Directdr of Studies - Dr Margaret Miers, HSC 
Supervisor - Dr Theresa Mitchell, HSC 
Supervisory arrangements: To be agreed with your Director of Studies 
Student enrolment You will be required to enrol as a student with the Faculty to 
procedure: enable you to commence your studies. The requisite forms are 
enclosed with the covering letter for completion. 
Project registration You are required to register for your research degree with the 
procedure: University. There is a one-off University registration fee payable of 
£410, which will be met by the Faculty. The Faculty Research 
Degrees Committee will ratify your project registration on 7 July 2004. 
Progression examination: Your transfer interview constituted a progression examination and you 
will not be required to undertake a further examination at this time. 
Re-enrolment procedure: Re-enrolment takes place in September each year until the completion 
of your candidature. Re-enrolment is only authorised subject to your 
satisfactory progress during the previous academic year. This is 
monitored by annual reports, produced by yourself and your 
supervisors in the Spring term of each year. 
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Ethical approval: Your project must comply with current ethical and research 
governance policies. Approval by the Faculty Ethical Committee is 
necessary for research Involving human subjects. Your research will 
also require approval from the relevant NHS Research Ethics 
committee if it involves human subjects, documents or premises 
associated with the NHS. -If approval has already been obtained 
please provide a copy for, the Research Office records.. 
Induction programme: The Faculty operates an Induction Procedure and attendance at a 
Research Students' Induction Day Is desirable. You will also be 
provided with a Research Student Resource File In due course. 
Support/training -- It is expected that all research students attend the University 
programme: and Faculty training and support programmes for research degree 
-'" `- - ýtUdenrts--The also uns generaesearch Seminar 
Research Support Workshop Programmes. Copies of all these 
programmes will be provided in due course. You will need to discuss 
research training with your supervisory team at your first meeting with 
a view to completing a Research Training Action Plan. 
Available facilities: As a part time research student you are entitled to use the available 
facilities. This includes a shared "hot desk", containing a computer 
and telephone, together with access to a printer, photocopier and fax 
machine. 
Intellectual Property Please see the University's current Intellectual Property Policy (IPP) 
Policy (if appropriate) located on the web at http: //crigs. uwe. ac. uk/intranet/ 
techTransferAndIP/IPfinal. doc, which governs the position of 
students and revenue sharing arrangements with staff, your attention 
Is drawn to section 2.2 in particular. In accepting this Studentship 
offer, you are agreeing that you will, If necessary, assign your IP 
Rights to the University. You may also be required to keep 
information relating to your project confidential. The University may 
already have decided on these matters and/or entered Into 
commitments relating to your project and will advise you If this is the 
case. The University will consult with you before entering Into-any 
new commitments that might affect your rights. Please note that in 
the event of you being required to assign IP, the University will treat 
you as an employee for sharing of income received from patents filed 
by the University. The University will use reasonable endeavours to 
enable you to publish, but please note that In some cases, you may 
be required to have a thesis (either In full or in part) examined In 
confidence. The University will advise you If this Is necessary. 
NB Forms and information relevant to research degrees can be found on the S drive at 
S: HSC/Faculty Info/Research/Studfms and Documents 
17.05.04 
STUDENTS\GENERAL\MLT&C 
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Our ref: GH/It 
10 August 2004 
Mr M Lipscomb 
UWE 
Faculty of Health, &- Social Care 
Gloucester Centre 
Hartpury Campus 
Gloucester 
GL19 3BE 
Dear Mr Lipscomb 
Application number: HSC/04/07/11 
Faculty of Health 
and Social Care 
BRISTOL 
Dean Professor Steven West esc MPodA FChS MIPEMs 
Glenside Campus 
Blackberry Hill, Stapleton 
Bristol BS16 1 DD 
Telephone 0117 958 5655 
Facsimile 0117 32 
Direct Line 0117 32 
Application title: Culture, Agency and Structure in Hospice Work: an 
exploration of professional prospectives on care 
Your ethics application was considered at the Faculty Ethics Sub-Committee 
meeting of 26 July 2004 and based on the information provided was given a 
favourable opinion to proceed with the following conditions: 
1. This is a retrospective application as it is understood that all the data has 
been collected. If any new data is to be collected, a new application needs to 
be made to the Faculty Ethics Sub-Committee. 
You do not need to resubmit your application providing you fulfil the above 
conditions. You must notify the committee in advance if you wish to make any 
significant amendments to the original application. 
If you have to terminate your research, please inform the Faculty Ethics Sub- 
Committee within 14 days, indicating the reasons for early termination. 
We wish you well with your research. 
Yours sincerely 
Gill Hek 
Chair 
Faculty Ethics Sub-Committee 
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RvVAL 
Professor D. Woodward, 
The Graduate School, 
Cheltenham & Gloucester College of Higher Education, 
Cornerways, 
PO Box'220, 
The Park Campus, 
The Park, 
Cheltenham, 
Gloucestershire, GL50 2QF. 
Dear Professor Woodward, 
19th November, 2001. 
Mr. Martin Lipscomb, PhD Research Degree 
Mr. Martin Lipscomb, a full time staff nurse at Hospice, has been granted 
permission by the Patient Care Committee of Hospice to conduct research at the 
hospice that will hopefully lead to the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). We understand the 
nature of the proposed research is to understand hospice work within a sociological context. As 
part of the research process, Mr. Lipscomb will act as a "participant observer", he will be 
interviewing staff but will not interview patients or their relatives or non-professional/paid staff 
With regard to anonymity, our understanding is that neither the hospice, or participants, 
will be named in the work. Participants will be volunteers, they remain free to leave the study at 
any time. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mrs... 
Head of Nursing. 
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Consent Form - Research at ' Hospice 
Culture, agency and structure in hospice work: an exploration of professional 
perspectives on care, 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research project, your assistance is greatly 
appreciated. 
Martin Lipscomb (the researcher) will explain why the study is being undertaken, how it will be 
conducted and what your involvement entails. Any questions that you may have (now or at a 
later date) will be answered. 
What Is involved 
A or approximately'one hour" '' (exceptions 
to this schedule may occur with participant approval). 
Interviews aim to capture your thoughts and insights regarding hospice work. 
Interviews will be tape-recorded and a copy of the transcript will be offered to you following 
transcription. 
If you believe a transcript misrepresents your comments or opinions, please inform the 
researcher and an alternative wording will be negotiated. 
Confidentiality - Anonymity 
Your name will not appear in the research. 
Hospice will not be named in the research 
Patient names will not appear in the research. 
Volunteers occupying unique roles or positions within the organisation will be advised (before 
each interview) of the possible complications regarding anonymity that may arise from this 
situation. 
Please sign and date this form if you are willing to participate in the study and accept 
the terms of this agreement. 
Interview I Volunteer to sign and date 
1 
2 
3 
You are free at all times to decline to answer any question, or to withdraw from an interview, 
or to withdraw from the whole project without giving a reason. 
A copy of this consent form will be given to each participant. 
Thank you again for your assistance. 
Martin Lipscomb - Martin. Lipscomb@uwe. ac. uk - Tel: 01531 
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Interview guide 
" Re-introduce study: re-explain purpose, aims, methods. 
" Does interviewee have any questions? 
" Invite interviewee to sign consent form. 
" Start tape recorder: ensure interviewee comfortable/ready to proceed. 
1. Confirm grade/position/role/tide. 
2. How long have you worked here? 
3. Where were you before coming here? 
4. Change? 
a. Where? 
b. How? 
c. When? 
d. Why? 
e. Specifically? 
f. Impact on staff? 
g. Impact on patients/care? 
h. Impact on you - your role - your work/function? 
5. Admissions /Discharges 
a. Admission 
i. Who do we admit - criteria for admission? 
ii. Balance? 
iii. Who influences/controls admissions? 
b. Discharge 
i. Timeliness? 
ii. Organisation of? 
iii. Reasons for? 
iv. Issues? 
6. Consultant differences 
a. Your opinion? 
b. Degree - extent - impact - significance? 
c. Specifically? 
d. Which, if any, approach do you favour? 
e. Benefits/problems? 
7. Treat 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
Went/interventions 
Changes? 
Specifically? 
Why occurring? 
Appropriateness? 
i. When appropriate? 
ii. When inappropriate? 
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8. Spirituality/Religion 
a. At study site? 
b. Distinguishing spirituality from religion? 
c. Changes in practice/attitudes? 
d. Significance for hospice? 
e. Significance for you? 
f. Role, if any, in care? 
9. External relations /consultant attitudes/care standards 
a. Who do we interact with? 
b. Why do we interact with them? 
i. How is the process of interaction managed? 
c. NHS palliative care consultant attitudes to hospices in general and 
us specifically? 
i. Significance - impact - threat? 
d. Clinical Governance and Care Standards? 
i. Role - significance - meaning for function/activity? 
10. Other: 
a. Education? 
b. Funding? 
c. Future developments? 
" Does interviewee have any questions/wish to say anything? 
" Is interviewee comfortable with questions/experience? 
" Restate - copy transcript to be forwarded following transcription. 
" Thank interviewee for participating and conclude. 
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Pre-coding interview summary A: a 
Conversational style allows content display as `binary contrasts' - A: a, NA, 15 years 
service at hospice (arrived 12-18 months after opening). Recent drop in hours to PT 
from FT. 
Past 
Quieter (8 beds) 
Time-to talk/socialise 
Less patients 
Predominantly terminal patients 
Discharge rare (seen as 'success') 
Relationships with pts/families `friends' 
Relationships were `closer' 
Less staff (total) 
More staff "on ground" 
(Implication - less professionalised) 
More NAs (ratio) bigger role in care 
Less trained nurses 
More cleaners/kitchen staff (ratio) 
Less admin/support staff 
High staff camaraderie (crisis) 
Clinical staff actively fundraise/promote 
Nursing/NAs share common values 
Overt spiritual values expressed 
Sympathetic to religion 
Chapel used more 
Staff psyche support `religious' 
Present 
Busier (16 beds + day hospice + 
outreach + Macs) 
Less time to talk/socialise 
More patients 
Mainly palliative patients (active 
symptom treatment)' 
(Implication - discharge now 
common) 
Relationships with pts/families 
`professional' 
Relationships now `distanced' 
More staff (total) 
(Implication - as (a) ratio changes, (b) 
less `hands on') 
Increased professionalism distances 
staff from patients/families' 
Less NAs (ratio) reduced 
role/importance 
More trained nurses 
Less cleaners /kitchen staff (ratio) 
More admin/support staff 
(Implication - now less camaraderie) 
(Implication - clinical & support staff 
distinct)" 
New 'NHS' staff more diverse 
(different values) 
Secular, few spiritual values displayed 
Less sympathetic (hostile? ) to religion 
Chapel less utilised 
(Implication - support now secular 
or fractured/professionalised) 
I Despite change from terminal to palliative admissions current balance is about right, p. 13. 
2 Anomaly? Rare discharge a `success', need to `keep them going so they can go home again' 
- query does this undermine `acceptance' of death, p. 3? 
3 Increased numbers of professionals contribute to pt/family-staff distancing, p. 5. 
4 Indicates role/professional boundaries originally fluid, implies now fixed/rigid - note 
relaxed non-medical behaviour of earlier hospice medics, p. 16. Sadness at loss of 
camaraderie/aim, p. 7. 
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Prayers prior to MDT 
Bell call to prayers 
Prayers offered on death 
Less medicalised (talk - pain control) 
(Implication - poor medical leadership) 
Nurses `freer' to give medication 
Less documentation/ bureaucracy 
Practice abandoned 
Practice abandoned 
Prayers now covertly offered - 
limited expression allowed (by 
whom? ) 
More medicalised (quicker resort to 
drugs) 
Medical leadership improved 
Nurses `hands tied' re medications 
(distinguishes between old/new 
hands)' 
More documentation/ bureaucracy 
Hospice. 
Attitude - care 
Humane 
people. 
Personal relationships formed 
Body `a nice place to be' 
Not turning away from death6 
Open awareness (sensitive) 
Pt `bravery' confronted with death 
Originally seen as `defeat' by some GPs 
`In beginning' voluntary organisation 
status valued 
More than a job 
Good aftercare (hoped for)' 
Hospice patients: 
Hospitat 
Attitude - cure 
Less humane - pts not treated as 
Depersonalised 
Treatment overextended (`worse than 
disease') 
Turning away/reluctance to accept 
death 
(Implication - voluntary status now 
devalued/nebulous? ) 
(Implication - just a job for some? ) 
Poor aftercare (e. g. drug labelling) 
Non-ho spice patients 
Those treating it as hotel (disrespect) 
Dementia - mental illness, mental 
degeneration (disruptive) 
Professionalism rejected emphatically - p. 6 
Attitudinal changes linked to influx of hospital (system) influenced staff - p. 6 
Strong emotional commitment to hospice 
Hospice Board - elitist, distant. 
5 Difference in use of drugs noted between old timers and new recruits. 
6 Possible anomaly, p. 5 - doctor refers to hospice as `unit', why embarrassed by name? 
7 Wants admin/discharge liaison nurse appointed, p. 13-4. Practical aspects of aftercare often 
ignored, p. 14. 
2of2 
Appendix H 
Pre-coding interview summary B: a 
Conversational style discursive and `layered'. ß: a - Nurse [Edit]. At hospice 
approximately 2 years. 
Emotional response to or engagement with suffering prompts choice of nursing 
career. Early professional/work experience gained in nursing homes (NH) and 
[Edit]. Frustrated by inability to care for patients as would like. Retrained [Edit] - 
became [Edit]. Frustration regards care standards provided continued prior to 
move to hospice. Following move to hospice, B: a able to provide terminal care as 
wants to. 
Death 
`Good' death an important concept for B: a. Prefers terminal to respite pts or 
arranging discharges. Prefers relations `calm', patient sedated `calm', not 
fighting/thrashing, notes that family and respondents perceptions can vary. 
`Bad' death involves uncontrolled symptoms, anger, unresolved personal or family 
issues, not relaxed. Claims age irrelevant (but note multiple references to aged death 
as more acceptable/less fearful than youthful death). Vivid descriptions given of 
frightening symptoms/deaths (faecal vomit and catastrophic bleeds in particular). 
Own death fears [Edit] 
Professionalism & emotional involvement 
Emotional involvement deliberately curtailed/limited behind professional `face' - 
professionalism used to distance B: a from emotional response (may be involved 
with/experience 2/3 deaths per day at hospice). Notes reduction in emotional 
involvement with rising medical input. Professionalism associated with `doing' 
rather than `feeling'. Notes professional expectations vary between hospice and NH. 
Conscious focus at hospice on technical/rational knowledge/aspects of care. 
Tech/rational skills valued above `homemaker' skills. Hospice patients have 
complex needs and their deaths can be vivid and frightening [Edit]. Involvement - 
influenced by likeability of patient, i. e., `like my own granny'. Personal fear of 
cancer. Distinguishes between personal response to horror (revulsion/nausea) and 
professional ability to cope [Edit]. 
Symptom control 
Claims that appropriate knowledge exists to control symptoms so that, personal 
failings aside, symptom control should be unproblematic. Pain - states that effective 
pain control requires professional's to tackle psychiatric `problems' (pain not purely 
physiological). 
Reluctant to articulate concept of total pain (though aware of concept). Term can be 
a `cop out', has potential for misuse. 
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Hospice patients 
Mix generally correct bar qualms about some respite and dementia patients (linked 
to `valued' good death). Unprepared to say who should come in/be excluded. Notes 
that `nice' patients kept longer than burdensome. 
Hospice 
Higher staffing ratios, more resources, good medical cover. Privacy in bays 
problematic. Hospice = public deaths. Younger deaths less accepting (than 
advanced ages). Old patients watch younger patients die. 
Dissent problematic. Conformity valued (by management? ). Initiative valued by 
clinical team. Ideal hospice - single rooms, encourage talk, high staff ratio, good 
symptom control, good communication, not raising false hope, setting clear 
boundaries/objectives. In actuality - communication sometimes lacking, poor 
nurse/doctor communication (nurse opinions devalued on ward rounds). Lack of 
`momentum', nothing definite, drift. Poor management by consultants, patients slide 
between categories /boundaries - absence of clarity. Poor planning. 
Nursing homes 
Long term care fosters `family' like atmosphere (their own home). Poor medical 
(GP) input (cost, attitude). Attempt not to admit to hospital. Privacy in own (or 
twin) rooms. NH = private deaths. Advanced age associated with acceptance. High 
emotional involvement (3/4 deaths per year). 
Professionalism rather than `professional', claims difference. NH deaths acceptable 
(not frightening), however - note qualms re inadequate pain/symptom control. 
Description of NH death somewhat idealised, but more `hospice' than hospice. 
Hospitals 
Hospice better (no evidence), superior communication. 
Change at hospice 
Notes major changes over last two years. Was - more like NH. Now - busier/more 
interventionist (more IVs/antibiotics). Suggests doing more may add to patient 
problems. Interventions (palliative or otherwise) raise patient/family expectations. 
Danger of giving false hope (when `little hope' exists). Over-treatment of symptoms 
may hamper peaceful death. Activity hinders acceptance. Possible reticence on 
hospice's part to state situation/prognosis (closed awareness? ). 
Acknowledges separateness of palliative and hospice care, but reluctant to articulate 
difference. 
Consultants 
Recognises major difference between consultants. Coni keeps patients longer. 
Prescription differences (Con2 lower initial doses). Con2 more interventionist. 
Disagrees with some of Con2 interventions (e. g. inappropriate transfusions). 
Acknowledges differing nursing preferences for consultant styles. 
Personally likes Con1 despite being worse boundary smudger than Con2 (anomaly). 
Choice - Do we allow patients too much choice? Should we `guide' more? (sec 
Change above) 
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Opiates /Euthanasia 
We hasten death, but this is not unacceptable. Equivocal regards euthanasia 
(variable attitude towards). 
Against euthanasia in hospice - what we do is `euthanasia enough'. 
Prepared to equate sedation with euthanasia. Notes differences in nurse medicating 
- linked with potential for abuse. Yet also believes we can hold back sedation 
(reticence about offering enough in a timely manner). 
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Interview coding process - A: a 
TpA coding begins when `a label is attached to a section of text to index it as 
relating to a theme or issue which the researcher has identified as important to his 
or her interpretation' (King, 2004, p. 257). Following King (2007b, 2004), coding did 
not begin however until the researcher was familiar with the interviews. To this end 
recordings were replayed, transcripts were re-read and notes were made (Appendix 
G and H). Familiarisation enabled the researcher to formulate provisional ideas or 
proto-theories regarding (i) individual transcripts, (ii) relations between transcripts 
and (iii) relations between transcripts and observed practice. Familiarisation also 
facilitated (iv) reflection on the relationship between interview derived proto-theory 
and MM theory. To illustrate both the labelling process and the importance of pre- 
coding interpretation a short passage from the interview with participant A: a is 
examined. 
quietness physical size 
busyness 
staff numbers 
A: a Well it was, well f one it was much quieter th uiete 
(e hasis). The whole, you know, I mea we were on y open for tight beds 
We o ave four staff in the morning and t rec iae and 
three on the night and that was it. And it was like two trained and two 
aux " erhaps more than that, two trained and three a in the 
medicalisation 
morning and one trained and two auxiliaries in the afternoon and one 
train nd two auxiliaries at night. And so it was very much a (pause). Not 
so medical (emphasis). You kno it was very much well we'll go and ask the 
social and/or trained staff if you can have something, you know, but if you want me to sit 
emotional 
engagement her ve a chat if that might help. And sometimes it mes 
the drug wasn't necessary; it was just let's sit and hold your hand and have 
talk. ý'ýý 
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ML So did they have an on site doctor all the time? 
A: a Yes, yes they did. 
ML But you felt you didn't go to them as often as we do now, or do you feel you 
relied less upon the prescription charts? staff numbers 
staff ratios 
A: a Yes but they (pause), I mean they were written up for ain killers, they were 
written up for morphine. You know, for anti-eme cs and all that sort of 
thing. They were written up for t ley them if they 
wanted to. Bu e ere were a of o rounc and you 
social and/or ka lot more socialising, sitting o, g on ti cd emotional 
engagemen show us your knitting, and you know sitting on the bed and playing 
rabble. 
ML So by implication we don't do that so much now? 
A: a No, no we don't. 
ML When did it change then? staff numbers 
recruitment 
busyness 
use I suppose as we got more and more patients as we started to to 
more sicker akin in e 
admission staff. And te trained staff were coming main y re you 
practice don' playing scra e aug is , or crosswords, you 
' ou 
medicalisation ow, you don't sit there giving somebody a massage or spending time 
cur ha' nr what L-,, You know, that's, that's wh, c; it 
beca e more of a (pause) medical job. I do 't kn w what the words arc. 
social and/or emotional 
engagement 
ML You wrinkle your nose when you say that, so do you put, I take it from the 
way you say it, that you place a high value on the way it was to begin with? 
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A: a 
, 
ý'kausd)sý but then; you know I'm coming from an ai iary=s_pQint i)F -`-, 
-'"ý- , 
View ca. mean oo at te wor we - caw it's 
Nursing assistan 
registered nurse,, far fnore palliative than terminal isn't it. I mean then it was terminal care,. -- 
------------------------------ -- 
Hospice/palliative workloads Hospice/palliative status 
Interviewee A: a begins by emphasising how much quieter the hospice used to be 
and thus, by implication, it is now busier. Quietness is put down to size "we were 
only open for eight beds" and linked to staff attitudes or behaviours "but if you 
want me to sit here and have a chat, if that might help. " The hospice was, in its early 
period, "Not so medical" and staff engaged with patients in what might be termed 
emotionally therapeutic socialisation (i. e. massage, playing scrabble and hair curling). 
This past is then juxtaposed against seven overlapping features of current practice; 
changes in the ratio of nursing auxiliaries and registered nurses, the admission of 
more and "sicker" patients, staff recruitment from environments where unhurried 
socialisation is impractical, increasing busyness, a move from terminal to palliative 
care and medicalisation. Further, implicit or unarticulated assumptions about 
nursing assistant-registered nurse interaction and the relative workload involved in 
terminal and palliative (symptom control) care may also be discernable. 
In the exemplar passage (above), identifying labels (notated on transcripts by 
a mixture of overlapping coloured markings and scribbled margin comments) 
referenced `quietness', `busyness', `physical size', `social and/or emotional 
engagement', `admission practice', `recruitment', `staff numbers', `staff ratios', 
`medicalisation' and `hospice/palliative status'. Provisional or tentative labels arc 
also posted against `nursing assistant-registered nurse interaction' and 
`hospice/palliative workloads' (the provisional nature of these labels is here 
illustrated by the use of dotted lines and italicised scripts). 
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Some comments carry multiple labels. This is termed parallel coding. Parallel 
coding occurs when `the same segment is classified within two (or more) different 
codes at the same time' (King, 2004, p. 258). Parallel coding occurs in the above 
passage when two labels, `quietness' and `busyness', are attached to the opening 
phrase (current busyness is implied). Parallel coding is also apparent in the template 
created for A: a (Appendix K). Here comments about increasing 
treatment/interventions are linked to staff recruitment. These data are situated 
under the first level codes `Change' and `Treatment/interventions'. 
Labels describe data. However, following §2 Chapter 1, labels do not simply 
arise from the data, rather they are suggested by thematically informed pre-coding 
interview proto-theory as well as broader philosophic/theoretic considerations. Pre- 
coding transcript familiarisation had, in this instance, forewarned the researcher that 
A: a and other participants linked together changes such as staff ratios/numbers and 
recruitment to increasing medicalisation and treatment/intervention use. 
Familiarisation facilitates the interpretive process when, in examining a single 
passage, the researcher is, as stated, cognisant of its place within the transcript as a 
whole, its relation to other transcripts and observed practice. Textual (transcript) 
analysis is thus aided by factors external to the interview `segment' under review 
(this aspect of interpretation is developed further in Appendix J). For example, in 
the passage above, the label `staff ratios' can only be attached because subsequent 
comments by A: a make it clear that this is what she was referring to (the key word 
here is `us' - i. e. `us' auxiliary nursing assistants) and, below, intcrvicwer-intcrvicwcc 
familiarity allowed (non-over exposing) affective revelation by A: a to highlight the 
significance or meaningfulness of what was being said. Thus, in response to the 
question, "Do we still get to know them [patients] as well as we used to? " A: a 
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replies "No" and suggests that such interaction "isn't part of it", hospice activity, 
"any more". 
A: a No. No. We got to know them a lot (pause), a lot better because we had 
more time. You know there weren't all these people about. 
ML Why don't we have time? We have very good patient-staff ratios? 
A: a Yea (pause). Why don't we? (Pause) Well because that, that isn't part of it 
any more. That was it (emphasis). That isn't (pause) [it now]. 
This excerpt suggests that an emotional distancing has occurred between staff and 
patients. The literal meaning of these comments is clear and yet the emotional or 
affective `weight' captured in the interview recording is lost in transcription. 
Through inflection and wavering tonality a tremendous sadness is conveyed to the 
listener at this point. A: a may not have revealed this distress to an unfamiliar 
researcher and, even had this occurred, without knowing the respondent an 
unfamiliar researcher may not have appreciated the importance of such expression. 
Pre-coding familiarisation alerted the researcher to the significance of this and 
similar passages in advance of formal coding; it helped to suggest the sorts of labels 
that might usefully be employed and it demonstrated that data analysis benefits 
from consideration of extra-textual factors. It is a strength of TPA that it 
encourages such consideration and, as in the above instance, such consideration 
allows due significance to be given to emotional as well as literal (textual) 
statements. 
NM (level 2) theory allows (§1 Chapter 2) that unequal rates of change may 
occur between, for example, social and cultural structures and the expression and 
interpretation of data/labels were influenced by this possibility. In the exemplar 
passage it was supposed that suggestive evidence for just this form of differential 
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morphogenesis might be apparent (level 3 theory). Grand conclusions cannot of 
course be drawn from short transcript excerpts such as those presented above. 
Nonetheless, the consistency and coherence of the interpretation allowed by the use 
of these labels is demonstrated internally, within the transcript, both by the repeated 
use of these labels in describing subsequent passages (albeit that, in TpA, frequency 
does not equal salience) and the closeness or case of `fit' between labels and 
template themes. Externally, the utility of these labels is demonstrated by their 
ability to interpret data across transcripts. 
As will be noted, it is not claimed that A: a's narrative is itself consistent or 
coherent - though it appears to be - rather, emphasis is placed on the consistency 
and coherence of the interpretation allowed by theoretically informed label use. This 
does not concede that coding `merely' produces an interpretation. It recognises 
rather that, for realists who reject correspondence theories of truth (§1 Chapter 3), 
transitive explanations of intransitive reality are always and necessarily 
interpretations. 
Following formal labelling, TpA orders similar labels or codes `together to 
produce more general higher-order codes .. [and this] Hierarchical coding allows 
the researcher to analyse texts at varying levels of specificity' (King, 2004, p. 258). 
Appendix K lists six levels of code for A: a. These range from high first level codes 
such as `Change within the hospice' (level 1) through to more specific lower level 
codes such as `claims need to keep hospice spirit alive' (level 3). As will be noted, 
the description of data in Appendix K does not use the `bulleted' labels described 
earlier. Rather, more descriptive phrases are employed and this change reflects the 
requirement that template coding captures the entirety of an interview. That said, 
although the exemplar passage describes only a small fragment of the interview, 
data/evidence from this passage clearly informs Appendix K at several points. 
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For example, starting with the above identified data labels (quietness, 
busyness, physical size, etc) and working `upwards' it was possible to maintain and 
incorporate additional themes into the interpretation of A: a's narrative so that, in 
the researcher's opinion, a more comprehensive picture of her position is captured. 
Thus, as can be seen (Appendix K), under the general heading `Change within the 
hospice' and three second level codes (i) `was quieter, now busier', (ii) 
`professionalisation - role change' and (iii) `staff-patient relations, much of the data 
from the exemplar passage is reproduced. 
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Interview coding process - B: a 
Here emphasis is placed on the suggestion that interpretation is best accomplished 
when transcript data are: (i) read in the round (rather than being disaggregated), (ii) 
placed in context of the interview as a whole and (iii) related to comments made in 
other interviews. Where this occurs, analysis of the exchange supports and extends 
initial template themes. The exchange was prefaced by a query regarding participant 
B: a's nursing home experience. 
B: a Well, well, if, we have, we have better staffing. We have, but in nursing 
homes you often are looking after people you've known for very many years 
often. And they are very much part of the family (pause). And to be fair the 
carers and the staff feel it very greatly when people do die (emphasis) (pause). 
And I think the difference is that there, there is very little, trying to stop 
anybody dying. Or, I think symptom control, I think pain control is bad 
(emphasis) in nursing homes because GPs often don't want to know. And if 
you call in a specialist they don't particularly want to be bothered to come 
out to a nursing home. And there are cost implications that, that they ask to 
be paid to come out and give an opinion. And that, often the nursing homes 
can't do that and you find that people are dying on paracetamol (pause). 
Which is (laughs) a very good drug (laughs), but you've got someone who 
(pause). You're using all of the other methods, you're using (pause) 
positioning of the patient who's, you're using wheat bags, you're using heat, 
you're using (pause) massage, you're using lots of other, you, you have to be 
very, very inventive because often you can't get NISTs' or, because of cost 
implications to the GPs who really can't be bothered with (pause) with, to 
visit nursing homes. I find, I did find that very frustrating (emphasis). But 
here I find it amazing because everything is thrown at people like [Patient] 
to make sure that things are good. And that was one of the things I found 
very frustrating in nursing homes (pause) .. In a nursing 
home it's a bit like 
they're dying in their own homes. They've often been with us a long time, 
like I said. So consequently they, they often die with, in their own bed, with 
their possessions around them. They're in a place they've known as home, 
often. With people around them that they recognise, or don't recognise as 
family. There's certainly (pause), I don't know, I think they feel (pause). We 
try very hard not to send them into hospital. We feel very strongly that they 
should die at home, as in their home (pause). Dying here I think can be a 
little bit (pause) hospitalised and a bit (pause) medicalised (pause). I think we 
do our best if a family stays. And obviously they can have as many people 
around them as they like. But (pause) often, well certainly in the four bedded 
I : Morphine sulphate tablet. 
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areas (pause), the families I'm sure, and the patients themselves are quite 
aware of the deaths going on in the next beds. And that sort of thing. In 
nursing homes, we did use to make sure that people had their privacy. They 
often all had single rooms anyway. So it was perhaps always private, their 
deaths. Whereas here sometimes the deaths are a little bit public (pause). 
And then again, of course, (pause) people in nursing homes tended to be of, 
of an age when (pause) not only did they accept it perhaps themselves, but 
also the people in the nursing home could. Here (pause), I find that some of 
the, with the age differences, you've got some, an older person watching a 
younger person die. Or, visa-versa, it's (pause) perhaps, it can be much more 
frightening, here. Whereas in a nursing home, in a way, they did expect to 
die. 
ML You said that in the nursing home (pause), it was their home (pause), you'd 
known them for some time, and when they died, you felt it keenly. Whereas 
here, if, how does that compare with here? 
B: a (Pause). I don't allow myself to feel a great deal here. To me, clearly this is a 
different ball game (pause). There, that was their home and we got very 
involved with them (pause). So that, there, they were a little bit like, to use, a 
little bit like our grannies and granddads. It was, it was a home yea. And we 
tried to make it homely. Here (long pause), that was still professional, it was, 
I was still a professional person. But here I find it different; I find it more, 
more (pause) perhaps because it is more medicalised. Because we do more 
things (pause). Perhaps because it's a more professional team generally and 
there's a lot more going on. I don't know (pause). I've very rarely been 
affected by anybody dying here (pause). I don't think it's because I'm hard 
(pause). I just think it's (pause). When I came here it is what I came here for 
and to do. And I, I, I'd known those people for perhaps three or four years. 
I'd watched them get more poorly. Whereas here, they're often admitted 
more poorly and (pause). I can't explain it, it's different, but I don't get as 
close. Whether that's because I consciously don't get as close because we 
have so many and I, emotionally I don't think anyone would be able to hack 
it if you felt every death (pause). But certainly if you're having two or three 
in a day (pause). 
At one level several of the labels used to code A: a (Appendix I) are applicable here. 
Thus, "we have better staffing" was labelled `staff numbers' and "Dying here I think 
can be a little bit hospitalised and a bit medicalised" was labelled `medicalisation'. 
New labels are also introduced. For example, in the first paragraph `GP/pain' was 
applied to comments regarding perceived GP failings and the statement "everything 
is thrown at" was labelled `resource'. The extract's interpretive significance is 
however, not revealed in line by line or close labelling (though this occurred). 
2of6 
Appendix J 
Rather, the extract's significance becomes apparent when read as a whole. It can 
then be seen to expose values and ideas about nurse-patient relations, good or 
desirable forms of death and changed hospice practice through the juxtaposition of 
commentaries on nursing home and hospice deaths. 
Thus, despite recognising that pain control may be suboptimal and 
resources limited, B: a idealises nursing home deaths. Reflecting personal values 
articulated elsewhere in the interview B: a notes that nursing home deaths occur 
privately in "single rooms". People die "in their own bed, with their possessions 
around them" and, when it occurs, death is expected and accepted. Importantly, 
patients are "people you've known for very many years .. And they are very much 
part of the family. " Consequently, when they die, "the staff feel it very greatly". 
Such deaths are infrequent and B: a quantifies this by later noting that two or three a 
year may be normal. 
At the hospice it is, in contrast, common to have "two or three" deaths a 
day. These deaths lack privacy. They are "public" and occur in un-homely bays 
where "patients .. are quite aware of the 
deaths going on in the next bed. " 
Significantly, for B: a, emotional engagement is reduced. Contra her nursing home 
experience, B: a states that "I don't allow myself to feel a great deal here" and "I've 
rarely been affected by anybody dying here. " These comments are somewhat 
disingenuous since it is quite evident from subsequent passages (edited to prevent 
over-exposure) that B: a, like others, is profoundly affected by witnessed violent and 
traumatic hospice deaths. Nevertheless, the number and forms of death experienced 
at the hospice necessitate that, for B: a, conscious boundaries be erected against 
exposing emotional engagement and, to manage this exposure it is later suggested 
that "I feel here [at the hospice that] I use my `professional' head (pause) in a way 
almost as a (pause) wall to hide behind, to keep me from getting too involved. " 
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Situated within the interview, these comments may be interpreted as a 
critique of change that uses the running juxtaposition of nursing home-hospice 
difference as a plot or narrative device. Thus, for example, later in the interview Na 
notes that "When I first came here it was closer to (pause) a nursing home death 
than it is now. " B: a also states that "I seem to remember that when I first came 
here. We, we (pause) we did things for them, but then we seemed to know when to 
call it a day. " Now however, increasing treatment/interventions, although palliative 
in intent, cannot but "give them hope when there isn't any (pause) hope. " Indeed, 
the hospice currently seems "to treat quite actively and (pause) I don't think that 
does anything to get, to give somebody a nice, a peaceful death. " Again, the censure 
of current hospice practice is contrasted with nursing home care where "they just 
seemed to accept the fact that they were dying, as did the family, 
because that's what 
was happening .. everyone was very accepting of that" and B: a thus 
links change at 
the hospice with more active treatment/interventions, the potential giving of false 
hope, professionalisation and personal emotional withdrawal or boundary setting. 
Looking across transcripts, this interpretation is bolstered insofar as §2 
Chapter 1 and Appendix I both describe, for A: a, kindred changes at the hospice 
regarding busyness, a rise in the number of high dependency patient admissions and 
increases in the number and complexity of treatment/interventions. A: a talks about 
an influx of acutely trained staff whereas B: a does not. Nevertheless, A: a specifically 
mentions forms of low or non-technical therapeutic intervention (e. g. massage) that 
mirror B: a's comments on the use of massage, positioning and 
heat pads to relieve 
discomfort and A: a reports upon forms of developing professionalisation that, 
accompanying these changes, encourage or are synonymous with emotional 
disengagement. Further, allied sentiments about the direction of change, 
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treatment/interventions and staff-patient relations are echoed by other cainicall), 
based nurses. 
Respondent E: a, for example, made comments that appear to `confirm' or 
support the opinions offered by A: a and B: a. E: a is a registered nurse who worked 
at the hospice in its early years and, following a break, more recently. She stated that 
for the early hospice: 
E: a the level of medical intervention was far less .. I always, we used to be able 
to feel that our patients died peacefully, I don't anymore (pause). They were 
loved. We used much less in the way of intervention. We would never have 
had sub-cute fluids up. We never had an IV. ' We weren't allowed to give 
blood .. 
it was different (emphasis) the atmosphere was different. The 
atmosphere was much more homely. Much less like a hospital .. 
The recurrent ubiquity of similar expressions amongst some respondents does not 
mean that personal experience validates external reality - the authenticity of extra- 
linguistic reality cannot meaningfully be `voted' upon - and contradictory 
viewpoints were also expressed - nevertheless, insofar as the interpretation of 
respondent comments offered here is coherent within and across transcripts, the 
reader may perhaps have some confidence in the interpretation offered. 
B: a's interview template (Appendix L) recognises the nursing home-hospice 
distinction by the inclusion of a new theme labelled `Nf-I and hospice care. ' In this 
way the initial template is extended albeit that some of the issues illustrated by this 
dichotomy are parallel coded under other headings such as `Mcdicalisation' and 
`Professionalisation - role change'. At master template (Appendix M) level the 'N II 
and hospice care' theme is, as stated in §1 Chapter 1, lost, since other interviewees 
did not raise this distinction in this way. Nevertheless, key elements from Na, A: a 
and E: a's commentaries (as well as others) appear under the heading 'C lange within 
2 Subcutaneous. 
3 Intravenous infusion. 
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the hospice' and subsidiary headings `T'reatment/interventions' and 
'Professionalisation' and, in this way, the substance of these interpretations is 
maintained. 
TpA coding, interpretation or analysis occurs at a variety of levels. The place 
of pre-coding interpretation and line by line labelling was described in Appendix I. 
Here, emphasis is placed on the argument that interpretation also requires that 
interpreters look beyond the transcript details so that interviewee comments may be 
understood `in the round'. Contextualisation is provided by `placing' interviewee 
comments within the `frame' of the transcript as a whole as well as other 
transcripts/observations. Contextualisation here enables B: a's nursing home- 
hospice contrast or dichotomy to be seen as a narrative device through which ideas 
about change and the consequents of change can be articulated. This interpretation 
then allows NM theory to overtly re-enter the analytic process and, for example, it 
might be suggested that B: a describes structural changes that `outstrip' the S-C; 
`position' or values of B: a and other clinicians. Suggestions regarding differential 
morphogensis and agential S-C interaction are made simply to illustrate how TpAA 
coding may inform MM theory and sufficient evidence is not supplied here to 
substantiate such proposals. 
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Template A: a 
Code levels: 
123456 
Change within the hospice 
was quieter, now busier 
sicker patients - greater willingness to intervene medically 
different patients 
professionalisation - role change 
unwelcomed - increasing focus on treatment/interventions 
unwelcomed - distances staff from patients/ families 
unwelcomed - greater role specialism/separateness 
respondent more involved in hospice activity when less 
professionalised 
during 1980s financial crisis - respondent involved in 
fund raising - moral/camaraderie then good 
financial crisis necessitated practice changes 
(equipment use) 
claims need to keep hospice spirit alive 
now more `upstairs people' and relatively fewer `downstairs people' 
more `form filling' -a shift away from patient care 
staff relations change with increasing numbers of staff 
staff relations change with changing staff ratios 
auxiliaries - decline in ratio compared with nurses 
auxiliaries less active in MDM' 
auxiliaries disempowercd from wider hospice involvement 
nurses - influx from local state sector 
differences between behaviours/attitudes of old anti new 
recruits 
doctors - medicalisation 
more doctors - medical staff have more power relative to 
nurses 
I MDM - Multi-disciplinary meeting. 
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new doctors and nurscs - nurscs and tIC>cturM coýnuiuk 
fr"rii 
acute backgrounds - nurses Icss w,. "illirig/nlblc to act 1111 f)%%-Il 
initiative - inability to intervene toi relieve lain willi«nut 
medical input 
staff-patient relations change (used to `know' Patients more) - less involvcd 
in personal care with increasing staff numbers 
less than adequate care attributed to recent influx of hospital staff 
(discharge medications) 
Treatment/interventions 
rise in interventions linked to increased staff numbers and recruitment 
from 
NHS 
rise in interventions linked to change from terminal to palliative care 
rise in specific interventions - example, blood used 
Spirituality/Religion 
Overtness of spiritual/religious dimension lost 
bell no longer rung 
experiences `loss' at changed situation 
Decline in overt spirituality/religiosity linked with new influx of staff from 
NHS 
More focus on symptom palliation, less focus on event of death or suffering 
Prayers on death - now offered covertly 
Open awareness 
Increased 
Reticence of some early medical staff to use term hospice 
Patient groups 
Were terminal - now palliative care 
Paradoxically, respondent appeared to prefer old regime but would 
not want to turn away non-terminal patients 
People with mental health problems and those with dementia not suitable 
hospice patients 
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Inappropriate patients or patient behaviours recognised 
Consultant differences 
Consultant differences acknowledged - one (Conl) a `soft touch' 
Hospice management 
Trust board -a distant relationship 
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Template B: a 
Code levels: 
12345 
Change within the hospice (often juxtaposed against Nursing Home care) 
Significant change observed in two years 
defined as move away from Nursing Home (NH) type care 
new patient needs recognised 
higher dependency admissions 
new medical responses possible 
new forms of care initiated (more treatment/interventions) 
new care changes staff-staff and staff-patient relationships 
Professionalism 
hospice becoming more professional - care becoming more 
professional 
in contrast to NH professional behaviour hospice professionalism: 
promotes technical competence (doing skills) 
a response to changing patient needs 
a response to medical willingness to meet those needs 
allows emotional disengagement/protection 
disengagement welcomed - response to multiple 
violent deaths 
more active patient management required 
decision making - poor when `passive', when patients kept 
for no purpose 
Rising expectations on part of public/patients/families 
Treatment/ interventions 
Interventions increasing (e. g. - more IVs, antibiotics ctc) 
Interventions may inadvertently engender unfounded/ false hope 
paradox between intervening to ameliorate symptoms (good) and 
raising false expectations about delaying impending death (bad) 
contrast good NH practice (accepting inevitable death) with 
confused messages given out by proactive hospice stance 
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Treatments may continue for too long - difficulty or failure in withdrawing 
and/or defining boundaries /limits 
Consultant differences 
Consultant differences acknowledged 
paradox - respondent wants more active management of patient 
admissions but prefers less active consultant style on medication use 
and patient communication 
Criticism of active consultant for offering patients options that they cannot 
emotionally refuse "clutching at straws" 
Believes less interventionist consultant generally preferred by nursing staff 
Proactive consultant innovative (good) 
Discharge 
Problems with discharges - quick readmission - poorly managed 
Distinguishes between liked and disliked patients (disliked discharged more 
speedily) 
Communication 
Communication and personal skills valued by patients - not just technical 
skills 
Challenges crude ideas about open awareness (emphasises need for privacy 
- "properly private things") 
Danger of engendering false hope (need to make treatment refusal 
acceptable) 
Call for communicative clarity when discussing options with patients - need 
to set expectational boundaries - encourage patients to get out when able 
Notes occasional poor doctor nurse communication 
Leadership/Management 
Need to take lead in managing admission duration and treatment goals - 
notes occasional current problems 
Lack of medical lead - lack of clarity (results in overly long patient stays & 
delayed discharges) 
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moral imperative to manage admission goals/aims on patients bchalf 
Currently failing to manage some patients effectively - in particular - 
changes in patient status (respite - symptom control - palliative - terminal) 
poorly managed 
Top heavy management 
Sedation 
Not enough sedation sometimes given - possibly should scdatc for reasons 
other than pain 
Concedes opiate use life shortening 
Willing to consider euthanasia but probably not at hospice "what we do 
here is euthanasia enough" 
Accepts that terminal sedation a form of euthanasia (functional 
death) 
Nurse differences - some give more opiates than others - open to 
abuse 
Patient groups 
Terminal patients - favoured patient group 
Access - despite preference for terminal patients - respondent 
unwilling to deny access to non-terminal patients 
Respite and MND patients - admission suitability questioned 
Death Fears 
Strong personal interest in death 
Fear of death - hospice deaths often violent and nasty [Edit] 
Good death - peaceful, calm, sedated, family appreciative 
Bad death - lack of equanimity rather than age related (however, NI-I deaths 
distanced by age) 
Coping with death - difference between professional and private reactions 
NH and hospice care 
Hospice staff less emotionally involved with päticnts than NH staff 
Respondent emotionally detached at hospice 
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explanation for detachment - high patient turnover and numbcr of 
deaths 
professionalism a bulwark against emotional involvement 
professional `face'/expectations vary between hospice and 
NH 
NH staff lack hospice resources and must be inventive in tackling 
pain/symptoms 
Death in NH -a death in the family 
Hospice death comparatively medicalised and interventionist compared with 
NH death 
NH death less public than hospice death 
NH death expected and accepted (age important) - hospice death may be 
more unwelcome/violent 
Hospice and hospital care 
Belief that hospice care superior to hospital care 
more staff 
more openness and honesty (however, sec comments on 
engendering false hope) 
more time 
Criticism 
Hospice reluctant to seek or accept criticism 
Hospice management do not like `boat rockers' 
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Master template 
Code levels: 
123456 
Structures and institutions 
State/NHS relations - hostile environment, hospice perceives that its interests are 
threatened - conscious engagement with external bodies to protect interests 
Department of Health 
Clinical Governance 
burdensome 
little/no benefit to hospice 
resource wasteful 
Care Standards Act 
requires compliance 
will align hospice and NHS practices 
means to control hospice activity 
PCT' 
County Palliative Care Directorate 
Con2 Chair 
hostile to study site: 
controlling - wish to make hospice more 
accountable to state sector 
financial levers 
organisational levers 
NHS Palliative Care Consultants 
hostile to hospices in general and study site as local manifestation 
GPs 
relations initially difficult - now greatly improved 
referrals `patchy' 
not always appropriate 
Macmillan nurses 
historically `mixed'/antagonistic relationship 
Demographic relations 
Admissions 
sicker 
Discharges 
physically more dependent than was once case 
later (from acute sector, from community) 
sooner (family support reduced) 
changing referral patterns 
migrant workers 
family support reduced - some discharges delayed 
more complex 
I Primary Care Trust 
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Relations within the hospice 
Organisational re-designation as SPCUZ (2000) - pro- and anti-change groups 
emerge at hospice consequent to change 
Hospice (historic) 
less busy 
holistic care valued 
non-physical and physical care awarded equal attention 
spirituality important to all 
terminal care plus symptom control 
SPCU 
busier 
specialist rather than holistic 
physical care predominates 
spirituality a speciality 
symptom control plus terminal care 
patients 
increasing dependency (patients' sicker) 
physical needs predominate 
staffing 
new staff from acute sector 
compared to past - new staff orientated to: 
treat/intervene more 
use more medications 
use medications in different ways 
compared to past - new staff are not orientated to: 
`stand back' from life sustaining 
treatment/interventions 
engage emotionally - act independently 
new nurses more reliant on medical direction 
Consultant differences 
Consultant 1 (Con1) - GP background 
non-interventionist 
pain medication `generous' 
slow to discharge 
traditional admission criteria 
focus within institution 
unproblematic relationship with hospice 
Consultant 2 (Con2) 
acute background 
interventionist 
pain medication `parsimonious' 
quick to discharge 
non-traditional admission criteria 
focus external to institution 
PT at hospice 
problematic relationship with hospice 
sees hospice care as inequitable, elitist, unaccountable 
2 Specialist Palliative Care Unit 
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Treatment/interventions 
increasing use of treatment/interventions 
reasons for increasing use of treatment/interventions 
new treatment/interventions available 
new willingness to use treatment/interventions 
change in institutional designation 
palliative rather than hospice 
function - symptom control 
less value placed on non-clinical interventions 
Admissions - Discharges 
Admissions 
more high dependency patients being admitted 
favoured patients 
nurses question suitability of some admissions 
mental health 
dementia 
Discharges 
conflict 
end stage patients 
Professionalism 
Professionalism perceived to be increasing - needed to: 
manage large organisation 
fundraising 
future planning 
successfully meet State/NHS expectations/demands 
Professionalism - perceived problems: 
specialisation allows staff to withdraw from aspects of care 
creates barriers to staff-patient relations 
creates barriers within organisation 
volunteers seen as unprofessional 
Bureaucratisation 
necessary to: 
protect hospice future 
meet external demands 
problematic because: 
specialisation distances workforce 
Medicalisation 
more doctors doing more doctoring 
changes in staff ratios 
staff from acute backgrounds 
resistance from long service nurses 
Spiritual-religious issues 
Religious withdrawal 
overt religious expression diminishing 
dog collar seen as problematic 
prayer bell no longer rung 
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relatively few formal religious services 
prayers no longer offered following death 
chapel to relocate and loose most Christian iconography 
Secularisation and increasing treatment/interventions 
focus of activity shifting to treatment/interventions 
Secularisation and professionalization 
role specialisation - spiritual matters responsibility of clergy 
Secularisation and recruitment 
new nursing staff less spiritually aware than earlier recruits 
Spiritual values 
differentiate care in hospice from State/NHS 
spiritual branding 
give purpose to activity 
define purpose for symptom control 
gives meaning to death 
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Hospice links with external organisations and professional groups 
In an attempt to protect the hospice's interests, senior hospice staff sought 
positions with external organisations and professional groups. The most significant 
of these were (alphabetical order): 
Association of Hospice Management 
Members only. 
Cancer Network 
The Chief Executive is regional network liaison lead. As such he attends 
Regional Cancer Network palliative meetings. This group reports to 
National Council (NCHSPCS - see below). 
County Palliative Care Directorate 
1. Con2 Chairs the Directorate 
2. The hospices full-time educator chairs the Directorate education 
subcommittee. 
Forum of Hospice Chairman 
The hospice Chairman is currently regional Chair. He is about to become 
National Chair. As National Chair he will get a seat on board of the 
National Council (LACHSPCS). 
Independent Hospices Representative Committee (part of Help the Hospices) 
The Director of Nursing is the regional representative (elected post). 
National Association of Hospice Fundraisers 
Members only. 
National Council for Hospices and Specialist Palliative Care Services (LACHSPCS) 
The Chief Executive sits on council as Regional representative (elected 
post). The NCHSPCS provides national representation. It actively lobbies- 
government. 
NICE' 
The Director of Nursing is a member of the working group responsible for 
palliative care guidelines. 
RCN2 
The Director of Nursing is a member of the Policy and Practice Forum that 
has responsibility for hospices and specialist palliative care. 
1 National Institute for Clinical Excellence. 
2 Royal College of Nurses. 
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